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Argumentative Euphemisms, Political Correctness and Relevance 
Abstract 
The account presented in the thesis combines insights from relevance-theoretic 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995) and neo-Gricean (Levinson 2000) pragmatics in arguing that a 
specific euphemistic effect is derived whenever it is mutually manifest to participants of a 
communicative exchange that a speaker is trying to be indirect by avoiding some dispreferred 
saliently unexpressed alternative lexical unit(s). This effect is derived when the indirectness is 
not conventionally associated with the particular linguistic form-trigger relative to some 
context of use and, therefore, stands out as marked in discourse.   
The central theoretical claim of the thesis is that the cognitive processing of utterances 
containing novel euphemistic/politically correct locutions involves meta-representations of 
saliently unexpressed dispreferred alternatives, as part of relevance-driven recognition of 
speaker intentions. It is argued that hearers are “invited” to infer the salient dispreferred 
alternatives in the process of deriving explicatures of utterances containing lexical units 
triggering euphemistic/politically correct interpretations.  
In the course of time, such invited inferences can lead to semantic change by 
becoming routinized relative to some context of use and reanalyzed as the defeasible default 
meanings of these locutions, presumed in the absence of contextual assumptions to the 
contrary. This conventionalization process is responsible for euphemisms becoming 
“contaminated” with negative connotations associated with taboos, which leads to their 
recycling in the vernacular or ‘euphemism treadmill’. It also explains why political 
correctness is effective only when it is novel and still capable of bringing people’s 
unconscious biases to consciousness. The biases are, arguably, brought to consciousness by 
metarepresenting the salient dispreferred alternatives as part of comprehension of utterances 
containing PC locutions perceived to be marked in the given context. 
It is suggested that the likelihood of the euphemism treadmill taking place is increased 
in cases of narrowing the lexicalized meaning of a concept to its taboo meaning, while it is 
less likely to happen in cases of conceptual broadening. 
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Introduction 
The thesis is intended as a contribution to the ongoing semantics/pragmatics interface 
debate. It pursues the general goal of attempting to ascertain what predictions pragmatic 
theories of communication can make in terms of the cognitive procedures brought to bear on 
the online processing of utterances containing lexical units, which trigger 
euphemistic/politically correct interpretations.  
The introductory chapter presents arguments for choosing euphemisms and political 
correctness as the object of the thesis, explains the relevance of the topic in the general 
context of pragmatics research and stresses the importance of undertaking a pragmatic 
approach to its investigation.   
Chapter 1 of the thesis reviews and critically assesses the main tenets of Gricean, 
relevance-theoretic and neo-Gricean pragmatics. It also reviews how various pragmatic 
theories deal with figurative language processing and what suggestions they make regarding 
the stages along which comprehension of what people intend to communicate when they 
speak figuratively takes place. 
Chapter 2 dwells on such semiotic notions as synonymy, ancient fear-based and 
contemporary taboos, connotations and markedness as relevant for the analysis of 
euphemisms. It reviews the issue of how concepts are represented in human cognitive systems 
and examines various definitions and ways of formation of euphemisms presented in extant 
research literature on the topic. 
Chapter 3 introduces the notion of political correctness (PC), reviews the history of 
the term and discusses various linguistic manifestations of this phenomenon. It analyzes why 
certain practices associated with political correctness are sometimes perceived negatively. I 
also look at instance of “mock-PC” and attempt to provide theoretical explanation of the 
principles along which they are coined.  
Chapter 4 discusses functions of euphemisms/PC in various types of discourse. It 
considers the nature and types of speaker-hearer cooperation and, following Abrantes (2005), 
draws a distinction between conventionalized and transparent cooperative euphemisms, which 
are listed as such in dictionaries, and non-cooperative argumentative euphemisms.  
Chapter 5 addresses the role of intentionality in assessing the x-phemistic value of 
utterances. It dwells on derogatory and appropriated uses of slurs and explains the notions of 
euphemistic dysphemisms and dysphemistic euphemisms. It also considers the 
Introduction 
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methodological issue of the possibility of distinguishing euphemisms from PC-inspired 
vocabulary.  
Chapter 6 presents a discussion of some of the most influential theories of politeness 
and analyzes whether euphemisms and political correctness can be subsumed under a broader 
category of linguistic politeness.  
Chapter 7 situates the PC-debate within the framework of Critical Discourse Analysis 
and dwells on the ideological aspects as well as the manipulative potential of euphemistic/PC 
language. 
Chapter 8 analyzes how utterances containing euphemisms/PC expressions are 
processed online from the Gricean, neo-Gricean and post-Gricean points of view. I examine 
the possibility of combining relevance-theoretic and GCI-theoretic inferential mechanics in an 
account of conventionalization of meaning. 
Chapter 9 presents an account of semantic change, namely of the process known as 
‘euphemism treadmill’ from the relevance-theoretic lexical-pragmatic perspective.  
General conclusions and implications of this research are discussed in the concluding 
chapter of the thesis. 
In a broad sense, the subject of this investigation is the lexical semantic relation of 
synonymy, which is the paradigmatic relation between linguistic units defined in terms of  
having the “sameness of sense” by Lyons (Lyons 2002: 469) or  “sameness of meaning” by 
Palmer (1981: 88) and Cruse (Cruse 2004: 154). More specifically, the thesis focuses on how 
choices people make in using synonymous lexical units give rise to indirectness in discourse, 
a (slightly exaggerated) instantiation of which is illustrated by the following exchange from 
the TV show “The Big Bang Theory” (Season 5 Episode 10): 
(1) 
Sheldon: I believe I would like to alter the paradigm of our relationship. 
Amy: I’m listening. 
Sheldon: With the understanding that nothing changes whatsoever, physical or 
otherwise, I would not object to us no longer characterizing you as “not my 
girlfriend”. 
Amy: Interesting, now try it without the quadruple negative. 
Sheldon: You’re being impossible (Amy leans over to another guy). Fine! Amy, will 
you be my girlfriend? 
Amy: Yes. 
Introduction 
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As seen from the use of the indirect ‘hedged’ I believe I would like to and the multiple 
negatives in Sheldon’s second statement, which he resorts to for indirectness purposes in 
order to avoid uttering the straightforward Will you be my girlfriend?, in the course of 
communication speakers can face cognitive dissonance1-inducing situations in which there is 
a need to choose between referring to something directly or relieving oneself of some 
responsibility by resorting to ‘off-record2’ communicative strategies and thereby sacrificing 
semantic clarity while counting on the hearers to draw inferences regarding the intended true 
meaning behind one’s words.  
Speakers may resort to indirectness for argumentative purposes in various types of 
discourse and it is certainly no stranger to political speeches, as illustrated, for instance, by the 
following excerpt from the annual State of the Union address delivered in 2012 by the US 
President Barack Obama in which he declared: 
(2) 
America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take 
no options off the table to achieve that goal3.  
Compared to the blunt we will consider declaring war on Iran, the vague and very 
general expression take no options off the table is an example of how politicians resort to off-
record communicative strategies in order to be able to plausibly deny having some definite 
informative intention and leave it up to their audience to guess or ‘infer’ the meaning behind 
the words uttered. Depending on the manner in which the informative intention made 
manifest by the very act of ostension is recognized and fulfilled (inferred), the interpretation 
of take no options off the table can be broadened to include such contextually relevant 
assumptions concerning possible actions against Iran as peaceful political talks, economic 
sanctions, UN resolutions and a military intervention/war by some addressees of the speech, 
                                                 
1 According to Festinger (1957), “cognitive dissonance” is a state of tension that occurs whenever a 
person holds two cognitions (ideas, attitudes, beliefs, opinions) that are psychologically inconsistent. It produces 
mental discomfort, ranging from minor pangs to deep anguish; people don’t rest easy until they find a way to 
reduce it. 
2 Following (Gibbs 1999), an ‘off-record’ message is one where it is not possible to attribute only one 
clear communicative intention to what the speaker says. A speaker conveys a message ‘off-record’ when he or 
she can plausibly deny having that intention and can articulate a different intention that still reasonably fits with 
what was said. 
3 Attested: www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2012/01/25/2012-state-union-address-
enhanced-version#transcript 
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as well as narrowed to a carefully worded threat, by not explicitly ruling out that war is a 
possibility.  
Example (2) illustrates how indirectness can be used intentionally and strategically 
with the purpose of inviting inferences based on what seems most relevant given the context 
of the produced utterances. According to Gibbs (1999: 167-168), the mechanism of inviting 
inferences lies at the core of a broad array of indirectness strategies, including giving hints, 
using innuendos, giving association cues, presupposing, resorting to understatements, 
overstatements or hyperboles, using tautologies, contradictions, being ironic, using 
metaphors, rhetorical questions, being vague and relying on listeners to infer different aspects 
of their communicative intentions, even in cases where speakers wish to avoid responsibility 
for the meanings that listeners understand. 
The thesis focuses on an instantiation of such indirectness strategies, namely lexical 
units interpreted as ‘euphemistic’ (from Greek eu: ‘good’ or ‘auspicious’ and pheme: 
‘speech’4) and politically correct. Speakers resort to such strategies driven by heterogeneous 
motivational factors ranging from superstitious belief in “word magic”, which proscribes 
mentioning direct nominations related to supernatural powers lest they be angered/summoned, 
to mitigation of acts, which can threaten hearer’s, speaker’s or some third party’s public 
(self)-image or ‘face’.  
In the process of communication, speakers choose words and expressions from 
paradigmatic sets of available synonymous alternatives. Giving preference to some lexical 
units over the others serves as evidence of the desire to represent some state of affairs in a 
certain way. To illustrate this, let’s consider the following exchange from the “The Big Bang 
Theory” (Season 3 Episode 20) in which Sheldon is talking to Penny, who lives across the 
hall from him and who has just broken up with Sheldon’s roommate and best friend Leonard: 
(3) 
Sheldon: I was going to get my mail. 
Penny: Okay. Are, are you hoping to get it telepathically? 
Sheldon: I think you mean ‘telekinetically’. And no, I just wasn’t sure of the proper 
protocol now that you and Leonard are no longer having coitus. 
Penny: God, can we please just say no longer seeing each other? 
Sheldon: Well, we could if it were true. But as you live in the same building, you see 
each other all the time. The variable which has changed is the coitus. 
                                                 
4 For more on the etymology of the word euphemism see McArthur (1992: 387). 
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Penny: Okay, here’s the protocol, you and I are still friends, and you stop saying 
coitus. 
Sheldon: Good, good. I’m glad we’re still friends. 
Penny: Really? 
Sheldon: Oh, yes. It was a lot of work to accommodate you in my life. I’d hate for that 
effort to have been in vain. 
Penny: Right. 
Sheldon: Just to be clear do I have to stop saying coitus with everyone or just you? 
Penny: Everyone. 
Sheldon: Harsh terms. But all right, I’ll just substitute intercourse. 
Penny: Great. 
Sheldon: Or fornication. Yeah. But that has judgmental overtones, so I’ll hold that in 
reserve. 
Penny: So, how you been? 
Sheldon: Well, my existence is a continuum, so I’ve been what I am at each point in 
the implied time period. 
Penny: You’re just coitusing with me, aren’t you? 
Sheldon: Bazinga. 
In this dialogue the participants are each trying to communicate their preference of 
some synonymous lexical units over others coitus vs. intercourse vs. fornication and these 
preferences happen to be very individual. Penny suggests that Sheldon substitute the specific 
coitus with the more general no longer seeing each other but that, according to Sheldon, is not 
the truthful representation of the underlying reality as Penny and Leonard are neighbors and 
will indeed continue seeing each other. Sheldon insists that the sexual relationship part, 
namely the fact that two people engage in coitus, is the most important characteristic and 
salient feature of the dating ‘scenario’ rather than the other part of this scenario, i.e. going out, 
meeting, seeing each other or even sleeping together.  Sheldon objects to the euphemistic 
strategy of metonymically replacing the most important characteristic or part of the dating 
scenario with the less important ones to represent the state of affairs as not truthful, while also 
considering that the more direct fornication might trigger axiologically disfavorable 
judgmental overtones. The use of coitusing instead of fucking in the last remark by Penny 
shows that such euphemisms themselves can be immediately ‘appropriated’ to assume all 
functions of the underlying dispreferred expression (with which it now shares all logical and 
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contextual implications) as well as to give rise to a humorous effect (Sheldon uses the word 
bazinga as an explicit reformulation marker indicating that the utterance preceding it is to be 
taken as a joke).  
Speakers can attempt to replace the more straightforward representation of some state 
of affairs with some alternative indirect one for argumentative purposes in various types of 
discourse. In the following fictional example from the show “24” (Season 9 Episode 5), the 
White House Chief of Staff is (implicitly) insisting that the indirect collateral damage should 
be used instead of the straightforward ‘we had killed civilians’ in his conversation with the 
President of the United States, in an attempt to strategically distort the underlying reality. He 
subsequently realizes that the attempted manipulation has failed as his interlocutor is already 
fully aware of the true state of affairs, and replaces the indirect linguistic form (locution) with 
the more direct civilian casualties.  
(4) 
President Heller: You didn’t think that you could trust me with the truth? That if I 
knew that we had killed civilians, somehow I wouldn’t lobby as hard as you thought! 
Chief of Staff: I was protecting you. That’s why you hired me. No military action is 
purely surgical! When a fight begins collateral damage is always a factor. But our US 
drone program lets us hit our enemies with the fewest civilian casualties. 
Outside of the sphere of politics, interlocutors often engage in negotiations regarding 
what the true representation of some state of affairs ought to be like in legal discourse, as 
illustrated by the following fictional courtroom exchange (from the show “Desperate 
Housewives” Season 2 Episode 19): 
(5) 
Defense counsel: …and that's when Mr. and Mrs. Solis, fearing for the welfare of this 
helpless child, fled the hospital. 
 Judge: You mean they kidnapped her. 
 Defense counsel: Well, technically, that's true, but, given the situation that led up to 
the rescue... 
 Judge: Kidnapping… 
 Defense counsel: Your honor, yes 
The importance of studying such off-record strategies and lexical units associated with 
their use stems from the fact that from the semiotic point of view the availability of multiple 
ways of referring to the same topic in discourse is indicative of potentially problematic, 
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conflictual or sensitive areas or as the author of “A Dictionary of Euphemisms and Other 
Doubletalk” H. Rawson puts it, they are “outward and visible signs of our inward anxieties, 
conflicts, fears, and shames. They are like radioactive isotopes. By tracing them, it is possible 
to see what has been (and is) going on in our language, our minds, and our culture” (Rawson 
1981: 1). In similar claims Scott (1990) notes that euphemistic phrasing is “a nearly infallible 
sign that one has stumbled on a delicate subject” (Scott 1990: 53) and Murphy (1996: 16) 
compares euphemisms to white blood cells, in that their presence in discourse “might well be 
a sign of mild or serious pathology but it is also a sign that a natural defense mechanism has 
kicked in”. 
Despite the ubiquity of euphemisms in everyday communication, which are 
“embedded so deeply in our language that few of us, even those who pride themselves on 
being plainspoken, ever get through a day without using them” (Rawson 1981: 1), relatively 
few inquiries have been made into their domain, compared to other areas of figurative use of 
language. Previous research includes accounts providing classifications of the ways in which 
euphemisms are formed (Warren 1992), tracing motivational factors for euphemistic use 
(Liszka 1990), diachronic inquiries into their history (Coleman 1992, Linfoot-Ham 2005), 
highlighting social and linguistic aspects of euphemisms (Katsev 1988), analyzing trends and 
stages of the development of euphemistic vocabulary (Enright 1985, Allan and Burridge 
1991, Holder 2003, Allan and Burridge 2006) as well as studying euphemisms within the 
cognitive linguistics framework (Pfaff, Gibbs and Johnson 1997, Crespo Fernandez 2006a, 
2006b, 2011).  
Attempts of determining what constitutes euphemistic/politically correct 
communication in terms of analyzing semantic features of lexical units, representative of 
these constraints on verbal behavior, undertaken in previous studies on the topic, have led to 
proliferation of taxonomies aiming to provide an exhaustive picture of all possible ways in 
which the linguistic units underlying this type of communication are formed. Moreover, the 
semantic accounts fail to explain what happens in cognitive systems of addressees of such 
utterances in the process of their interpretation and how certain lexical units come to be 
labeled as euphemistic and politically correct. 
The goal of this study is to show that pragmatics provides the tools necessary for a 
sub-personal-level explanatory account of how certain linguistic forms receive euphemistic 
and politically correct interpretation. I see the main advantage of undertaking such an analysis 
in that pragmatic research regards language-users as "rational actors who must behave in 
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certain ways if communication is to be possible at all [and considers] that the most basic 
principles of human communication hold at a high level of generality where they are 
unaffected by social and cultural differences” (Cameron 1998: 445). 
The thesis focuses on lexical strategies, which reflect the choices individual speakers 
make rather than discursive indirectness. In addition to the lexical level, speakers may resort 
to such discursive indirectness strategies as speaking off-record, being vague, ambiguous, 
withholding information etc., which may not necessarily include euphemistic/PC lexical 
choices. For example, Trask and Stockwell (2007) quote Chilton in arguing that “the 
linguistic strategies that effect euphemism include not only lexical replacements but also 
omission, passivization and nominalization.” (Trask and Stockwell 2007: 89) An example of 
such non-lexically-based indirectness strategies is the use of agentless passive in Mistakes 
have been made, which speakers resort to in an attempt to diminish the level of their personal 
involvement/responsibility instead of using the direct I made a mistake. Indirectness can also 
be achieved by (manipulatively) constraining the effort/effect ratio of the cognitive contextual 
selection (see Maillat and Oswald 2011), for instance, when a parent, faced with the need to 
communicate the ‘bad news’ about the pet’s demise to a child, attempts to ‘cushion the blow’ 
by uttering: Let me tell you a story. Once upon a time, a car ran over your dog this morning, 
in the hope that it will be ‘shallow-processed’ (see section 7.3 of the thesis) by the child. 
Most of the examples of euphemistic and politically correct lexical units analyzed in 
the thesis were selected from the current English-speaking media discourse. Some are 
construed and introspective, following the tradition adopted in pragmatics research. In 
analyzing the language, which gives rise to euphemistic and politically correct interpretations, 
I often turn to political discourse in which such lexical replacements are ubiquitous, as 
illustrated, for instance, by a memo from the US office of management and budget to the 
Pentagon instructing the speech writers there that “this administration prefers to avoid using 
the term Long War or Global War on Terror. Please use Overseas Contingency Operation”5, 
with a subsequent transformation of war spending into overseas contingencies operations 
budget at Pentagon press-conferences.  
I begin by presenting a general overview of how research in the field of pragmatics 
addresses the fact that the semantic meaning encoded in sentences underdetermines what 
speakers uttering these sentence on particular occasions communicate. 
                                                 
5Attested example from the Daily Show with Jon Stewart 31.03.09 
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Chapter 1. Pragmatics of verbal communication 
This chapter introduces theoretical ideas from the field of pragmatics6 in order to lay 
the groundwork for the ensuing discussion of the pragmatics of indirectness, namely, the 
language interpreted as euphemistic and politically correct, in subsequent chapters. It reviews 
and critically assesses the main tenets of Gricean, post-Gricean and neo-Gricean theories of 
communication and shows how these frameworks treat the fundamental issue of pragmatics: 
bridging the gap between the meaning encoded in sentences by semantics and the meaning 
actually communicated by speakers uttering these sentences on particular occasions, known as 
“the underdeterminacy thesis”. 
1.1 The code model and Gricean pragmatics 
This section introduces the groundbreaking ideas of H.P. Grice, which gave an 
impetus to the until then insignificant research agenda of pragmatics.  
Prior to Grice’s ([1967] 1989) work, the communication process was regarded as 
consisting in a speaker encoding a thought into a sentence of a language (seen as a code that 
pairs phonetic and semantic representations of sentences) and a hearer decoding the uttered 
sentence into an identical ‘reduplicated’ thought (see Shannon and Weaver 1949; Peirce 1955; 
Jakobson 1960; Saussure 1974). This code-model view of communication was based on the 
so-called “conduit metaphor”, as illustrated by such notions as “putting one’s thoughts into 
words”, “getting one’s ideas across”, “putting one’s thoughts down on paper” (see Sperber 
and Wilson 1995: 1).  
On the code-model view of the process of linguistic communication, individuals who 
share a linguistic code will communicate successfully provided there are no external 
distortions in the transmission of the message. Such a view may have accurately represented 
some physical aspect of communication processes, however, it was unable to explain its 
psychological dimensions, namely, the importance of inference at all levels of 
comprehension, whereby what is communicated is something other than what is encoded in 
the message.   
                                                 
6 In the parlance of the so-called “continental” tradition the term ‘pragmatics’ is used broadly to refer to 
social aspects of language studied by sociolinguists and discourse analysts. In this thesis, following the Anglo-
American tradition (see Levinson 1983: ix), by ‘pragmatic approach’ I mean the study of language in use and 
more specifically research paradigms that deal with the processes, principles and constraints of online utterance 
interpretation. 
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It was Grice’s approach to communication that departed from the code-based view in 
suggesting that intentional communicative behavior should be regarded as producing an 
‘effect’, which the audience infers following a reasoning process, which involves hypothesis 
formation and evaluation in search for the speaker-intended meaning. In his discussion of 
non-natural aspects of meaning (meaning-nn) Grice ([1967] 1989) drew a distinction between 
what is said by a speaker in uttering something and what he/she thereby implicates (its 
‘implicature’). He viewed what is said by a sentence as intended by the speaker and 
determined by the conventional linguistic meaning along with such contextual factors as 
reference assignment, resolutions of indexicals and disambiguation (Grice 1989: 89).  
Grice distinguished between conventional and conversational (particularized and 
generalized) implicatures. Regarding conventional implicatures, Grice argued that in some 
cases the conventional meaning of the words used (e.g. ‘but’, ‘therefore’) will determine what 
is implicated, besides helping to determine what is said (see Grice [1967] 1989). Unlike 
conventional implicatures, automatically triggered by the conventional meaning of a specific 
word, conversational implicatures are triggered by “certain general features of discourse” 
(Grice [1967] 1989). These features include the assumption of speaker’s rationality and that 
of linguistic exchanges being governed by the Cooperative Principle of conversation.  
Particularized conversational implicatures (PCIs) require special features of the context to be 
derived, while generalized conversational implicatures (GCIs) are triggered in the Gricean 
framework by the use of a certain form of words in an utterance in the absence of special 
circumstances. Both types of conversational implicatures (PCIs and GCIs) are characterized 
by some degree of indeterminateness, because a conversational implicature is, by definition, 
defeasible, non-detachable, calculable and nonconventional (see Bach 2006; Levinson 1983). 
The Cooperative Principle (CP) is formulated as follows: “Make your conversational 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or 
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice 1967/1989: 26). 
Conversational (sub)maxims of the CP were designed to explain what makes a particular 
hypothesis about the intended interpretation the best candidate by imposing particular 
constraints on the interpretation process: 
Maxims of Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the 
current purposes of the exchange). 
Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
Maxims of Quality: Try to make your contribution on that is true. 
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Do not say what you believe to be false. 
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
Maxims of Relation: Be relevant. 
Maxims of Manner: Be perspicuous. 
Avoid obscurity of expression. 
Avoid ambiguity. 
Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
Be orderly. 
(Grice 1967/1989: 26-27). 
According to Grice, a speaker S conversationally implicates that Q by saying that P 
only if: 
(i) S is presumed to be following the conversational maxims, or at least the 
Cooperative Principle; 
(ii) the supposition that S is aware that (or thinks that) Q is required to make S’s 
saying or making as if to say P consistent with this presumption;  
(iii) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) 
that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the 
supposition mentioned in (ii) is required. (Grice 1989: 30-31) 
In attempting to communicate something indirectly, speakers may fail to observe the 
CP and its maxims in several ways: 
- by opting out of the CP and its maxims, thereby indicating their unwillingness to 
cooperate; 
- by intentionally violating a maxim; 
- by flouting or exploiting a maxim while being presumed to be cooperating by 
hearers; 
Such non-observance of the CP and its maxim is, according to Grice (1967/1989), 
responsible for the generation of conversational implicatures.  
Gricean assumption of the cooperative nature of communication is shared by Searle, 
who noted that even human conflict, in most of its forms, requires cooperation, and even in a 
quarrel there is a common purpose of exchanging information (Searle 1998:120). The 
cooperative nature of communication advocated by Grice and Searle, is disputed, however, in 
other pragmatics research paradigms. Relevance-theorists (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 162), 
for instance, argue that cooperation is not automatically expected of communicators (see 
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section 1.2 of the thesis). Similarly, Taillard (2004) dismisses the Gricean approach to 
cooperation by arguing that “… as communicators, we behave in a way that is most 
advantageous to ourselves and, at times, this goal is not accomplished by providing truthful 
testimony, but rather by affecting the audience’s attitudes to our own benefit. (This, by the 
way, is the main reason why a theory of communication cannot be based on a principle of 
cooperation)” Taillard (2004: 254-255). 
In Grice’s seminal works on inferential communication, properly inferential pragmatic 
processes were seen as only responsible for the derivation of implicatures. In recent years, 
however, there has been a growing consensus among ‘post-Gricean’ theorists that in addition 
to implicit meanings, the sentence meaning also underdetermines the explicit content of an 
utterance or ‘what is said’ (Sperber and Wilson 1995; Récanati 2004; Carston 2002a). 
According to this view, the meaning of an utterance remains underdetermined even after such 
processes, as reference assignment, resolution of indexicals and disambiguation, regarded in 
Gricean framework as contributing to what is said, have taken place, and often hearers need to 
enrich an utterance further in order to get to the level of a complete truth-evaluable 
proposition that can be assumed to be communicated (see Récanati 1989; Sperber and Wilson 
1995; Carston 2002a). 
I now turn to presenting the main tenets and key notions of such a post-Gricean theory, 
namely, the cognitive-pragmatic theory of communication, known as Relevance Theory. 
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1.2 Relevance-theoretic pragmatics  
1.2.1 Theory of mind and mutual manifestness 
The cognitive pragmatic account of ostensive communication known as Relevance 
Theory (RT) (Sperber and Wilson 1995), considers search for relevance to be the mechanism 
responsible for pragmatic enrichment of semantically underspecified content. According to 
RT, hearers arrive at the speaker-intended meanings guided by the relevance-seeking nature 
of human cognition and the subconscious knowledge that every act of ostensive 
communication conveys the presumption of its optimal relevance.  
Sperber and Wilson (1996) base their theory on an observation that at any given 
moment in one’s cognitive life, there is a wide range of new information being monitored in 
the environment, and there is an even wider range of information in memory, bits of which 
might be activated and would provide a context in which to process the information from the 
environment or other pieces of information from memory. Code-based approaches to 
communication fail to account for the gap between sentence meaning and speaker meaning 
and cannot explain how the hearer selects the intended context in the process of interpretation. 
Relevance Theory sheds light on the mechanisms underlying the selection of information 
during online processing of utterances where the principle of relevance serves as a constraint 
on the selection of subsets of information to be used for the interpretation on a particular 
occasion and indicate when such processing is to stop.  
Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory (1995) develops one of Grice’s central 
claims, that an essential feature of human communication is the expression and recognition of 
intentions, while rejecting Gricean view of the process of communication as cooperative and 
governed by maxims. Instead RT proposes that hearers always interpret utterances in terms of 
relevance, which is a property carried by ostensively produced utterances.  
Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue that during the course of evolution people started 
allocating their cognitive processing capabilities only to optimally relevant information which 
was most likely to improve their knowledge of the world. Having evolved towards increasing 
cognitive efficiency, human cognition is now geared to the maximization of relevance, i.e. to 
striking the best balance between costs and effects and so to achieving the greatest cognitive 
effects for the least processing effort:  
“As a result of constant selection pressure towards increasing efficiency, the human 
cognitive system has developed in such a way that our perceptual mechanisms tend 
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automatically to pick out potentially relevant stimuli, our memory retrieval 
mechanisms tend automatically to activate potentially relevant assumptions, and our 
inferential mechanisms tend spontaneously to process them in the most productive 
way” (Wilson and Sperber 2002a: 254). 
Sperber and Wilson (1995) have argued that, given that language contains context-
sensitive elements such as indexicals and ambiguity, for the code model of communication to 
work, the context used by the hearer in understanding an utterance should always be identical 
to the one envisaged by the speaker. In other words, on the code model view of 
communication there must be some mutual knowledge or common ground between 
interlocutors for communication to succeed. On the RT view, the mutual knowledge 
hypothesis is intuitively incorrect, given our everyday experience with communication, and 
leads to infinite regress (I know that you know that I know that you know, ad infinitum, 
which Sperber and Wilson find psychologically implausible (see Sperber and Wilson 1995). 
The ‘mutual knowledge paradox’ was first discussed by Lewis (2002 [1969]) and 
Schiffer (1972), and various solutions have been proposed to it, in particular by Bach and 
Harnish (1979), and Clark (1992, 1996). RT replaces the traditional pragmatic notion of 
mutual knowledge with a weaker notion of ‘mutual manifestness7’ where a fact is manifest to 
an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of representing it 
mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 
39).  Unlike knowledge, which is binary in the sense that one either knows something or one 
does not, the degree of manifestness of an assumption can vary from being weakly manifest to 
being strongly manifest. Sperber and Wilson explain the notion of weak manifestness by 
showing that it includes those facts which can be deduced from existing knowledge, but 
which have never come to our level of conscious awareness, e.g. we know in a weak sense 
that Noam Chomsky and Julius Caesar never had breakfast together (see Sperber and Wilson 
1995: 40). 
A set of facts manifest to an individual at a given time is known as a cognitive 
environment (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 39). In general, within the cognitive framework of 
RT, the goal of communication is not seen as a direct modification of thoughts, but rather as 
increasing the mutual manifestness of cognitive environments. The shared sets of contextually 
                                                 
7 An assumption is mutually manifest if not only this assumption is manifest to the individual, but also 
if it is manifest to this individual that the assumption is manifest to another individual as well (Sperber & Wilson 
1995: 41-42). 
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available assumptions that the speaker and the hearer are capable of sharing and using in the 
process of interpretation to achieve an optimal balance between cognitive effects and 
processing effort, are referred to in RT as a mutual cognitive environment (Sperber and 
Wilson 1995, Blakemore 1992). 
The construction of assumptions about someone else’s cognitive environments is 
referred to in psychology as theory of mind or mind-reading8. Inferential communication 
draws on this biologically-evolved ability of humans to generate hypotheses based on the 
evidence provided regarding the mental state of the speaker. The ability to attribute 
underlying beliefs, intentions and desires to others in terms of conceptual representations that 
humans are capable of forming is referred to as forming ‘metarepresentations’ by Sperber 
(1994, 2000). It is regarded as a key notion in identifying the content of speaker meaning and 
constitutes the basis of a specialized pragmatics module (for discussion, see Maruenda 
Bataller 2002).  
                                                 
8 Issue 17(1-2) of “Mind and Language” provides developmental and neuropsychological evidence to 
support the existence of a link between mind-reading and communication. 
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1.2.2 The relevance-seeking processing model 
In Relevance Theory, human communication is regarded, contrary to the view 
stemming from the code model of communication, as bearing merely some degree of 
resemblance between the communicator’s and the audience’s thoughts (Sperber 1996: 83). 
While acknowledging the proper place of decoding as carried out by a cognitive faculty 
known as the ‘linguistic module’,  RT highlights the important role played by inferential 
processes that take place during the derivation of meaning from linguistic structures, 
considering such variables as context and intentionality. 
RT regards the speaker as a sender of ostensive stimuli, which serve as evidence of her 
informative intention: to ‘make manifest’ (or more manifest) to the audience a set of 
assumptions I by sending the stimuli (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 63), and, in so doing, intend 
the audience to arrive at certain conclusions. This set of assumptions can be communicated 
explicitly or implicitly as well as strongly and weakly depending on the degree of 
indeterminacy introduced by the inferential aspect of comprehension (see Wilson and Sperber 
2002b).  The manner in which the assumptions are communicated (weakly or strongly) 
demonstrates the extent to which the speaker is committed to having the hearer recognize 
these meanings. The speaker’s intention to communicate to the audience that she has the 
informative intention is referred to in RT as the communicative intention (Sperber and Wilson 
1995: 61). In addition to the two basic intentions, there are various other intentions, which, 
according to Taillard (2002: 192), are part of a highly organized structure of plans and 
intentions that constitutes much more than just the general context in which communication is 
produced and understood.  
At the core of RT lies a definition of relevance as a property of inputs to cognitive 
processes and two principles, which guide hearers towards the speaker-intended 
interpretation:  
(1) the Cognitive Principle of Relevance, according to which, human cognition tends 
to be geared to the maximization of relevance and 
(2) the Communicative Principle of Relevance, according to which every act of 
ostensive communication automatically carries a presumption of its own optimal relevance 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 260).  
Regarding the nature of these principles, Sperber and Wilson explain that they apply 
both to explicit and implicit communication. Sperber and Wilson (1987) explain that hearers 
do not need to know of relevance or the two principles of relevance to communicate “any 
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more than they need to know the principles of genetics to reproduce” (Sperber & Wilson 
1987: 704). 
The presumption of optimal relevance, which guides hearers in their search for the 
possible relevant interpretation of the speaker-intended meaning, runs as follows: 
(a) the ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee’s effort9 
to process it and 
(b) the ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the 
communicator’s abilities and preferences (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 270). 
RT views ostensive utterances as achieving relevance by means of conveying 
information, which produces contextual effects10 in cognitive systems of their addressees. 
These effects may be of three kinds: strengthening of previously held assumptions, 
contradiction and elimination of previously held assumptions and contextual implications, 
which arise only as a result of combining new information with previously held assumptions. 
The relevance of an input is not only proportional to the number and quality of the cognitive 
effects that can be derived from the interaction of the input and some context. In addition to 
cognitive effects relevance is defined in terms of the cognitive effort it takes to process the 
input. The relevance of incurred cognitive effects is inversely proportionate to the amount of 
cognitive effort applied to the processing of the stimulus – the more cognitive effort the 
processing requires, the less relevant the stimulus will be to the addressee.  
According to Wilson and Sperber (2002a), the Communicative Principle of Relevance 
and the definition of optimal relevance suggest a practical procedure for constructing a 
hypothesis about the speaker’s meaning. The hearer should take the linguistically encoded 
sentence meaning; following a path of least effort, he should enrich it at the explicit level and 
complement it at the implicit level until the resulting interpretation meets his expectation of 
relevance: 
Relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure 
                                                 
9 Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue that what controls processing effort is not the striving toward the 
preferred goal, but reaching an acceptable goal while avoiding a dispreferred one. 
10 Relevance varies between different persons and not just between different contexts. In the postface of 
Sperber and Wilson (1995) the following adjustment of terminology is suggested: “Contextual effects in an 
individual are cognitive effects ... They are changes in the individual’s beliefs ... Let us first define a cognitive 
effect as a contextual effect occurring in a cognitive system (e.g. an individual), and a positive cognitive effect as 
a cognitive effect that contributes positively to the fulfilment of cognitive functions or goals” (Sperber and 
Wilson 1995: 265). 
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 a. Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: test interpretive 
hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of 
accessibility.  
 b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied 
The relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure applies in the same way at both 
explicit and implicit levels and the overall task is broken down into a number of sub-tasks:  
 Sub-tasks in the overall comprehension process  
 a. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about explicit content (in relevance-
theoretic terms, EXPLICATURES) via decoding, disambiguation, reference 
resolution, and other pragmatic enrichment processes.  
 b. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual assumptions 
(in relevance-theoretic terms, IMPLICATED PREMISES).  
 c. Constructing an appropriate hypothesis about the intended contextual implications 
(in relevance-theoretic terms, IMPLICATED CONCLUSIONS) 
These sub-tasks are not sequentially ordered but take place in parallel (see Wilson 
and Sperber 2002a: 261). The Gricean assumption that all pragmatically-derived (maxim-
dependent) meaning constitutes a conversational implicature is dropped in RT, since one and 
the same pragmatic principle is responsible for both all cases of conversational implicature 
and all pragmatic contributions to truth-conditional content.  
The Gricean assumption that ‘what is said’ is determined prior to the derivation of 
conversational implicatures, is also relaxed and the two levels of communicated content are 
taken to be derived in parallel via a mechanism of ‘mutual adjustment’ in search for 
relevance, so that, for instance, an interpretive hypothesis about an implicature might lead, 
through a step of backwards inference, to a particular adjustment of explicit content (see 
Carston 2002a for a discussion).  
A comprehension procedure based on the maximization of cognitive efficiency allows 
for such mutual adjustment of the explicit and the implicit. The procedure is divided into 
several stages. During the initial stage (semantic decoding) an abstract sub-propositional 
logical form11 of the utterance is derived as an output of linguistic processing that takes place 
in the language module. This logical form or ‘blueprint’ is subsequently developed via 
                                                 
11 The logical form (LF) consists of the logical properties of a representation: “a well-formed formula, a 
structured set of constituents which undergoes formal logical operations determined by its structure” (Sperber 
and Wilson 1995: 73). 
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inferential enrichment (pragmatics) into a complete propositional form, which is capable of 
being evaluated as true or false. Analogously to the term implicature coined by Grice, Sperber 
and Wilson call a fully propositional form an explicature if it is mutually manifestly intended 
to be conveyed by the speaker and if it is a development of the linguistically encoded logical 
form of the utterance (Carston 2002a: 124). Unlike implicatures, which are wholly inferred by 
identifying implicit premises and conclusions, which yield an overall interpretation that is 
relevant in the expected occasion-specific way, in RT, explicatures are the product of two 
different processes taking place in utterance interpretation: semantic decoding and pragmatic 
inferencing, which come from two different sources, respectively the linguistic forms used 
and the context. The reliance on the two sources distinguishes the RT explicatures from the 
Gricean notion of semantically determined ‘what is said’.  
A hypothesis about an implicature can both precede and shape a hypothesis about an 
explicature: 
 “<...> comprehension is an online process, and hypotheses about explicatures, 
implicated premises, and implicated conclusions are developed in parallel against a 
background of expectations which may be revised or elaborated as the utterance 
unfolds” Wilson and Sperber (2004: 615). 
Saussure (2007a) points out that research literature tends to reject more and more the 
classical idea that the separation between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’ entails a 
timeline staging:  
“In fact, it may well be the case that we start betting on implicatures as soon as i) we 
have available information on the propositional content at the level of explicatures, 
and ii) an implicit meaning is more obviously intended <…> When all necessary 
representations (logical-syntactic, semantic, pragmatic) make sense together, that is, 
conform or are congruent with one another, then the hearer considers that the intended 
meaning is found – provided there is some relevance in that meaning, that is, provided 
that the effort of processing information was compensated by sufficient cognitive 
effect (such as new information, changes in the presupposed assumptions, etc.).”  
(Saussure 2007a: 186). 
In addition to the pragmatic processes, which Grice envisaged as responsible for the 
derivation of what is said, i.e. disambiguation, reference assignment and resolution of the 
indexicals etc., the RT notion of explicature includes other types of pragmatic enrichment, 
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notably lexical-pragmatic processes of broadening and narrowing, to the discussion of which I 
return in chapter 9 of the thesis. 
Sperber and Wilson have extended the notion of explicit content to include the so-
called higher-level explicatures or assumptions derived by developing the semantic 
representation of an utterance so that an explicature is recovered by (optionally) embedding it 
under a propositional attitude, speech act description or in general, any assumption schema 
typically expressing an attitude toward it (Sperber and Wilson 1993; 1995). Unlike 
explicatures, which are “the proposition expressed”, higher-level explicatures are 
linguistically communicated (i.e. they are a further development of the logical form of an 
utterance) but “are not normally seen as contributing to the truth conditions of the associated 
utterance” (Wilson and Sperber 1993: 6). 
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1.2.3 The RT notion of context 
The dynamic cognitive view of context assumed by RT views it not as simply the 
preceding linguistic text, or the static environment in which the utterance takes place, but as a 
psychological construct, a subset of the hearer’s assumptions about the world: 
“It is these assumptions, of course rather than the actual state of the world, that affect 
the interpretation of an utterance. A context in this sense is not limited to information 
about the immediate physical environment or the immediately preceding utterances; 
expectations about the future, scientific hypothesis, or religious beliefs, anecdotal 
memories, general cultural assumptions, beliefs about the mental state of the speaker, 
may all play a role in interpretation” (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 15-16).  
The subsets of information in the form of mental representations/assumptions 
constituting the cognitive context are often viewed as stored in an organized way, for 
example, as cultural information or cultural metarepresentations (Sperber 1996), or grouped 
in different types of frames (alternatively referred to as scenarios, schemata, scripts, Idealized 
Cognitive Models in other research paradigms12), which capture different aspects of reality, 
experience, relations etc., and are used for interpretation of utterances in a contextually 
relevant manner as the search for the interpretation on which an utterance will be most 
relevant involves a search for the context which will make this interpretation possible 
(Sperber and Wilson 1982: 76). 
Since selection of context can only be made out of the set of assumptions manifest to 
the speaker/hearer, the RT notion of context is much more dynamic and fluid than views, 
which treat context as external and equal to physical environment plus social setting, in the 
sense that assumptions become more or less manifest with every utterance in an exchange. 
Constitutive elements of cognitive context in a relevance-theoretic frame of reference are 
mental representations, propositions, contextual assumptions, which may vary in strength.  
The processing of new information therefore relies on “old information” in an 
inferential model of communication in the following ways: “As a discourse proceeds, the 
                                                 
12 Working within the RT framework, in his analysis of jokes, Yus (2013)  proposes that a unifying term 
‘make-sense frame’ be used to refer to the organized sets of assumptions used as a cognitive context for 
interpretation of utterances. This is suggested, as Padilla Cruz (2012) notes, with the purpose of overcoming the 
existing overlapping between terms like ‘frame’, ‘schema’ and ‘script, as the term ‘make-sense frame’ includes 
all sorts of encyclopedic information, e.g. related to specific terms (word-associated schemas), actions 
(sequence-associated scripts) and situations (situation-associated frames) (see Padilla Cruz 2012). 
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hearer retrieves or constructs and then processes a number of assumptions. These form a 
gradually changing background against which new information is processed” (Sperber and 
Wilson 1995: 118). This activation of old information reinforces its salience on hearers’ 
minds, makes it more accessible in a more direct, less effort requiring manner. Selection of a 
context will be affected by the twin aims of minimizing processing effort and maximizing 
contextual effect (see Blass 1990: 53). 
Speakers can deliberately or accidentally design their utterance so that sufficient 
relevance is not immediately achieved. In such cases, the hearer has to extend the context by 
accessing memories of earlier discourse or preceding deductions, by accessing encyclopedic 
information attached to concepts or by incorporating information received from sense 
perception (Sperber and Wilson 1995). The type of discourse or genre information may 
influence a hearer’s willingness to extend the context.  
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1.2.4 Descriptive and interpretive use  
Sperber and Wilson (1995) claim that the relationship between an utterance and a 
speaker’s thought is always one of interpretive resemblance between the propositional forms 
of the utterance and the thought. Consequently, in interpreting an utterance the hearer makes 
interpretive assumptions about the speaker’s informative intention. In line with the nowadays 
uncontroversial rejection of a maxim of truthfulness, an utterance (including its possible 
implicatures) need not be completely identical with the speaker’s thought (see Wilson and 
Sperber 2004) as hearers don’t assume that the speaker’s utterance is literal, they only assume 
that it is optimally relevant. 
Relevance Theory draws a distinction between representations with propositional form 
(e.g. utterances) used descriptively to represent some state of affairs in virtue of the 
propositional form being true of that state of affairs and representations used to represent 
some other representation, which also has a propositional form — a thought, for instance — 
in virtue of a resemblance between the two propositional forms. In other words, in the latter 
case, the first representation can be used interpretively as an interpretation of the second one 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 228–229). If an utterance is used interpretively it doesn’t describe 
a state of affairs in the world but rather represents another representation with a similar 
content.  
Since RT views utterances as bearing interpretive resemblance to thoughts they are 
used to express, on RT view any utterance involves two levels of representation: it 
interpretively resembles a thought of the speaker, which itself descriptively represents some 
state of affairs, or interpretively represents some further representation (Sperber and Wilson 
1987: 707). The interpretive resemblance of thoughts is a first-order interpretation, which 
does not amount to the RT notion of interpretive use. Metarepresentational use involves 
actually a second-order interpretation where the speaker’s thought is itself used to 
metarepresent another thought or utterance which it resembles in content (interpretive use) 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 224-31) or in form (metalinguistic use) (see Noh 2000: 74). 
The presence of metarepresentational use can be indicated overtly, e.g. by the use of 
metalinguistic negation or covertly when the objection is stated without the explicit use of 
negation as in the following example: 
(6) 
Russia has elected its first black official. Shame on you Russia, they prefer to be called 
‘African-Americans’ (from “The Colbert Report” 26.07.2010).  
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Metalinguistic use standardly involves the 'contradiction' intonation contour (a final 
rise within the negative clause), followed by a correction clause, and contrastive stress on the 
offending item and its replacement (Horn 1989: 374). Among other properties of 
metalinguistic use Carston names their use as a rejoinder to an utterance of the corresponding 
affirmative; they are garden-path utterances, requiring double processing (pragmatic 
reanalysis) in order to be correctly understood (Carston 1996).  
An utterance or part of an utterance can be used to metarepresent another 
representation, public, mental/private (unspoken thoughts, assumptions, hopes, etc.) or 
abstract. When a representation reports what someone else has said or thought and expresses 
an attitude to it, Sperber and Wilson (1995) refer to it as ‘echoic’. Echoic utterances achieve 
relevance mainly by conveying the speaker’s attitude to an attributed utterance or thought 
(Wilson 2000: 432). The thought being echoed may not have been expressed in an utterance; 
it may not be attributable to any specific person, but merely to a type of person, or people in 
general; it may be merely a cultural aspiration or norm (Wilson and Sperber 1992: 60) as well 
as a thought or an utterance speaker attributes to herself at a time different from the time of 
utterance (Curcó 2000: 261-262). 
In echoic utterances, attitudinal content has priority over the informative one. Here, 
the recognition of the speaker’s attitude is necessary for the recovery of the intended effect. 
Standards or rules of behavior, for instance, are culturally defined, commonly known and 
frequently invoked. They are thus always available for echoic mention. It’s always worth 
mentioning when something has fallen short of the norm (Sperber and Wilson 1981).  
 Wilson and Sperber (2012) highlight the fact that: “Norms, in the sense of socially 
shared ideas about how things should be, are always available to be ironically echoed when 
they are not satisfied. People should be polite, smart, handsome, actions should achieve their 
goal, the weather should be good, the prices should be low, and so on. So, when these norms 
are not satisfied, utterances such as ‘She is so polite!’, ‘That was smart!’, ‘What a handsome 
man!’, ‘Well done!’, ‘Nice weather!’ ‘This is cheap!’ and so on are readily understood as 
ironical because they echo a norm-based expectation that should have been met” Wilson and 
Sperber (2012: 142). 
When it is a case of echoing an utterance there is a range of properties in addition to 
semantic or conceptual content that might be the target of the echo: linguistic factors such as 
phonetic, grammatical or lexical properties, aspects of dialect, register or style, and 
paralinguistic features such as tone of voice, pitch or other gestures, audible or visible.  
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Carston (1996) illustrates the echoic use with the following example: 
(7) 
We didn't see the hippopotamuses. 
a. We saw the rhinoceroses.  
b. We saw the hippopotami. 
Carston (1996: 321) explains that in the example an objection is communicated to 
some property of the representation falling within the scope of the negation, some property 
other than its truth-conditional semantic content, in this case the particular manifestation of 
the plural morphology of the word ‘hippopotamus’. The pronunciation of a word can also be 
objected to by the use of negation as in: “We don't eat tom[a:t{uz] here, we eat tom[eiD{uz]” 
(Carston 1996: 322). 
Interpretive uses of language require a higher order of metarepresentational ability 
than descriptive uses. The speaker gives some indication of his/her attitude to the attributed 
utterance, thought or the opinion being echoed and his/her utterance achieves part of its 
relevance thereby. The metarepresentational ability allows hearers to identify the source of the 
opinion echoed, either an utterance or thought, and to recognize the speaker’s attitude, which 
can be expressed overtly or left for the hearer to infer. Thus the relevance of interpretively 
used utterances depends to a large extent on the identification of the type of speaker’s attitude 
(e.g. endorsing, questioning, dissociative etc.) to the original thought or utterance being 
metarepresented (see Noh 2000: 92). 
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1.2.5 The limitations of RT analysis 
RT has often been accused by alternative pragmatic theories of human communication 
of being an entirely hearer-oriented account which does not address the question of how and 
why the speaker, given what she wants to convey, utters what she utters (cf. Horn 2005: 194 
and other ‘neo-Gricean’ researchers e.g. Saul 2002). 
One of the most serious charges against the adequacy of RT as an explanatory theory 
of communication has been the claim that RT is asocial. For example, Mey and Talbott (Mey 
1993, Mey and Talbot 1988, Talbot 1993) argue that a cognitively grounded theory of 
utterance interpretation is “disconnected from everyday communication and its problems” as 
people are “social beings” who interact in “pre-existing [socially determined] conditions” 
(Mey 1993: 82). 
Mey (1993) has argued that Relevance Theory pays no attention to the sociocultural 
dimensions of language use. However, researchers working within the framework of RT have 
shown that the theory pays as much attention to sociocultural dimensions as speakers and 
hearers do, since communication participants notice and store any and all relevant information 
about others as all sorts of assumptions, which will be brought to bear on the process of 
communication in the form of cognitive context in which to process utterances, as discussed 
in section 1.2.3. 
RT does not treat the three tasks, which the mind had to accomplish in the process of 
communication, listed by Brown and Yule (1983: 225), quoted in LoCastro (2003): 
computing the communicative function of the utterance, incorporating sociocultural 
knowledge and determining inferences, as being different from each other in terms of 
information processing. Therefore, sociocultural information is not regarded in RT as 
different from any other type of cognitively processed information. 
While early discussions of RT indeed tended to focus on the informational aspects 
over the social aspects of communication to the extent that some critics accused Sperber and 
Wilson of only seeing humans as information processors and not as social beings (Talbot 
1993), subsequent research has found the theory to be compatible with such sociologically 
motivated aspects of language as phatic communication (Nicolle and Clark 1998, Žegarac 
1998, Padilla Cruz 2005a, 2007b), politeness (Escandell Vidal1998, Jary 1998, Padilla Cruz 
2007a), insults (Mateo and Yus 2000, 2013) and compliments (Padilla Cruz 2005b). The work 
of these researchers provided interesting insights into how the ostensive inferential 
mechanisms and the principle of relevance account for the non-explicit communication of 
Chapter 1. Pragmatics of verbal communication 
34 
 
knowledge about social relationships and the negotiation of social issues such as power and/or 
politeness.  
Escandell-Vidal (1998), for instance, approaches communication of social information 
within the RT from the perspective of expected levels of politeness where impolite verbal 
behavior is inferred as abnormal, while the polite behavior is anticipated and hence not 
processed. Escandell-Vidal’s insight that certain expressions “will contain a characterization 
both of the expression and of the conditions under which it will be appropriate” paves the way 
for an account of how information about appropriate social conditions is handled within RT 
with regard to the notion of ‘markedness’ to the discussion of which I will turn in chapter 8. 
Generally speaking, RT regards the nature of linguistic underdeterminacy to be a 
matter of effort-saving convenience for the speaker (Carston 2002a), where a speaker, in order 
to save herself the effort of having to express a long, complex sentence, can choose to use a 
sentence which does not fully encode her intended meaning, and rely on the hearer using his 
pragmatic inferential capacity to turn it into a fully propositional representation. This view 
converges with Levinson’s (2000) observation that human speech encoding is relatively slow, 
the actual process of phonetic articulation is a bottleneck in a system that can otherwise run 
about four times faster, and speakers are constantly trying to find economical ways for 
conveying large chunks of information – invoking specific ideas in the hearer, knowing that 
the hearer has exactly this expectation.  
Apart from treating the production of utterances in terms of effort-saving convenience, 
RT does not specify what principles guide speakers in choosing the right linguistic form to 
suggest a specific interpretation to the hearer, and treats interpretation of all utterances as 
entirely context- and speaker intention-specific. Taking such a radical contextualist stance to 
meaning renders accounting for the conventionalization of meanings, which come to be 
associated with lexical units, rather problematic. In order to rectify this situation, the thesis 
attempts to combine tools offered by Levinson’s neo-Gricean theory with relevance-theoretic 
pragmatics in an account of the conventionalization of lexical units interpreted as 
euphemistic/PC. 
Unlike RT, in his theory of Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs), Levinson 
(2000) pays special attention to the fact that both the content of the utterance and its 
metalinguistic properties (its form) can be and are used to carry the message. In his 
framework, an overview of which is presented in the following section, the metalinguistic 
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scrutiny by the addressee of utterance form, including the consideration of salient alternatives, 
is used to amplify the content of utterances. 
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1.3 Presumptive vs. speaker-intended meanings 
In order to be able to account for the fact that sometimes meanings are presumed to be 
the ‘default’ meanings of certain linguistic forms, Levinson (2000) argues for the need of 
distinguishing among the following layers of meaning: sentence-meaning, utterance-type 
meaning and utterance-token meaning: 
“According to the standard line (more often presupposed than justified) there are just 
two levels to a theory of communication: a level of sentence-meaning (to be explicated 
by the theory of grammar in the large sense) and a level of speaker-meaning (to be 
explicated by a theory of pragmatics, perhaps centrally employing Grice’s notion of 
meaningnn)… Speaker-meaning, or utterance-token-meaning, will be a matter of the 
actual nonce or once-off inferences made in actual contexts by actual recipients with 
all of their rich particularities. This view, although parsimonious, is surely inadequate, 
indeed potentially pernicious, because it underestimates the regularity, recurrence, and 
systematicity of many kinds of pragmatic inferences. What it omits is a third layer 
<…> of systematic pragmatic inference based not on direct computations about 
speaker-intentions but rather on general expectations about how language is normally 
used” (Levinson 2000 : 22). 
The third layer of ‘utterance-token’ meanings involves conventions of use, in virtue of which 
certain linguistic forms come to be defeasibly associated with certain meanings.  
Levinson (2000) argues for the existence of three (Q, I, M) principles or inferential 
heuristics which have developed as “ways of overcoming the constraints of the narrow 
bandwidth of human speech” (Levinson 2000: 169), responsible for the generation of such 
utterance-token meanings or ‘Generalized Conversational Implicatures’. The GCI-inducing 
principles, which bear relationship with three of Grice’s maxims of conversation, are: 
The Q(uantity) Heuristic – “For the relevant salient alternates, what isn’t said, is not 
the case”, corresponding to Grice’s first Maxim of Quantity - Make your contribution 
as informative as is required. 
The standard Q-implicature is that uttering the weaker term implicates that the 
stronger term does not apply, e.g. some implicates not all. 
The I(nformativeness) Heuristic – “What is expressed simply is stereotypically 
exemplified”, related to Grice’s second Maxim of Quantity - Do not make your 
contribution more informative than is required. 
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Informativeness implicatures refer to the tendency to construct maximally informative, 
often stereotypical interpretations (e.g. a road is taken to refer to the standard hard-
surface type of road, as long as no information to the contrary is provided). 
The M(anner) Heuristic – “What is said in an abnormal way isn’t normal”, related 
directly to Grice’s maxim of Manner - Be perspicuous: avoid obscurity of expression 
and avoid prolixity. 
Levinson’s M-implicatures (classified as R-implicatures in Horn’s neo-Gricean 
framework13) capture all kinds of suggestions produced by unusual and less economic ways 
of saying things (e.g. cause to die is heard as referring to a non-standard way of killing).  
Levinson suggests that the distinction between the Q- and the M- inferences is based 
primarily on linguistic alternates, while the I-inferences are based primarily on stereotypical 
presumptions about the world. The notion of ‘stereotype’ is fundamental to Levinson’s views 
of the heuristics/principles and how they are applied. It involves a cluster of concepts linking 
sets of assumptions that language-users bring to bear on the topic at hand and the form of the 
expression selected. For Levinson, stereotypes are “connotations associated with meaning, but 
not part of them, which nevertheless play a role in interpretation” (Levinson 2000: 115). 
Stereotypes are “complex mental constructs” (Levinson 2000: 329) that range from very 
specific social constructs which needn’t have a close relation to reality or statistical tendency 
(Levinson 2000: 115), to very broad concepts. Stereotypical meaning is said to be ‘unmarked’ 
(U), that is, it is assumed to be semantically more general and formally shorter than the 
marked member of the pair (Levinson 2000: 115).  
There is an implicit opposition or parasitic relationship between the I and the M 
heuristics: what is said simply, briefly, in an unmarked way picks up the stereotypical 
interpretation; if in contrast a marked expression is used, the stereotypical interpretation 
should be avoided.  
M-implicatures take priority over the I-implicatures that would have arisen from the 
use of a corresponding unmarked expression (Levinson 2000: 157). The I-principle induces 
                                                 
13 Horn (2004) put forward a set of neo-Gricean pragmatic heuristics, which speakers may exploit in 
leading the hearer to draw certain inferences. Horn’s framework distinguishes between two principles: Q – a 
speaker should say enough to achieve her communicative goals and R – a speaker should say no more than is 
necessary to achieve her goals, where the Q-principle invites upper-bounding inferences (e.g. the use of some to 
mean ‘some and not all’) while the R-principle invites lower-bounding inferences (e.g. the use of if to mean ‘if 
and only if’ and more generally the use of vague expressions as euphemisms for what one would prefer to leave 
unsaid) (see Israel 2006). 
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stereotypical interpretations, unless: a marked expression has been used where an unmarked 
one could have been employed instead, in which case the M-implicature defeats the relevant 
I-implicature, by inducing the inference to the complement of the I-implicature that would 
have arisen from the unmarked expression (Levinson 2000: 157). 
Thus Q and M heuristics differ in the kind of metalinguistic contrast that they rely on – 
Q relies on sets of alternates of essentially similar form with contrastive semantic content, 
whereas M relies on sets of alternates that contrast in form but not in inherent semantic 
content, in other words, synonyms differing in markedness. These heuristics can only be 
recovered by reference to what else might have been said but was not. Levinson regards both 
as metalinguistic in that they imply something negative, specifically that “the speaker is 
avoiding some stronger (Q) or some simpler (M) expression” (Levinson 2000: 40) and thus 
indicates that he or she is not in a position to use those other expressions.  
Because they are metalinguistic, the implicatures they generate can be denied by using 
metalinguistic denial with special stress, as in You didn’t eat SOME of the cookies, you ate 
ALL of them (Levinson 2000: 41), and, presumably, by You didn’t mean Jane CAUSED Bill 
TO DIE, she KILLED him. The major difference is that within the metalinguistic domain there 
is a further subdivision of labor. Q is constructed as restricted to so-called “Horn scales” of 
the type <all, some>, while M is construed as restricted to “synonyms differing in 
markedness” (Levinson 2000: 41), e.g. cause to die, kill.  
Generalized Conversational Implicatures contribute to ‘utterance-type’ meaning, 
which is distinct from both sentence meaning and speaker meaning. Carston (2004c) 
discusses that it is pragmatic in that it involves an element of meaning, which is ultimately 
communicatively based, that is, dependent on certain principles of appropriate communicative 
behavior. However, it has become established as the preferred or default interpretation of a 
linguistic expression so that it bypasses Gricean processes of pragmatic reasoning, and 
considerations of the speaker’s intended meaning, and arises through the automatic activation 
of default inference rules which are attached to particular expression types. These are 
defeasible rules, so that if their results are inconsistent with some particular salient contextual 
assumption, then are cancelled (see Carston 2004c).  
Similarly to Relevance Theory, Levinson’s (2000) theory of Generalized 
Conversational Implicatures (GCIs) treats the linguistic encoding not as definitive content, but 
more like interpretive clues, guiding hearers to the speaker-intended interpretation. As noted 
above in section 1.1, Grice viewed GCIs as inferences that appear to go through in the 
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absence of information to the contrary; but additional information (addition of further 
premises) to the contrary may be quite sufficient to cancel them. This view is shared by Horn 
(2004), who notes that whatever the theoretical status of the distinction between generalized 
and particularized conversational implicatures, it is apparent that “some implicatures are 
induced only in a special context (…), while others go through unless a special context is 
present (…)”Horn (2004: 4-5). 
Levinson provides the following definition of PCIs and GCIs: 
a. An implicature i from utterance U is particularized iff U implicates i only by virtue 
of specific contextual assumptions that would not invariably or even normally obtain. 
b. An implicature i is generalized iff U implicates i unless there are unusual specific 
contextual assumptions that defeat it (Levinson 2000: 16; italics in the original). 
Récanati (2010: 260) points out that Grice’s generalized conversational implicatures 
are different from Levinson’s (2000) default implicatures in that the former cannot arise at the 
local sub-sentential level (they are derived through a global inference generated by the fact 
that the speaker has said that P), while the latter are conventionally associated and are 
automatically triggered by certain expressions during the online processing of the utterance 
containing them. Hence, the GCI theory can explain the processes that happen at the ‘local’ 
sub-sentential level of lexical pragmatics.  
Unlike the GCI-theoretic pragmatics, the original version of the relevance-theoretic 
pragmatics accounted for explicatures and implicatures derived only at the global level of the 
logical form of the utterance (for discussion see Carston 2002a; Reboul 2004; Capone 2011). 
Research in relevance-theoretic lexical pragmatics (e.g. Carston 2002a; Wilson and Carston 
2007), however, showed that semantic underdeterminacy is resolved by an interaction 
between decoding and inference not only at the level of what is explicitly communicated by 
uttering a whole sentence, but also at the level of individual lexemes and phrases. Carston’s 
revised definition of explicatures, for instance, has been expanded to include such local sub-
sentential meaning relations as, for instance, entailment: “An assumption (proposition) 
communicated by an utterance is an ‘explicature’ of the utterance if and only if it is a 
development of (a) a linguistically encoded logical form of the utterance, or of (b) a sentential 
subpart of a logical form” (Carston 2002a: 124). The RT account of lexical-pragmatics is 
detailed in chapter 9 of the thesis.  
Relevance Theory makes no distinction of any theoretical import between GCIs and 
PCIs. It regards implicatures as varying in their generality along the continuum - some being 
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very general, others less so, and some being essentially one-off (nonce). According to Carston 
(2004c: 8), no implicatures are a matter of default inference; rather all must be warranted by 
contextual relevance. From the relevance-theoretic standpoint, derivation of both explicatures 
and implicatures requires inference, however, while in explicatures the pragmatic element is 
to fill in and adjust the semantic scaffolding provided by the linguistic expression used, the 
derivation of implicatures is purely pragmatic (Carston 1995, 2002a). 
In an analysis of the way neo-Griceans treat scalar implicature, Moeschler (2007: 12) 
argues that their view of this phenomenon needs to be replaced with a truth-conditional 
pragmatic theory of “generalized explicatures”. According to Moeschler (2007: 10), the 
processes, which neo-Griceans call generalized implicatures are viewed by Relevance Theory 
as explicatures of logical form, i.e. propositional/truth-conditional pragmatic enrichments14. 
Burton-Roberts (2010) argues against Carston’s (2002a) view that explicatures can be 
cancelled. He claims, rather, that cancellation of explicatures dependent on the recognition of 
speaker’s intention is impossible, since “what was intended was intended” (Burton-Roberts 
2010: 138) and suggests that cancellation is only possible without contradiction of intention. 
In other words, Burton-Roberts suggests that GCIs are cancellable, since they are derived 
irrespective of recognition of speaker’s intention, while the intention-specific contextually 
derived PCIs are not. 
The distinction between explicatures and implicatures (which are always 
particularized in RT) is captured in derivational terms: the processes involved in deriving an 
explicated assumption take the schematic, truth-conditionally incomplete, output of linguistic 
decoding and supply it with inferred material, as required to fix variables and to enrich 
content, in accordance with the criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance. 
Regarding explicatures being syntactical restricted to the development of the logical 
form of the utterance, Jaszczolt (2010) argues that the representation of what is said, which in 
her model of Default Semantics is referred to, following Récanati (2004) distinction, as 
‘primary meaning’, need not be isomorphic with any development of the syntactic form and 
hence need not constitute an enrichment of modulation of the proposition expressed in the 
sentence.  Jaszczolt and Allan (2011) show that in recent years, relevance theorists seem to be 
                                                 
14 I stop short of equating neo-Gricean generalized conversation implicatures with ‘generalized 
explicatures’, since according to Carston (2002a: 148-150), unlike Levinson’s (2000: 183) view of GCIs as 
contributing to the proposition expressed (what is said), in RT, it is not an explicature that enriches or 
‘embellishes’ a logical form, pragmatic inferences do that; rather an explicature is a kind of representation that 
results from the pragmatic embellishment of a logical form (it IS what is said).  
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tacitly weakening the logical-form-based distinction between the explicit and the implicit 
content, recognizing the powerful role of ad hoc concept-adjustment (Carston, e.g. 2002, 
2010) and construing the logical entry as inference rules rather than propositional 
representations. 
Some implicatures are less salient, than others; for example, from an utterance like I 
don’t like fancy cars as an answer to a proposal to rent a Mercedes, the hearer may well gather 
that the speaker doesn’t like expensive things or luxury in general, but this is not the primary 
aim of the communication. Such contents are indeed implicated but, so to speak, ‘weakly’; 
they are weak implicatures. 
Similar to the way PCIs are derived in the relevance-driven manner in RT, Carston 
(2004d) sees Levinson’s (2000) PCIs as depending on a maxim of relevance which is 
responsive to particular contextual assumptions. Relevance Theory does not, however, 
recognize context-free default meanings. 
According to the communicative principle of relevance, the hearer of an utterance is 
entitled to expect that the speaker has aimed for a level of optimal relevance. This, according 
to Blakemore (2002: 64), means that the hearer is entitled to expect that the speaker has aimed 
to produce an utterance whose processing requires the lowest amount of effort that is 
compatible with his interests and abilities. In other words, according to the communicative 
principle of relevance, the hearer is entitled to expect that the interpretation of an utterance 
does not call for any unnecessary processing effort. A speaker who produced an utterance 
whose interpretation required contextual assumptions, which were not accessible to the hearer 
at all or who could have achieved the same effects by producing an utterance whose 
interpretation required more easily accessed assumptions would, of course, fail to meet the 
level of optimal relevance communicated by his utterance. According to Blakemore (2002): 
“speakers whose desire to show off their extensive vocabulary, technical knowledge or their 
political correctness outweighs their desire to communicate the informational content of their 
utterance may spring to mind here” Blakemore (2002: 65).  Equally, the presumption of 
optimal relevance would be false in cases where the speaker causes unnecessary processing 
by requiring the hearer to process concepts which are already highly accessible. Such 
speakers run the risk of being classed as patronizing or even of not being listened to.  
Popa (2009: 85) notes that Levinson (2000) argues against Grice’s reliance on an 
unavoidable interdependency between what is said and what is implicated, since hearers draw 
on more pragmatic information when deriving what is said, than Grice’s account suggested. 
Chapter 1. Pragmatics of verbal communication 
42 
 
Levinson (2000) proposes a solution to “Grice’s circle”15 by “abandoning Grice’s view that 
saying and implicating are mutually exclusive, and, modifies the assumption that implicatures 
arise form application of the maxims to ‘the saying of what is said’, such that for what is 
implicated to be figured out, what is said/asserted does not need to be determined first” (Popa 
2009: 85).  
Unlike the GCI-theoretic view, which recognizes two different kinds of inference 
(GCIs and PCIs) and one kind of context, in RT, there is one kind of inference and two kinds 
of context, the default context (a default scenario in which inference takes place) and the fully 
particular nonce context (amounting to a reduction of GCIs to PCIs) (see Levinson 2000:26). 
Therefore, the first step in attempting to combining GCI-theoretic and relevance-theoretic 
views of utterance interpretation, is to allow for two kinds of inference and two kinds of 
context, where the seeming lack of economy is offset by a potential to account for a wide(r) 
range of phenomena (see Terkourafi 2001: 152).  
Žegarac (1998) suggests, from the relevance-theoretic standpoint, that it is not the 
inferences that become conventionalized, but particular linguistic expressions can become 
associated not with implicatures but with contextual assumptions (e.g. Allan and Burridge’s 
‘middle class politeness criterion’ discussed in section 5.2). The contextual assumptions 
required to arrive at a euphemistic interpretation can become instantly accessible as 
background or ‘encyclopedic’ information about the expression. Žegarac (1998) claims that 
standardized expressions such as ‘how are you?’ make available encyclopedic knowledge 
about how such expressions are usually understood, in the form of assumptions about the 
typical contexts in which particular strings are usually processed for relevance. When an 
expression becomes conventionalized, any linguistically encoded meaning becomes 
suppressed leaving just encyclopedic knowledge about the type of context in which the 
conventionalized expression is typically used. The meaning of the expression becomes 
‘transparent’ and a true referent behind it starts to shine through. This point is consonant with 
Terkourafi’s (2001) GCI theory-based view that lexical units can be regarded as 
conventionalized only relative to some context of use. 
                                                 
15 The problem Levinson refers to as Grice’s circle is the following: “Grice’s account makes 
implicatures dependent on a prior determination of ‘the said’. The said in turn depends on disambiguation, 
indexical resolution, reference fixing, not to mention ellipsis unpacking and generality narrowing. But each of 
these processes, which are prerequisites to determining the proposition expressed, may themselves depend 
crucially on processes that look indistinguishable from implicatures. Thus what is said seems both to determine 
and to be determined by implicature” (Levinson 2000: 186). 
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Vega Moreno (2007) points out that from the relevance-theoretic standpoint, in 
interpreting any utterance, hearers’ expectations of relevance direct them towards a certain 
combination of assumptions and a certain inferential route yielding a range of implications 
which the speaker might have intended to convey. In the case of creative figurative language 
use,  
“the responsibility for considering those assumptions, following that inferential route 
and deriving the range of implications is largely left to the hearer/reader. Different 
readers, or the same reader at different times, may therefore consider different sets of 
weakly manifest assumptions and derive different implications <…> Another way of 
guiding the hearer is to set up strong expectations of relevance by using relatively 
standardized forms. The more familiar a hearer is with a certain metaphorical 
expression, the more precise are his expectations of relevance and the more salient are 
the set of intended assumptions and inferential route to follow in processing it” (Vega 
Moreno 2007: 114-115).  
The combination of contextual assumptions with a certain inferential route serves in 
RT merely as a template for comprehension, which is fine-tuned contextually on every 
occasion of actual utterance in an ‘ad hoc’ manner to satisfy certain expectations of relevance 
generated by the particular utterance. This results in the construction of concepts differing in 
nuances of meaning on each such occasion (more on such ‘ad hoc’ concept construction in 
chapter 9). 
In her discussion of processing of figurative speech, Vega Moreno (2007) provides a 
Relevance Theory-based description, which echoes the manner in which Levinson’s (2000) I- 
and M-principles operate, without explicitly stating that, with frequent use, some linguistic 
forms create certain expectations regarding the way language is normally used. An extended 
quote is in order here: 
“The responsibility for constructing the intended interpretation of relatively familiar 
metaphors in everyday conversation is thus not just down to the hearer; the speaker 
also shares a lot of the responsibility A speaker aiming at optimal relevance should 
have some idea about which sort of assumptions will be most accessible to the hearer 
at the time, and which sort of implications he will be likely to derive, and should 
formulate the utterance accordingly <…> Has she intended him to consider a 
different range of assumptions, computations and derive a different range of 
implications than those normally derived in processing the familiar metaphor in 
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stereotypical circumstances, she should have produced another linguistic stimulus” 
(Vega Moreno 2007: 115, emphasis mine – A.S.). 
The author does, however, acknowledge (ibid: 117) that such a development of what 
she refers to as a ‘pragmatic routine’ – a cognitive procedure that is expected to develop given 
the Cognitive Principle of Relevance and is encouraged by the Communicative Principle of 
Relevance, bears close resemblance with Bach’s (1996) neo-Gricean notion of ‘short-circuited 
implicature’ with which a particular linguistic form can become associated due to being 
frequently used in a particular way.  
Considering the difference in cognitive processing of language used literally and 
figuratively, Wearin (2002: 62) argues that despite the fact that conversational participants are 
strongly disposed to infer the communicative intentions of others and in the typical case, an 
implicature follows from what is said (the proposition expressed) for reasons that depend 
entirely on the specific context of utterance, in cases of figurative language, by contrast, the 
non-literal interpretation does not appear to depend as greatly on features of the particular 
context of utterance for its generation but rather on semantic features and more general world-
knowledge about the elements of what is said. This is consonant with Levinson’s (2000) idea 
regarding the existence of the layer of systematic pragmatic inference based not on direct 
computations about speaker-intentions but rather on general expectations about how language 
is normally used (Levinson 2000 : 22). 
The following section considers whether the traditional literal/figurative language 
distinction bears any theoretical significance in terms of cognitive online processing of 
utterances. 
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1.4 Processing figurative language  
The aim of this section is to present and critically assess how various pragmatic 
theories deal with figurative language processing and what suggestions they make regarding 
the stages along which comprehension of what people intend to communicate when they 
speak figuratively takes place. 
1.4.1 The priority of literal meaning 
According to Gibbs (1999: 148), people speak figuratively to be polite, to be 
humorous, to avoid responsibility for the import of what is communicated, to express ideas 
that are difficult to communicate using literal language, and to express thoughts in a compact 
and vivid manner. The most typical way for people to express their communicative intentions 
indirectly is to employ figurative language assuming that listeners will be capable of inferring 
what they intended to communicate from what they say.  
There exist several views regarding the stages along which comprehension of what 
people intend to communicate when they speak figuratively takes place. One-stage processing 
theories are advocated by Sperber and Wilson (1995), Gibbs (1994, 2002), while the origin of 
the two-stage processing view can be traced to the works of Grice (1975) and is further 
advocated by Récanati (1995; 2004) and Giora (2003). 
In his theory of conversational implicature Grice (1967/1989) assumed that figurative 
language requires additional cognitive effort to be understood because such utterances violate 
one of the conversational maxims thereby triggering a related true implicature: in the case of 
metaphor, this would be a simile or comparison based on the literal meaning, in the case of 
verbal irony it would be the contradictory or contrary of the literal meaning, and in the case of 
understatement it would be something stronger than the literal meaning (see Wilson 2006). 
This view, which came to be known as the Standard Pragmatic Model of processing 
(Grice 1967/1989, Searle 1979a), predicts greater cognitive effort for the processing of 
figurative language than for the processing of literal language. The reason is that after 
computing the literal meaning of the utterance, the hearer, allegedly, must make a decision 
about its appropriateness, and after a potential rejection of the literal meaning, the hearer is 
supposed to compute a second figurative meaning of the utterance.  
The interpretation of non-literal utterances within the Standard Pragmatic Model is 
viewed as serial and proceeding in two stages:  
(1) the hearer computes the proposition literally expressed by the utterance;  
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(2) on the basis of this proposition and general conversational principles, he or she 
infers what the speaker really means by speaking figuratively. 
Recent claims found in the psycholinguistic literature, however, emphasize that 
figurative language does not require more processing effort than literal language, and that 
furthermore it is not generally necessary to process the literal meaning of a figuratively 
intended utterance.  Studies by Coulson and van Petten (2002), Gibbs (1994; 1999; 2002) and 
Glucksberg (2001; 2003), Gibbs and Tendahl (2006), for instance, are quite damaging to the 
claim that people understand figurative language in a series of steps, because it always 
violates conversational maxims. Similar psychological mechanisms appear to drive the 
understanding of both literal and figurative speech, at least insofar as very early cognitive 
processes are concerned. The fact that people may, on occasion, consciously focus on 
figurative meanings does not mean that such language is “special” or “deviant” in any way 
(see Gibbs 1999).  
Gibbs (1999) cites experimental psycholinguistic evidence indicating that from the 
earliest moments of processing, figurative language comprehension does not differ in kind 
from the understanding of literal language and concludes that from such a vantage point, there 
is no need to postulate any special cognitive mechanism to explain how people understand 
metaphor, irony or euphemisms. Figurative language can, in many cases, be understood 
effortlessly without conscious reflection and without necessarily having to analyze the literal 
meaning of utterances.  
According to Gibbs (1999: 150), the Gricean view follows the centuries-old belief that 
literal language is a veridical reflection of thought and the external world while figurative 
language distorts reality and only serves special rhetorical purposes. Gibbs (1999) points out 
that one of the weaknesses of Grice’s account of tropes is that it does not explain why a 
rational speaker should decide to utter a blatant falsehood in order to convey a related true 
implicature which could just as well have been expressed literally. The reasons for uttering 
figurative utterances thus have to be solved otherwise. 
According to Sperber and Wilson, Grice tended to take for granted and Searle 
explicitly argued that when someone uses language to communicate she is presumed to 
express her meaning literally (Sperber and Wilson 2008: 87). By contrast, RT claims that 
verbal comprehension involves no presumption of literalness. Relevance Theory does not 
treat metaphors and figurative language as a violation of any communicative maxim, but as 
‘merely alternative routes to achieving optimal relevance’ (Wilson and Sperber 2004).  
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In RT there is no suggestion that the literal meaning must be tested first and the 
encoded concept is considered as merely a clue to the intended interpretation or a point of 
access to an ordered array of encyclopedic assumptions from which the hearer is expected to 
choose in constructing an overall interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance:  
“The widely accepted view that language use is governed by a norm of literalness 
(which is violated by metaphor and other figurative uses – hence their distinctiveness) 
follows straightforwardly from the even more widely accepted view that the function 
of language in communication is to allow the speaker to encode her meaning and the 
hearer to decode it” (Sperber and Wilson 2008: 85). 
Gibbs (2002) points out that literal speech (however one defines it) is clearly not the 
norm in ordinary talk:  
“Listeners readily infer what people intend to communicate when they speak indirectly 
and do not merely focus on the meanings of the words or utterances themselves. More 
importantly, people even appear to infer what speakers intend to communicate by their 
indirect messages without necessarily having to analyze what speakers literally say. 
Speakers do not always want to make explicit what they think, and so say things in 
such a way that listeners must infer their true beliefs. People frequently use deception, 
tease one another, speak ironically or sarcastically, use understatement, and equivocate 
in ways that are not meant to be understood literally” Gibbs (2002: 142-147). 
From the relevance-theoretic standpoint, a hearer interpreting any figurative utterance, 
is entitled to employ the usual interpretation strategies in just the same way as he does with 
other, non-figurative utterances. He should stop processing when every further implication he 
could get is not worth the effort it takes to obtain these additional cognitive effects. The 
implicatures hearers derive may be strong (the speaker ostensively intends the addressee to 
recover them in order to make the utterance relevant in the intended way) and weak (those 
implicatures which the addressee does not have to recover in order to confirm the relevance of 
the utterance). Weak implicatures may be recovered and may also contribute to the overall 
relevance of the utterance, but their recovery leaves a great share of responsibility to the 
addressee. The addressee may feel encouraged to recover these weak implicatures, but the 
relevance of the utterance does not depend on any single weak implicature. If a value were to 
be put on the degree of figurativeness of an utterance, it could be seen, according to Gibbs 
and Colston (2012), as being roughly proportional to its number of weak implicatures.  
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Relevance theorists propose that conventional metaphors communicate at least one 
strong implicature and in addition to that several weak implicatures. Very creative language 
metaphors do not communicate a strong implicature, but only a whole array of weak 
implicatures. The relevance of the utterance depends solely on the recovery of at least some of 
these weakly communicated implicatures and the utterance thereby achieves a poetic effect. A 
poetic effect is “the peculiar effect of an utterance which achieves most of its relevance 
through a wide array of weak implicatures” (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 222).  
Carston (2002a) notes that some kinds of metaphors, most notably conventional 
metaphors, may be processed rapidly while acknowledging the possibility that novel and 
creative metaphors may require more time and, therefore, processing effort. She notes, 
however, that such a conclusion does not stem from the relevance-theoretic comprehension 
procedure:  
“<...> according to the relevance-theoretic account, the interpretation of literal and of 
loose (including metaphorical) utterances proceeds in the same way (implications are 
considered in their order of accessibility and the process stops once the expectation of 
relevance is fulfilled), so the account does not predict that loose (including 
metaphorical) uses will generally require more processing effort than literal uses. 
Indeed, it is to be expected on this account that, in appropriate contexts, a 
metaphorical interpretation of an utterance may be more easily derived than a literal 
one” (Carston 2002a: 373). 
Tendahl (2009: 90) argues that the additional time required for processing creative 
metaphors may not be the result of people analyzing and rejecting the literal meanings of 
metaphorical utterances, as claimed by the standard pragmatic view, but could be due to all 
sorts of hidden cognitive processes, such as the effort needed to integrate an easily understood 
metaphorical meaning with the context at hand, as well as the effort needed to infer complex 
metaphorical meanings. 
Relevance Theory does not suggest that it is possible to quantify the notion of 
relevance or its constituent notions of cognitive effects or effort. Wilson and Sperber (2004: 
626), for example, claim that there cannot be any absolute measure for either mental effort or 
cognitive effects, given the difficulties with quantifying ‘the spontaneous workings of the 
mind’. Instead, Relevance Theory assumes that the “actual or expected relevance of two 
inputs can quite often be compared” (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 626). The general RT idea is 
that investing more cognitive effort necessarily results in more cognitive benefit. A study by 
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Gibbs and Tendahl (2006) is in agreement with relevance theorists that in cases in which 
optimal relevance can be achieved, more processing effort usually leads to more cognitive 
effects. At the same time Tendahl (2009: 98) notes that extra processing effort may decrease 
relevance, if the extra effort is too high for the additional cognitive effects. 
Sperber and Wilson (1995: 76–77) and Unger (2001) make the important point that the 
genre determines to a large extent how much processing effort hearers will be ready to invest. 
On this view, metaphors, both novel and creative ones, appearing in ordinary conversations 
do not necessarily require more processing effort than literal language, and hearers will stop 
processing them once they have derived enough cognitive effects. Thus in a usual 
conversation the duration of the actual utterance limits the processing time, whereas readers 
of a sacred text devote much more time and processing effort. 
The importance of considering genre-related information is also noted by Tendahl 
(2009: 103), who considers that a fuller processing of poetic metaphors may be the case when 
reading a poem, because this genre comes with the promise that investing a lot of processing 
effort will result in an appropriate number of cognitive effects. He explains that in such cases, 
the threshold for hearers might be higher before they stop processing, because the 
expectations of cognitive effects are higher.  
According to Sperber and Wilson (1995:231), by uttering a metaphor the speaker 
intends to communicate a complex thought. Instead of trying to convey it literally, thus 
causing the hearer increased processing effort, the speaker chooses to communicate a more 
easily expressed assumption, which shares with the thought some logical and contextual 
implications. The exact subset of implications of the utterance that will be taken to be shared 
by the speaker’s thought is yielded each time by the criterion of consistency with the principle 
of relevance. Metaphor is thus considered to be a variety of loose use of language, where what 
matters is not the truthfulness/literalness of a proposition but its degree of faithfulness to the 
content of a thought: “There is a range of apparent counterexamples to the claim that speakers 
try to tell the truth. These include lies, jokes, fictions, metaphors and ironies” (Wilson and 
Sperber 2002b).  
In her PhD thesis investigating the pragmatic routes to the non-literal, Popa (2009) 
observes that the assumption that there are two neatly distinct forms of communication: literal 
and non-literal is entrenched in pragmatic theories, which make no real distinction among 
various figures of speech and treat all figurative speech as inducing an indirect 
communication. Such theories view indirectness associated with figurative language as 
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recovered via conversational implicature. She notes that recently, relevance-theorists and 
philosophers of language have started to question this traditional assumption by suggesting to 
view figurative meanings on a continuum with literal/loose uses and arguing that the 
difference is one in degree and not in kind. 
Sperber and Wilson (1998) argue that the occurrence of a word in an utterance 
provides a piece of evidence, a pointer to a concept involved in the speaker’s meaning and 
any interpretation, whether literal or not, results from mutual adjustment of the explicit and 
implicit content of utterances. This adjustment process stabilizes when the hypothesized 
implicit content is warranted by the hypothesized explicit content together with the context, 
and when the overall interpretation is warranted by (the particular instantiation of) the 
communicative principle of relevance. 
Grice considered tropes as “overt floutings” of the maxim of truthfulness, while RT 
proposes to consider them as well as most other “non-literal” uses of language as general 
cases of loose use of language, such as approximations and sense extensions, since  
“most of our serious declarative utterances are not strictly and literally true, either 
because they are figurative, or simply because we express ourselves loosely… Loose 
uses of language present few problems for speakers and hearers, who are rarely even 
aware of their occurrence; but they do raise a serious issue for any philosophy of 
language based on a maxim or convention of truthfulness… It is not just 
approximations but all utterances – literal, loose or figurative – that are approached 
with expectations of relevance rather than truthfulness. Sometimes, the only way of 
satisfying these expectations is to understand the utterance as literally true. But just as 
an utterance can be understood as an approximation without being recognized and 
categorized as such, so it can be literally understood without being recognized and 
categorized as such… Literal, loose, and figurative interpretations are arrived at in the 
same way, by constructing an interpretation which satisfies the hearer’s expectations 
of relevance” (Wilson and Sperber 2002b)16.  
Thus the RT account (e.g. Sperber and Wilson 2008) characterizes figurative language 
in terms of such notions as loose use and weak implicatures while not viewing figurativeness 
as a separate category requiring specialized processing procedure.  
                                                 
16 For instance, some figurative ironical utterances are not literally false, such as “it is raining a few 
drops” said during a heavy rain. 
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Despite the fact that some of the psycholinguistic studies show that given sufficient 
context people understand nonliteral meanings without first analyzing the complete literal 
meaning of an expression, the following section shows that there are several lines of 
theoretical and experimental research, which demonstrate that people still analyze aspects of 
literal meaning when understanding figurative language. 
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1.4.2 The salience of primary meanings 
Récanati’s (2004) view of literal and non-literal meaning distinguishes between 
primary pragmatic processes that apply to certain phenomena at the lexical level and 
secondary pragmatic processes responsible for the determination of speaker’s intention and 
derivation of implicatures. Primary pragmatic meanings go by different names within various 
pragmatic theories. Thus in Relevance Theory they are ‘explicatures’, which are part of ‘what 
is ‘said’ by the utterances. They are derived partially by decoding and partially by inference. 
For Bach (1994) these are ‘implicitures’ (meanings ‘implicit in what is said’ rather than 
implied by saying it). For Levinson (2000) they are ‘generalized conversational implicatures’.  
Récanati postulates that primary pragmatic processes, responsible for the 
determination of truth-conditional content of utterances are local17 associative processes, 
which need not involve inferences from premises concerning what the speaker can possibly 
intend by his utterance (see Récanati 2010: 251-252), i.e. they do not require prior 
computation of the proposition literally expressed. These processes are governed by a 
dynamics of accessibility constrained by structured patterns of information stored in the long-
term memory in a contextually relevant manner.  This dynamics is part of the general 
cognitive ability to detect and store regularities of any kind (see Mazzone 2011: 2149). 
Récanati argues that normally we do not have to reason to understand what the others 
are saying: “the judgment that the speaker has said that p is made directly upon hearing the 
utterance, without being inferentially grounded in some prior judgment to the effect that the 
speaker has uttered sentence S” (Récanati 2004: 70). Only when the unreflective, normal 
processes of interpretation yield weird results, does a genuine inference process take place 
whereby we use evidence concerning the speaker’s beliefs and intention to work out what he 
means (Récanati 2004: 34). 
The secondary pragmatic processes (responsible for the generation of nonce context-
specific particularized conversational implicatures), are inferential in the narrow sense 
because they satisfy the following availability condition:  
                                                 
17 Experimental work by Rubio-Fernández (2012: 17), has demonstrated that “inferential processes are 
fully integrated in the processing system, operating not only at the global level of the utterance but also at the 
local level”. 
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“In deciding whether a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance meaning is part 
of what is said, that is, in making a decision concerning what is said, we should always 
try to preserve our pre-theoretic intuitions on the matter” (Récanati 1993, p. 248). 
The debate on the associative vs. inferential nature of pragmatic processes is a 
relatively new development in the research literature (Carston 2007, Récanati 2004, Mazzone 
2011, Wilson and Carston 2007, Rubio-Fernández 2012, Mazzarella 2013a). And while most 
researchers unanimously agree that pragmatic processes responsible for derivation of 
implicatures/recognition of speaker’s intention are genuinely inferential, they part views 
regarding the nature of processes responsible for the recovery of the explicit content of 
utterances (what is said). 
Récanati (2004) argues against the view that the processing of figurative language 
begins by paying attention to literal semantic values, and turns to derived values only after the 
literal semantic value of the whole (the proposition literally expressed) has been computed 
and found pragmatically deficient. On his view, derived meanings proceed (associatively) 
from literal meanings, which they presuppose; but, although generated serially, they are 
processed in parallel. The literal meaning has no compositional privilege over derived 
meanings; they compete and it is possible for some derived meaning to be retained while the 
literal interpretation is suppressed.  
As I will attempt to show throughout the thesis, the issue of whether literal meaning of 
figurative utterances is mentally represented during their processing has do to with how 
salient this meaning is on people’s minds. The extent to which some meaning is salient on 
people’s minds need not coincide with being literal, but instead does coincide with familiarity 
and frequency of use (for discussion see Jaszczolt and Allan 2011). 
In her experimental work, Giora (e.g., 2003, 2008) proposes a salient/non-salient 
distinction and presents evidence from experimental studies that show that it is relative 
salience, rather than whether an expression is literal or figurative, which determines whether a 
particular meaning is processed more quickly. At the core of Giora’s Graded Salience 
Hypothesis (GSH) (1997, 2003) is the claim that “salient meanings are processed before less 
salient meanings are activated” (Giora and Fein 1999: 1601). 
She argues that during the processing of familiar metaphors both the literal meaning of 
the expression and the figurative meaning are salient and are therefore simultaneously 
activated. However, when non-familiar metaphors are processed only the literal meaning is 
salient and will be activated before a potentially intended metaphoric meaning gets activated. 
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According to the GSH, familiar metaphors have a salient figurative meaning that hearers can 
retrieve directly from their mental lexicon. It claims that even in supportive contexts, novel, 
unfamiliar metaphors always activate a salient literal meanings first. 
According to Giora (2003), Giora et al. (2004), for a meaning to be salient18, it should 
be foremost on our mind due to factors such as experiential familiarity, frequency, 
conventionality, or prototypicality. Responses low on these dimensions would be less salient. 
Responses not coded in the mental lexicon are nonsalient. Salient and less salient responses 
get activated automatically upon encounter of a familiar stimulus, regardless of context fit, 
but are ordered; salient responses are activated faster.  
As a consequence, salient meanings of lexical units (e.g., conventional, frequent, 
familiar, or prototypical meanings) are processed automatically, i.e. they are accessed faster 
than and reach sufficient levels of activation before less salient ones, regardless of contextual 
information or speaker’s intention (Giora 2003: 11). Access of salient meanings is hard to 
prevent, even when context is highly supportive of the less or nonsalient meaning, 
irrespective of whether they are literal or nonliteral (Giora 2003: 103). Although context 
effects may be fast, they run in parallel with lexical processes and initially do not interact with 
them (Giora 2003: 24). In her framework, context is viewed as producing final interpretations 
but not affecting the lexicon itself. The claim to the effect that salient information may not be 
filtered out even when it is contextually inappropriate is in stark contrast with the context-
dependency view advocated by Relevance Theory. 
Having reviewed the principal contributions of pragmatic theories of verbal 
communication to the complex issue of figurative language processing, I maintain that the RT 
explicature/implicature based model in which all figurative language is processed along the 
same line as the language used ‘literally’, makes drawing the distinction between figurative 
                                                 
18 In a recent study, Kecskes (2013) distinguishes three theoretically significant categories of salience: 
inherent salience, collective salience, and emergent situational salience. Inherent salience is largely equivalent to 
cognitive status. It is characterized as a natural built-in preference in the general conceptual and linguistic 
knowledge of the speaker, which has developed as a result of prior experience with the use of lexical items and 
situations, and changes both diachronically and synchronically. Inherent salience is affected by collective 
salience and emergent situational salience. Collective salience is shared with the members of a speech 
community, and changes diachronically. Emergent situational salience that changes synchronically refers to the 
salience of specific objects or linguistic elements in the context of language production and comprehension, and 
may accrue through such determinants as vividness, speaker motivation and recency of mention. In an actual 
situational context, inherent, individual salience is affected and shaped both by collective and situational 
salience. 
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and literal language rather problematic as speakers do not aim for and hearers do not expect 
literalness but relevance in discourse. 
The existence of constant turnover of vocabulary used to refer to taboo topics 
indirectly, commonly known as the “euphemism treadmill” (e.g. Pinker 1994a; Allan and 
Burridge 2006), resulting from euphemisms and PC expressions becoming ‘contaminated’ 
with taboo meanings, serves as evidence of the fact that salient dispreferred meanings, which 
are ‘literal’ meanings of euphemisms/PC expressions are inevitably ‘metarepresented’ by 
addressees during cognitive online processing of these lexical units in discourse, along the 
lines suggested by Giora’s (2003) Graded Salience Hypothesis. The phenomenon of 
euphemism treadmill will be discussed at length in chapter 9. 
I now turn to presenting the state of the art of extant research in the areas of 
euphemisms and linguistic practices associated with political correctness. 
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Chapter 2. Semiotics of x-phemisms 
This chapter dwells on such semiotic issues as ancient fear-based and contemporary 
taboos, connotations, synonymy, arbitrariness, iconicity and markedness as relevant to the 
analysis of euphemisms. I review the issue of how concepts are represented in human 
cognitive systems and examine various definitions and ways of formation of euphemisms 
presented in extant research literature on the topic. 
2.1 Taboo 
2.1.1 Ancient fear-based taboos 
Throughout history people have attributed supernatural powers to names as a special 
case of fear-based need to avoid mentioning supernatural beings, diseases, dangerous things 
and animals or replace them with alternative nominations. This folk belief in the magical 
power of language runs contrary to the scientific claim made by one of the founding fathers of 
modern linguistics Ferdinand de Saussure in his Cours (Saussure 1916: 67) to the effect that 
the relation between the linguistic form (the signifier) and meaning (the signified) is mostly 
arbitrary19. The linguistic sign arbitrariness thesis, however, does leave unanswered the 
question of why it is that some linguistic forms are mentionable and desirable while others 
referring to the same concept are unmentionable and forbidden or ‘tabooed’.   
Allan (1986) sees an explanation of this dilemma in the so-called ‘naturalist’ 
hypothesis, according to which, the proscription against uttering certain lexical forms stems 
from an ancient belief that words possess the capacity of influencing and altering reality and 
the form of an expression somehow communicates the essential nature of whatever it denotes. 
One of the earliest manifestations of such fear-based proscriptions of verbalizations came in 
the form of banning of the use of the Lord’s name in vain found in the Bible: “And he that 
blasphemeth the name of the Lord, he shall surely be put to death” (Leviticus 24: 16, quoted 
in Allan and Burridge 2006: 15).  
Similarly to lexical units, concepts themselves can be subject to proscription. The 
proscribed status of a concept has been found capable of causing the loss of a word, as in the 
classical Indo-European case of the word for the concept BEAR (Malmkjær 2010: 241). 
Avoidance of the term is thought to have occurred in the northern Indo-European regions, 
                                                 
19 There is a certain degree of iconicity in language, e.g. onomatopoeia where the sign somehow does 
communicate the “essential nature of whatever it denotes” (Allan 1986) by resembling its object. 
 Chapter 2. Semiotics of x-phemisms 
57 
 
where the bear was prevalent, and another name (employed, perhaps, not to offend it or as 
part of a hunting taboo against speaking the name of the prey) was substituted in the form of 
Proto-Germanic *ber- ‘brown’, that is, ‘the brown one’. Attempts by researchers to discover 
the original “true” name for BEAR in Russian have so far been unsuccessful as the obviously 
periphrastic substitute медведь (medved’ – honey-eater) had been established as the only 
acceptable way to refer to this sacred and feared by the ancient Russians animal.  
In addition to the alleged capacity to alter external reality, researchers have argued that 
the phonological form of the word can be directly associated with an affective psychological 
response. Thus in their version of linguistic relativity, Bowers and Pleydell-Pearce (2011) 
argue that due to the fact that words become directly associated with emotional centers in the 
brain, taboo words can evoke strong emotions even when they are uttered without any desire 
to offend.  
Fear-based taboos still persist and in some languages and even extend to words 
triggering the negative affective psychological response by virtue of being homophonous with 
those that designate or connote something dangerous, feared or inappropriate. There can be 
instances in which offense is caused by the so-called ‘incidental’ use of tabooed vocabulary 
(see Anderson and Lepore 2013a) where the mere phonetic and/or orthographic resemblance 
with a prohibited word can cause lexical material, which bears no semantic or etymological 
tie with the tabooed one, to be perceived as offensive. 
Thus according to Merlan (2006), in Chinese the word for number four, si, is often 
avoided because it sounds like the word si – to die while the number eight is highly preferred 
(in advertisements, business names, etc.) because it is a near homophone with the phrase get 
rich. Merlan (2006) also observes that in Japanese, word avoidance is triggered by the 
dissonance of certain word meanings with occasions: hence at a wedding speakers tend to 
avoid words meaning leave, exit, send back, sever, and suffer. Avoidance of these words is 
paralleled by practices of verbal preference: a word may be used because it sounds like 
another that has positive connotations. 
Today, the naturalist hypothesis can certainly be disregarded as unscientific since, the 
speech-act theoretic (Austin 1962) claim that one can do things with words aside, one cannot 
expect reality to change as a result of one’s invocation of certain names. The same 
informational material can, nevertheless, be ‘packaged’ into different linguistic means for 
argumentation purposes as speakers continuously make attempts to alter hearers’ perception 
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of certain aspects of reality by ‘framing’ it through linguistic means.  I will return to this issue 
in section 7.2.  
Chamizo Domínguez (2009) observes that the phenomenon of linguistic interdiction 
can be documented in any society and in any historic time, although the objects and the terms 
considered taboo change from one age to another and/or from one society to another: “<…> 
even within one given time and society, taboo objects and terms change from one social group 
to another. Every historical period develops and cultivates its own taboos and euphemisms, 
which can be considered as symptoms of the customs, censorships and bad habits of its 
society” Chamizo Domínguez (2009: 433). Thus even though taboos are present in every 
human society, it is probably safe to assume that there is no such thing as an absolute taboo 
(one that holds for all cultures, times, and contexts) as “every taboo must be specified for a 
particular community of people for a specified context at a given place and time” Allan and 
Burridge (2006: 6).  
Chamizo Domínguez (2009) notes that the need to refer to the objects themselves, no 
matter how much they are forbidden, and consequently cannot be named, using the terms 
which literally name them, prompted humans to adopt some linguistic stratagems so they 
could continue naming or alluding to taboo objects without running the risk of being 
censored. Considering the social implication of having to resort to taboo topics, the researcher 
concludes that since tabooed objects and terms have always existed in every human group, 
some linguistic mechanisms were needed in order to allow speakers to refer to what is 
tabooed without suffering social rejection.  
Historically, the existence of strict taboos and sensitive topics20 prompted the need to 
find ways of talking about them without triggering negative associations. As a result, speakers 
started using linguistic “fig leaves” – words or phrases used as an alternative to dispreferred 
expressions, which help to avoid direct reference to an axiologically disfavorable or sensitive 
topic thereby avoiding “possible loss of face: either one’s own face or, through giving 
offence, that of the audience, or of some third party” (Allan and Burridge 1991:11). Resorting 
to euphemisms has also enabled speakers to replace the trigger (the offending word form) by 
another word form that expresses a similar concept but that is not itself associated with a 
conditioned response. 
                                                 
20 Throughout the thesis I will refer to the entire continuum – from mildly sensitive topics to strongly 
tabooed ones as ‘taboo’ for brevity and convenience. 
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Euphemisms can thus be regarded as socially motivated by considerations of avoiding 
negative associations of words and expressions related to both cross-culturally common 
stigmatized strongly forbidden as well as merely sensitive topics, such as religion and 
supernatural powers, death, sexual relations, crime, political and military facts, drug and 
alcohol abuse, food, human anatomy, physiology, diseases, physical and mental disabilities, 
pregnancy, professions, race, immigration, environment, social status, wealth and poverty 
etc., as well as other topics considered impolite, inappropriate or shameful in a certain society 
at a certain time (for discussion see Warren 1992; Allan and Burridge 2006).  
By choosing to resort to euphemisms speakers can aim at shielding hearers from 
communicative discomfort. When discussing death, for example, people often avoid 
mentioning the word death itself altogether and instead speak of those who have passed away 
to communicate their compassionate attitude. Similarly, the expression ritual services 
(translation from Ukrainian ритуальні послуги – rytual’ni posluhy) is used instead of the 
more direct funeral services to avoid mentioning the word funeral and sparing the hearing of 
emotional distress associated with it. In such cases the use of euphemisms produces the not-
saying-it-all effect of a ‘cushioned blow’, thereby distancing conversational participants from 
the reality of human mortality. In this respect, Cameron (1995) notes that even if the use of 
collateral damage obscures neither the fact of civilian deaths nor the intention to minimize 
their impact, it still enables people to keep a certain emotional distance from those deaths.  
Apart from the “increased emotional distance”, replacing death with pass away also 
aims at achieving the effect of inviting hearers to focus on the ‘changed state’ aspect of dying 
by representing death as a sort of transition into the unknown, rather than a finite ‘end of 
everything’ associated with the use of the lexeme death itself. The alternative euphemistic 
expression attempts to ‘frame’ reality by construing it in a different way.  
The mechanism underlying the use of all euphemisms can variously be described as 
part of more general linguistic phenomena, i.e. the communicative strategies of indirectness, 
mitigation, attenuation (semantic weakening) or hedging21. Burridge (2005) considers that the 
more vague and indirect the euphemism is, the more successful it can be at implementing its 
‘hedging’ function. She writes: “Vagueness, of course, is what you want in a euphemism, and 
                                                 
21 The terms ‘mitigation’, ‘hedging’ along with the synonymous ‘downgrading’, ‘weakining’ and 
‘attenuation’ have been used in research literature (see Clemen 1997; Fraser 2008) to refer to the communicative 
strategy of softening the ‘impact’ or ‘face threat’ associated with uttering a discourse string. 
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many euphemistic substitutions involve expressions that refer indirectly to something risqué. 
The most successful euphemisms are those where this association lacks any sort of precision” 
Burridge (2005: 41).  
If concepts are marked with hedges (also called ‘understaters’ by House/Kasper’s 
1981 and ‘shields’ by Prince’s et al. 1982), their referents are not prototypical representatives 
of the class, but non-prototypical ones22. Therefore a sentence like ‘A penguin is a sort of a 
bird’ is acceptable but ‘A raven is sort of a bird’ is absurd. Similarly, the hedged pass away 
appears to be construing some non-prototypical form of dying by inviting hearers to 
conceptualize death as a journey to some different unknown world. According to Allan and 
Burridge (2006: 277), the image such euphemisms offer is one of consolation.  
Since euphemisms are used to communicate an attitude to what is said and/or the 
hearer or some third party, the euphemistic effect can be considered as a sort of evaluative 
attitude evoked by certain linguistic behavior and expressions that come to be associated with 
such behavior can, with frequent use, become conventionalized or ‘entrenched’ (Fauconnier 
and Turner 2002: 49) as capable of triggering such an effect to varying degrees. From the 
relevance-theoretic standpoint, frequent processing of certain linguistic forms in stereotypical 
contexts results in certain encyclopedic assumptions from the encoded concepts getting a 
higher degree of activation (see Vega Moreno 2007). They become ‘salient’ in Giora’s (2003) 
sense (see section 1.4.2). The hearer thereby fine-tunes the speaker-intended ‘ad hoc’ meaning 
of the encoded concept in a particular way, transforming these highly activated assumptions 
into salient meanings associated with the use of the linguistic form in the specific context.  
                                                 
22 Rosch (1978) provided psychological evidence for prototype effects in categorization: statements 
about central members of a category are processed far more quickly than statements about marginal members, 
and reasoning about any category is based on what is known about good examples of the category. 
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2.1.2 Modern-day taboos 
Burridge (2006) notes that since the 1980s, English speakers have shown a growing 
apprehensiveness of how to talk to and about others, particularly those perceived to be 
disadvantaged or oppressed: “The new taboos are sexism, racism, ageism, and religionism, so 
that sexist, racist, ageist, and religionist language is not only contextually inappropriate (dys-
phemistic), but also legally so” (Burridge (2006b: 983). In this respect, Hughes (2006: x) 
points out the existence of a double standard: fuck and cunt are designated as ‘taboo’, but are 
commonly used, as any data on currency show. He concludes that such lexemes are not 
exactly taboos anymore and in modern reality the strictest taboos are represented by a new 
category of racist, ethnic, sexist etc. slurs. 
This view is shared by McWhorter (2014), who in a recent New York Times articles 
writes:  
“Today, the “four letter” words traditionally termed profanity in American English are 
more properly just salty. As late as 1920, the lowlier word for excrement rarely 
appeared in print; its use has increased a hundredfold since. The uses of “damn” and 
“hell” in print are higher than ever in written history. No anthropologist observing our 
society would recognize words used so freely in public language as profanity. 
At the same time, consider the words we now consider truly taboo, that we enshroud 
with a near-religious air of sinfulness. They are, overwhelmingly, epithets aimed at 
groups. 
Gone are the days when our main lexical taboos concerned religion — with “egad” as 
a way to evade saying “Ye Gods!” — or sex and the body, as when Americans started 
saying white and dark meat to avoid mentioning breasts and limbs. 
Instead, today the abusive use of the N-word, the word beginning with F that refers to 
homosexual men and a four-letter word for a body part that can be used to refer to 
women are considered beyond the pale even in casual discourse, to an extent that 
would baffle a time traveler from as recently as 50 years ago”. 
The practice of avoiding the modern-day interdictions regarding references to 
stigmatized population groups and replacing them with new vocabulary units came to be 
known as ‘being politically correct’ and ‘political correctness’ (PC). Researchers point out 
that political correctness refers entirely to human beings (and derivable terms) and represents 
the modern form of taboo (Grzega 2002: 1036). The PC-related practices are viewed as an 
endeavor to “<…> make taboo many areas which previously involved prejudicial attitudes 
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and stigmatizing language” (Hughes 2010: 46). Among such areas Hughes (2010: 48) lists 
demeaning terms for women, homosexuals, foreigners, minorities, as well as mentally and 
physically handicapped people. 
Various opinions on the essence of euphemisms have been expressed in research 
literature. Wałaszewska (2010), for instance, names association with some taboo as an 
essential feature of euphemistic expressions while Warren (1992: 135) does not see 
association with a taboo as a necessary feature of euphemisms and instead suggest a weaker 
criterion for recognizing euphemisms in discourse: “we have a euphemism if the interpreter 
perceives the use of some word or expression as evidence of a wish on the part of the speaker 
to denote some sensitive phenomenon in a tactful and/or veiled manner” (Warren 1992: 135).  
The two points of view may in fact be quite consonant since the notion of taboo has 
changed over time and today the term is used differently from its original sense. Today 
‘taboo’ has come to mean “highly inappropriate” rather than the traditional sense of “strictly 
forbidden” (cf. Hughes 2009: 46). In modern societies, the taboos are usually avoided not out 
of fear of supernatural beings and death, but rather out of concern for not harming the 
sensibilities of any parties involved. The contemporary taboo topics are avoided because they 
are felt to be embarrassing, offensive, impolite, xenophobic or otherwise inappropriate under 
certain social circumstances. 
In the following sections I discuss how the need to refer to a topic in an indirect 
manner necessitates finding new substitutes and leads to proliferation of synonymous 
expressions, which share the same descriptive content but differ in expressive or ‘connotative’ 
aspects of meaning. 
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2.2 Synonymy and concepts 
2.2.1 Absolute and near-synonymy 
As an area of linguistics research, synonymy, i.e. the semantic relations between 
linguistic units that influence the structure of the lexicon, has often been neglected and 
thought of as a non-problem: “[...] either there are synonyms, but they are completely 
identical in meaning and hence easy to deal with, or there are no synonyms, in which case 
each word can be handled like any other” (Edmond and Hirst 2001: 106). Research of 
synonymy by Edmond and Hirst (2001) shows that it is just as complex a phenomenon as, for 
instance, polysemy and that it inherently affects the structure of lexical knowledge, since 
synonyms can express a myriad of implications, connotations, and attitudes in addition to 
their basic dictionary meaning.   
Despite the fact that research within the field of lexical pragmatics (e.g. Récanati 
1995, 2004; Carston 1997, 2002a, 2010; Blutner 1998, 2002; Wilson and Carston 2006, 2007) 
has a direct bearing on the semasiological and onomasiological relations, a search query  
through the Relevance Theory Online Bibliographic Service 
(http://www.ua.es/personal/francisco.yus/rt.html) yielded no entries dedicated to synonyms or 
synonymy, while polysemy has only recently become the subject of the PhD thesis “The 
Semantics and Pragmatics of Polysemy: A Relevance-Theoretic Account” (Falkum 2011). 
Synonymy is traditionally understood as several lexical or syntactic forms sharing a 
similar or identical meaning and analyzed in terms of the degree of overlap of their semantic 
features. In her research Falkum (2011: 10) observes that the fact that several words may have 
the same meaning was addressed at least as early as the writings of Aristotle who in the 
opening of his “Categories” distinguished between synonymy (‘univocity’) and homonymy 
(‘multivocity’). In a quote from Shields (2009) she describes Aristotelian view of synonymy 
and homonymy thus: 
“Two things, a and b, are synonymous or univocal if they are both called by the same 
name F, and the definition of F is the same for both of them, whereas a and b are 
homonymous if they are called by the same name F, but the definition of F for a does 
not completely overlap with the definition of F for b. An example of synonymy is the 
occurrences of human in ‘Socrates is a human’ and ‘Plato is a human’, where the 
things named by the word human are the same in both cases.” 
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Pinker (1994b) makes an observation to the effect that though most common words 
have many meanings, few meanings have more than one word. That is homonyms are 
plentiful while synonyms are rare and virtually all supposed synonyms have some difference 
in meaning, however small. The rare candidates for absolute synonymy tend to be technical 
terms. There are, however, cases where even the most seemingly perfect technical candidates 
for absolute synonyms can nevertheless differ in expressive and attitudinal aspects in certain 
contexts of use.  
Synonyms are traditionally viewed in research literature as units sharing not only the 
same reference, as the Aristotelian view would suggest, but also having the same sense (see 
Lyons 1997: 199). Thus on the Fregean view ‘This dog howled the whole night’ and ‘This cur 
howled the whole night’ would be considered synonymous since they express the same 
thought (the same sense). They differ in that only the latter conveys an attitude of contempt 
for the dog on the part of the speaker (see Williamson 2009 for discussion). 
According to Murphy (2010) languages generally resist synonymy and it is very rare 
to find pairs that are perfectly synonymous, even for just one of their sense. Clark (1988) 
employs the principle of contrast “every two forms contrast in meaning” to show that 
languages work to eliminate absolute synonyms, i.e., either an absolute synonym would fall 
into disuse or it would take on a new nuance of meaning. Cruse (1986) echoes the thought 
that natural languages abhor absolute synonyms just as nature abhors a vacuum, because the 
meanings of words are constantly changing. Murphy (2010: 112) suggests that people usually 
assume that different linguistic forms are associated with different meanings and illustrates 
this point by quoting Clark and Clark (1979) who provide examples of when an established 
verb to cook is contrasted with a new verb to chef that denotes the same activity as to cook. 
Under such circumstances hearers can presume that the new coinage must mean something 
different than cook (e.g. as connoting more professionalism). 
Modern Ukrainian language, for example, has three different words for helicopter in 
the same neutral register (none of them are slang terms similar to the English word chopper). 
The availability of the three different terms, which coexist in the language to refer to this 
seemingly affectless and unemotional subject might appear rather odd at the first glance. 
However, when the extra-linguistic factors and motivations underlying the use of these terms 
are taken into account, it becomes clear that they reflect Ukraine’s complicated (linguistic) 
geopolitical situation. Of the three lexical units, вертоліт (vertolit) is likely to be used by 
people who are probably fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian as it sounds almost exactly the 
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same as its Russian language counterpart вертолет (vertolet), гвинтокрил (hvyntokryl) is 
likely to be used by people who pride themselves on speaking pure Ukrainian as it sounds 
nothing like its Russian counterpart, while the third term гелікоптер (helicopter) is likely to 
be used by speakers who declare their pro-Western stance, as this word happens to be a 
Cyrillic transliteration of the English word helicopter. 
Clark puts forward a principle, according to which for certain meanings, there is a 
conventional form that speakers expect to be used in the language community (Clark 1988, 
1990). The pragmatic implications of this principle are that it captures the fact that whenever 
there is a conventional form to express a certain meaning and a speaker uses a novel form 
instead, the hearer is entitled to make an inference to the effect that the speaker has a 
different, contrasting meaning in mind (provided the alternative expression is salient or 
‘manifest’, in relevance-theoretic terms, to the hearer). 
M.A.K. Halliday (1978: 165) was among the first researchers to observe that an 
existing problematic area in a society is often marked by its over-lexicalization in language.  
To illustrate that a problem area in language is often indicated by the availability of many 
alternative variations of a concept which lacks a single unmarked form, Harvey and Shalom 
(1997) list a range of categories which refer to sexual intercourse, including: the technical 
(sexual intercourse, fornication, carnal knowledge); the mild and inoffensive (go to bed with, 
sleep with, have sex with) and the crude and vulgar or dysphemistic (fuck, shag, screw, shaft, 
bonk, bang).  
Crespo Fernández (2008: 95–110) notes the tremendously high degree of synonymy in 
the English vocabulary for genitalia and copulation, while Allan and Burridge (1991: 96) 
report that English has accumulated more than 1000 synonyms for penis, 1200 for vagina, 
800 for copulation, and over 2000 for prostitute. The lack of a single unmarked form and the 
abundance of euphemisms for sex and sex-related terms, death, disease, substance abuse and 
other “problematic areas” points to the importance of being able to refer to such topics in an 
indirect circumlocutionary way.  
Murphy (2010:110) suggests a substitutability test to determine whether two words are 
synonyms: “words are substitutable if there is no change in the meaning of a sentence when 
one word is substituted for the other” (2010: 110). In her example the truth of “A person is 
standing beside me” entails the truth of “A human is standing beside me”, and vice versa and 
hence person and human are synonyms. At the same time on her account man and person are 
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not synonyms since there are things that can be referred to as person that cannot be called 
man – namely, women, girls, boys.  
With regards to euphemistic language use, we can see that, for instance the 
euphemistic, passed away appears to be fully synonymous with died, however fails the 
intersubstitutability test in The flowers have passed away vs. The flowers have died due to the 
difference in attitudes communicated by the two sentences.  The euphemistic pass away is 
inappropriate in reference to flowers, or any other non-sentient being for that matter, because 
one cannot be expected to seriously express the kind of attitude in relations to flowers that 
he/she expresses towards people. Therefore uttering The flowers have passed away will most 
likely be interpreted as a kind of an ironic statement or as a sort of poetic language echoing 
attitudes speakers show towards other human beings.  
McGlone et al. (2006) argue that when technological or scientific advancements alter 
the way society conceives of a topic, conceptual innovation is the engine of euphemism 
production. The authors regard conceptual innovation as the driving force behind 
terminological turnover in social, cultural, and political domains as well.  Their view is 
contrasted with that of Pinker (1994a, 1994b), who attributes the appearance of new 
euphemistic synonyms in the vernacular to the power of concepts over words. This power, 
according to Pinker (1994a, 1994b), is what drove the succession from colored people to 
Negro to black to African-American to people of color. 
McGlone et al. (2006) argue that, Pinker’s (1994a, 1994b) assertion to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the terms negro, black, African-American, and person of color are not 
synonyms: “At different times in recent history, the same individual might have been 
identified (and perhaps also identified herself) using each of these terms. However, common 
reference is distinct from synonymy <…> [T]he terms African-American and people of color 
are motivated by different sociopolitical agendas. The former communicates respect by 
emphasizing ethnicity over race and the latter was intended to replace the negatively framed 
racial label nonwhite with a positive <…>” McGlone et al. (2006: 278). 
Murphy (2010) points out that synonyms that are denotationally identical may still be 
different in non-denotational ways – for example, by belonging to different dialects, registers, 
or by having different connotations (Murphy 2010: 111). Thus the synonyms for toilet 
facilities are not strictly substitutable because the sentences: “Where is the john?”, “Where is 
the lavatory?” and “Where is the powder room?” would not be equally appropriate in all 
 Chapter 2. Semiotics of x-phemisms 
67 
 
social contexts (see Murphy 2010: 112 for discussion) as the attitudes to what is said 
expressed by speakers would be different in each case. 
Modern research on synonymy tends to agree that that there exist few words in well-
studied natural languages that are absolutely synonymous in that they can be used 
interchangeably in some range of contexts without any difference of affective, emotive or 
socio-expressive meaning (for discussion see Lyons 2002: 469).  According to Murphy’s 
(2010) definition, words are said to be absolute synonyms if they are substitutable in any 
possible context with no changes in denotation or other aspects of meaning including 
connotations, i.e. the emotional responses and associations which can be triggered, for 
instance, by the above-mentioned tabooed and sensitive topics, a detailed discussion of which 
is presented in the following section. 
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2.2.2 Connotations and perspectivization 
Pinker (2007: 18) illustrates connotational aspects of meaning by the formula devised 
by Bertrand Russell in a 1950s radio interview: I am firm; you are obstinate; he is pigheaded. 
In this triplet the words denote very similar concepts, but the attitudinal meanings 
communicated by them range from attractive to neutral to offensive or in Allan and 
Burridge’s (2006) parlance: from euphemism to orthophemism to dysphemism – a continuum 
of co-referential cross-varietal synonyms which share the denotation but differ in 
connotations. Similarly to Russell’s triplet, the nomination religious organization, is a 
euphemism clearly representing the point of view of someone whose attitude to it is positive, 
while referring to the same religious group as a sect is dysphemistic as in most cases the 
connotations communicated by the use of this word will be negative enough to provide 
evidence of the negative stance assumed by the speaker.  
Rigotti and Rocci (2006) show that the terminological opposition denotation and 
connotation has been variously used in philosophy, linguistics, semiotics and stylistics to 
indicate a number of diverse distinctions in the realm of meaning. Their meta-analysis of the 
two notions has discovered that it is customary to distinguish two broad uses of denotation 
and connotation as technical terms in semantics: a philosophical use and a semiotic-stylistic 
use.  
Allan (2006) traces the history of the term connotation to the distinction made by 
medieval researchers such as Duns Scotus (c 1266 – 1308) and William Ockham (c 1285 – 
1349) between connotatum and significatum. Allan (2006) shows that Mill (1843) contrasts 
connotation with denotation much as Frege (1892) contrasts Sinn with Bedeutung and later 
writers sense with reference and intension with extension.  There is, however, another use of 
connote that distinguishes it from sense and intension.  
In this thesis I use the term ‘connotation’ in the sense that is different from the 
idiosyncratic notion of J.S. Mill who in “A system of logic” (1895) writes: “The word ‘white’ 
denotes all white things, as snow, paper, the foam of the sea, and so forth, and, implies, or as 
it was termed by the schoolmen, connotes, the attribute whiteness” and is closer to what Frege 
(1892) meant by ‘fragrance’, ‘coloring’ and ‘tone’. 
Rigotti and Rocci (2006) note that in some of the broad interpretations, the opposition 
denotation vs. connotation tends to overlap with a series of distinctions that have occupied the 
center stage in the recent debates on the relationship between semantics and pragmatics in the 
linguistic and philosophical literature: “distinctions such as propositional (or truth-
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conditional) meaning vs. nonpropositional (non-truth-conditional) meaning, literal23 vs. 
nonliteral meaning, coded vs. inferred meaning” (Rigotti and Rocci 2006: 437). 
Rigotti and Rocci (2006) argue that connoted meanings are not part of the truth 
conditions of the proposition directly associated with the meaning of the sentence in which 
they appear, in other words, that they belong to nonpropositional meaning, since phenomena 
habitually associated with connotation exhibit the basic properties shared by all 
nonpropositional semantic components (e.g., they are not part of the asserted content and 
cannot be negated). 
This view echoes the distinction, which Kaplan (2005) between two different kinds of 
semantic content, descriptive, representing the world as being a certain way and hence 
capable of being evaluated as true or false and expressive, representing speaker’s attitude and 
not capable of being evaluated as true or false24. 
Allan (2006) quotes Leech (1981) as saying that connotations are semantic effects that 
arise from encyclopedic knowledge about its denotation (or referent) and also from 
experiences, beliefs, and prejudices about the contexts in which the expression is typically 
used (Allan 2006: 41). In a later article on the pragmatics of connotation, Allan (2007: 1047) 
indicates that connotations are pragmatic effects, intimately involved with notions of 
appropriateness in language use.   
To illustrate that connotations of a word are not exclusively properties of the truth-
conditional semantics but can be regarded as pragmatic effects connected to the use of a word 
in a particular context, let’s consider the following example from “The Big Bang Theory” 
(Season 4 Episode 12).  
(8)  
Howard: Why am I listed as your executive assistant? 
Sheldon: Cause the word secretary has fallen into disrepute. Oh fyi, my mother’s 
birthday is coming up and I’m gonna need you to pick up a present. 
It is often the case that people doing secretarial work in the office are referred to as 
executive assistants with the purpose of elevating the status of this occupation. Meanwhile, 
when the word secretary appears as part of the word-combination Secretary of defense, it is 
                                                 
23 Following Frege (1952), the literal meaning of any sentence is traditionally thought to be its 
compositional meaning (i.e., the combined meaning of the individual words apart from context). 
24 Hedger (2012; 2013) points out that Kaplan considers expressive content truth-apt just in case the 
attitude expressed is one which is genuinely held by the speaker. Kaplan’s idea is that an expression is 
“expressively correct” just in case it displays what is the case, which is usually an attitude of the speaker. 
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considered a respectable term that does not require any dignifying substitute to ameliorate its 
meaning25. The different associations the word secretary invokes in various contexts point to 
the fact that connotation is a thoroughly pragmatic aspect of meaning – a kind of meaning, 
which Leech (1981) refers to as ‘affective meaning’. From the pragmatic point of view, the 
use of the polysemous word secretary in discourse is constantly contextually adjusted: 
secretary1 used to refer to a job that welcomes an exonerating euphemistic substitute and 
secretary2 that does not require euphemization. 
As we can see from example (8), “occupational euphemisms” can be used with the 
purpose of elevating prestige of certain occupations and professions. Thus sanitation engineer 
sounds more exalted than garbage collector, as does vermin control officer or rodent 
extermination officer for rat catcher. In this respect Chamizo Domínguez (2009: 442) points 
out that it is a fact of experience that the prestige of a given social group often depends on the 
kind of euphemisms it uses in order to refer to its own activity in contrast with the terms that 
the out-groupers use in order to refer to the same activity. He also notes that this not only 
happens with regard to professions of doubtful repute, but also with regard to many other 
professions whose repute is not, in principle, called into question. For example, women who 
look after the passengers on a ship or aircraft do not call themselves stewardesses, but prefer 
to be called flight assistants/attendants or cabin assistants/attendants.  
Considering that what counts as synonymous from a pragmatic point of view is 
constrained not by some contextually independent semantic meanings of lexical units but 
rather by the fact that some units become co-referential in certain context, lexicalizations of 
similar concepts cannot simply be viewed as synonyms by virtue of their semantics, but they 
might have the potential to be used in similar ways in certain contexts.  
To illustrate this point, let’s take an example from the show “Seinfeld” quoted in 
Steven Pinker’s book “The stuff of thought” (2007) in which ‘come up for coffee’ is used 
synonymously26 with (it’s meaning is ‘broadened’ to include) ‘have sexual intercourse’:  
(9)  
                                                 
25 The joke-generating potential of such a substitution can be observed in the following example from 
“The Daily Show with Jon Stewart” (06-01-09): Hilary Clinton is going to become one of Obama’s secretaries 
[Secretary of State – A.S.]. Well, first of all, I think they are called ‘executive assistants’. 
26 Cruse points out that  a synonym is often employed as an explanation, or clarification, of the meaning 
of another word. (Cruse 1986: 267). Thus, in this example coffee (unidirectionally) means sex. 
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George is asked by his date if he would like to come up for coffee. He declines, 
explaining that caffeine keeps him up at night. Later he slaps his forehead and 
realizes, “‘Coffee’ doesn’t mean coffee! ‘Coffee’ means sex!”  
In this example, the utterer of “Would you like to come up for coffee?” is directly or 
‘explicitly’ suggesting a drink while may be indirectly or ‘implicitly’ suggesting a follow-up 
in the form of a sexual intercourse with a high degree of plausible deniability made possible 
by the cancellable nature of conversational implicatures. 
Among the central problems in synonymy research Edmond and Hirst (2001) name the 
issue of contextual appropriateness: “<…> in order to find the right word to use in any 
particular situation – the one that precisely conveys the desired meaning and yet avoids 
unwanted implications – one must carefully consider the differences between all of the 
options.” (Edmond and Hirst 2001: 105) This is tantamount to saying that in the process of 
communication, speakers constantly (carefully) select their words from paradigmatic 
sets of available synonymous alternatives, if they want their utterances to produce the 
desired effect upon the hearers. Such paradigmatic sets of synonyms to choose from are not 
set and static, but are dynamically evolving and are constantly updated as a result of language 
use. For instance, in the context of social network statuses, the neutral not married becomes a 
sort of a euphemisms – an attenuated expression weaker and vaguer than the alternative 
straightforward single, dating, in a relationship, actively searching etc.  
While the degree of “carefulness” or cognitive effort speakers are willing to invest into 
producing the most contextually appropriate synonym relative to their communicative goals 
will vary considerably from speaker to speaker and from situation to situation, we can 
imagine that there are instances when doctors, faced with the need of having to communicate 
the “bad news” to their patients, try (are obliged to) to find the most efficient euphemistic 
substitutes for the direct nomination in an attempt to exercise utmost tact and caution. This 
can be illustrated by the following example from the Commencement address delivered by 
Steve Jobs on June 12, 2005 at Stanford University: 
(10) 
 “About a year ago I was diagnosed with cancer. I had a scan at 7:30 in the 
morning, and it clearly showed a tumor on my pancreas. I didn't even know what a 
pancreas was. The doctors told me this was almost certainly a type of cancer that is 
incurable, and that I should expect to live no longer than three to six months. My 
doctor advised me to go home and get my affairs in order, which is doctor's code 
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for prepare to die. It means to try to tell your kids everything you thought you'd 
have the next 10 years to tell them in just a few months. It means to make sure 
everything is buttoned up so that it will be as easy as possible for your family. It 
means to say your goodbyes”.27 
Languages offer alternative synonymous or ‘co-referential’ expressions for seemingly 
truth-functionally equivalent expressions – dad/father, spend/waste, etc., because it often 
turns out that there are some situations that so favor one conceptualization over another that 
the other expression is contextually inappropriate and so the two expressions are not always 
judged as truth-functionally equivalent.  
Looking at the set of synonyms crippled, handicapped, disabled, and physically 
challenged, one can argue that connotations of disabled are more ‘benevolent’ than those 
conveyed by crippled and handicapped. This is reflected in lexicographical sources by 
marking crippled, for example, as ‘somewhat offensive’ and ‘sometimes offensive’ 
(Battistella 2005: 98), as the meaning of this lexeme emphasizes the debilitating effect of an 
affliction on one’s body. Battistella (2005) points out that the term crippled is also inaccurate 
in that afflictions that were once crippling are, in light of medical and social advances, often 
less debilitating today. The author considers the term physically challenged to be less than 
optimal since it is both long and somewhat euphemistic, representing disability almost as an 
opportunity to test oneself: “Euphemisms call attention to a speaker’s connotation and so the 
term singles out the disabled in the same way that disparaging usage might.” (Battistella 
2005: 98) 
The source of connotational nuances in meaning can be regarded as assuming a certain 
perspective or looking at something from different angles: from in front, from the sides, from 
behind, from on top, etc. In this respect Cruse (2004: 115) notes that all these different views 
are perceptually distinct, but the mind unifies them into a single conceptual unity during 
construction of meaning.  
Powell (2010) points out that for Frege, one of the key facts about meaning is that 
linguistic expressions present what they refer to in a particular way. This is tantamount to 
postulating that we cannot think of something or someone other than as the satisfier of certain 
properties: 
“I can’t entertain a bare thought about the desk I’m working at, for instance; I must 
instead think of it as that which is presented to me in such-and-such a way. Given this 
                                                 
27 Attested: http://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/june15/jobs-061505.html 
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epistemological slant there can be, for Frege, no non-connotative names: if a name 
were non-connotative, it would seem that to grasp the meaning of that name would be 
simply to think of its referent, without thinking of that referent in any particular way. 
All singular expressions must therefore have descriptive meaning, that is, sense. Not 
only does this view tie in with the fundamental tenets of Frege’s epistemology, it also 
offers a way out of a puzzle that has dominated the philosophy of reference for a 
century, a puzzle that has come to be known as Frege’s puzzle.” Powell (2010: 5) 
Indeed, whenever people speak they express some point of view from which their 
discourse is represented. It is not possible to represent something, without representing it from 
some point. Sometimes the vantage point is expressed more explicitly and sometimes it is 
implicit and will take longer to recognize, however “no sentence (or rather utterance of a 
sentence on a particular occasion, A.S.) in any discourse is free from a certain degree of 
perspectivization.” (Sanders and Redeker 1996: 290) Thus if discourse perspective is broadly 
defined as a particular vantage point, then no utterance in any discourse is free from a certain 
degree of perspectivization or activation of some background, ‘encyclopedic’ properties 
associated with the concepts28 in particular contexts of use. 
Such ‘perspectivization’ can be achieved in discourse strategically through ‘framing’, 
which Hart (forthcoming) describes as the process whereby “particular concepts invoked in 
discourse provide access to associated knowledge structures giving rise to connotative and 
affective meaning as well as making available particular inferences”. Hart (forthcoming) 
makes a very important point for this research to the effect that strategic framing may 
potentially exploit the relevance-driven nature of human cognition (see section 1.2) so as to 
make certain inferences likely to be entertained whilst potentially closing down others (as 
suggested by O’Halloran 2003 and Maillat and Oswald 2011). 
The same event or phenomenon can be framed in rather different terms, depending, for 
example, on the political stance/country of origin of the media sources covering it. Alternative 
categorization evoke, according to Hart (forthcoming), alternative organized sets of 
knowledge or ‘frames’, which trigger different emotions and entailments in their addressees 
and result in alternative conceptualizations of events etc. (see also Hart 2013). 
To illustrate the role of connotations in conveying a certain perspective, Potapova 
(2008) gives the following examples: a person can be dismissed or fired, but can also be 
                                                 
28 As shown in the next sub-section, in Relevance Theory a concept is considered as providing access to 
lexical, logical and encyclopedic information in memory (Sperber and Wilson 1995). 
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released as a result of downsizing, streamlining or rightsizing of a company. Here downsizing 
is used to invite hearers to look at this event from a different point of view and to distance 
management from assuming responsibility for the mass dismissals associated with 
organizational restructuring. Downsizing and redundancy now tend to be invoked as 
synonymous linguistic alternatives. 
The word independent is another example of ‘perspectivizing’29 at work. It may 
activate a different sets of encyclopedic properties associated with the concept depending on 
the context of use. According to O’Sullivan et al. (1994: 148) independent has been made to 
describe funding sources; the term is a euphemism for ‘capitalist’ or ‘commercial’ in the 
British broadcasting scene, where the main commercial channels in both television and radio 
(ITV and ILR) and their regulatory bodies (the ITC and Radio Authority) are dubbed 
independent – presumably of state ownership. At the same time the ‘independent film sector’ 
uses the term to help secure public funds from bodies like the Arts Council, British Film 
Institute and local councils for low-budget non-commercial production. Hence the same term 
has been found useful at the opposite extremes of the film world.  
The notions of connotation and perspectivization are central to drawing the distinction 
between euphemisms and dysphemisms in that euphemisms aim at ameliorating negative 
aspects associated with referents of expressions by ascribing them positive connotations and 
focusing hearers’ attention on the more positive aspect(s) while presenting them as salient 
features of the referent, while dysphemisms aim at denigrating referents by focusing on and 
exaggerating some negative aspect(s) of the referent.  
At the core of any theorizing about synonymy lies the issue of how concepts are 
represented in human cognitive systems to the discussion of which I turn in the following 
section. 
 
                                                 
29 See also Allott (2005) on the misuse of concept DEMOCRACY. 
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2.2.3 Mental representation of concepts 
2.2.3.1 Imagistic and propositional mental representations 
Conceiving of understanding utterances in terms of mental images they produce in 
people’s cognitive systems is quite common in research literature. R. Lakoff, for instance, 
argues that whenever a speaker utters ‘desk’, hearers will form in their minds an image of a 
particular sort of piece of furniture. Uttering ‘table’, will produce another image, with some 
similarities to and some differences from ‘desk’.  According to Lakoff, in such cases 
reference is all we need to worry about as most of us don’t attach positive or negative 
connotations to these words (Lakoff 2000: 86-87).  
In analyzing the frequent use of euphemistic language in technostrategic discourse, 
Cohn (1987: 1) writes:  
“<…> certain nuclear devices are labeled as clean bombs, directing perception away 
from the dreadful results of their high-energy blasts. Counter value attacks obscure the 
destruction of cities, and collateral damage neatly hides the resultant human corpses”.  
She notes that there is an explicit element of sanitization in some aspects of 
representation: clean bombs are employed in surgically clean strikes where an opponent’s 
weapons or command centres can be taken out, meaning that they are accurately destroyed 
without significant damage to anything else. Cohn (ibid.: 2) finds such a “surgical metaphor” 
inappropriate and states that the image is unspeakably ludicrous when the surgical tool is not 
a delicately controlled scalpel but a nuclear warhead. 
Employment of such metaphors as surgical strike with the purpose of argumentatively 
perspectivizing or focusing on certain aspects of reality while backgrounding others, in this 
case to justify the ethics of drone attacks US carries out around the world, is mocked 
extensively in the media. For instance, Stephen Colbert quotes a statement by the director of 
the CIA John Brennan to the effect that the US has made it clear that these drone attacks are 
done with surgical precision, and notes sarcastically, that the best way for a surgeon to 
remove one’s appendix, is by Hellfire missile: “We may have vaporized your liver, kidney 
and spleen, but your appendix is on the run.” (“The Colbert Report” 13.11.2013) 
Research by Gallese and Lakoff (2005) has found that the same neural substrate used 
in imagining is used in understanding: “Consider a simple sentence, like ‘Harry picked up the 
glass.’ If you can’t imagine picking up a glass or seeing someone picking up a glass, then you 
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can’t understand that sentence”. On this view, understanding is imagination, and that what 
one understands of a sentence in a context is the meaning of that sentence in that context.30  
It is indeed tempting to think of euphemistic language in terms of images it produces, 
metaphorically ascribing it the capability of covering up facts and blurring reality. In “Politics 
and the English Language” Orwell, for instance, appears to be assuming this type of imagistic 
view of comprehension process in describing how euphemism and academic language are 
used to blur the meaning of facts and cover up details: “Such phraseology is needed if one 
wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them. (my emphasis, A.S.).” 
(Orwell 1946) 
According to Carston (2010: 3), the primary exponent of an image theory is Davidson 
(1978/84), according to whom there is no such thing as a metaphorical meaning and what a 
metaphor does is bring to our attention aspects of the topic that we might not otherwise 
notice, by provoking us or nudging us to ‘see’ the topic in a new or unusual way. On 
Davidson’s view, rather than communicating a cognitive content, a metaphor evokes certain 
responses, including mental images. 
In proposing a hybrid theory of metaphor, Tendahl (2009) discusses Carston’s (2002a) 
observation that many metaphors have a strikingly imagistic quality and that an account of 
metaphor that only focuses on conceptual representations might leave out an important feature 
of metaphor. Carston suggests that figurative language processing should encompass aspects 
of both the proposition theory and the image theory since full understanding of any metaphor 
involves both a propositional/conceptual component and an imagistic component, though the 
relative weight and strength of each of these varies greatly from case to case. The distinction 
between two modes of processing focuses on the way in which the propositional component 
may vary across different metaphors, both with regard to how it is derived  and to its strength 
or determinacy: “Images are not only non-propositional effects of metaphor comprehension 
but also, at least in some instances, vehicles used in the recovery of propositional effects.” 
(Carston 2010) 
As an instance of figurative language, euphemisms also have to do with images. For 
example, if the expression collateral damage, used instead of accidental killing of civilians 
                                                 
30 Wittgenstein (1961) called the ‘pictures of reality as we imagine it propositions in “The Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus” (Paragraph 4.01.). They are bearers of truth and falsity and the contents of these mental 
pictures or mental states, such as belief, knowledge, doubt, supposition, memory, desire, intention, and so on 
were called propositional attitudes by Russel (1903). 
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during military operations, succeeds in ‘masking’ the fact that innocent people died then the 
reality has been distorted. Thus in cognitive terms, euphemisms can be viewed as used when 
one wants to name things without conjuring up a mental image of them. The aim of using 
euphemisms can be regarded as striking at a person’s imagination.  
This suggestion is in line with Gambino’s (1973) discussion of how through the power 
of sanitized palliative hygienic language, even killing a human being loses much of its 
repugnancy. Soldiers waste people rather than kill them. Bombing missions are described as 
servicing the target, in the likeness of a public utility. The attacks become clean, surgical 
strikes, arousing imagery of curative activities. Similarly, calling the slaughterhouse with a 
foreign borrowing abattoir may stop steak-loving animal-right activists from conjuring 
dissonant images in their cognitive environments. Aviary sounds and somehow “looks” better 
than bird-cage.   
Considering this, it becomes problematic to assume that euphemisms are resorted to 
whenever there is a need to name things without calling up a mental image of them. The 
motivational goal of using euphemisms and politically correct expressions can thus be 
assumed to be something else. I will later argue for regarding it to be the expression of certain 
attitudes to the proposition expressed by utterances containing euphemisms/PC expressions, 
and therefore as having more to do with considerations of speaker’s, hearer’s or some third 
party’s positive or negative self-image or ‘face’, rather than with shielding the hearer form 
communicative discomfort through not calling up disfavorable mental images. 
Contrary to advocates of the mental-image view of concepts, Pinker (2002) argues that 
there are convincing reasons why images cannot constitute the contents of our thoughts. His 
explanation is that images, like words, are inherently ambiguous:  
“An image of Lassie could stand for Lassie, collies, dogs, animals, television stars, or 
family values. Some other, more abstract form of information must pick out the 
concept that an image is taken to exemplify. Or consider the sentence ‘Yesterday my 
uncle fired his lawyer’ (an example suggested by Dan Dennett). When understanding 
the sentence, Brad might visualize his own ordeals of the day before and glimpse the 
‘uncle’ slot in a family tree, then picture courthouse steps and an angry man. Irene 
might have no image for ‘yesterday’ but might visualize her uncle Bob's face, a 
slamming door, and a power-suited woman. Yet despite these very different image 
sequences, both people have understood the sentence in the same way, as we could see 
by questioning them or asking them to paraphrase the sentence. Imagery couldn't be 
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the key to comprehension, Dennett points out, because you can't draw a picture of an 
uncle, or of yesterday, or firing, or a lawyer. Uncles, unlike clowns and firemen, don't 
look different in any characteristic way that can be visually represented, and 
yesterdays don't look like anything at all <...> People are not helplessly programmed 
with images; they can evaluate and interpret what they see using everything else they 
know, such as the credibility and motives of the source.” (Pinker 2002: 193) 
Carston (2010: 318) suggests that the evocation of imagery through language use may 
fall in with other psychological responses or ‘perlocutionary’ effects (see Austin 1962) such 
as being scared, amused, comforted, moved etc., which, although not communicated as such, 
can be (intentionally) triggered by uttering something.  
If images are the sole medium of comprehension, it is hard to imagine (pun intended) 
what (prototypical) images uttering lexemes like education, trust, married, etc. are supposed 
to conjure. Even if they were produced, the resulting mental imagery would be so individual-
specific that it would render understanding each other next to impossible. There is absolutely 
no guarantee that the images associated with the thoughts speakers intend to communicate, 
which they see with their ‘mind’s eye’, will be in any way similar to the ones hearers entertain 
in their own cognitive systems. It appears that the situation with comprehension Davidson 
referred to as “<…> a picture is not worth a thousand words, or any other number. Words are 
the wrong currency to exchange for a picture” (Davidson 1978/1984: 263), works both ways 
and pictures are also the wrong currency to exchange for words.  
Discarding the purely imagistic view of cognitive representation of concepts, from the 
so-called atomistic point of view advocated, among others, by Fodor (1998), Fodor and 
Lepore (1992), and contrasted with meaning holism adopted in structuralism (cf. discussion in 
Jaszczolt 2002), such synonymous doublets as water and H2O, lie detector and polygraph 
cannot be said to be identical representations: they are co-referential, but differ in the mode 
of presentation. This problem is central to this research since its focus is the lexical choices 
speakers make in discourse: what motivates communicators to create and resort to the “cross-
varietal synonyms” (Allan and Burridge 2006) or co-referential (public and private) 
representations, which share the denotation but differ in modes of presentation of the referent, 
and how utterances containing them are represented and understood in the cognitive systems 
of their addressees during their online processing. 
Mental pictures associated with the use of, for example, Native Americans and 
Indians, mentally retarded and cognitively challenged will, arguably, be identical as these 
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expressions refer to the same fragments of reality or in other words have the same truth-
conditional value or content (Kaplan’s ‘descriptive meaning’), but, at the same time, the 
different connotations associated with the use of different synonymous linguistic forms, serve 
as evidence of speaker’s intention to convey a certain attitude to that content (Kaplan’s 
‘expressive meaning’).  
Relevance Theory generally assumes the propositionalist view of concept 
representation and adopts the non-decompositional Fodorian atomistic view of the nature of 
conceptual representations (but see the discussion of the “periphrastic” nature of ‘ad hoc’ 
concepts in chapter 9) on which the lexical form rabbit encodes (‘maps to’) the unstructured 
concept RABBIT. In a recent study, however, working within the framework of Relevance 
Theory, Pilkington (2010) convincingly argues that mental imagery does play a role in 
accounting for the so-called emergent properties in metaphor comprehension and that imagery 
is a distinctive type of mental category which is not reducible to conceptual. Similarly, 
Carston (2010) believes that future work within RT on the pragmatics of figurative language 
use needs to look more closely at the role of imagistic representation. 
According to Fodor’s theory of cognitive concept representation, also known as the 
Language of Thought Hypothesis (Fodor 1975), a mentally represented concept, a constituent 
of the ‘language of thought’ (Fodor 1975, 2008), is seen as an address (or entry) in memory 
that may provide access to three types of information: the logical properties of the concept 
(e.g. one-way meaning postulates, such as RABBIT → KIND OF ANIMAL); a set of 
assumptions, or encyclopedic information, about the denotation of the concept, that is, 
conceptually represented assumptions and beliefs, including stereotypes and culture-specific 
information about the denotation as well as personal idiosyncratic observations and 
experiences, scenarios, scripts, and also, in many cases, imagistic and/or sensory-perceptual 
representations (e.g. RABBITS HAVE FUR, RABBITS ARE EDIBLE, RABBITS HAVE 
FOUR LEGS, RABBITS LOOK LIKE THIS: [MENTAL IMAGE], etc.). 
Following Fodor, RT (Sperber and Wilson 1998: 94) regards concepts as atomic 
entities consisting of addresses in memory which make available three kinds of information: 
logical, lexical and encyclopedic. Thus every concept consists of information about deductive 
rules in which the concept may be involved or entailment relations. In addition, there is 
information about linguistic signs connected to that concept, for example words, phrases and 
their collocations. Last but not least, there is information about the denotation and 
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connotations of that concept, for example, typical objects or ideas instantiating the concept 
plus potential attitudes and feelings towards them. 
There exist two major approaches to the issue of concept stability: internalism and 
externalism. According to the internalist approach, we can account for their stability, and their 
contents, by looking only at cognitive information represented inside the mind (Vega Moreno: 
2007: 19). The internalist view holds that concepts are different when people form different 
mental representations even if the represented category remains the same. From an externalist 
point of view proposed by Fodor (1998) and which Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 
1995, Carston 2002a) holds, although two conceptual representations that pick out different 
things in the world are necessarily different concepts, picking out the same thing in the world, 
does not make two conceptual representations identical. To be identical they must also share 
the mode of presentation (see Vega Moreno 2007: 20). These opposing views have numerous 
consequences not only for what should count as a concept, but for what should count, or not, 
as a pairing between a linguistic form and a concept.  
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2.2.3.2 Conceptual representation of cross-varietal synonyms 
A recent state of the art regarding the issue of how concepts are represented in the so-
called “mental lexicon” is provided by Falkum (2011: 28ff.) who in her PhD thesis discusses 
two main research paradigms, which try to answer the question of what word meanings are 
and what kind of mental representations are encoded by lexical forms. The author refers to a 
fundamental debate in lexical semantics of whether word meanings decompose into smaller 
units of meaning held by lexical decomposition approaches, according to which in order to 
capture meaning relations between words (e.g. synonymy, entailment) word meanings must 
consist of complex representations (e.g. ‘the sense enumeration lexicon’ advocated by Katz 
1972).  Thus on the decompositionalist view, the euphemistic synonym for die ‘pass away’ 
would mean (translated into the mental lexicon) DIE. Falkum (2011: 74) points to a range of 
problems associated with decompositional accounts in general: the incompleteness of many 
decompositions, the vagueness of many concepts, the fact that we may be ignorant or 
mistaken about the properties we take the instances of a concept to have, etc. (e.g. does pass 
away simply mean DIE or DIE IN A PEACEFUL/NON-VIOLENT MANNER?) 
The view that takes concepts to have their components (definitions, prototype 
structures, etc.) as proper parts is opposed by the non-decompositional approaches, which 
hold that word meanings do not arise from definitions, but are (innate) primitive unstructured 
atoms and that most lexical concepts have no internal structure or proper parts (see Fodor 
1975; 2008). On this view, pass away means PASS AWAY. The specific sets of meaning 
distinctions or ways of expressing an attitude to someone’s death can be lexicalized by such 
sets of cross-varietal synonyms as passing away (associated with a compassionate attitude) 
and kicking the bucket (associated with flippant attitude) in English, while they can involve a 
more descriptive way of explicitly expressing one’s attitude involving the use of die plus 
some propositional attitude marker in a different language31.  
In Fodor’s Representational Theory of Mind, concepts are considered to be mental 
representations, which are the constituents of propositional attitudes such as beliefs and 
desires and thinking is considered to take place in the language of thought or ‘mentalese’ 
                                                 
31 Such synonymous expressions can be viewed as belonging to or being part of some lexical semantic 
network, field or “frame” (cf. Lakoff 1987) with the more and less prototypical ways of dying DIE1 DIE2 DIE3 
etc. 
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(Fodor 1975, 1998). Mentalese is conceived of as a system of representations, which has a 
language-like syntax and a compositional semantics.  
Among the first advocates of the Language of Thought hypothesis was Chomsky who 
argued in 1957 that thought had to be translated into language in the process of linguistic 
expression, and translated out of language into a language of thought in the process of 
linguistic comprehension. Fodor (1975) subsequently proposed that words and sentences 
come by their meaning through being paired with internally represented formulae in 
‘mentalese’. On his view, mentalese is not a public language. It has expressive power equal to 
or surpassing that of public language. Pinker (1994b) develops Fodor’s (1975) hypothesis that 
the language of thought probably looks like all the languages; presumably it has symbols for 
concepts, and arrangements of symbols. Following Chomsky, Pinker (1994b) claims that 
language understanding involves the translation of regular language into the language of 
thought.  
Carston (2006: 559) explains that the idea that there is a language of thought amounts 
to the following: “having a thought with a particular content is a matter of being related in a 
certain way to a sentence in an innately given mental language”. According to Carston, a 
thought is an intentional state if mind, where intentional mental states are those that have the 
property of being representational, that is, of being about the world. Beliefs, desires, 
intentions, hopes, and fears, commonly referred to as ‘propositional attitudes’, are different 
types of intentional mental states (Carston 2006: 559), since they involve the having of an 
attitude to a content or proposition, i.e., to believe or fear something is to bear a relation to an 
inner sentence token that means the content of that belief is fear. 
Despite viewing most words as encoding atomic concepts, which are constituents of 
thought, Relevance Theory regards natural language sentences not as encoding sentences in 
the language of thought but rather as providing a blueprint, which must be inferentially 
enriched in order to construct such language of thought sentences. Carston (2002a) argues that 
natural language sentences cannot be assigned a ‘real’ truth-conditional semantics, since they 
drastically underdetermine propositional content. She notes, however, that words that encode 
concepts may inherit a referential semantics from the concepts (CAT, SING, OPEN, RAW, 
HAPPY, etc.) which they encode (and so activate in an addressee’s mind when uttered) 
(Carston 2002b). 
As propositionally equivalent cross-varietal synonyms, euphemisms are hypernyms of 
their dysphemistic counterparts (the denotation of a euphemism is a set that contains the 
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subset of denotation of the dysphemistic term). There are sound pragmatic assumptions 
available in order to explain this hyperonymic property: the hypernym being less specific, 
picking the specific concept, requires inferencing then optionality, hence indirectness. The 
semantic generalization associated with the use of hypernyms enables the speaker to “broaden 
the borders of truth” as, for instance, anything can be meant by incident, issue, situation, 
reform, optimization and doing it (which, despite bordering on semantic vacuity, is a 
conventional euphemism for having sex). 
Thus in the example (9), where the hyperonymic come up for coffee is used to 
euphemistically imply (stand for) the more direct have sex, the implicated meaning is 
defeasible, which allows for plausible deniability. In time, however, the frequent inferential 
broadening the meaning of come up for coffee to have sex can lead to semantic change 
resulting from the conventionalization of such inferences The dispreferred have sex can 
become the default meaning derivable (but still cancellable) from this expression irrespective 
of the underlying speaker’s intention in uttering this locution. 
The following example from “The Big Bang Theory” (Season 2 Episode 20) 
demonstrates that the semantic change resulting from conventionalization of inferences 
associated with the use of come in for some coffee leading to is automatic interpretation as 
have sex, is a very individual-specific matter, i.e. it is a convention of use, rather than a 
convention of language:  
(11) 
Penny: Um, you know, it’s kind of early. Do you want to maybe come in for some 
coffee or something?  
Stuart: Oh, gee, it’s a little late for coffee, isn’t it? 
Penny: Oh, you think coffee, means coffee. That is so sweet. Come on, I think I have 
decaf. 
In this example the lexicalized concept COFFEE can be interpreted as meaning 
COFFEE1 in its usual drink-sense, as well as COFFEE2 as meaning sexual intercourse. A 
speaker responding “No thanks, I’ve already had coffee” to an invitation “Would you like to 
come up for coffee” extended at the end of a date, can be implicating:  
I don’t want to have any more COFFEE1  
Implicated premise: if I drink much coffee in the evening, I will have trouble falling 
asleep 
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Implicated conclusion: I don’t want to have coffee now because it will keep me up all 
night 
On the other hand, the response can be intended as implicating “I’m not interested in 
having COFFEE2 with you”, where both the speaker and the hearer can deny having intended 
coffee to mean COFFEE2. Such cases of polysemy are explained in Relevance Theory in 
terms of online modulation of conceptual meaning due to pragmatic factors operating at the 
level of individual words resulting in the construction of occasion-specific ‘ad hoc’ concepts 
(see Falkum 2011). In Chapter 9 I apply this relevance-theoretic model of lexical pragmatics 
to analyzing how euphemisms/PC are processed online.  
According to Warren’s (1992) observation, contextual meanings are constantly created 
in language and euphemisms are created when the novel term or expression is a “desirable 
alternative” (Warren 1992: 130). The following section reviews suggestions made in research 
literature on the topic regarding what should count as a ‘euphemism’ as well as proposals on 
various structural and lexical-semantic patterns of creating euphemisms. 
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2.3 Definitions and suggested ways of formation 
2.3.1 Lexical-semantic and structural means of euphemization 
This thesis does not pursue lexicographical goals of compiling and classifying 
paradigmatic lists of euphemistic synonyms related to various topics. This kind of research 
has been successfully undertaken previously and such sources are constantly updated by 
lexicographers. Among them are such reference volumes as Holder (2003), Neaman and 
Silver (1995), Rawson (1981), Ayto (1993). Lexicographers who compile dictionaries of 
euphemisms and dysphemisms typically base their collections on social attitudes to the 
situation in which they believe a given expression is uttered. 
There exists a plethora of definitions of euphemisms in research literature, which 
Casas Gomez (2009) classifies into several main groups: the extralinguistic, the strictly 
linguistic and the ones that draw a distinction between word taboo or linguistic 
taboo/interdiction and concept taboo or conceptual interdiction. The author points out that 
most non-linguistic definitions classify euphemisms according to their motivation and not 
because of the mechanism underlying or linguistic resources employed for their production. 
For example, Scott (1990) argues that from the psychological point of view we tend to invoke 
euphemisms, and are encouraged by others to invoke euphemistic forms or phrasing, as a 
means of skirting around issues and ideas which, otherwise, would be problematic and/or 
discomfiting to address by more direct means. 
Casas Gomez (2009) defines euphemism or dysphemism as “the cognitive process of 
conceptualization of a forbidden reality, which, manifested in discourse through the use of 
linguistic mechanisms including lexical substitution, phonetic alteration, morphological 
modification, composition or inversion, syntagmatic grouping or combination, verbal or 
paralinguistic modulation or textual description, enables the speaker, in a certain context or in 
a specific pragmatic situation, to attenuate, or, on the contrary, to reinforce a certain forbidden 
concept or reality” (Casas Gomez  2009: 738). 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines a euphemism as “That figure of speech which 
consists in the substitution of a word or expression of comparatively favorable implication or 
less unpleasant associations, instead of the harsher or more offensive one that would more 
precisely designate what is intended… which partakes of the nature of metaphor”. Halmari 
(2011: 828) notes that major dictionaries of the English language ascribe the following 
attributes to euphemistic expressions: they are mild, vague, roundabout, indirect, polite, less 
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distasteful, inoffensive, agreeable, tactful, less explicit, have comparatively favorable 
implications or less unpleasant associations, whereas the substituted phrase is characterized as 
harsh, blunt, direct, distasteful, painful, unpleasant, taboo, indelicate, offensive, or 
frightening.  
For such informal definitions, what makes a euphemism such is directly linked to 
favorable and less unpleasant connotations vs. harsh or more offensive connotations triggered 
by the alternative wording. The obvious disadvantage of such an analysis is that it can turn 
into a discussion of the semantic meaning of the lexeme ‘euphemism’ rather than an insight 
into the mechanism underlying online cognitive processing of utterances interpreted as 
euphemistic.  
According to Hughes (2010), euphemism and other forms of “verbal sanitization” 
have a long history and typically take two semantic forms: the metaphorical use of root terms 
(pass water instead of piss and break wind instead of fart), or the substitution of Anglo-Saxon 
words by polysyllabic abstract formulations using Latin vocabulary. Examples of such a 
substitution using liquidate, neutralize, or terminate with extreme prejudice instead of kill, 
terminated pregnancy instead of abortion, erectile dysfunction for impotence, coitus 
interruptus for prematurely interrupted sexual act. 
Various models of euphemism production listing almost all types of morphological 
and semantic innovations have been proposed in research literature. Among them is the one 
put forward by Allan and Burridge (1991), which names such methods as: remodellings, 
circumlocutions, clippings, acronyms, abbreviations, omissions, one-for-one substitutions, 
general-for-specific and part-for-whole metonymies, by substituting some other term – 
perhaps a learned one, or one borrowed from another language – by hyperbole, or by 
understatement. 
Warren’s (1992: 133) model provides a seemingly nearly-exhaustive list of the ways 
in which euphemisms can be formed: 
I. Word formation devices: 
 1. Compounding 
 2. Derivation 
 3. Blends 
 4. Acronyms 
 5. Onomatopoeia 
II Phonemic modification where the form of an offensive word is modified or altered 
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 1. Reversal of words 
 2. Rhyming slang 
 3. Phonemic replacement 
 4. Abbreviation 
III. Loan words 
 1. French 
 2. Latin 
 3. Other languages 
IV. Semantic innovation 
 1. Particularization 
 2. Implication 
 3. Metaphor 
 4. Metonym 
 5. Reversal 
 6. Understatements or “litotes” 
 7. Overstatements or “hyperbole” 
As well as several other methods which are not as productive: 
Omission; 
Use of proper names; 
A description of the word. 
Interestingly, Warren (1992: 133) also notes that there are occasional examples of 
where the connection between the novel referent and the conventional referent is none of the 
enumerated above. 
Warren (Warren 1992:133) distinguishes several categories of euphemisms involving 
the semantic development of a novel sense for some established word or word combination 
without the use of word formation mechanisms: 
1. Particularization: when a general term becomes “particularized” in a certain context 
to create a new sense, e.g. innocent (in the sense: “of a virgin, virginal”); 
2. Implication: e.g. loose, which implies the sense “unattached”, and then, 
consequently “sexually available”; 
3. Metaphor: e.g. thick (in the sense of “stupid”), where the image of a dense 
environment obstructing the progress of a traveller seems to be a mapping of a reasonable 
thought going through the medium which is someone’s head; 
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4. Metonymy (general-for-specific): e.g. problem (in the sense of “a disease, medical 
condition”), as in alcohol problem; 
5. Reversal (irony): e.g. blessed in the sense of “damned”; 
6. Understatement (litotes): as in sleep in the sense of “die”; 
7. Overstatement (hyperbole): e.g. glory, as in fight to glory, in the sense of “death”. 
Chamizo Domínguez (2005) notes that although there are many sources (borrowings, 
phonetic similarities, acronyms, allusions, verbal plays, back formations, diminutives, etc.) 
for the creation of euphemisms, many of them have originated in one (or several) figures of 
speech. 
Although  producing  a  typology  of various  ways of euphemism production  is  
clearly  useful  and  an  interesting  goal  in itself,  it  offers more a description  than  an  
explanation  of  what  is  going on during actual comprehensions of euphemisms by hearers in 
discourse. 
The heterogeneity of the existing taxonomies is immediately apparent as is the fact 
that all of these formal linguistic structures and strategies do not have to be used in their 
euphemistic function all the time. Naturally they can receive euphemistic interpretation under 
certain circumstances (in certain contexts) but so can the use (or failure to use) of any other 
linguistic device. For instance word-reversal, listed as one of the device of euphemism 
formation, as used by international retail store chain FCUK (French Connection UK) can 
hardly be said to have been used with the purpose of euphemistically replacing the need to 
name a store “FUCK”. It is most likely deliberately playfully meant not to veil but to focus on 
addressees’ ability to recognize dysphemism whenever an expression flags itself as ‘hiding 
something’ as is the pseudo-Chinese dyslexic statement Yuck Fou! and emphatically 
pronounced Shut the front door!, which in the context where no ‘front door’ is present can 
only be unambiguously meant to be recognized as Shut the fuck up! (on why such pseudo-
euphemistic coinages give rise to humorous effects see the discussion of ‘mock-PC’ and 
creativity in section 3.5). 
In an article titled “X-phemism and creativity” Allan (2012) suggests that overall there 
are two ways in which X-phemisms are created: formally through remodeling and 
semantically through figurative language. He argues that many X-phemisms are figurative; 
many have been or are causing semantic change; some show remarkable inventiveness of 
either figure or form; and some are indubitably playful. Allan notes that euphemism can be 
achieved antithetically by both hyperbole and understatement, by the use of learned terms or 
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technical jargon instead of common terms, and conversely by the use of colloquial instead of 
formal terms, by both general-for-specific substitution and part-for-whole substitution, by 
both circumlocution and abbreviation, acronym, alphabetism or even complete omission, as 
well as by one-for-one substitution from the existing resources of the language or by 
borrowing from another language. 
It appears that “bottom up” exercises in typological taxonomies of euphemism 
formation, which seem to have been the primary concern of euphemism research, are not 
exhaustive and unproductive as they cannot capture all possible instances of euphemism 
formation.  
Consider the following example from the show “Desperate Housewives” (Season 6 
Episode 15): 
(12) 
Kathryn: Those two pigs confirmed what I’ve been thinking for a while now. I think 
it’s time for me to give up on men.  
Robyn. Oh, Amen, sister! 
K. It’s official. My dating days are over. 
R.: I mean you don’t have to take it that far. You can always just do what I did and 
explore other options.  
K: What do you mean? 
R: Cast a wider net? Expand the pool? Date chicks… 
K: Oh, so you’re a … 
R: Yep. 
Explore other options, cast a wider net and expand the pool are used here as 
euphemisms for become a lesbian. Neither of these expressions is listed as a euphemism in 
dictionaries, let alone the silent placeholder ‘…’ in the ‘Oh, so you’re a …’, yet all of them 
are immediately understood by the hearer by taking linguistic clues only as input to inferential 
processes responsible for relevance-driven recognition of a particular speaker-intended 
meaning in the context. 
The following section considers metaphor-based euphemisms from the point of view 
of Conceptual Metaphor Theory and the related discipline of Cognitive Linguistics. 
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2.3.2 Euphemisms as conceptual metaphors/metonymies 
Many euphemisms can be regarded as metaphor-based.  From the point of view of 
Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) Conceptual Metaphor Theory and the associated discipline of 
Cognitive Linguistics, in the conventional euphemisms ‘to pass away’, ‘to depart’, ‘to be gone 
beyond the horizon’ death is conceptualized as a journey so these euphemism can be seen as a 
product of engaging the conceptual metaphor DEATH-AS-A-JOURNEY (cf. Lakoff, 1987, 
1993). In the metaphor-based euphemisms like cast a wider net in the example (12) above, 
linguistic expressions in the source domain are used to replace the dispreferred expressions in 
the target domain. The metaphorical nature of an utterance has to do with what it means, 
while its euphemistic nature has to do with attitudes and speaker intentions. 
The Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) views metaphor as a 
cognitive mechanism whereby one experiential domain is partially mapped onto a different 
experiential domain, the second domain is structured or understood in terms of the first one. 
The domain that is mapped is called the source domain, and the domain that is mapped to is 
called the target domain. The two main functions of metaphor are highlighting and hiding. 
Metaphors are systematic; the systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect 
of a concept in terms of another will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept. In allowing 
to focus on one aspect of the concept, a metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on 
other aspects of the concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 
1980). 
Through conceptual metaphor, the source domain (euphemistic expression) is mapped 
systematically to the target domain (taboo expression). Because of the systematicity, some 
aspects of the target domain (the positive, favorable or neutral aspects) are highlighted while 
others (the negative, unpleasant, or embarrassing aspects) are hidden. For example, in the 
conceptual metaphors DEATH IS REST and DEATH IS A JOURNEY the REST and 
JOURNEY domains are mapped onto the DEATH domain.  
Similar to the treatment of conceptual metaphors, Cognitive Linguistics also considers 
metonymy to be systematic and experientially-based. According to the definition proposed by 
Radden and Kovecses (1999: 21), metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual 
entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the 
same idealized cognitive model (ICM). The authors subsume various types of metonymy-
producing relationships under two general conceptual configurations: “Whole ICM and its 
part(s); Parts of an ICM” (Radden and Kovecses 1999: 30). They further classify typology of 
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metonymies into many what they call “most entrenched metonymies”. Their types are as 
follows: 
1. Whole event for subevent 
2. Subevent for another subevent within the same ICM 
3. Part of a form for the whole form 
Radden and Kovecses (1999: 44-51) point out that there are many cognitive (e.g. 
specific over generic; central over non-central) and communicative (e.g. clear over obscure; 
relevant over irrelevant) principles motivating metonymy. The fully motivated metonymies 
are called default metonymies. However, sometimes the motivations conflict with each other 
and thus decrease the overall motivation of metonymy.  
The use of metonymy may be motivated by a speaker’s expressive needs or a given 
social situation. The use of euphemism occurs in the latter situation which is governed by 
social norms and usually involves violating some cognitive and communicative principles. 
The euphemistic expressions “to go to the bathroom” and “to wash one’s hands” describe 
activities that only tangentially relate to the central and relevant event, hence, according to 
Radden and Kovecses (1999), they violate the principles of central over peripheral, relevant 
over irrelevant as well as clear over obscure.  
The euphemistic expressions may become so entrenched that they are no longer felt to 
be metonymic. Thus “to go to the bathroom” is no longer associated with its spatial meaning 
“to transport oneself to the bathroom”, but evokes the target sense directly in expressions such 
as “The dog went to the bathroom on the living room rug”. 
Research by Gradečak-Erdeljić (2005) shows that while euphemisms do not abide by 
the Gricean Cooperative Principle and almost none of the maxims, in the light of cognitive 
linguistics, metonymy as part of ‘idealized cognitive models’ can facilitate mental access to a 
concept where a euphemism replaces some axiologically disfavorable expressions:  
“Metonymic mapping is specific for its one-correspondence mapping, i.e. both the 
source and the target concept belong to the same domain, and precisely this contiguity 
quality, or the proximity of the concepts involved in the mapping renders this 
cognitive process a perfect candidate for construing euphemistic expressions. One of 
the most ubiquitous metonymies in the context of euphemisms is PART OF THE 
SCENARIO FOR THE WHOLE SCENARIO, where it serves as a vehicle to 
accessing the target concept via some narrowed semantically bleached content” 
(Gradečak-Erdeljić 2005: 298). 
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The euphemistic expression ‘air support’ standing for the central part of the scenario 
for bombing i.e. planes hitting and destroying the target, metonymically maps the more 
neutral concept of a non-violent part of the event – planes supporting military forces on the 
ground (note the use of a heavily positive lexical item: ‘support’) (Gradečak-Erdeljić 2005: 
296). According to Gradečak-Erdeljić (2005) a euphemism ‘body count’ reflects the part of 
the whole scenario, which follows the actual killing of people and the latter consequences and 
actions undertaken, i.e. the survivors count the dead, the number of the dead bodies is 
reported and the focused body counting stands for the whole target domain of killed people. 
Such uncooperative (see section 4.1) uses of euphemisms can be regarded as a form of 
lying. Using ‘body’ instead of ‘dead body’ or ‘corpse’ is definitely a way of not telling the 
truth by substituting direct nomination with the one with more positive connotations. Not 
mentioning ‘dead’ body as irrelevant and using ‘body’ instead is considered appropriate in the 
context where politeness effect would prevent notions of death – a classic example of the 
socially recognized taboo – from entering the scene (see Gradecak 2005: 298). 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest that “the essence of metaphor is understanding and 
experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another”, while euphemisms became a salient 
phenomenon of language usage in modern political culture by virtue of their ability to conceal 
something behind a hedged lexical unit for argumentative purposes. In the follow-up research 
paradigm of Cognitive Linguistics, such metaphors are viewed as being pre-wired in our 
cognitive systems rather than products of linguistic communication itself: a point of view with 
which Relevance Theory disagrees. From a relevance theory perspective, on the contrary, 
such linguistic metaphors would be seen as originating in creative uses of language for 
opportunistic communicative purposes, which, if repeated often enough, might result in the 
setting up of systematic correspondences between the domains. 
Wilson (2010: 43) illustrates this point by discussing that many cultures have a set of 
flower metaphors (e.g. daisy, lily, violet, rose) which are typically applied to women. From a 
cognitive linguistics perspective, these linguistic metaphors might be seen as surface 
reflections of an underlying conceptual metaphor WOMEN ARE FLOWERS, based on 
systematic correspondences between the domains of women and flowers. Wilson (2010), 
however, questions the extent to which conceptual cross-domain mappings originate in 
language use, and argues that they have to be explained at least partly in pragmatic terms. 
In Relevance Theory conceptual cross-domain mappings are viewed as originating in 
language use rather than being pre-wired in cognition. As Vega Moreno (2007: 3) puts it, 
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repeated derivation of the same sort of implications in processing a familiar stimulus may 
result in the development of a special type of cognitive procedure, a pragmatic routine, for the 
processing of this stimulus, which leads to the conventionalization of this inference.  
Papafragou’s (1996) critique of Cognitive Linguistics, in which she argues that the 
‘associationist’ model adopted by this research paradigm is not backed up by any cognitive-
pragmatic principle and that such an approach can at best deal only with conventionalized 
metonymies, can also be extended to conceptual metaphors. It follows that, since it is not 
based on any cognitive-pragmatic principle, the approach is unable to handle really creative or 
“one-off” metaphoric/metonymic uses, since according to Lakoff an association is supposed 
to spring up to mind almost automatically. 
Abrantes (2005) points out that euphemisms often build up on already existing 
mechanisms (extensions of the DEATH-AS-A-JOURNEY conceptual metaphor in such 
expressions as to pass away), thus being easily detected and deciphered in their euphemistic 
function. Thus the major limitation of this analysis is that very few euphemisms lend 
themselves to interpretation through conceptual metaphors. Novel euphemisms very rarely 
relate to pre-established conceptual metaphors and therefore we need to have a mechanism 
that works out the meaning of the utterance if a euphemistic utterance cannot be associated 
with a particular metaphor.  
Relevance Theory (e.g. Carston and Wilson 2005) suggests that the phenomena, which 
Cognitive Linguistics treats as “conceptual metaphors” are rather relatively standardized 
similes/analogies, which hearers may construct or retrieve from memory in understanding a 
novel metaphor:  
“Life is not necessarily conceptualized in terms of journeys even if it may be 
compared to journeys on certain occasions as the two have some aspects in common. 
Life is like a journey in some respects, yet it is not a journey <…> Conceptualizing 
life as a journey would imply we cannot think of life without thinking of journeys. 
This is clearly not the case” (see Vega Moreno 2007: 139). 
According to Carston and Wilson (2005), such analogies may be stored in long term 
memory and may be used as contextual assumptions brought to bear on the interpretation 
process. 
Considering the multitude of suggested ways through which euphemisms can 
potentially be formed, for the purposes of this attempt to investigate euphemisms from the 
standpoint of their online processing, I suggest to treat any utterance (including the so-called 
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“communicative silence”) as potentially open to interpretation and/or post-dicto re-
interpretation as x-phemistic. X-phemisms are not a natural class or category but a special 
pragmatic (perlocutionary) effect. The view proposed here advocates focusing on the way in 
which linguistic expressions contribute to the pragmatic processes involved in utterance 
comprehension to yield x-phemistic and politically (in)correct interpretations.  
If we regard euphemisms in the broadest sense as substitutes for something which was 
rejected as dispreferred, we may end up with a picture in which all utterances may potentially 
receive euphemistic interpretation (in the sense that something else could have been said but 
was not), provided the right context. This assumption converges with phenomenological 
philosophy, which argues that every perception connects ‘presented’ data with ‘appresented’ 
data, that are not actually perceived, but integrated into perception (cf. Husserl 1973, 150 f.) 
and follows from the (revised) presumption of optimal relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 
270): 
(a) [The utterance] is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee's effort to 
process it. 
(b) [The utterance] is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's 
abilities and preferences. 
It follows that the most relevant utterance possible is not necessarily worth the 
addressee’s effort and that speakers might fail in producing the most relevant utterance. 
Hearers should be aware that speakers might not have the information hearers would find 
most relevant. Perhaps speakers even withhold the most relevant information deliberately or 
they just cannot think of it at the moment. Lack of time, of ability, or personal stylistic 
preferences could be reasons which prevent speakers from expressing themselves maximally 
relevant. 
The ‘abilities and preferences’ clause of the presumption of optimal relevance is 
crucial for understanding the way euphemisms are produced and interpreted in discourse. If 
the hearer takes the “abilities and preferences” to be of benevolent nature, then euphemisms 
are interpreted as a cooperative face-saving strategy while when the “abilities and 
preferences” are taken to be of malevolent nature, the euphemisms can be interpreted as 
uncooperative or manipulative. A similar claim can be found in Blutner’s (2000) bidirectional 
Optimality Theory, the crucial insight behind which is that for the hearer to determine what 
the optimal interpretation of a given form is, he/she must also consider the alternative 
expressions the speaker could have used. 
 Chapter 2. Semiotics of x-phemisms 
95 
 
The issue of choosing from a paradigmatic set of co-referential synonymous 
alternatives discussed so far in relation to x-phemisms, also lies at the core of the linguistic 
manifestations of non-discriminatory practices commonly known as ‘political correctness’ or 
‘PC’, various aspects of which are the subject of investigation of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3. Political correctness: general issues 
This chapter introduces the notion of political correctness (PC), reviews the history of 
the term. I look at cases of “mock-PC” and provide theoretical explanation of the motivation 
and principles along which they are coined.  
3.1 History and origin of the term “PC” 
This section provides the state of the art of theoretical discussion concerning the 
linguistic32  manifestations of the phenomenon known as “political correctness” or “PC” and 
shows that although at the height of the debate much was written about PC from a cultural–
theoretical perspective (Aufderheide, 1992; Beckwith and Bauman, 1993; Berman, 1992; 
Choi and Murphy, 1992; Dunant, 1994; Hughes, 1993; Newfield and Strickland, 1995; Richer 
and Weir, 1995; Thibodaux, 1992; Williams, 1995; Wilson, 1995), and there have been a 
number of insightful assessments of the political and philosophical implications of PC from a 
sociolinguistic point of view (e.g. Cameron, 1995; Janicki, 1997; Lakoff, 2000), and 
discourse-analytic perspective, much remains to be said about the topic from the point of view 
of pragmatics of production and interpretation of utterances containing the PC-related lexical 
units.  
Regarding the origin of the term PC, several researchers argue that although the term 
‘political correctness’ originated with left-wing politicians, it has been later largely ‘hijacked’ 
by those on the right. Thus Cameron (1995) and Lakoff (2000) show that the term has been 
used as an insult, as a joke and in sincerity by people who believe that the linguistic choice of 
terms used to represent minority and marginalized groups in discourse is indeed a relevant 
moral and ethical issue.  
Suhr and Johnson (2003) point out that there are a number of differing accounts of the 
earliest occurrence of the phrase ‘political correctness’ and its derivatives. According to 
Wilson (1995), for example, ‘politically correct’ first appeared in the 1793 Supreme Court 
Case Chisholm versus Georgia, which upheld the right of a citizen to sue another state. The 
earliest examples of the use of the phrase ‘political correctness’ in OED is from 1948 “In 
                                                 
32 Apart from the linguistic aspect proper, PC on a broader scale encompasses practices aimed at 
ensuring equal treatment of all members of social groups or sometimes even preferential treatment in relation to 
minorities (e.g. the so-called “affirmative action” policy at US Universities); development of non-
Eurocentric/non-western academic curricula with emphasis on non-western, non-white and female academic, 
cultural, literary etc. contributions. 
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general, Hull, although modest and tolerant of other views, is quite certain of the moral, 
legal, and political correctness of his own policies” (American Political Science Review, 
XLII, 1948) and then 1979 “No matter what criticisms are hurled at this feminist fiction, no 
doubt the author will be cushioned by her political correctness” (Washington Post, 
09/16/1979). 
Lakoff (2000: 94–5) identifies 1991 as a watershed in the discursive history of PC. In 
a survey of PC in the US print media from the early 1980s onwards, she describes how: “The 
term picks up steam around 1990, peaks between 1991 and 1995 and appears to subside after 
that” (Lakoff 2000: 95). She notes, however, that in spite of its apparent quantitative decline, 
PC continues to permeate everyday language use and, in particular, media discourse.  
Wilson (1995: 8) suggests that PC first “exploded into popular consciousness” in the 
USA in 1991 by showing, for example, how the number of newspaper articles mentioning 
‘political correctness’ in the US rose continuously between 1985 and 1994, with a significant 
increase occurring in 1991. This upward trend would then appear to have coincided with what 
Cameron (1995: 122–30) described as the point of ‘discursive drift’, whereby the ironic, in-
group connotations of the term ‘PC’ as used on the left were rapidly transformed into a 
derogatory term.  
Despite all the controversy it instigated, political correctness first emerged out of the 
need to refer to someone’s disadvantaged condition or “difference from the norm” without 
offending them. Similarly to euphemistic strategies, PC language is motivated by the same 
drive to be polite, inoffensive, but its primary concern can be seen as replacing arbitrary 
biased words and expression with new motivated linguistic units referring to human beings, 
thereby communicating relevance of tolerant attitudes  and  showing sensitivity to such social 
issues as age, race, ethnicity, gender, social status, sexual orientation, disability, religion, 
political views etc. 
Pointing to the complicated nature of the issues related to such naming practices, Truss 
(2005) notes that:  
“<…> most of the time a person who is female/black/disabled/gay wants this not to be 
their defining characteristic; you are supposed to be blind to it. But then, on other 
occasions, you are supposed to observe special sensitivity, or show special respect. . . I 
mention all this because ‘political correctness’ is sometimes confused with respect, but 
it operates quite differently . . . it’s mainly about covering oneself and avoiding 
prosecution in a world of hair-trigger sensitivity.” (Truss 2005: 163–4) 
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The type of language used to refer to certain stigmatized population groups was 
considered an irrelevant issue by the mainstream community prior to the introduction of PC 
practices, which was often undertaken by establishing prescriptive33 codes of conduct on 
college campuses and introducing courses and departments dedicated to the study and 
inclusion of previously marginalized (usually non-male/non-Eurocentric) members of society. 
As a result of such prescriptive practices, PC has been often regarded as an attempt to enforce 
and legalize behavior that was previously supposed to be governed by the rules of etiquette 
and politeness34, hence the term political correctness as opposed to linguistic tact (for more 
suggestions on etymology of the term ‘political correctness’ see Allan and Burridge 2006 and 
Perry 1992).  
As a complex and sophisticated junction of cognitive, intentional and axiological 
aspects, the abstract concept of PC finds linguistic manifestation in communicative situations 
by representing competing notions of what is normal, standard, moral, ethical as well as other 
existential values. Such regular ‘objectification’ of this concept generates corresponding kinds 
of behaviors (PC and politically incorrect) and expectations in discourse. Thus the cognitive 
frame for political correctness can be viewed as encompassing culture-specific concepts and 
corresponding linguistic units, which nominate, describe and express politically (in)correct 
(verbal) behavior.  
 
                                                 
33 Prescriptivism is defined in research literature as “[…] the imposition of arbitrary norms upon a 
language, often in defiance of normal usage. […] Prescriptivism consists of the attempts, by teachers and writers, 
to settle […] disagreements about which forms should be part of a standard language by insisting upon the use of 
those particular forms and usages which they personally prefer by condemning those others they personally 
dislike. […] [T]he problem is that many prescriptivists go too far, and try to condemn usages which are in fact 
perfectly normal even for educated speakers […]” (Trask 2007: 246) 
34 Politeness is understood in this thesis as a theoretical notion: the expected and appropriate level of 
behavior relative to the particular context of social interaction, established in terms of expectations, which can be 
anticipated in discourse as well as communicated both explicitly and implicitly (inferred in the form of a 
perlocutionary effect) (cf. Escandell-Vidal 1998, Jary, 1998; Fraser 1990, Padilla Cruz 2007; Terkourafi, 2003). 
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3.2 PC as the marked choice 
The umbrella term ‘PC’ is applied to heterogeneous practices of replacing the existing 
standard or unmarked lexical forms with other forms in an attempt to construct new standard 
unmarked norms. Thus for instance, it has traditionally been a common practice to refer to 
male as the unmarked form or ‘the default’, while resorting to some marked form in referring 
to females: cf. actor – actress, waiter – waitress. In such nominations, the suffix –ess makes 
females appear somehow different from the norm since grammatically marked gender is a rare 
phenomenon in English. 
Representative of various marginalized groups are keenly aware of this biased state of 
affairs as can be witnessed from the statement made by the African-American host of the talk 
show “Totally Biased with W. Kamau Bell” (Season 1 Episode 2):  
(13) 
President Obama recently sat down with ‘Black Enterprise’ magazine, or as I call it 
‘Enterprise’ magazine. 
In this example, the African-American talk show host is objecting to the word 
Enterprise ‘defaulting’ to the conceptually narrower White Enterprise, emphasized by the 
availability of the marked alternative Black Enterprise. 
The marked / unmarked opposition can also be illustrated by the distinction drawn 
between the NBA (National Basketball Association) and the WBA (Women’s Basketball 
Associations) in the domain of sports. The interpretation of the unmarked form NBA is an 
autohyponym35 of the narrowed male basketball league while the marked form WBA 
explicitly indicates that it includes only women and simultaneously claims that this is not the 
norm in basketball, cf. also a Golf Tournament vs. a Ladies Golf Tournament.  
Nominations that have been around for some time become entrenched in people’s 
cognitive systems and the purpose of political correctness can be regarded as ‘recasting old 
news’ as once again newsworthy and thereby claiming the relevance of such issues as bias 
and discrimination, which were previously regarded as irrelevant. According to Cameron 
(1995), conversational participants are rarely aware of the cognitive and linguistic processes 
that underlie their understanding of others’ communicative intentions. She argues that only 
when the attempt to coordinate fails do people seem cognizant of their misunderstandings of 
                                                 
35 Levinson (2000: 102) notes that this term is mentioned in Horn (1984), Lyons (1977) and Kempson 
(1980) who discuss how diachronically implicated autohyponymy leads to systematic polysemy. 
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what someone has intended to convey by the words he or she says. Even more importantly, 
the author points out that speakers can only try to avoid linguistic conventions of which they 
are conscious as the grip of people’s native language on their perceptual and thinking habits is 
usually so strong that they are no more aware of such linguistic conventions than they are of 
the air they breathe.  
Proponents of PC-related practices of prescribing and proscribing certain types of 
(linguistic) behavior consider its main goal as calling traditional usage of language into 
question by overtly contradicting previously held assumptions regarding what constitutes ‘the 
norm’ as well as the expected or polite behavior. Such practices aim at bringing people’s 
unconscious biases to consciousness thereby making them aware of things, which could 
potentially trigger axiologically disfavorable responses in different individuals.  
By way of illustration, consider how the prescription of ‘male generics’ has long been 
the center of debates about linguistic sexism in English and other languages: the use of man as 
a generic form used in the English language to define male and female and the ambiguous use 
of the pronoun he in neutral contexts where both sexes are to be addressed, e.g. pedestrian, 
consumer, patient. The reverse, i.e. the use of feminine nouns with gender-indefinite 
reference, has, until the relatively recent PC-induced changes, been the rare exception. 
Hellinger and Bussmann (2001) discuss that terms for occupations traditionally considered to 
be of higher statues such as lawyer, surgeon or scientist are frequently pronominalized by the 
male-specific pronoun he in contexts where referential gender is either not known or 
irrelevant. On the other hand, low-status occupational titles such as secretary and nurse will 
often be followed by anaphoric she. They argue that social gender has to do with stereotypical 
assumptions about what appropriate social roles for women and men are, including 
expectations about who will be a typical member of the class of, say, surgeon or nurse and 
point out that deviations from such assumptions will often require overt formal markings, as 
in English female surgeon or male nurse (Hellinger and Bussmann 2001: 11). 
According to Mills (2008), sexism has traditionally been defined as language which 
discriminated against women by representing them negatively or which seemed to implicitly 
assume that activities associated with women were necessarily trivial. The aim of feminist 
movements therefore was to call attention to the way in which the use of certain language 
items seemed to systematically discriminate against and cause offence to women, by 
compiling lists of such language items in dictionaries and calling for people and institutions to 
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avoid such language use. According to Mills (2008: 38), such lexicographical work has been 
important in calling attention to overt sexist language. 
Allan and Burridge (2006) point out that the problem with such an approach to 
language change is that while some women may feel wrongfully excluded by compounds like 
chairman; others are probably comfortable with being referred to as Madam Chairman 
because they understand chairman to be a de-etymologized idiom denoting the office of 
chairperson in this particular context of use. The “sexist semes” of these words have long lost 
their dominating status and became semantically empty due to their grammaticalization and 
therefor can hardly be referred to as ‘sexist’, unless one consciously chooses to do so. The 
final stage of this de-etymologization can probably be illustrated by the fully grammaticalized 
plural form of the word walkman, which happens to be walkmans not walkmen (let alone the 
PC-inspired walkpersons or walkpeople). 
From the pragmatic point of view, the use of marked (newly preferred) language in 
place of the unmarked (politically incorrect or otherwise dispreferred) one appears to be the 
right tool for dealing with gender, racial and other kinds of stereotypes as, according to 
Escandell-Vidal (1998: 46), conversational strategies can only have their raison d’etre as 
exploitations of a default unmarked behavior. Thus replacing the use of generic anaphoric 
he/his pronoun in cases where sex is not indicated by the combined his/her or plural pronoun 
their, is meant to be deliberately clumsy.  Allan and Burridge (2006) suggest that the use of 
generic she, for example, is intentionally distracting – it’s meant to jar. The presence of a 
linguistic stimulus in a code which is not expected by the addressee is interpreted as marked – 
it is an attention grabbing device36.  
On the other hand, due to the absence of synthetically marked grammatical gender in 
English, words like stewardess and poetess can be perceived to be discriminatory, especially 
by advocates of the feminist movement, because they stand out as anomalies in the 
predominantly genderless paradigm of the English noun and imply the ‘otherness’ of females, 
i.e. that female is not the ‘norm’ in the respective contexts. They focus on the fact that the 
referent is a woman, rather than stressing her professional status.  
Gender stereotypes associated with such lexemes as secretary, fire fighter, doctor, etc. 
can be regarded as cases of the so-called default inference, which Levinson (2000) in his 
                                                 
36 My teenage son was genuinely surprised to have read the following in a computer game: “When a 
player reaches her potential…” which proves to me the “attention-grabbing” effect as well as ubiquitous nature 
of PC in all kinds of discourse. 
Chapter 3. Political correctness: general issues 
 
102 
 
theory of Generalized Conversational Implicatures takes to be governed by the rule, according 
to which semantically general expressions automatically undergo narrowing in the derivation 
of a (generalized) implicated meaning and are only restored to the encoded concept if the 
resulting implicature clashes with a salient contextual assumption (see section 1.3). The 
concept MOTHER, for instance, is normally narrowed to the salient stereotypical concept 
HOUSEWIFE MOTHER, which reflects an (old-fashioned) cultural expectation about what a 
mother is supposed to be like (see Lakoff 1987: 79-90).  
The  discussion of how Relevance Theory can account for the lexical-pragmatic 
processes underlying the extension of the concepts DOCTOR, POET37 and the like to include 
both males and females rather than the stereotypical ‘defaulting’ to (white) males alone, will 
be presented in chapter 9. It is worth mentioning at this point of the discussion that, from the 
RT point of view, such words and expression appear to achieve relevance as a result of the 
same mechanism, which several researchers working within the relevance-theoretic 
framework (namely Escandell-Vidal and Jary) propose for the way interpretations of 
impoliteness arise in discourse rather than for how utterances give rise to interpretations of 
politeness, which is considered to be the default or unmarked state of affairs in discourse (see 
the discussion in chapter 6). 
This section has shown that ‘overt formal markings’ can be used to implicitly 
communicate what is standard and normal in the areas of racial, gender and professional 
relations. Unless otherwise specified, hearers following the sexist line of thought, often 
assume that doctor references a man, and speakers’ use of such terms as lady doctor 
emphasizes this assumption. In addition to male doctor, the default interpretation of doctor 
happens to also be a white doctor as speakers often include an ethnic nomination for 
historically white male positions (e.g., black doctor).  The language that prescribes normalcy 
extends to bias in other areas as well. 
 
                                                 
37 The word stewardess represents an exception to this pattern, as it was not reduced to steward as a 
generic term. Instead, both of the gender-marked terms were subsumed under flight attendant or cabin crew. 
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3.3. PC-inspired metonymic references 
In addition to feminist anti-sexism campaigns to change the way gender and race are 
represented linguistically, during recent years, other population groups have attempted to 
draw attention to language used to talk about them. The so-called ‘people-first’ language 
constitutes one of the most recent fields for linguistic revision e.g. people living with 
disabilities, people with AIDS / PWAs and people living with AIDS / PLAs, a person who uses 
a wheelchair; Russian человек с ограниченными физическими возможностями (chelovek 
s ogranichennymi fizicheskimi vozmozhnostyami – a person with limited physical abilities. 
Halmari (2011: 829) points out that the early 1990s saw a cluster of publications in 
psychological and educational literature, proposing the ‘people-first’ approach, where 
premodified nouns (disabled people) were to be replaced by postmodified nouns (people with 
disabilities). Just as with anti-sexist language campaigns, the purpose of introducing such 
conspicuously coherence-disturbing and therefore attention-grabbing linguistic units was, 
supposedly, to make them stand out in discourse since in the English language positive 
attributes normally precede nouns they modify, e.g. beautiful people, healthy people, normal 
people, making the new coinages sound odd.  
Bias against people with a disability occurs whenever a disabled person is identified 
by that disability. For example, it is biased to refer to someone as “blind”; one must say 
instead, “a person who is blind”, “a person who uses a wheelchair” instead of “wheelchair 
bound”. In this context it should be pointed out that focusing on someone’s ‘difference’, be it 
disability, skin color, gender, etc. when it is irrelevant appears to be intrinsically dysphemistic 
no matter how “polite” a nomination one chooses to resort to. The ‘people first’ proposal is 
based on the idea that postmodification automatically draws attention away from the 
disability, however, the use of an odd marked postmodified noun phrase in place of the 
expected unmarked one is likely to have the contrary effect of bringing extra attention to what 
it attempts to hide.  
Some words will be considered pejorative by the individuals they nominate regardless 
of the type of intentionality underlying their production and despite the fact that their 
introduction was motivated by considerations of politeness, since they stereotype or 
stigmatize certain groups of people by metonymically focusing on and communicating the 
relevance of only certain of their features, such as a disability or sexual orientation, rather 
than focusing on the whole individual as a person. By way of an illustration we can list such 
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substantivized adjectives as disabled, dyslexic, diabetic, deaf and epileptic. These lexical 
units will most likely be considered offensive as they define or ‘perspectivize’ people by their 
physical characteristics or condition of health.  
In general, metonymic namings whereby a salient aspect of a person is used to stand 
for the person as a whole will always be dysphemistic. For instance, in referring to someone 
as ham sandwich or a piece of ass, the speaker is not saying that the person has the sandwich 
or possess a certain body feature, but that the person is a sandwich/ass and by identifying the 
whole person by some salient and, in speaker’s opinion, dominating with regard to a certain 
context feature, the speaker will be taken as expressing a derogatory attitude. 
Papafragou (1996) has noted that there is a general cognitive tendency to 
metonymically identify an individual (or an object for that matter) through one salient 
property he/she possesses (cf. non-PC related metonymies used in relation to humans “the 
ham sandwich is getting impatient”). This practice has its roots in the general tendency of 
human cognitive systems to maximize relevance that is, deriving the greatest cognitive effects 
possible for the smallest processing effort (Sperber and Wilson 1995). The metonymic 
isolation of salient properties of objects or individuals for identification is accomplished when 
salient property is focused upon through the process of selective attention.  
In Papafragou’s (1996) opinion, using a metonymy to name the referent by ‘holding 
up’ the property for the hearer to attend to it, allows the speaker to express her attitude toward 
him or her in an indirect way, an enables the hearer to infer that she wants him to know that 
she thinks that the referent possesses this property. Metonymy achieves relevance either by 
representing the most cost-efficient way to identify an individual or, in the cases where its 
primary function is to draw the hearer’s attention to a particular property of the referent, the 
extra effort that may be required to identify the referent of the description is offset by extra 
effects that would not be achieved by the use of a more direct utterance. Metonymies help to 
focus or defocus certain aspect of what is said and weaken the speaker’s commitment to what 
is said by distancing the speaker from what he/she is communicating.  
Metonymic PC references appear to be functioning in a similar ways with slurs (see 
section 5.2.1) in that they “allows us to focus more specifically on certain aspects of what is 
being referred to” (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980:37).  In contexts where mentioning particular 
features of people is not relevant (does not produce any positive cognitive effects compared to 
the available salient alternatives), such metonymic use highlights the fact that, the speaker 
resorting to such lexical units is not interested in the person as a person but only as a 
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representative of a certain racial, ethnic, religious etc. group, or a customer (cf. the absence of 
such terms as European Americans and people living without disabilities). 
Mentioning somebody’s features of, for instance, physical appearance in contexts 
where it is irrelevant, that is where the use of this word or expression does not contribute to 
the overall relevance of what is being communicated, but rather focuses on some other aspect 
of it. In other words, where it does not generate maximal cognitive effect with a minimum of 
processing effort (see Sperber and Wilson 1995: 158). I suggest that it is not even the lexemes 
used in each particular case that make all the difference, but rather the very process of 
metonymically referring to another human being by a nomination, at odds with what those 
people themselves prefer to be called as well as being in a position to do so, that is perceived 
as derogatory.  
Thus comparing the following statements from an imaginary police report, one can 
immediately grasp the difference between what is communicated in uttering them: 
(14) 
(a) Two people walked into the store yesterday (neutral, hence PC) 
(b) Two African-Americans (blacks, people of color etc.) walked into the store 
yesterday (the use of PC lexemes in an utterance which cannot qualify as PC according to our 
definition) 
(c) Two Russians/immigrants (etc.) walked into the store yesterday (use of neutral 
lexeme in an utterance which cannot be classified as PC according to our definition – likely to 
trigger stereotypical inferences similar to the case of ‘two African-Americans”) 
(d) Two gay people (or “a lesbian couple”) walked into the store yesterday (doesn’t 
belong in the script – hard to imagine such a statement in a police report) 
While “two African-Americans” will most likely trigger inferences about them being 
the ‘main focus’ of the police report in the cognitive environment of hearers based on the 
stereotypical frame/script, mentioning “2 people” will be less likely to lead to such 
conjectures (the people could themselves be victims of a crime or a roof collapse etc.) 
 Mentioning someone’s race as the most relevant feature of the person in question will 
in most contexts constitute a face-threatening/dysphemistic behavior irrespective of using the 
allegedly PC nomination African-American. There are, however, contexts where mentioning 
race can be relevant for the conversation at hand. Consider: 
(15) 
(a) Peter and Mary came to the polling station. 
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(b) Two African-Americans came to the polling station. 
Even when the name of the referent is known, the metonymic PC expression will 
provide the easiest access to the targeted referents in the context of a census, statistical 
surveys or public opinion polls. In keeping the record of the percentage of black, white, etc. 
voters, information about people’s race is often more relevant to the corresponding agencies 
than their names. Thus for a population census or a statistical agency, wording such as (b) 
may be the most processing-saving way of achieving maximal positive cognitive effects in 
identifying the referents of an expression. However, as I have tried to argue throughout this 
thesis, to people outside this trade, euphemistic/PC partonymies cannot be considered as 
appropriate referential shortcuts.  
Mentioning somebody’s otherness only emphasizes this otherness. In this context, it 
was very hard to understand the slogan which was very popular during the 2005 Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine: The police should be with the people! Could such a slogan do 
anything but not ‘hit home’? The “in-your-face” presupposition that this slogan triggered (the 
police are not the people) could only distance the police further from the protesters by 
focusing on its otherness stemming from the use of the ad hoc concept PEOPLE* narrowed to 
include only the protesters. Thus claiming the relevance of one’s otherness in contexts where 
it is irrelevant can only convey a derogatory attitude.  
From the relevance-theoretic point of view, resorting to a part-for-whole metonymy 
for naming purposes appears to be dysphemistic in itself as there does not appear to be much 
of a difference between referring to someone by using an orthophemistic or a dysphemistic 
part-for-whole metonymy. Moreover, as Wajnrub (2005: 11) argues by quoting Macquarie 
Dictionary's Sue Butler, that it really is the act of calling someone a "something," whatever it 
is precisely, that increasingly offends: "Today's taboos are all about the labels you use for 
people. So that the sentence 'you are a . . . ' is practically a no-no <…> because you're putting 
it in the same context as things which are clearly rude." Wajnrub (2005: 247) 
It is not information encoded by utterances, but the fact that speaker focuses on one’s 
race, nationality, sex, gender, age, sexual orientation as relevant for the eventuality at hand, 
that is responsible for classifying the utterance as PC or not PC. In other words, it is not the 
lexemes themselves that carry information about an utterance being neutral, racist or 
politically correct but the intention of the speaker which underlies their use and the 
appropriateness of mentioning somebody’s otherness in a given context, thereby claiming 
such information as relevant. 
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In this section I have argued that metonymic nominations, despite being the most 
relevant effort-saving means of identifying their referents, will be interpreted as 
dysphemistic/politically incorrect when used in relation to humans. Mentioning and focusing 
on some aspects of one’s identity rather than the whole person, constitutes intrinsically 
derogatory behavior when it is irrelevant to the conversation at hand.  
In chapter 9 I will show that the ‘people-first’ proposal is semantically naïve (see also 
Halmari 2011: 839) in that its proponents believe that once new words have been introduced 
for old concepts, these new words will not be subject to the common fate of euphemism, 
where euphemisms inevitably, sooner or later, end up being associated with the features of the 
referents they were originally designed to hide.  
Applying the strategy of ‘avoiding discriminating against’ irrespective of whether one 
is talking about discriminated groups or people with disabilities on the one hand and 
criminals, corrupt politicians and even inanimate objects (which are not in need of being 
equal with anything or anyone) on the other, leads to an absurd situation. If all people are 
equal, then representatives of such intrinsically politically, morally, ethically etc. negative 
social groups as serial killers, prostitutes and corrupt politicians deserve similar nominations 
with positive connotations (respectively: sex worker and people with hard to meet needs) as 
other supposedly discriminated against groups which needed to be renamed (people living 
with AIDS, hearing-impaired people). In this respect Halmari (2011: 838) notes that 
compared to “Prosecutors not convinced killer retarded”, a PC alternative “Prosecutors not 
convinced killer an individual with mental retardation” would be not only awkward but might 
even show some overtones of sarcasm. It appears that the main paradox of PC-related practice 
was that it demanded tolerance to everything except the non-PCers. In other words, it became 
politically incorrect to discriminate against everyone except those who are not politically 
correct. 
Since certain linguistic signs produced by speakers can lead to making adverse 
inference about the type of the speaker, speakers have an incentive to alter what they say to 
avoid that inference to preserve their public self-image or “face”. The fact that some people 
see PC not as a set of anti-discriminatory practices, but primarily as a tool for preserving 
ones’ positive public self-image/face, has led to it being perceived as something opposite of 
what it was meant to be. I elaborate on PC evaluated negatively in the next section. 
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3.4 PC evaluated negatively 
Driven by the widespread assumption in the public and political institutions that 
language shapes thought, influences our worldview, conditions all our thinking about social 
problems and, generally, shapes ontological reality, proponents of political correctness are 
taken to insist that the use of sexist or racist language promotes corresponding types of 
thought and call for introduction of novel expressions, substituting previously used terms with 
the purpose of avoiding prejudice, discrimination and including all society members by 
treating them equally.  
The assumption underlying such line of thinking is known as “linguistic determinism” 
or “the strong version of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis” in linguistics. The hypothesis is not 
favorably looked upon in many linguistic circles, in part because of the popularity of 
Chomsky’s universalistic claims (see McGlone 2001, Pinker 1994b for a critique of the Sapir-
Whorf hypothesis). Sapir (1961) and Whorf (1956) argued that our world view is relatively 
constrained by the linguistic system we employ in representing the world. Whorf held that 
concepts have no existence independent of language. The weaker version of the Sapir-Whorf 
view, known as linguistic relativism, suggests that the world is not given to us directly by 
experience, but that experiences are, in part, mediated by language.   
Researchers like Pinker, however, argue that since mental life goes on independently 
of particular languages, it is not possible to suppress “undesirable” thought by the PC-inspired 
inventions. Contrary to the view suggested by Orwell’s Newspeak,  such concepts as freedom 
and equality will be thinkable even if they are nameless: “There are far more concepts than 
there are words, and listeners must always charitably fill in what the speaker leaves unsaid, 
existing words will quickly gain new sense, perhaps even regain their original senses” (Pinker 
1994b: 82). 
Some holding extreme views of the PC-related linguistic practices equate PC with an 
attempt to control people’s thoughts in the way Orwell’s Ingsoc did through Newspeak. 
Lakoff (2000), however, rightfully remarks that the opponents’ repeatedly cited descriptions 
of the PC phenomenon in the media suggest something much more threatening than is 
actually the case. 
It needs to be pointed out that as a result of PC-related practices in English, for 
example, it has become impossible to talk about most socially sensitive issues (contemporary 
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taboos) without announcing one’s point of view or “stance” towards it. In this respect 
Cameron (1995) points out that today: 
“there is a choice of possible positions: you can say ‘Ms A. is the chair(person)’ and 
convey a more conservative attitude. What you cannot do any more is to select either 
alternative and convey by it nothing more than ‘a certain woman holds a particular 
office’. Choice has altered the value of the terms and removed the option of political 
neutrality” (Cameron 1995: 119).  
With the introduction of the new PC alternatives there is now a choice in most cases 
between resorting to androcentric or to PC terms : man(men) – person(s), people; policeman – 
police officer; chairman – chairperson, coordinator, moderator, presiding officer, head, 
chair; businessman – business executive; he – they, he or she. Speakers of languages are now 
in a position of making a conscious choice which will reflect their views, beliefs and attitudes. 
 The introduction of the salient readily available lexical alternatives to choose among 
created a situation in which some people do not welcome “politicizing” of their words against 
their will or, in the parlance of cognitive-pragmatics, derivation of unintended inferences. 
Cameron (1995) raises this issue in her book “Verbal Hygiene”: 
“<…> at times, “radicals charge that a certain word is, say, ‘racist’; their critics 
indignantly deny this on the grounds that when they use the word they do not intend to 
be racist, and accuse the radicals of ‘reading things in’. At other times, the critics 
stress that words do have meanings independent of speakers’ intentions in using them, 
and that ‘political correctness’ precisely perverts those time-honored meanings. It is 
therefore an attack on the language, and on the possibility of communication” 
(Cameron 1995: 119). 
Today the choice among the expressions Merry Christmas and Happy Holidays (the 
discussion of which term to give preference to is often labeled “The War on Christmas” in the 
conservative US media), Christmas Tree of Holiday Tree or between Founding Fathers and 
Founders clearly signals one’s ideological stance to others. Hearers may choose to interpret 
the greeting Happy Holidays!, as well as any other substitution of Holiday for Christmas, 
either as driven by consideration of economy of expression, a convenient shorthand for I wish 
you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year! or a euphemistic substitute expressing an 
attitude of tolerance to other religions. The utterance of this greeting can be interpreted as 
communicating the unwillingness to utter the religious greeting Merry Christmas! by, for 
instance, conservative media. In a similar way, the proposed renaming of St. Patrick’s Day to 
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Potato Day at one of Los Angeles schools (attested: “The Daily Show” 7.04.09) as a more 
appropriate and hence politically correct substitute can sound very derogatory to the Irish as it 
metonymically declares potatoes as the most salient feature of what it is to be Irish.  
The existence of skeptical, ironic or just plain negative attitude among speakers of 
English to PC can also possibly be explained by the fact that the English word ‘correct’ does 
not have ‘degrees’, it’s not a gradable notion and has more to do with linguistic prescriptivism 
than sensitivity and tactfulness. One can either be correct or incorrect unlike such more vague 
notions as civility, tactfulness, politeness and appropriateness. The word ‘корректный’ 
(korrektniy) in Russian, for instance, and some authors38 suggest that PC is of the Russian, 
namely “Leninist” origin, is quite different and can be found in such collocations as 
некорректный вопрос (inappropriate, but not incorrect question), некорретное поведение 
(tactless/impolite, but not incorrect behavior). Consequently, in Russian the meaning of 
‘политическая корректность’ is closer to ‘political civility’ rather than ‘political rightness’, 
which would be ‘политическая правильность’. If the term ‘political correctness’ is indeed of 
Russian origin, it is interesting to note that something seems to have gotten lost in translation 
as the opposite of корректный (korrektniy) in Russian is not ‘wrong’ or ‘incorrect’, but 
некорректный (nekorrektniy) rather means ‘inappropriate’ or ‘intolerant’. Thus in the 
Russian linguistic environment ‘политическая корректность’ means ‘political civility’ 
rather than ‘political rightness’, which would be ‘политическая правильность’. 
According to Cameron (1995), the term ‘political correctness’ was most likely first 
used in a straightforward way, in the sense of political actions, which the speaker approved of. 
In time, however, its use became laden with ironic connotations as it was extensively used as 
a self-mocking joke to describe the extreme, overly pious or “holier-than-thou” standards of 
behavior. As a result, Talbot (1998) notes that today ‘political correctness’ is used almost 
always in derogatory terms and in contexts where it is characterized as a problem. 
Similarly, Mills (2008: 33) observes that ‘political correctness’ is generally viewed 
negatively, to the point that the term ‘political incorrectness’ is characterized in a positive 
way as something quite risky and daring, criticizing those who are seen to be trying to limit 
                                                 
38 Berman, for example, suggests that “‘Politically correct’ was originally an approving phrase on the 
Leninist left to denote someone who steadfastly toed the party line. Then it evolved into ‘P.C.,’ an ironic phrase 
among leftists to denote someone whose line-toeing fervor was too much to bear. Only in conjunction with the 
P.C. debate itself did the phrase get picked up by people who had no fidelity to radicalism at all, but who 
relished the nasty syllables for their twist of irony” (Berman 1992: 5). 
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freedom of expression.  And since the term ‘politically incorrect’ is assumed to have 
“connotations of daring to voice unspeakable truths which the ‘nanny’ state would prefer to 
keep hidden” (Mills 2008: 114), the negative connotations of ‘political correctness’ are so 
well established today, that it is now virtually impossible to use the term in any positive sense.   
The label ‘PC’ was successful in discrediting the movement to which it was attached 
as can be witnessed by such descriptions as “The new McCarthyism”, “thought police”, 
“Orwellian”, “Fascist” and “totalitarianism”, which “conjure up a Nineteen Eighty-Four 
world of inexpressibility, constriction, and savage repression” (Lakoff 2000: 98). A search for 
“political correctness” on google books yielded titles, discussing how PC corrupts American 
journalism, attacks higher education, sabotages art, causes “pan-cultural dumbing down", 
intimidates, threatens civil liberties, generally tells people to keep their “mouth wide shut” 
and has “racial paranoia” as its unintended consequence. 
As a result, nowadays proponents of neutral language do not use the term ‘PC’ 
descriptively, in RT terms, to refer to their ideology or actions. The term as such is used 
interpretively, about the proponent of such language reforms by the conservative right for 
attack purposes ("you're so PC"), as a disclaimer ("I'm not PC, but . . . " ), or in irony or jokes. 
The predominantly ironic, bordering on negativity, attitude to the notion of PC, 
regarded by some as a form of censorship and an attack on freedom of speech, has prompted 
numerous coinages, which mock the earlier earnest “PC-as-tolerance”-induced language, as 
can be illustrated by the example in which a professor of economics at University of Texas 
(interviewed on the “The Daily Show” 14.11.2011) suggests to extend legal protection to ugly 
people or Uglo-Americans (ugly Americans) analogously to the way it has been done with 
racial and ethnic minorities, women and disable individuals. Among the examples of such 
mock-PC are vertically-challenged (short), chronologically-challenged (old) and follically-
challenged (bald), pavement deficiency (sidewalk), the otherwise located (people who are 
absent – example from “The Big Bang Theory” Season 04 Episode 02) etc., which effectively 
undermine serious attempts at language reform and deflect attention away from the 
underlying issues.  
The mixing of real and invented examples of suggested reforms, together with the use 
of the term ‘PC’ in contexts where it is uniformly negatively evaluated, has led to a genuine 
confusion amongst the general population about what ‘PC’ actually is. The following section 
analyzes instance of satirical ‘mock-PC’ language use, i.e. neologisms, which speakers coin 
by analogy with the existing constructions employed by proponents of PC. 
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3.5 Mock PC, alternative curse words and creativity 
This section considers examples of “mock-PC”, which are interpretively used ‘echoic’ 
nominations created analogously to the PC language already in use. I suggest that PC 
expressions which fit the Optimal Innovation Criterion, put forward by R. Giora et al. (2004), 
will receive ironic interpretation and thus cannot be treated as instances of PC, but rather are 
instances of mock PC. 
In exploring recent trends in the use of neologisms such as adverbial phrases 
incorporating ‘challenged’ (physically challenged, intellectually challenged, etc.), derivational 
uses of ‘-centric’ and ‘-ism/-ist’ (ethnocentric, racialism, fattist) and changes in phrase 
structure brought about by both a restructuring of noun phrases (people with disabilities as 
opposed to disabled) as well as the apparent demise of the generic pronoun ‘he’, Nagle et al. 
(2000) draw attention to the difficulties in delineating clearly between serious and humorous 
usages of many phrases, which came to be associated with PC-inspired language. Among 
such phrases, the authors name vertically challenged for short or follically challenged for 
bald/balding (Nagle et al. 2000: 265). The challenging nature of such a delineation is also 
discussed by Johnson and Suhr (2003), who argue that it is problematic to describe the 
empirical effects of PC on actual language usage as the analyst would be placed in the 
methodologically awkward position of having to stipulate a priori both what does and does 
not ‘count’ as linguistically ‘PC’. 
The effects of PC practices as well as negative reactions of the general public to such 
use of language appears to stem from the general ‘anti-euphemistic’ vein, noted by Leech 
(1969: 139-140), which he sees as a modern age tendency of referring to a taboo subject by 
means of a jokingly indelicate periphrasis, often a figurative one: kick the bucket for die, etc. 
He considers this tendency to be motivated by a, deeply-rooted in the human mind, urge to 
overcome one's fear by turning its object into a matter of familiarity and fun, or, in other 
words: “If it’s ridiculous, it can’t be very threatening” (Lakoff 2000: 100). 
This anti-euphemistic tendency noted by Leech in the 1960s continues to flourish 
today, which is illustrated by the joke-generating potential of PC expressions: amphibian 
American – frog, osmotically challenged – thirsty,   creatively re-dyed – stained, 
motivationally challenged – lazy, person with hard to meet needs – serial killer or the 
differently pleasured – sado-masochists. A show on the US channel ABC is called 
“Romantically challenged”, which means single or not with somebody at the moment. 
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This practice even gave rise to entire books where, for instance, the most famous fairy-
tales are rewritten in the mock-PC language. Thus the author James Garner describes the title 
character Goldilocks as melanin-impoverished, and the bears’ porridge as thermally-
enhanced. He is purposely overusing PC-inspired phrases to replace concepts like WHITE 
and HOT that do not require any PC substitutions, at least as they are used in the given 
context, so that he can exaggerate the PC-related practices of replacing potentially offensive 
lexical units with more neutral ones. In the foreword the author of the book makes the 
following disclaimer:  
“If, through omission or commission, I have inadvertently displayed any sexist racist 
culturalist, nationalist regionalist, ageist, lookist, ableist, sizeist, speciesist, 
intellectualist, socioeconomicist, ethnocentrist, phallocentrist, heteropatriarchialist, or 
other type of bias, as yet unnamed, I apologize and encourage your suggestions for 
rectification”. Garner (1994) 
The author’s disclaimer is important here since, as shown in the experiment by Pfaff, 
Gibbs and Johnson (1997), readers attempt to match their perceptions of the author and their 
understanding of the point of the story. So for the participants who recognize the author's 
intended satirical object, there should be a tendency to describe the author as critical of 
political correctness, and for those who do not recover the intended object, the descriptions 
refer to liberalism. 
The mock-PC version of the following lines from the Gettysburg Address delivered by 
President Abraham Lincoln on November 19, 1863: “Four score and seven years ago our 
founding fathers brought forth upon this continent a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and 
dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal” would probably run as follows: 
“Four score and seven years ago our founding caretakers (founders), with the expressed 
explicit permission of the local population – the Native Americans,  brought forth upon this 
continent a new nation™, conceived in Liberty™, and dedicated to the proposition that “all 
womyn/men are created (born) equal”®”. 
The use of mock-PC neologisms like the horizontally-gifted instead of fat or the 
chronologically gifted for old created by analogy with such earlier serious attempts of 
linguistic reform as  physically disabled for invalid, which have by now already successfully 
become conventions of both language and use, are certainly not part of any serious 
conversation in the English language. In this respect, Allan and Burridge (2006: 82-83) 
rightfully note that it is doubtful that expressions like person with hard to meet needs (for 
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serial killers) or the differently pleasured (for sado-masochists) were ever more than satirical 
inventions.   
The popularity of this type of linguistic creativity39 whereby speakers coin mock-PC 
neologisms, can be explained by the fact that in processing such lexical material, hearers are 
able to recognize the familiar behind the novel as, similarly to euphemisms, all PC 
expressions in general (both real and mock) are the result of metarepresentational substitution 
of some salient nomination one considers dispreferred for some other preferred one. 
According to the Optimal Innovation Hypothesis (Giora et al. 2004), people are more willing 
to start using novel language if the neologisms evoke familiar concepts.  
Thus in the following example from “The Daily Show” (01.11.2012) Afroamericans is 
easily recognized in the new coinage Akroamericans (which does not really require a PC-
inspired substitution): 
(16) 
Paul Ryan: One of my best friends is from Akron. 
Jon Stewart: Oh, really. “One of my best friends is from Akron. I’d let my daughter go 
out with someone from Akron”. Well, if that was true, you’d know that they prefer to 
be called Akroamericans. 
Effective novelty is such that induces change but is rooted in salience to the extent that 
it allows for the recoverability of the familiar (Giora 2003). The Optimal Innovation 
Hypothesis suggests that such neologisms as War against Terra (instead of terror) or 
Weapons of mass distraction (instead of destruction) will catch on easily. In order to qualify 
as optimally innovative, an (ostensive) stimulus must: 
(a) involve a novel – less or nonsalient– response to a given stimulus, which 
differs not only quantitatively but primarily qualitatively from the salient response(s) 
associated with this stimulus and at the same time, 
(b) allow for the automatic recoverability of a salient response related to that 
stimulus so that both responses make sense (e.g., the similarity and difference between 
them can be assessable.  
To the extent that a linguistic innovation allows an insight into some salient meanings 
while promoting new ones, it is optimally innovative and pleasurable (Giora et al. 2004). For 
example, it is easy to recognize the familiar Shut the fuck up! in the novel Shut the f...ront 
                                                 
39 Bauer (1983: 63) – following Lyons – defines productivity as rule-governed innovation, as opposed 
to creativity, which is said to be rulechanging. 
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door!; anger management in Anchor management (attested example: “The Daily Show” 
03.03.2010 referring to the biased nature of Fox News); shit happens in shift happens, as well 
as effortlessly reach the intended interpretation of such exclamations as Mother Ford Ka! and 
Market Farmer!  
The echoic nature of mock-PC expression enables hearers to recognize the salient PC 
expressions by analogy with which they were coined and not some stigmatized referent, to 
which the PC expression itself refers. The referent of the PC expression is thereby “pushed” 
one inferential step or metarepresentational level further. Such practices converge with and 
reinforce the main large-scale goal of PC-inspired language reform as an attention-grabbing 
device, which is bringing people’s unconscious biases to consciousness by defamiliarizing/de-
automatizing the familiar40, insisting on seeing the object as opposed to mere recognition 
through deliberately increasing effort required for processing a stimulus by claiming that it is 
relevant.  
The mocking attitude to PC-inspired neologisms also arises when there is a perceived 
discrepancy between the way it aims to represent the world and the way things are actually 
perceived to be. In such cases utterances containing both PC and mock-PC expressions 
achieve relevance by ironically echoing some attributed thought and speakers can express the 
‘dissociative’ attitude to this attributed thought.  
According to Saussure and Schulz (2009), the contrast between what is said and what 
should be said (the expectations of discourse participants with respect to a certain socio-
pragmatic context or ‘frame’) can give rise to an ironic effect. As a result of this the hearers 
resort to ‘metarepresenting’ conventionalized alternatives whenever they come across a 
‘marked-with-respect-to-a-certain-frame utterance’ using their existing background 
(encyclopedic) knowledge about what should be said in a certain setting. It is the discrepancy 
between what is said and what should, according to the hearer, be said to describe some state 
of affairs, that creates the ironic effect.  
For example, calling a pothole ‘pavement deficiency’ (Allan and Burridge 2006) is 
tantamount to equating the social importance of such topics as discriminating against ethnic 
groups to discrimination against inanimate objects. Such expressions refer to non-human 
                                                 
40 The Optimal Innovation Hypothesis bears close resemblance to the view put forward by Russian 
formalists (e.g., Shklovsky, 1917/1965) and Prague linguists (e.g., Mukarovský 1932/1964, 1978) regarding the 
attention-grabbing capabilities of ‘estranging’ (ostranenie in Russian) of ordinary routines in poetic discourse 
(see also Jakobson 1960; Lakoff and Turner 1989). 
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entities that cannot possibly find any nomination dispreferable and therefore do not actually 
need to be part of any PC-inspired language reform. Neither will such coinages be used 
seriously and without irony/sarcasm in any real conversation. 
Ferdinand de Saussure observed that “Of all social institutions, language is least 
amenable to initiative,” because of what he identified as a “collective inertia towards 
innovation” (de Saussure 1966: 73–4) (see Hughes 2010 for discussion).  
Interesetingly, the existence of satirical uses of PC facilitates acceptance of the very 
ideas the satirists intend to disparage as the use of irony/satire may have facilitated acceptance 
of the more moderate forms of PC.  Unlike PC expressions proper, the mock-PC ones (e.g. 
Amphibian-American for frog) were not coined with the goal of replacing some existing 
dispreferred word or expression that actually required a PC-inspired alternative. They 
function to amuse, entertain and/or criticize PC practices through satire (by showing a 
dissociative attitude to them).  
Calling for change at the lexical level aims at drawing attention to problems at the 
level of conceptualization as PC-related practices represent an attempt to alter people’s 
perceptions of certain signifieds (concepts) by replacing old signifiers (labels) with new ones.  
From the semiotic point of view, the introduction of new PC expressions may be viewed as an 
attempt to call traditional usage into question and replace signs where the relationship 
between the signified and the signifier is arbitrary with the motivated compositional phrases 
where this relationship is not arbitrary anymore but motivated by considerations of avoiding 
discrimination as well as preserving one’s positive public self-image or “face”.  
According to Saussure (2005), cognitive representations of the individuals involved in 
a discursive interaction evolve through time. Unlike individual-specific sets of assumptions, 
which can be relatively easily modified (strengthened, contradicted), culture-specific sets of 
assumptions remain relatively stable. Information that contradicts them does not change them 
but tends to be interpreted as incorrect or abnormal. This position converges with the well-
known cognitive ‘confirmation bias’: confirming pre-existing assumptions is less effort-
consuming for the brain than cancelling them.  
Considering this, the thesis argues, following Giora (2003), that PC practices seen as 
motivated by the goal of bringing people’s unconscious biases to consciousness can only be 
effective when they are still perceived as novel. I will return to this issue in the discussion of 
euphemism treadmill in chapter 9.  
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In the next section I turn to a more detailed examination of the range of goals and 
functions that resorting to euphemistic and PC-inspired language may have in discourse by 
considering the extent to which speakers intend to cooperate with their audience in using such 
language and either facilitate or impede the process of recognition of speaker-intended 
meanings. 
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The chapter discusses functions of euphemisms/PC in various types of discourse.  
Following research by Abrantes (2005) and Attardo’s (1997) distinction between various 
types of cooperation in discourse, I distinguish between, on the one hand cooperative 
euphemisms where there is equal access to information for all parties involved. On the other 
hand there is uncooperative argumentative euphemistic jargon or ‘doublespeak’, which 
speakers resort to in an attempt to conceal or distort some states of affairs as not beneficial to 
them or some third party. In such cases one of the interlocutors has direct access to 
information while the other only attains it through the first one’s version as the relation 
between the word or phrase and the referent is not clear.  
4.1 Conventionalized vs. argumentative euphemisms 
Euphemisms are instances of cooperative communication when it is known (later to be 
referred to as “mutually manifest”, using the notions adopted in Relevance Theory) to the 
participants that the particular linguistic unit is used in place of another dispreferred one to 
refer to some unmentionable subject. Such euphemism is a compromise between the need to 
be accurate and the wish to avoid offence.  Whenever such euphemisms are used, both the 
referent they designate and their concealing intention are transparent to the participants of a 
communicative act (see Abrantes 2005). 
Burchfield (1985: 15) observed that “a language without euphemisms would be a 
defective instrument of communication”. Not all language scholars agree with his assessment. 
Some have argued just the opposite that euphemisms exert a corrosive influence on 
communicative clarity and argue that a well-adjusted, mature society would have no need for 
euphemism at all (Bartsch, 1994; Lutz, 1989). George Orwell (1946) considered euphemisms 
to be useful tools for politicians who engage in the ‘defense of the indefensible’. He 
condemned euphemism as a weapon of mind control that can be used to “make lies sound 
truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind” Orwell 
(1946: 56). 
The functional classifications of euphemisms found in research literature are rather 
heterogeneous. Moskvin (2001), for instance, identifies as many as 6 functions of 
euphemisms in discourse: 1) to stand for names of frightening objects; 2) to stand for names 
of unpleasant and repulsive objects; 3) to signify something, which is considered indecent; 4) 
etiquette euphemisms; 5) to camouflage the true essence of the signified; 6) to name 
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(embellish the names of) organizations and professions, which are not considered 
‘prestigious’. 
Unlike Moskvin’s (2001), Rawson’s (1981: 1) classification is on the leaner side 
drawing a twofold distinction between positive and negative euphemisms. His positive 
euphemisms are motivated by the desire to inflate and magnify, making the euphemized items 
seem more important and positive than they really are. The negative euphemisms are 
defensive in nature, offsetting the power of tabooed terms and otherwise eradicating from the 
language everything that people prefer not to deal with directly. Rawson’s (1981) positive 
euphemisms include what he refers to as ‘fancy’ occupational titles, used to elevating the 
status of certain professions, e.g. using custodian for janitor, counsel for lawyer, the many 
kinds of engineer (exterminating engineer, mattress engineer, publicity engineer, etc.), help 
for servant, and so forth. His negative or defensive euphemisms are the fear taboo-based 
replacements referring, for instance, to supernatural beings. 
It appears that Rawson’s positive and negative euphemisms are two sides of the same 
coin as making something more positive and making something less negative/threatening 
appear to be two dialectic ways of looking at the same mechanism of mitigation of some 
negative emotional response certain words and expressions can trigger in the audience or 
some third party. 
In drawing the distinction between euphemisms based on the degree of their 
conventionalization and the extent to which interlocutors cooperate in resorting to them, 
Abrantes (2005) views conventionalized euphemisms as a face-saving strategy resulting from 
a tacit implicit agreement between conversational participants. The avoided subject is well 
known to the hearer, who is fully capable of what she refers to as ‘decoding’ the true meaning 
lurking behind the speaker’s current lexical choice. In such cases, the author argues,  the 
speaker’s choice and the face-saving intention are transparent to the hearer and both discourse 
partners are glad that there are alternative euphemistic expressions for them to use: the 
speaker avoids being offensive, the hearer recognizes this purpose and engages in a sort of 
complicity with the speaker.  
This type of euphemism can be illustrated by the following example from “The Big 
Bang Theory” (Season 3 Episode 7): 
(17) 
Penny: Okay, we went out a little bit, a long time ago, but we were never like “going 
out”. 
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Leonard: Okay, not to be pedantic, but the last I checked went out was in fact the past 
tense of going out, which I think we all know is a popular euphemism for saw each 
other naked. 
The expression ‘go out’ is referred to as “popular euphemism” in this exchange since 
it is commonly used to refer to one part of the dating scenario (going out to dinner, for 
example) instead of another part of the scenario (sexual intercourse or, in this case also a 
subpart of that, namely ‘seeing each other naked’). The expression ‘got out’ can be said to 
have been conventionalized for this particular use as most speakers will immediately be aware 
of what it is used to cover up upon encountering it in such a context. 
Similarly to Abrantes (2005), Burkhardt (2010: 358) observes that in cases of 
cooperative euphemisms there is a “secret coalition between the parties concerned, a tacit 
understanding of the true reference of a euphemistic expression, e.g. that golden age is used to 
euphemistically refer to old age, is, or at least could be recognized by almost all speakers. In 
such cases, even if the euphemistic character of an expression is obvious to any language 
user, there will, arguably, still be a slight psychological effect of maintaining emotional 
distance, which will make it easier to talk about some axiologically disfavorable state of 
affairs, whenever there is a need to make reference to it, by changing the perspective from 
which the hearer is invited to look at it (e.g. focusing on one part of dating scenario instead of 
another).  
This transparent nature of cooperative euphemisms promotes their acceptance and 
eventual conventionalization in discourse. For example such euphemisms as pass away, join 
the majority, meet the maker for die in English or отправиться к праотцам (otpravit’sia k 
praotsam), отдать богу душу (otdat’ bogu dushu), приказать долго жить (prikazat’ 
dolgo zhit’) instead of умереть (umeret’) – to die in Russian, where the meaning and 
motivation is transparent to all communication participants, are used as a sort of verbal 
anesthesia in order to change the perspective from which to conceptualize death. Such 
euphemisms are used to avoid triggering axiologically disfavorable reactions in hearers 
associated with the negative connotations of the straightforward nomination die. As 
previously discussed, such lexical substitutes have traditionally been used in place of direct 
nominations prohibited by social norms to hedge or attenuate some aspects of reality capable 
of causing communicative discomfort. Words and expressions like these can be thought of as 
linguistic makeup or fig-leaves, since they provide ways to refer to things which are 
considered bad or forbidden in a certain society at a certain period of time without actually 
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uttering the words that designate those things directly.  Such use is, according to Cameron, a 
“<...> form of superstitious word magic whereby I can convey the meaning without 
ambiguity, but without actually allowing the taboo word to pass my lips” (Cameron 1995: 
74).  
Unlike the transparent cooperative euphemisms, which are used as a response to 
taboos and subscribe to social conventions of avoiding offence, argumentative uncooperative 
euphemisms, are deliberately used as a tactic of avoiding a negative reference, by 
intentionally concealing and/or distorting some aspects of reality as strategically motivated by 
speaker’s interests (e.g. not damaging the image of some public figures). The result is the 
occurrence of vague expressions, which are not always easy to interpret, i.e. the hearer is not 
always able to recognize the referent behind its name. Such expressions are often not 
immediately recognized as euphemisms and the lexical units they make use of are taken 
literally.  
Speakers resort to uncooperative euphemistic jargon in an attempt to conceal some 
states of affairs as not beneficial to them, mislead the hearer, hide their mistakes, soften 
unpleasant messages etc. Such euphemisms function as a “manipulatory veil” (Mey 2001). In 
such cases speakers appear to be using some ‘wrong’ lexical form for their intended concept 
(e.g. operation for war) for argumentative purposes. According to Carston (1999), speakers 
can resort to wrong lexical forms either because they simply have the wrong concept-form 
mapping in their lexicon, as a slip of the tongue or with a specific purpose in mind.  
Both the cooperative and the argumentative euphemisms can be used as a result of a 
taboo on mentioning the denotation (e.g. the explicit proscription against using the name of 
the Lord in vain found in the Bible discussed in section 2.1.1), as well as a proscription where 
it is not the denotation itself that is tabooed but there exist a verbal ban on certain linguistic 
forms used to refer to it as they can potentially trigger associations considered axiologically 
disfavorable by some hearers. 
Euphemistic expressions for sensitive topics like disease or death, sex or the human 
body are carefully chosen by speakers in a deliberate attempt to veil something, which they 
believe can have an adverse perlocutionary effect on the hearer, e.g. the one resulting in 
hearer holding a certain negative belief regarding the speaker’s face: “the speaker is impolite, 
insensitive, intolerant”, etc. Such substitutes are ubiquitous in any human language since 
taboos, which give rise to them, have been found to be a linguistic universal by many 
researchers (see section 2.1). They function as linguistic shields, are relatively salient on 
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people’s minds due to their conventionalized nature (they are marked in their euphemistic 
function in dictionaries) and, therefore, are easy to find whenever the need to resort to them 
arises.  
In section 8.3, I show that hearers interpreting utterances containing such expressions 
in contexts relative to which they are conventionalized and unmarked, immediately recognize 
such euphemisms for what they are, without having to pay special attention to the particular 
intention underlying their production. However, it is necessary to point out that the degree of 
conventionalization of lexical units is subject to variation both cross-linguistically and intra-
linguistically. Terkourafi (2001:130) defines conventionalization as a relationship holding 
between utterances and context, which is a correlate of the (statistical) frequency with which 
an expression is used in one’s experience of a particular context. Conventionalization is thus a 
matter of degree, and may vary in different speakers, as well as for the same speaker over 
time.  
In the thesis I do not view conventionalization in the sense that some expressions in a 
particular language are conventionalized in comparison with some others. That is, 
conventionalization is not viewed as a property of linguistic expressions, “inhering in 
particular linguistic forms” (Brown 1995: 154). This does not preclude the possibility that a 
particular expression may be conventionalized in a particular context for virtually all speakers 
of a particular language, thereby appearing to be a convention of the language. In this thesis, 
by ‘conventionalized euphemism’ I mean that it is listed as “euphemism” in dictionaries, 
which appears to be the only criterion for conventionalization bearing at least some degree of 
objectivity.  
I agree with Terkourafi (2001) who argues that an expression can be regarded as 
conventionalized for some use only in relation to some context. Uttered in a different context, 
the same expression will no longer be conventionalized, and the recognition of the speaker’s 
intention will then be crucial for recognizing the intended meaning. By way of an example, 
we can take the lexeme gay, which not only changed its salient meaning diachronically from 
cheerful to homosexual, but whose salient meaning in the English-speaking discourse of 
young people currently acquired a new meaning of boring, uninteresting, along with lame 
(which earlier was used only to refer to a person’s physical handicap), e.g. “The movie was so 
gay/lame”. 
The cooperative/uncooperative nature of euphemisms is a crucial factor in establishing 
the degree to which they become conventionalized in discourse. The line between cooperative 
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and uncooperative euphemisms, however, is very thin and dynamic as the following section 
shows.  
Chapter 4. Functions of euphemisms/PC in discourse 
124 
 
4.2 The issue of cooperativeness 
Attardo (1997: 756) distinguishes between two levels of cooperation in discourse: 
speakers may be locutionary cooperative without necessarily being perlocutionary 
cooperative. Following Abrantes (2005), we may consider some euphemisms (most 
conventionalized ones) to be locutionary cooperative and perlocutionary cooperative, while 
others only locutionary cooperative – cooperation takes place only on the semantic level 
(ostensive stimuli are successfully decoded by conversation participants) while there is no 
cooperation on the perlocutionary level (by intentionally using the “wrong” word forms, 
speakers pursue some hidden self-interest or positive self-presentation agenda which is not, in 
relevance-theoretic terms, manifest to hearers as, for example, in the case of political speeches 
or reporting about war). If both locutionary and perlocutionary cooperation are present, the 
euphemisms gradually become the established, commonly accepted and even desired and 
expected responses in discourse to unmentionable subjects and the urge to speak about them.  
Abrantes (2005: 97) suggests that in the case of locutionary cooperative but 
perlocutionary uncooperative euphemisms the speaker is aware of the intrinsic negativity of a 
subject, as well as the effect it might have on the hearer, if it were to be openly mentioned in 
discourse. Yet she cannot simply avoid it, and for this reason chooses to use a euphemism 
instead, mostly not to veil the subject but rather to conceal or disguise it. The hearer in turn 
has no access to the subject to which the speaker refers, since the euphemism is sufficiently 
effective not to be explicit. Therefore the hearer derives only the inferences that the speaker 
wants him to derive (no cooperation at Attardo’s perlocutionary level takes place). The only 
way the hearer can identify the true referent of the euphemism is by gathering background 
information (provided it is available or ‘manifest’ to him). An example of such an 
uncooperative euphemisms is using the internally displaced people to refer to refugees who 
have been driven out of their homes but cannot leave their home-countries41. 
Abrantes (2005: 97) argues that in cases of perlocutionary uncooperative euphemism, 
when (or rather if) the hearer comes to know what the speaker actually means by using a 
particular lexical form, he becomes aware of the purpose of the speaker’s lexical choice, 
mostly one of concealing or disguising an unpleasant fact, in order to make it sound less 
harmful. According to the author, the next step is to question this intention and the 
information the hearer receives after this point. The concealing function consists in disguising 
                                                 
41 Attested example from the National Public Radio broadcast 10.12.2005 
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a segment of reality, so that the euphemistic expression presents a fact in such a way that the 
hearer’s attention is guided to specific parts of the utterance or to opinions which are 
deliberately chosen by the speaker. The author concludes that the speaker’s manipulation of 
this discursive reception does not necessarily imply a loss of face, since the speaker does not 
actually lie. 
Consider the following dialogue from the show “Friends” (Season 1 Episode 3): 
(18) 
Phoebe: Hi guys! 
All: Hey, Pheebs! Hi! 
Ross: Hey. Oh, oh, how did it go? 
Phoebe: Um, not so good. He walked me to the subway and said ’We should do this 
again!’ 
All: Ohh. Ouch. 
Rachel: What? He said ’we should do it again’, that’s good, right? 
Monica: Uh, no. Loosely translated ‘We should do this again’ means ‘You will never 
see me naked’. 
Rachel: Since when? 
Joey: Since always. It’s like dating language. You know, like ‘It’s not you’ means ‘It 
is you’. 
Chandler: Or ‘You’re such a nice guy’ means ‘I’m gonna be dating leather-wearing 
alcoholics and complaining about them to you’. 
Phoebe: Or, or, you know, um,  ‘I think we should see other people’ means ‘Ha, ha, I 
already am’. 
Rachel: And everybody knows this? 
Joey: Yeah. Cushions the blow. 
Chandler: Yeah, it’s like when you’re a kid, and your parents put your dog to sleep, 
and they tell you it went off to live on some farm. 
Ross: That’s funny, that, no, because, uh, our parents actually did, uh, send our dog 
off to live on a farm. 
Monica: Uh, Ross. 
Ross: What? Wh- hello? The Millners’ farm in Connecticut? The Millners, they had 
this unbelievable farm, they had horses, and, and rabbits that he could chase and it 
was- it w- .....Oh my God, Chi Chi! 
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In this exchange, the participants are considering ways to ‘translate’ the special 
language or jargon of dating into plain English and argue that resorting to this sort of 
language cushions the blow similarly to the way parents, who are trying to spare their 
children’s feelings, basically resort to lying about the death of their pets (put to sleep is used 
in this exchange as a euphemism for euthanasia) by using the, conventionalized for adults 
relative to this context of use, formula went to live on a farm (upstate), which children 
perceive as the true state of affairs. Children are not aware of what this code actually means 
for adults. Therefore this formula can be considered as conventionalized and cooperative 
relative to the context of a conversation between adults, but uncooperative relative to the 
context of talking to one’s children. 
When euphemisms are cooperative on both the locutionary and the perlocutionary 
levels, speakers have access to the same amount of information, share the same 
conversational goals and these goals are strongly mutually manifest to them42. In this case, 
both the underlying referent and the covert nature of the situation are mutually manifest to the 
interlocutors. A typical example of this group of euphemisms is the strategy of ‘bleeping’ 
expletives on TV. Seeing such ‘fig leaves’ as f!?k written down is the same as seeing the 
swearword because everyone knows what it stands for as illustrated by the following example 
from “The Daily Show” (29.07.2010): 
(19) 
(CNN Live “American Morning”, onscreen text says “Goldman Bleeping Sachs”) 
Goldman Sachs announcing a zero tolerance policy for profanity in employee e-mails. 
You can’t even spell out swearwords with asterisks. 
Jon Stewart: Lesson learned. So let the word go forth: Goldman may still f**k you 
over, from now on they themselves will refer to it as making sweet sweet love to you.   
These are taboo-related types of euphemisms, which do not attempt to mislead the 
hearer regarding the true meaning behind the indirect expression. In this situation people 
don’t say what they mean because the underlying tabooed or disfavorable referent is 
transparent (mutually manifest) to both parties. To borrow an example from Pinker (2007), in 
the film “Fargo”, two kidnappers with a hostage hidden in the back seat are pulled over by a 
policeman because their car is missing the plates. The kidnapper at the wheel is asked to 
produce his driver’s license, and he extends his wallet with a fifty-dollar bill protruding from 
it, saying,  
                                                 
42 On the notion of (mutual) manifestness, see section 1.2 of the thesis. 
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(20) 
So maybe the best thing would be to take care of that here in Brainerd. 
 The statement, of course, is intended as a bribe, not as a comment on the relative 
convenience of different venues for paying the fine. Pinker (2007) asks why is it that people 
don’t just say what they mean: “If you let me drive off without further ado, I’ll give you fifty 
bucks”? His answer is that in this situation the speaker says something the he doesn’t literally 
mean, knowing that the hearer will interpret it as he intended. At the same time, the hearer 
knows that the speaker intended it to be interpreted that way, the speaker knows that the 
hearer knows that the speaker intended for the hearer to it interpret it that way, and so on. 
The notions of mutual manifestness and plausible deniability are, thus central to 
understanding why speakers resort to euphemisms. Pinker explains that with the veiled bribe 
one might guess that the technicalities of plausible deniability are applicable: bribery is a 
crime, and by avoiding an explicit proposition, the speaker could make a charge harder to 
prove in court. But this veil is so transparent that it is hard to believe it could fool a jury.  
The use of both cooperative and uncooperative euphemisms can serve the purpose of 
distancing or “moral disengagement” of the communicating parties from the content of 
utterances, which according to Bandura (2002), may center on redefining harmful conduct as 
honorable by moral justification. The notorious morally disengaging agentless passive in 
Mistakes have been made works via diverting hearer’s attention from the agent and 
highlighting the ‘mistakes’ which is tantamount to saying that the speaker deplores that fact 
and that was not his/her responsibility (the responsibility is diffused). It serves as an 
exonerative tool by creating the appearance that reprehensible acts are the work of nameless 
forces, rather than people (for discussion see Bolinger 1980). 
In examining practices aimed at cleaning up language by regulating its use Cameron 
(1995: 73) considers how language can be criticized for being obfuscatory: the allied forces’ 
use of the phrase collateral damage during the 1991 Gulf War to describe the unintentional 
killing of civilians in attacks on military targets. Cameron points out that the classic argument 
for finding this usage objectionable would be that (a) it is jargon or “code” (a sort of 
militarese), and to the extent that hearers cannot decode it, it conceals what is actually going 
on; and (b) it is a euphemism, abstract, agentless and affectless, so that even if people succeed 
in associating it with a real act or event they will be insulated and disassociate from any 
feeling of repulsion and moral outrage.  
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Cameron (1995) defines the term collateral damage in several different ways, 
including the killing of civilians, civilian deaths, murder and mass murder. She correctly 
notes that these other expressions use plainer words, but are no more neutral descriptions than 
collateral damage itself. She notes that to choose any one of them, and to object to any one of 
them, is in essence to state a position on the morality of the military action. If one finds the 
military strategy unjustifiable, she will probably regard the nomination civilian deaths as a 
euphemistic denial of agency which implicitly devalues lives of the victims; if one believes 
that the strategy is regrettable but necessary she will probably find murder and mass murder 
overtly emotive and biased. It is impossible to come up with a description which could not be 
interpreted as in some way taking sides.  
Abrantes (2005: 98) echoes this line of thought in her analysis by arguing that once the 
euphemism is detected, as well as the concealing function it intends to achieve, its 
euphemistic power decreases:  
“Whenever we hear of collateral damage in the context of a war, for example, we have 
no doubts as to what is meant by it. In this particular case, the official euphemism 
almost seems like a conventional one, since it is immediately decoded: ‘collateral 
damage’ means ‘death of civilians’ in the course of war. Yet there is a great difference 
between calling it by this euphemism and using a conventional expression for death, 
such as ‘to pass away’. ‘Collateral damage’ has a moral side to it, since it does not 
refer to a naturally caused death, but to death as the result of a deliberate action of war 
(even if its primary goal was not to kill civilians, but to aim at military targets). The 
sense of guilt, irrespective of whom it is imputed to, is part of the word itself. 
Expressions like this have the side effect of pulling the veil aside and revealing what 
they were supposed to hide. Since the original disguising intention is also revealed, the 
utterance raises distrust and its effect turns out to be quite the opposite of what it 
intended”.  
The author concludes that uncooperative euphemisms are more susceptible to a short 
existence than the cooperative ones. I will analyze this claim further in the discussion of 
euphemism treadmill in chapter 9 of the thesis.  
Comparing the functions of euphemisms in discourse from the point of view of degree 
of their cooperativeness, we can see that argumentative euphemisms like collateral damage 
present more complicated cases than transparent euphemisms like pass away. The former 
does not permit the same immediate, conventional and unambiguous ‘translation’, as in the 
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case when the latter is used. The hearer may go first to the more common meaning, and only 
later realize that it was a euphemistic expression. In some instances double-processing is 
required in order to recognize a euphemism for what it really is. Adding extra inferential steps 
creates a sort of a buffer and encourages ‘moral disengagement’, a strategy which is probably 
in most demand in political and military types of discourse as, according to Enright (1985), in 
political and military discourse euphemisms play a more sinister role than in the traditional 
areas of sex, medicine and religion. I now turn to analyzing the argumentative functions of 
euphemisms in various types of discourse. 
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4.3 Spheres of use: jargon and doublespeak 
As discussed in the previous section, in addition to being used as substitutes for direct 
nominations referring to traditional strongly tabooed and merely sensitive topics, today 
euphemisms are increasingly used argumentatively in political and military discourses, which 
have become very “productive areas of lexicalization as governments have become more 
democratically accountable and sensitive to adverse public opinion of their wars” (Trask 
2007: 89).  
Modern commercial discourse also abounds in argumentative lexical units used with 
the intention of covertly encouraging potential customers, passengers, patients etc. to buy a 
certain product or service. Such lexical strategies are resorted to for argumentative purposes 
in an attempt to elevate the attractiveness of goods and services so that they could appeal to as 
many consumer groups as possible as demonstrated by such airline terms as first-class, 
business class and economy (cheap) class; shops for petites and plus sizes or Renoir 
Collections; family-size tooth-paste and Jumbo packs of detergents; cf. hedged English best 
before found on food-product packages vs. straightforward Russian goden do (good until), 
pre-owned for used, affordable housing instead of low-income housing, efficient instead of 
small apartments, studio in place of one-room apartment, starter home for small house as well 
as compact car for small car.  
Used in commercial discourse, such lexical units focus on and exaggerate positive 
aspects and features of the goods and services while defocusing and diminishing the negative 
features that could have an adverse effect on how successfully they sell. As a commercial 
strategy, widely exploited to incite potential clients towards the consumption of a product, 
such practices appear to bear a strategic manipulative dimension according to the definition of 
prototypical manipulative communicative behavior, put forward in Saussure (2005). These 
practices meet at least one of the (necessary but not sufficient) preconditions for being 
manipulative – information conveyed by the utterance must be of benefit to the speaker:   
“[…] communication is manipulative when the speaker retains some relevant 
information, or provides the correct information in order for the hearer to conclude 
that he should behave in a way which favours the speaker’s interests, without being 
aware of it” (Saussure 2005: 119-120). 
As a recent illustration of the use of euphemisms in commercial discourse, consider 
for example, how the PR teams of beef-producing industry seek substitutes for the term pink 
slime to make it more appealing to customers. The term pink slime was coined in 2002 by the 
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US Food Safety and Inspection Service to refer to heat-treated highly processed low quality 
beef; a food additive consisting of animal by-products treated with ammonia gas to kill 
foodborne illness causing bacteria, which makes the by-products legally fit for human 
consumption. Nowadays beef-producing industry refers to it as lean finely textured beef 
instead of pink slime since it is perceived as less disgusting and implies that it is beef and not 
an unknown processed chemical meat substitute, which is the connotation that accompanies 
pink slime. 
This awkward substitution strategy is extensively mocked in the US media. “The 
Daily Show” (28.03.2012), for instance, mocks this manipulative substitution by pointing out 
that the PR teams make an attempt to elevate the status of this ammonia-soaked centrifuge 
separated byproduct paste and make it sound like “the Cashmere of beef”, “bovine velvet” or 
“Johnny Walker pink” by referring to it with an alias lean finely textured beef. 
The suggested allegedly more accurate alternative to pink slime is mocked on “The 
Colbert Report” (02.04.2012) as an awkward attempt to conceal the underlying reality: “Pink 
slime is believed to be an offensive slur against slurry because it already has a lovely name. 
The real name of the product is ‘lean finely-textured beef’. It’s called ‘LFTB’. (cut to 
Governor Rick Perry): “Let’s call this product what it is. And let ‘pink slime’ become the 
term of the past”. 
Jargon is a linguistic code shared by, for example, members of the same social and/or 
professional circle, which is designed to be intelligible for the insiders while creating 
communication barriers to keep out out-groupers, who find it unintelligible. Allan and 
Burridge (2006: 50) explain that to the initiated, jargon is efficient, economical, and even 
crucial in that it can capture distinctions not made in the ordinary language.  
Professional jargon is a good example of how language can be used in an attempt to 
frame reality by communicating the relevance of certain assumptions over others. Jargon is 
the language peculiar to a trade, profession, or other group, what some scholars call 
‘specialist’, ‘technical’ or ‘restricted’ language (Firth, 1968), ‘sublanguage’ (Kittredge and 
Lehrberger, 1982), and others ‘register’ (e.g., Zwicky and Zwicky, 1982; Wardhaugh, 1986). 
In ‘militarese’ jargon, for instance, disengage from the enemy or tactical withdrawal can be 
misleadingly used instead of the straightforward retreat. Sometimes new euphemistic jargon 
is introduced to replace medical terms which were often earlier euphemisms themselves e.g., 
people with long term mental illness for CMI, itself a euphemistic acronym for chronic mental 
illness. Brook (1974:72) points out that the use of initials as in t.b. for tuberculosis serves the 
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double purpose of promoting conciseness of expression as well as glossing over the reference 
to unpleasant reality.  
It goes without saying, that the perfect candidates for obscuring the relations between 
words and their referents are brand new coinages, which require most inferential work and 
sometimes will even fail to be decoded at all as, for instance in the case of such acronym as 
NEET, which economists use to refer to those who are not in employment, education or 
training43 or index (example from the show Rake Season 1 Episode 13) used in police reports 
to euphemistically stand for indecent exposure of a person (where person is itself a general-
for-specific metonymy-based euphemism). Borrowings from other languages appear also to 
be suitable strategic framing material. The use of words of Greek and Latin origin as well as 
French borrowings in English, for example, is likely to trigger connotations to the effect that 
these lexemes are more scientific and technical, while their Anglo-Saxon counterparts are 
often considered dispreferable. For example, honorarium, campaign contributions and per 
diem sound more “prestigious” than bribes, graft and expenses-paid vacations.   
Another area where jargon is common and widespread is medicine. According to 
Chamizo Domínguez (2009), medicalese is a paradigmatic field where the words used by 
patients widely differ from the words used by physicians or related professionals. The author 
observes that sometimes this divergence in words is not due to the fact that the terms in 
medical jargon are more precise and less ambiguous than the “normal” words are; most of the 
time it is due to the urge to use vocabulary that no ordinary person is able to understand and, 
for such a reason, doctors keep hold on the unfathomable mysteries and prestige of the 
medical profession itself. Thus technical terms like hepatic losses are frequently used in 
medicalese instead of haemorrhage or bleeding, which would be easier to understand for most 
people outside of medical professions. 
When doctors face the need to explain a medical condition to patients or refer to death 
in their medical records, they can resort to such euphemisms as therapeutic misadventure, 
diagnostic misadventure, diagnostic misadventure of the highest magnitude, negative patient-
care outcome, patient failed to fulfill his wellness potential. There is often a need to refer to 
the so-called stigmatized (itself a euphemism here) terminal or ‘shameful’ diseases as cancer, 
(euphemisms for which include tumor, growth, C, the Big C) mental illnesses and sexually-
transmitted diseases in a circumlocutionary way.  
                                                 
43 Attested example: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/16/world/europe/youth-unemployement-in-
europe.html?src=me&ref=general, also discussed in Crystal (2008: 3). 
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 The extreme cases of strategic framing in, for example, medicalese are sometimes 
achieved through uncooperative complete withholding of assumptions. The degree to which 
assumptions are attempted to be withheld (the degree of cooperativeness) can vary 
considerably as illustrated by the following examples from medicalese jargon: 
(21) 
1) You have fluid on your lungs as your heart is not pumping hard enough 
2) Your heart is a bit weaker than it used to be 
3) Your heart is not pumping properly 
4) Your heart is not working efficiently 
5) Your heart, which is a pump, is not working as well as it should, causing back 
pressure on the lungs 
6) Your heart is not as strong as it used to be 
7) Heart strain 
8) Your heart is not strong enough 
9) You have left ventricular dysfunction  
(examples from Tayler and Ogden 2005). 
Unlike the framing by attempting to completely withhold assumptions, there can be 
cases when assumptions are not withheld, but speakers rather attempt to alter relevance of 
certain aspects of what they are attempting to communicate. For instance, the framing attempt 
of substituting foetus for the  embryolike entity or activated egg can in certain cases indeed 
make it easier to experiment on an embryolike entity, whereas one may not have wanted to 
manipulate a foetus (for discussion see Chamizo Domínguez 2009: 442-443). 
If, in the case of cooperative euphemism, the hearer has no difficulty in grasping what 
the utterance refers to, and can then process and evaluate it accordingly, in jargons this is not 
the case. The hearer grasps an informative content, but is not aware that it is not quite 
equivalent to the referent. Therefore, he cannot evaluate it globally and objectively. That is 
what happens in utterances 7) and 9) of example (21), which can’t be relevant to an ordinary 
patient because of the lack of background knowledge. 
When a doctor uses utterances such as 2), 3), 4), 6) or 8), she does not substitute a 
strongly connotated expression with another one according to conventional patterns, nor does 
she create a euphemistic-like figurative way of presenting the information. The doctor simply 
fails to provide relevant information because of the lack of information embedded in these 
utterances with regard to the amount of information expected by a patient with a possibly vital 
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health problem. And, what is said about the medicalese can be said about the legalese, which 
is “an extremely powerful weapon with which the legal profession is able to intimidate and 
dominate the public” (Allan and Burridge 1991: 202). 
Crystal (1987) poses an interesting question “Why should people deliberately use 
language that is unintelligible to all but a few initiates?” and provides three general reasons as 
an answer:  
“<...> to mark a person’s membership of a group, to provide a pastime, and to ensure 
secrecy when performing a particular activity <...> Genres of secret language can thus 
be found in many cultures and in a wide range of human contexts, especially those 
where there is a concern to avoid detection (as in criminal argot, or cant), or to keep 
something hidden from lay people (as magical formulae)”. Crystal (1987: 58) 
The use of jargon is thus dysphemistic to out-groupers despite the fact that everyone 
necessarily uses jargon for some purpose or other.  Jargon can become cooperatively 
euphemistic once its meaning becomes transparent to all participants.  
In addition to such professional spheres as medicine and law, jargon can be used in 
political discourse as an attempt at concealing some deplorable facts of reality and presenting 
the state of affairs in the light that is beneficial to the speaker or some third party, as can be 
seen from the following conversational exchange from the “Daily Show” (21.03.2011): 
(22) 
Jon: Aasif, the United States military, now finds itself at war on three fronts.  
Aasif: (acting as a senior Libya correspondent) Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. Hold 
on there, General Patton. Who said anything about war? This is merely a coalition 
partnership imposing a no fly zone through a military operation. 
Jon: Aasif, we're not just grounding planes here. We've destroyed entire columns of 
tanks outside of Benghazi. 
Aasif: That's right. That coalition partners have now assured me they will never fly 
again.  
Jon: Well, let's call it a robustly enforced through missiles no fly zone led by the 
United States military and its ...  
Aasif: Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. Who said anything about "led by"?  
Cut to President Obama: We will provide the unique capabilities that we can bring to 
bear to stop the violence against civilians including enabling our European allies and 
Arab partners to effectively enforce a no fly zone.  
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Aasif: We're not leading. We're enabling.  
Jon: How many missiles did the US fire yesterday?  
Aasif: 122. 
Jon: How many did Britain fire yesterday?  
Aasif: Two. 
Jon: We're enabling our partners' enforcement of a non-war to get rid of Moammar 
Qaddafi.  
Aasif: Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa. No one said anything about getting rid of Qaddafi.  
Jon: We bombed his compound.  
Aasif: No, no, no.  
Cut to Fox News: The compound residence of Libyan leader Moammar Qaddafi has 
been hit. The Pentagon is saying it was not one of our tomahawk missiles.  It was a 
British cruise missile that slammed into Qaddafi's compound overnight. 
Aasif: We didn't do anything except enable.  
Jon: So the British bombed Qaddafi’s compound ...  
Aasif: No, no, they implemented a building inrubbleflication program.  
Jon: ... to hasten regime change.  
Aasif: No, no, no. No, to encourage Libyan leadership self-relocation.  
Jon: Aasif, what are we doing? Why are we doing this? Why these semantic 
acrobatics? Why not just “we're bombing Libya to get rid of Qaddafi”.  
Aasif: No, we are odyssey dawning to reenable enforcement of the refreedoming of...  
Jon: Just stop. Just stop.  
Similarly to the “semantic acrobatics” ridiculed in the example (22) above, in another 
example, the US Admiral Mike Mullen has referred to war in Libya as “Limited Operation, 
narrow in scope focused on supporting the United Nations Security Council resolution, which 
very specifically focused on humanitarian efforts protecting the civilians in Libya” (quoted on 
“The Colbert Report” 21.03.2011). Euphemistic reframings like this are referred to as 
‘semantic shenanigans’ by people outside of the field of linguistics research.   
In his critique of the language of corporations, institutions, and governments, Lutz 
(1989) writes that they use ambiguity, vagueness, and inflated language to misdirect. He 
argues that, for individuals and institutions alike, wordiness, jargon, and euphemisms replace 
frankness in dealing with people and complicate what might otherwise be simple and direct. 
Along the lines of the proposed view of euphemisms as fulfilling the cooperative and 
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argumentative functions, Lutz (1989: 96) draws a distinction between euphemisms proper and 
doublespeak44: “When a euphemism is used to deceive, it becomes doublespeak.” 
Lutz points out that basic to doublespeak is incongruity: “the incongruity between 
what is said, or left unsaid, and what really is; between the essential function of language and 
what doublespeak does – misleads, distorts, deceives, inflates, obfuscates” (Lutz 1989: 96). 
Therefore, the sole purpose of doublespeak is to make the unreasonable seem reasonable, the 
blamed seem blameless, the powerless seem powerful. Such language is often associated with 
governmental, military, and corporate institutions. In this respect, Chomsky noted that “to 
make sense of political discourse, it’s necessary to give a running translation into English, 
decoding the doublespeak of the media, academic social scientists and the secular priesthood 
generally” (Chomsky 1993). 
Chomsky’s statement should certainly not be taken to mean that during the process of 
communication one English word or expression actually needs to be translated, or in his own 
parlance ‘decoded’, to yield something meaningful in English. This would be tantamount to 
saying that English is translated into English. However, Relevance Theory has shown that in 
addition to the mere decoding, utterance comprehension involves rich inferential processes at 
the core of which is relevance-driven recognition of speaker intention. Understanding certain 
utterances containing euphemistic and politically correct words and expressions will require 
more cognitive processing effort than others depending on the degree of their 
conventionalization relative to some context of utterance and the degree of their salience in 
speaker’s cognitive systems. The following section addresses the role of intentionality in 
causing certain utterances to be labelled as ‘euphemistic’/‘PC’ in discourse. 
 
                                                 
44 The term ‘doublespeak’ was coined as an amalgam of two Orwellian expressions, ‘doublethink’ and 
‘newspeak’, both of which appeared in Orwell’s dystopian novel Nineteen Eighty Four in which he represents a 
totalitarian society where the ruling party is in the process of inventing a new artificial language, Newspeak. 
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Chapter 5. X-phemisms/PC and intentionality 
This chapter addresses the role of intentionality in assessing the x-phemistic value of 
utterances. It analyzes derogatory and appropriated uses of slurs and explains the notions of 
euphemistic dysphemisms and dysphemistic euphemisms. 
5.1 Euphemisms/PC as intentional acts of communication 
The debate around figurative language processing in general, as well as euphemisms 
and the related phenomenon of political correctness in particular, touches upon one of the 
fundamental questions in linguistics and philosophy of language: do words have meaning 
independent of speakers’ intention in using them? For instance, if someone is charged with 
using a racist language, can that person accuse the critics of “reading meanings in” by 
denying the intention to be racist and offend anyone by that kind of language? Is it indeed 
possible not to be racist if one preempts a discourse string by a disclaimer “I’m not a racist, 
but…”? 
The issue is complicated by the fact that, most of the time, intentions are of implicit 
nature, known only to the speaker, sometimes only in retrospect or ‘post-dicto’, and need to 
be guessed/recognized by the addressees in the process of online interpretation of utterances. 
To illustrate this point, lets’ take the following situation from the show “Two and a Half 
Men” (Season 9 Episode 16) in which a man named Allan praises his friend’s girlfriend for 
being educated and having a refined taste for opera but then realizes that this makes his own 
girlfriend angry and attempts to remedy the situation: 
(23) 
Allan: That’s one talented lady! And by talented I mean ‘annoying’ and by ‘lady’ I 
mean “bitch”. 
In this example the speaker is making his intentions explicit ‘post-dicto’ by asking the hearer 
to read/interpret his utterance as ironic despite the fact that ironic interpretation was clearly 
not originally intended. 
Sometimes hearers may not have necessary background information which would 
provide necessary tools for recognizing the true intentions behind speaker’s utterances as in 
the following example from “The Big Bang Theory” (Season 5 Episode 16) where the 
University President is saying that Dr. Sheldon Cooper  (who happens to be a workaholic 
theoretical physicist) is obligated to take a vacation: 
(24) 
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Sheldon: But if I don’t come in to work, what am I supposed to do with myself? 
University President: Read, rest, travel. I hear Afghanistan is nice this time of year. 
Sheldon (turning to his friends): Sarcasm? 
Howard: No, you should go! 
Sheldon is unsure whether to recognize President’s utterance about Afghanistan as 
sarcastic or literally intended, since he has no frame of reference for what Afghanistan is like 
at that point due to spending most of his time in the laboratory and being oblivious to the 
ongoing war in that part of the world. 
Consider the following exchange (from the “Daily Show” October 21, 2008): 
(25) 
Anderson Cooper CNN 360: In recent days McCain and his running mate Sarah 
Palin have raised the S-word… 
Jon Stewart: Oh no you didn’t!... Wait, which one… ‘scallywag, scoundrel, salsa-
dancer, superman’? I’ll tell you what, I’m gonna write down the S-word that I think 
the McCain campaign called Barack Obama and then we’ll see if I’m right… 
[Cut to McCain and Sarah Palin each charging Barack Obama with being a ‘socialist’] 
By uttering ‘S-word’ Anderson Cooper actually attempts to communicate that 
‘socialist’ is a forbidden or ‘tabooed’ word in the 2008 US presidential campaign discourse. 
That is why it is undesirable to say it out loud as it may be for some reason offensive to the 
potential audience. Therefore he chooses to cover up the allegedly undesirable or dispreferred 
lexeme by wording his statement in an opaque manner and letting the hearer derive or “infer” 
the underlying meaning. This substitution also happens to echo (is modeled after) the way 
another strongly proscribed derogatory lexeme is commonly replaced by ‘the N-word’ in 
discourse. 
It appears that in order for an utterance to be meant as an insult, the speaker must 
intend the utterance to be an insult and that intention must be, or be capable of being, 
recognized as such by the object of the insult or a third party. There are however instances 
when the offensive effect is generated when no offense is intentionally meant. For example, 
the racial dysphemistic slurs are so “explosively derogatory”, enough so that, according to 
Croom (2011: 11) just hearing them mentioned (as opposed to intentionally used with the 
purpose of offending someone) can leave one feeling as if they have been made complicit in a 
morally atrocious act. 
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Faced with the S-word hearers can and are very likely to generate an inference to the 
effect that uttering ‘S-word’ was a slip of the tongue (in this case ‘S-word’ will be 
pragmatically enriched to ‘N-word’) and that McCain campaign actually resorted to using a 
racist slur to talk about the African-American presidential candidate Barack Obama. Another 
possible candidate for the ‘slip of the tongue’ inferential path, the one Jon Stewart pretends to 
be following for humorous effect, would be one of the notorious ‘four-letter words’, the ‘F-
word’ (fuck).  
Since these inferences are of implicit nature the speaker can always deny having 
communicated them and thereby avoid being responsible for whatever meanings speakers 
may have derived from that particular utterance. Thus in example (25) the McCain campaign 
can certainly deny having resorted to the racist slur by saying that they did not ‘say’ anything 
of the kind.  
Allan and Burridge (2006) claim that it is not merely context that leads underspecified 
expressions like the f-word (fuck) or the c-word (cunt) to be immediately understandable; it is 
the shared common ground in the salience of the so-called SMD lexicon (lexical units 
associated with sex, micturition, and defecation). However, in cases like the above, the ‘S-
word’ is not a representative of the Allan and Burridge’s SMD lexicon and there are 
numerous other sensitive and tabooed topics speakers may choose to ‘cover up’ by resorting 
to such substitutions. Guided by the relevance-seeking nature of pragmatic inference, the ‘N-
word’ is immediately understood and inevitably enriched to the original racial slur as it is one 
of the constituent parts of the interdependent and co-activated frames.  
Indeed, some researchers find substitution practices like these to be controversial and 
objectionable. Hill (2008: ix), for instance, argues that such substitutions are an even more 
powerful site for the reproduction of racializing practice than is the moment of shock when 
the reader encounters the words spelled out. With the ellipses, both writer and reader share a 
false comfort – we are not the sort of people who would ever spell these words out – that is 
immediately contradicted by what is silenced in a deep presupposition – we both know these 
words”. In such cases, the underlying dysphemisms are, in relevance-theoretic terms, strongly 
mutually manifest to the interlocutors. 
It is interesting to note in this respect that diachronically, the same linguistic form can 
trigger activation of totally different frames. Thus in discourse on the US civil war the ‘S’-
word would most likely be assigned to the ‘slavery’ frame and therefore immediately 
inferentially enriched to the relevant ‘slavery’ and not to ‘socialism’. Within the same frame 
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of civil war, for instance, agriculture and resources were used to refer to “slavery” in 
speeches of leaders of confederacy of southern states. 
It is also very significant that both ‘the S-word’, ‘the N-word’, ‘the F-word’ and other 
fig-leaf like cover-ups formed along the same pattern ‘the x-word’, e.g. ‘the c-word’ for 
‘cunt’, are all used with the definite article ‘the’. The “x–word” substitution coined after the 
‘N-word’ is very common today. Sometimes it is used to generate a humorous effect as can be 
seen from the following example from the show “How I Met Your Mother” Season 7 Episode 
13): 
(26) 
Lily: You really wanna read our kid bed-time stories about monsters? 
Marshall: First of all, I wouldn’t use the M-word! Only they can call themselves that. 
As Allan and Burridge (2006: 135) point out that the “x-word” substitutions are as 
much proper names as the Himalayas and the Pope, immediately recognizable to the normal 
speaker of English despite the fact that, though there is only one set of Himalayas and only 
one Pope, there are thousands of <…> words beginning with n-, c- and f-. It can thus be 
assumed that these are new ‘proper names’ given to the existing concepts, an epiphenomenon 
caused by the need to change how something is referred to in discourse. Such instances can be 
viewed as attributive (as opposed to referential) uses of definite descriptions and from the 
point of view of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), the gap between the encoded 
meaning of such a definite description and what that description contributes to propositional 
content in a particular context is bridged by the relevance-guided pragmatic inference.  
From the relevance-theoretic standpoint that the N-word is used with the definite 
article similarly to the way ‘the waiter’ and ‘the check’ may be preceded by the definite 
article as such representations are constituent parts of larger stereotyped sequences of actions 
(scenarios or scripts, see Schank and Abelson 1977) that defines a well-known situation 
which make the specific sets of related assumptions strongly mutually manifest.  
Euphemistic language use is necessarily deliberate. “Accidental euphemisms”, if there 
is such a thing, will not be processed as such. Hearers should somehow be able to become 
aware that a euphemism has been used even without necessarily having to be able to label a 
discourse string as “euphemistic”. Many speakers who are non-linguists simply do not have 
the necessary terminology in their cognitive arsenal, i.e. they are not familiar with the notion 
of ‘euphemism’. What such speakers do become aware of, though, is a sort of effect 
consisting in holding the belief that some weaker lexical form has been used instead of some 
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stronger one, which could have been used, but was not and understand (in relevance-theoretic 
terms ‘metarepresent’) this stronger form accordingly. This process will inevitably involve 
mental representation of the relevant salient (or in relevance-theoretic terms ‘strongly 
mutually manifest’ in the interlocutors’ cognitive environment) dispreferred alternative 
expressions instead of which the euphemism has been used. 
The use of x-phemisms appears to be intentional in the sense that they are part of 
conscious linguistic behavior performed for special pragmatic purpose and one can’t be x-
phemistic or politically correct by accident. In order for these strategic conscious 
communicative practices to work and be perceived as such, the specific x-phemistic/PC 
intentionality-attitude underlying their use must be recognized and ascribed to speakers by 
their audience.45 In order for a discourse string to give rise to the euphemistic/PC 
interpretation, its addressees must recognize that a different, stronger and contextually 
inappropriate word or expressions could have been used instead of the one actually uttered but 
was not due to face-saving considerations. From the relevance-theoretic standpoint 
euphemistic and PC language can be viewed as relying on such representations of salient 
alternatives (metarepresentations) in order to be produced and understood. 
According to Rawson (1981: 3) euphemisms may sometimes be used unconsciously. 
He notes, however, that instances of such a use include mainly linguistic units that appeared 
so long ago that hardly anyone remembers the original motivation. Rawson exemplifies this 
category by such now orthophemistic terms as cemetery (from the Greek word for ‘sleeping 
place’), which replaced the more deathly graveyard (Rawson 1981: 3). Thus it is probably 
safe to assume that in the predominant majority of cases, being euphemistic/PC means 
behaving intentionally and such verbal behavior can be explained using the tools provided by 
a theoretical model of ostensive communication. 
                                                 
45 Euphemisms/PC, for instance, can be used to express a humorous/ironic attitude to what is said. For 
instance, one can produce an ironic understatement “He is only a little tipsy” about someone who is completely 
drunk. 
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5.2 Assessing the x-phemistic value 
5.2.1 Derogatory and appropriated uses of slurs 
As already discussed in section 2.1, following Allan and Burridge (2006), there is no 
such thing as an absolute taboo, absolute euphemism or dysphemism, which would hold for 
all cultures and times: “Like euphemism, dysphemism is not necessarily a property of the 
word itself, but of the way it is used” Allan and Burridge (2006: 45). According to the 
authors, the x-phemistic value of utterances entirely depends on, or in Allan and Burridge’s 
own words ‘wedded to’ context, place, time and intentions that lurk behind them.  
While acknowledging the central role of intentionality and context in assigning x-
phemistic values to utterances, Allan (2014) concedes that although particular language 
expressions are not necessarily euphemistic in all contexts, it ignores reality to pretend that 
ordinary people do not speak and act as if some expressions are intrinsically euphemistic and 
others dysphemistic – for instance, loo is euphemistic whereas shithouse is not.  
Allan and Burridge (1991: 21) suggest the hypothetical context of “being polite to a 
casual acquaintance of the opposite sex in a formal situation in a middle class environment” 
as one in which orthophemisms and euphemisms are likely to be used in place of a 
dispreferred alternative (dysphemism). As we can see, in naming the middle class politeness 
criterion (MCPC) as the one that establishes a default condition for resorting to 
orthophemisms and euphemisms, Allan and Burridge view context as a set of situation-
specific socio-cultural extra-linguistic variables-cues, which can constrain the interpretation 
process.   
Similar to the frame-based view of politeness proposed by Escandell-Vidal (1996, 
2009) and Terkourafi (2001), among others, Allan (2014) suggests that such socio-cultural 
variables take the form of cognitive frames/scripts against which the appropriateness of 
(linguistic) behavior is evaluated. Different contexts-frames impose different standards of 
appropriateness. 
Socio-cultural contextual variables (e.g. social status, gender, age, etc.) are also 
considered important in triggering euphemistic interpretations by Fussell (1983) and 
Senichkina (2006:), who suggests that it is possible to test whether a given linguistic unit is a 
euphemism by applying the following appropriateness conditions: “imagining resorting to it 
while conversing with an interlocutor of a higher social status” Senichkina (2006: 21). 
According to these authors, if a unit is appropriate to use under certain circumstances, fulfills 
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a softening (hedging) function and ameliorates the denotation, then the unit in question is a 
euphemism.  
Sometimes it is very difficult to establish the exact x-phemistic value of the expression 
with any degree of objectivity without taking sides. This point can be illustrated by a 
politically charged expression anchor baby, which is as a pejorative substitute for a lengthy “a 
child born of an immigrant in the United States”, used as a tool by which a family can find 
legal foothold in the US, since those children are automatically allowed to choose United 
States citizenship. The term is generally demeaning to both children and their parents as such 
‘nicknaming’ is based on a dehumanizing metaphor ascribing human children functions of 
inanimate objects (anchors) in a derogatory reference to the supposed role of the child. It is 
interesting to note that the fifth edition of the New American Heritage Dictionary initially 
defined this term, considered to be a racist and deliberate effort to dehumanize immigrant 
children by many, as neutral:  
(27) 
Anchor Baby, n. A child born to a noncitizen mother in a country that grants 
automatic citizenship to children born on its soil, especially such a 
child born to parents seeking to secure eventual citizenship for 
themselves and often other members of their family. 
This sparked controversy in the media and later the label ‘offensive’ was added to the 
entry in the online version of the dictionary by its editors to show that in uttering this 
expression speakers can and often do show their negative attitude to this phenomenon. This 
example shows that judgments regarding what may or may not be appropriate in certain 
situations are individual and differ from person to person, let alone culture to culture or 
different periods of time (see Warren 1992). 
I agree with van Dijk (2008), who argues that it is not the social situation that 
influences (or is influenced by) conversation, but the way the participants define such a 
situation. On his view, contexts are subjective constructs designed and updated in interaction 
by participants as members of groups and communities. He rightfully observes that if contexts 
were objective social conditions or constraints, all people in the same social situation would 
speak in the same way. Thus van Dijk (2008: 22) assumes a cognitive stance towards context 
as “subjective participant representations of communicative situations”, not as the 
communicative situations themselves: “[…] contexts are not some kind of objective social 
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situation, but rather a socially based but subjective construct of participants about the for-
them-relevant properties of such a situation, that is, a mental model” (van Dijk 2008: 56)46.  
Croom (2011) discusses the observation previously made by Hom (2008) and Hornsby 
(2001) to the effect that semantic and pragmatic theorists make rather different claims and 
generally disagree as to the role of intentionality in assessing the x-phemistic value of 
utterances. He notes, in this respect, that semantic theorists advocate the context-independent 
view of slurs where the derogatory content of a dysphemistic slur gets expressed in every 
context of utterance as it is part of its lexical meaning, whereas pragmatic theorists argue that 
derogatory content is rather context-specific, i.e. that which gets pragmatically communicated 
by the slur. Let us examine this in more detail. 
Slurs are traditionally regarded as “a conventional means to express strong negative 
attitudes towards members of a group” (Richard 2008). They ‘target’ racial, ethnic, religious, 
gender etc. groups by derogating47 them, e.g. portraying the group as inferior and/or 
despicable. They also vary in intensity of the conveyed contempt. The ‘targeting’ is 
accomplished through, for instance, referring to the hearer or some third person’s race, 
ethnicity, or nationality in such terms as to cause a face affront. The face affront can be 
caused intentionally as well as unintentionally. The speaker who utters slurs without having 
racist beliefs or intentions is regarded as having resorted to slurs unintentionally. The 
unintentionally used slurs are referred to as ‘gaffes’ by Hill (2008: 88), who notes that the 
actual linguistic content of slurs and gaffes can be identical; one commentator’s slur is 
another’s gaffe.   
Slurs are characterized as strictly tabooed linguistic expressions (see Anderson and 
Lepore 2013), along with other pejorative units, such as expletives or swear words (e.g. fuck, 
shit, damn) and insults (e.g. dick, bastard) (for a taxonomy of pejoratives see Hom 2010: 
164). Anderson and Lepore (2013a) note that, unlike derogatory or pejorative expressions 
(e.g. moron, dork), which can target individuals, slurs target whole groups of people: “anyone 
who uses the N-word slurs all black people, but one who uses ‘moron’ needn’t be slurring 
every mentally disabled person” Anderson and Lepore (2013a: 3). 
                                                 
46 Van Dijk’s (1977: 209) original definition of relevance is similar to the one adopted in Sperber and 
Wilson’s Relevance Theory: “a fact, and hence the knowledge of a fact, is important (or relevant) relative to a 
context or in general to a situation if it is an immediate condition for a probable event or action (or prevention of 
these) in that context or situation”. Relevance Theory defines relevance in the following way: “an assumption is 
relevant in a context if and only if it has some contextual effect in that context” (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 122). 
47 According to Hom (2008: 432), derogation is the actual application, or predication, of’ a slur.  
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According to Anderson and Lepore (2013a), the linguistic role of slurs, which the 
authors treat as words prohibited not on account of their offensive content, but because of 
relevant edicts surrounding their prohibition, is exhausted by picking out the same group as a 
neutral counterpart. Their account of slurs, which they refer to as Prohibitionism, explains that 
groups prohibit names not explicitly adopted by them, since calling a group by a name that its 
members have not chosen may be viewed as an attempt to usurp their authority to choose 
(Anderson and Lepore 2013b: 7). On their view, it is the taboo violation resulting from the 
use of slurs that causes offence.  
Croom (2013: 195) suggests an alternative semantic account of slurs, according to 
which by choosing to use a slur instead of some neutrally descriptive term, the speaker prima 
facie intends to express their endorsement of a (typically but not necessarily negative) attitude 
towards the (prototypical) descriptive properties (rather than the agent) possessed by the 
target of their utterance. 
Hornsby (2001: 128-129) observes that derogatory words apply to people and are 
commonly understood to convey hatred or contempt but that for each such word, there is 
another word that applies to the same people but whose use does not convey these things – 
there is, that is, a neutral counterpart. Accordingly, since speakers have a lexical choice 
regarding how they identify their intended targets – i.e., between (a) opting to use a slurring 
term (e.g. the N-word), which is commonly understood to convey hatred or contempt 
(Hornsby 2001: 128–129), or instead (b) opting to use a slurring term’s neutral counterpart 
(e.g., African-American), which is not commonly understood to convey hatred or contempt 
(Hornsby 2001: 128–129) – that speaker will be prima facie expected to choose the term that 
they consider most appropriate for identifying their intended target. 
Croom (2013: 180) notes that considering that the choice of words has often 
determined whether one lives or dies in real-life situations, it is clear that our practical choice 
of terms often carries immense significance. He goes on to say that speakers may exploit their 
understanding of the difference in derogatory force between neutrally descriptive terms and 
non-neutrally slurring terms to strategically choose to use one rather than the other in order to 
most aptly communicate to others, through their lexical choice, the corresponding attitude that 
they are intending to express towards the target of their utterances. 
Slurs have non-derogatory correlates – or at least there are alternative lexical options 
available to speakers such that their use of the slur over a neutral counterpart typically 
expresses a strategic choice that can signal derogatory intent towards a target – and so the 
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speaker’s choice to use the slur is often taken to indicate their approval of the slurring term 
and what it is typically used to convey. 
Slurs are derogatory by virtue of being indicative of the intention to show 
negative/contemptful etc. attitude associated with having selected the particular lexical unit 
from all the possible available alternatives to refer to some group of people, which the speaker 
could have resorted to instead of the slur (see Croom 2005, 2011 for discussion). 
Croom (2011: 1) points out that although it is true that the utterance of slurs is 
illegitimate and derogatory in most contexts, sufficient evidence suggests that slurs are not 
always or exclusively used to derogate. Existing semantic accounts of slurs suggest that 
descriptions used as neutral references to some stigmatized population groups are part of 
literal meaning of slurs together with the expression of a certain derogatory attitude to them 
along the lines of “x and bad/despicable because of it” where x stands for the neutral 
description of a stigmatized population group (cf. Blackburn 1984; Hom 2008; McCready 
2010; Saka 2007). Such theoretic proposals are problematic as they appear unable to explain 
how it is, if derogation is taken to be part of the literal content of slurs, that they can mean 
something non-derogatory or be felicitously applied in relation to some individuals who do 
not belong to the group typically associated with the slur. For instance, when the sexist slur 
‘fag’ is used to target non-homosexual individuals (see Szekely 2008). The semantic accounts 
fail to explain how slurs can communicate non-derogatory meaning between close in-group 
interlocutors as a means to strengthen the in-group solidarity (usually by representatives of 
the very in-group that the slur was originally intended to target)48 (see Croom 2013; 2014a, 
2014b for discussion). 
Some accounts (e.g. Potts 2007, 2008; Camp 2013) are classified by researchers as 
‘pragmatic’ (Bianchi 2014), since they treat slurs in terms of conventional implicatures. Since 
the notion of conventional implicature is not given any theoretical significance in most 
modern pragmatic theories (including RT and neo-Gricean accounts) and such meanings are 
considered to be on the semantic side of the divide, I will refer to such approaches as 
‘semantic’ as well. According to Carston (2003), most of the linguistic devices allegedly 
generating conventional implicatures are viewed in RT as encoding procedural constraints on 
                                                 
48 Bianchi (2014) considers such ‘appropriated’, ‘reclaimed’ or ‘subversive’ uses of slurs for non-
derogatory purposes (which the researcher collectively refers to as ‘community’ use of slur) from the relevance-
theoretic standpoint as cases of attributive (interpretive) use echoing derogatory uses in ways that make manifest 
the dissociation from the offensive contents. 
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the inferential processes involved in deriving conversational implicatures. Carston (2003) 
notes that certain of these devices are seen in RT as contributing to “what is said”, where this 
is construed as an entirely semantic notion. 
Hill (2008) discusses Butler’s (1997) arguments to the effect that since slurs cannot be 
completely eradicated from language thought proscription, they must be reshaped to acquire 
new kinds of subjectivity, i.e. be used as tokens of in-group solidarity. Hill (2008: 58) notes, 
however, that this circulation or ‘resubjectified’ slurs will reinforce the salience of these 
lexical units in discourse, thereby making them continually available for potential malign re-
appropriation. In such appropriative or in-group uses, a slur is a form of “mock impoliteness” 
since it is understood as intentionally nonoffensive (Culpeper, 1996). Leech (1983) has 
argued that interlocutors may act superficially impolite with one another in order to foster a 
sense of social intimacy and to reduce relative inequalities between them, and Culpeper 
(1996: 352) suggests that the more intimate a relationship, the less necessary and important 
politeness is. He argues that lack of politeness is associated with intimacy, and so being 
superficially impolite can promote intimacy. This only works in contexts in which the 
impoliteness is understood to be untrue such as in communicative exchanges between close 
friends or in-group members.  
From the pragmatic point of view, words don’t possess any literal meaning outside of 
the actual context of use. Therefore, depending on the underlying intentions or “who says 
what to whom” (Lasswell 1948), the use of ‘fag’ as well as the N-word, for example, can 
range from the most intensive of slurs to the rapport49-fostering indicator of friendship and 
solidarity and actually by synonymous with ‘my closest friend’ in this ad hoc use50.  
Some semanticists concur that in cases of non-derogatory appropriated uses of slurs 
we may be dealing with a change in meaning (Richard 2008: 9; Hom 2008: 17). The meaning 
of slurs is altered for the in-group use so that, for instance, ‘camaraderie’ becomes part of the 
meaning of the N-word (Saka 2008: 145). Such accounts, however, leave the mechanism 
underlying such semantic change unexplicated. Bianchi (2014) suggests a solution 
“compatible with the semantic and the pragmatic perspectives” (2014: 36) without postulating 
                                                 
49 I use the term ‘rapport’ to mean “affective quality of relations” (see Spencer-Oatey 2005, 2008, 
Spencer-Oatey and Franklin 2009). It refers to “people’s subjective perceptions of (dis)harmony, smoothness-
turbulence and warmth-antagonism in interpersonal relations” while the term “rapport management” is used to 
refer to the ways in which this (dis)harmony is (mis)managed” (Spencer-Oatey and Franklin 2009: 102).  
50 Some scholars argue that diachronically, slurs undergo semantic change and their meanings can be 
broadened and transformed (Butler 1997; Coupland 2007; Keckes 2008). 
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a change of meaning in appropriated uses. She regards the appropriated uses of slurs in 
relevance-theoretic terms as ‘echoing’ derogatory uses in ways and contexts that make 
manifest the dissociation form the offensive contents.  
I suggest that the account regarding appropriated uses of slurs as echoic and 
dissociative would render them ironic as it is verbal irony that is regarded in Relevance 
Theory as an interpretive echoic use displaying a dissociative attitude to the proposition 
expressed (Sperber and Wilson 1995, Wilson 2006). Such an account is only applicable to the 
appropriated use of slurs by the in-groupers who echo derogatory uses in ways and contexts 
that make manifest the dissociation from the offensive content conveyed by a slur as an 
ironical use requires a context where the dissociation from the echoed offensive content is 
clearly identifiable (see Bianchi 2014). If we allow that the appropriated uses of slurs are 
resorted to in their non-derogatory senses by the out-groupers, they could be regarded as 
echoing the appropriated use of slur (e.g. occasion-specific broadening of the N-word to 
denote closeness/camaraderie on the account of belonging to the group targeted by the slur as 
its salient contextually-relevant meaning) by in-groupers echoing the derogatory use of a slur 
with a dissociative attitude, which out-groupers regard as the new non-derogatory meaning of 
a slur (e.g. friend). The attitude expressed by out-groupers resorting to such appropriated uses 
of slurs will be one of endorsement of this new meaning rather than dissociation from it and 
such uses can be treated as phatic (see Padilla Cruz 2007c). Viewing such uses as phatic 
would explain their rapport-management potential, which is one of the functions attributed to 
the use of phatic utterances since Malinowsky’s (1923) seminal work, describing phatic 
communication as a “type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of 
words” and where the linguistic expressions are exploited to fulfill a social function (Žegarac 
1998; Žegarac and Clark 1999a).  
Bianchi (2014) recognizes that, diachronically, the appropriated uses of slurs leads to 
semantic change and facilitates the appropriation process. When the process in completed the 
new meaning of slurs becomes open for use by in-groupers and out-groupers alike without 
conveying any derogatory content. 
In order to produce an x-phemism, speakers choose words and expressions from 
paradigmatic sets of available alternatives due to more positive, in case of euphemisms or 
negative, in case of dysphemisms, connotations associated with their use. A word or 
expression can be considered euphemistic only relative to some other dispreferred one.  Thus 
uttering ‘collateral damage’ presupposes a prior rejection of ‘civilians killed as a result of 
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military operations’ as contextually inappropriate. The preferred word or expression gains 
meaning from the salience of the dispreference. The dispreferred representations has to be 
mentally entertained before producing the preferred one. 
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5.2.2 To praise or to offend? 
In the previous section I have touched upon the issue that although it is true that 
utterance of slurs is derogatory in most contexts, these lexical units are not always used to 
derogate. Speakers can and do resort to swearwords and racist slurs as rapport-enhancing in-
group solidarity markers (see Daly et al. 2004) and in case of the “N-word51’, for example, 
even non-African-American who identify with black hip-hop culture use the otherwise highly 
offensive word with no detrimental consequences (e.g. white hip-hop artist Eminem), since 
this kind of “mock impoliteness” is taken by all participants of communication to be 
intentionally non-offensive, i.e. that in this particular case the speakers has uttered the, 
otherwise racist, slurs without having racist beliefs or intentions.  
From the point of view of pragmatics of x-phemistic language use, Allan and Burridge 
(2006) show that linguistic forms (locutions) conventionalized in their dysphemistic use, can 
sometimes convey a benevolent attitude. Examples of such ‘dysphemistic euphemisms’ 
include calling a good friend an old bastard in English or Сукин сын! (Sukin syn! – Son of a 
bitch!) in both English and Russian, where the allegedly dysphemistic expression is used with 
the intention of praising and admiring someone’s good luck or wit.  
Research by Mateo and Yus (2000) demonstrated that the use of dysphemisms can be 
motivated by several various types of intentionality ranging from offense- to interaction- to 
praise-centered. Example (28) shows that the word cunt, which was regarded as the most 
offensive word in British English in the year 2000 (McEnery 2006: 35), can also be used as a 
token of an in-group friendly greeting:  
(28)  
Now consider the final sentences of this diary report from a British undergraduate: 
A close friend of mine from Norway was eating with myself and my parents. They 
asked about our shared friends and my friend (Eddie) began to tell anecdotes about 
them. Throughout this point he used the word ‘cunt’ repeatedly. I felt very 
embarrassed as I knew that Eddie uses this word in the place of words like ‘guy’ and 
‘dude’. In our circle of friends “Hi cunt” was a friendly greeting (example from 
Culpeper 2010: 323)  
                                                 
51 Used jokingly or as part of a phatic greeting, the N-word is pronounced with the [a]-ending, while the 
[er]-ending pronounciation is considered derogatory. 
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From the point of view of the so-called “naturalist hypothesis” mentioned in section 
2.1, the act of swearing, e.g. uttering the so-called “four-letter words” etc., by itself should 
usually be perceived as dysphemistic and therefore tabooed. However the linguistic forms 
dick and pussy are sometimes allowed on the air in the English-speaking media, but only as 
insults and not as references to anatomical parts. In other words, it is permissible to say 
You’re such a dick!, Don’t be a pussy! and even He’s such a pussy! (meaning a coward) but 
never Your dick… , Your pussy… etc. This shows that, contrary to the naturalist hypothesis 
it’s not the phonological form of the word itself that is tabooed and is in need of 
euphemization, but the way it is actually used in discourse, i.e. the type of intentionality 
underlying the actual utterance.   
By way of another illustration, consider how in episode 1 of season 5 of the US 
animated show “South Park”, euphemistically titled “It hits the fan”, the word shit is uttered 
uncensored 162 separate times (a counter in the bottom left corner of the screen actually 
counts the number of times the word has been uttered) and the point is made to the effect that 
there are acceptable forms of shit on TV. The show mocks the fact that it has become 
acceptable in the US to utter this lexeme in any context where it does not mean excrement. 
The plot of the episode revolves around the fact that everyone in the town of South 
Park is anxiously anticipating the follow up to the announcement that a famous TV Cop 
Drama is going to use the word shit uncensored.  The broadcast of the show leads to 
widespread acceptance of the word, even in schools, causing people to use it constantly, in 
casual conversations and often out of context. A school teacher is forced to clarify the 
acceptable context of use for the previously unacceptable word:  as a noun or adjective 
meaning bad, or as an exclamation of disappointment, the word is acceptable, but as a noun or 
adjective referring to feces, it is apparently unacceptable (a reference to real-life US Federal 
Communications Commission standards of indecency). Eventually all characters in the show 
come to the inevitable realization regarding intentionality and conventionalization of lexemes 
in discourse: it is not that saying shit in itself is wrong but saying it in excess leads to 
boredom with the word, or in the words of one of the characters, Stan Marsh: This sucks. Now 
that ‘shit’ is out, it isn't fun to say it anymore (see the discussion of the ‘associative 
contamination’ and ‘camouflage’ hypotheses related to ‘careers’ of x-phemisms in discourse 
in section 9.2). 
Wajnrub (2005: 40) makes a similar point: “It would seem that not only has FUCK 
lost its referential base but, as an intensifier, it no longer intensifies. In other words, nowadays 
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it takes more FUCKs to achieve what one lone FUCK would have achieved ten years ago.” 
The claim here is that overuse of fuck in the everyday speech of many people has led, to some 
extent, to a lessening of its impact as an expletive. According to Wajnrub (2005: 45-46) it 
started out as a taboo word because of its referential function where fuck stands for the sexual 
act. Then, as the word gravitated over time toward more emotional outlets, it lost its 
referential meaning. The author observes that now the taboo still lurks, though nowhere as 
strongly as even twenty years ago. There is barely a sexual glimmer of meaning in the word, 
as it often means something more like "go figure." 
Wajnrub (2005: 45) notes that although FUCK has no other exact synonym (screw and 
bang come closest), its referential sense is today one of its less frequent uses. Wajnrub (2005: 
47) quotes British writer and politician Wayland Young who contends that the supposed 
alternatives and euphemisms, such as copulate, fornicate, have sexual intercourse, sleep with, 
and make love are either incorrect or inappropriate. He argues that FUCK clearly and 
unequivocally says what it means. It’s worth pointing out in this respect that topics like this 
appear to be taboo irrespective of vocabulary used to refer to them. 
Returning to our discussion of the equivocal nature of utterances containing 
euphemistic lexemes, equally capable of offending and praising, depending on intentionality 
underlying their production. In additional to cases in which a speaker’s dysphemistic intention 
can be accomplished euphemistically, the opposite is also possible – a locution 
conventionalized in its euphemistic meaning can turn out to express a dysphemistic attitude. 
This is illustrated by example (29) in which the US President Barack Obama tells the talk 
show host Jay Leno during his appearance on the “Tonight Show” (19.03.09) that he is a 
decent bowler and that he bowled a 129 score. Jay Leno sarcastically says: “That’s very good, 
Mr. President.” At that comment by Leno, President Obama laughs and says: “it’s like the 
Special Olympics or something.” 
Here Special Olympics is a euphemism for Olympic games for the physically 
handicapped so Obama is actually saying that he bowled like an invalid  by covering it up 
with an allegedly euphemistic special Olympics. However, in this case this particular 
expression will function as a dysphemistic euphemism since by using the euphemistic form, 
the speaker expresses a derogatory attitude: 
(29) 
Obama: I have been practicing bowling 
Leno: Really 
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Obama: I bowled a 129  
Leno: That’s ‘very good’, Mr. President! 
Obama: That’s like Special Olympics or something. No, listen, I’m making progress 
on the bowling… (attested: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZXcgpZwsBPY) 
Another example of a dysphemistic euphemism would be the Russian expression лица 
кавказской национальности (litsa kavkazskoy natsional’nosti - persons of Caucasian 
nationality). Coined after лица еврейской национальности (litsa yevreyskoy natsional’nosti 
- persons of Jewish nationality), which was an awkward attempt during Soviet times at 
curbing presumably anti-Semitic use of еврей (yevrey - Jew), the expression refers to a non-
existing кавказская национальность (Caucasian nationality). Krongauz (2008) argues that 
this seemingly preferred construction is “hypocritical and in fact even more offensive than the 
expressions, which name the nationality directly, while the very unwillingness of referring 
to the nationality directly is indicative of a negative and disparaging attitude to it” 
(Krongauz 2008: 205, my emphasis, A.S.). This statement is crucial to the discussion of 
euphemisms and especially PC – related terms as most of them were coined with the purposes 
of referring to certain aspects of social, economic etc. life by, arguably, more positive 
alternative nominations. 
As already discussed in the previous section, discriminatory language can be analyzed 
as having several functions in discourse: apart from derogation itself, it can serve the purpose 
of group solidarity enhancement and face management. All these uses share a common 
feature: the use of a label implies that the speaker views the target as a group member rather 
than as an individual. In discriminatory discourse members of some social groups are never 
personalized, never depicted as individuals with unique characteristics. (cf. Van Leeuwen 
2000). The difference between the derogatory and appropriated uses lies in the type of attitude 
expressed to such a group labeling, and x-phemistic language serves just this purpose of 
communicating the descriptive propositional content along with the attitudinal expressive one. 
In additional to being explicitly expressed by the derogatory and appropriated uses of 
certain locutions (such attitudes can be seen as derived in the form of higher-level 
explicatures in RT terms, and so as actually being part of what is explicitly communicated by 
the speaker, rather than what is implicated), derogatory meanings may be derived at the level 
of discourses and patterns of language use rather than individual lexical items (Mills 2004: 
154).  This can happen when language use, for instance, is not ‘inclusive’ or prescribes what 
is ‘normal’ (see Ruscher and Wallace 2008). Such implicitly derived derogatory 
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interpretations may arise when organizations, for instance, address invitations to social events 
to “employees and their wives”, which conveys an implicitly communicated message of 
‘exclusion’ to female employees. Similarly, men may ask a female co-worker her opinion on 
a tie or a retail store, but may fail to include her in discussions of sports. In such cases, 
implicit discrimination can be found in what is not said.  
Regarding lexically-based derogation and discrimination, I argue in section 8.3, that 
understanding speaker’s intentions in uttering some discourse string is crucial to ascribing it 
x-phemistic/PC status when some lexical material still stands out as ‘marked’ in discourse. 
Once the linguistic form becomes conventionalized relative to some context of use, it is 
processes in an automatic heuristic-based manner without considerations of speaker 
intentions, all else being equal. Words and expressions, whose x-phemistic meanings have not 
yet become conventions of use acquire meanings in certain contexts as part of hearers’ 
recognition of the intentionality underlying what the speakers say.  
It certainly cannot be denied that some words and expression are generally presumed 
to be dispreferred in most contexts due to some established conventionalized semantic 
meaning. Thus making love can be considered a euphemism for having sexual intercourse, 
which in itself is a euphemism for shag, bang, fuck, screw etc. In such cases the dispreferred 
nature of the expression is not an individual matter but rather a convention of use in a socio-
cultural setting. In the following example, the alleged dispreferred or ‘curse-word’ status of 
the linguistic form fuck is so strong that the movie character McGrubber mistakenly considers 
dysphemistic rammed, humped and bone-session as euphemisms for the ‘F-word’52 thereby 
creating a humorous effect: 
(30) 
McGrubber: …and then we rammed.  
Piper: You what? 
McGrubber: I humped her. I don’t wanna use the F-word cause I don’t wanna 
diminish its beauty in any way but it was fucking great and I’ve never felt this way 
about a bone-session before. 
Piper: Yeah. Sounds really special. 
McGrubber: Thanks!  
                                                 
52 Taking to an extreme, this X-word substitution strategy can also be (jokingly) applied to coin such, 
later to be called ‘echoic’, euphemisms as the M-finger for the middle finger (example from Saturday Night Live 
11.02.2012) 
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The examples of Chinese and Japanese homophone-based taboos discussed in section 
2.1 seem to point in the direction of words sometimes having meaning irrespective of the 
underlying intentionality. The tabooed nature of some concepts is so dispreferable and salient 
on people’s minds that even the contextually independent semantic meanings of word forms 
themselves are axiologically disfavorable rather than their actual use or what uttering those 
words on particular occasions means.  
The association of a lexical unit with a taboo topic can become so strong that it 
arguably becomes dominant and contaminates the word-form itself eventually leading to the 
word “falling into disgrace” and becoming a dysphemism (e.g. the scientific Latin term for 
oral sex - fellatio is certainly a euphemism vis-à-vis the dysphemistic blow job, however, it 
can hardly be considered an acceptable substitute as the topic itself does not allow for an 
appropriate orthophemistic or polite way of referring to it in most discourse situations53).  
Among the researchers who paid attention to such semiotic paradoxes was Leech who 
back in 1974 discussed how a completely lexicalized euphemism comes into being when a 
given euphemistic sense becomes the salient meaning of a given word by looking at the 
history of the euphemistic sense of the English noun cock54 used as a substitute for penis, 
which has become so salient that it has pushed away the word’s axiologically neutral meaning 
of domestic fowl and become transparent with regard to its taboo association. This has 
allegedly caused the speakers of English to gradually abandon the word cock in its 
axiologically neutral sense and substitute it with rooster, not to be misunderstood or perceived 
as violating a taboo (see Leech 1974: 19).  
It is interesting to note, however, that according to the associative contamination 
hypothesis (see section 9.2) the word rooster, used as a replacement for cock would be subject 
to the same treadmill and a new substitute would eventually take its place in the vernacular, 
which is clearly not the case. If non-taboo homonyms of tabooed lexemes were subject to 
euphemism treadmill as well, this would lead to their subsequent abandonment, and this 
would render impossible explaining why nothing of the sort seems to be happening to the 
short form of Richard – Dick, whose homonym dick happens to be the absolute synonym of 
                                                 
53 As mentioned in section 5.2, Allan and Burridge (2006) name the MCPC as the typical situation in 
which speakers will be likely to resort to euphemisms in order to save their own and/or some third party’s face. 
54 Allan (2012:. 16) notes that the ambiguity of cock in English is found elsewhere in Indo-European 
languages, e.g. Latin gallus had a meaning ‘penis’ from classical times, through Vulgar Latin, and this meaning 
was maintained in Italian and Spanish. 
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cock (intersubstitutable in all context in its meaning penis), e.g. the name of the former US 
vice-president Dick Cheney has certainly never been substituted for anything in the US 
political discourse as potentially taboo-violating.  
To summarize the above view, the x-phemistic value of a lexical unit can be 
established only relative to some existing saliently unexpressed alternative nominations, 
which are part of the same frame-like paradigmatic set of synonyms. Generally speaking, any 
linguistic string can potentially receive euphemistic interpretation as rational communicators 
continuously make choices in terms of which wording to give to their thoughts at the expense 
of some other alternatives which are discarded as ‘dispreferred’ if the communication is to be 
cooperative. Thus uttering collateral damage presupposes a prior decision not to use civilian 
casualties on the part of the speaker. The preferred word or phrase gains meaning from the 
salience of the dispreference and the dispreferred content has to be mentally represented 
before producing the euphemistic (preferred) expression.  
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5.3 Explicating the euphemistic/PC intentions 
In this section I show that euphemistic/PC meanings can be inferentially derived in 
context or qualified explicitly by adding such disclaimers as ‘euphemistically speaking’, 
‘diplomatically speaking’ or ‘to be politically correct’. Such disclaimers are variously referred 
to as metalinguistic comments, contextualization cues indicating how speakers intend for their 
hearers to interpret what they say.  
Since people do not unconsciously, or otherwise spontaneously, label utterances as 
being ‘metaphoric’, ‘idiomatic’, ‘metonymic’, ‘sarcastic’, scholars such as Gibbs (2012: 109) 
inter alia, suggest that there is no empirical evidence to support the claim that in the process 
of online interpretation hearers typically recognize any type of figurative language as some 
special type of discourse. There is simply no time for that sort of labeling to be incorporated 
as part of their fast-acting unconscious comprehension processes. 
Gibbs (2012) quotes experimental studies that demonstrate that people may be greatly 
influenced by the figurative nature of certain arguments when making decisions, but have 
little conscious awareness, even when asked, of the type of language that shaped their 
thinking (Gibbs 2012: 110). Considering this, it is worth considering closely that the same 
may well apply to euphemistic discourse: comprehension of utterances containing 
euphemistic and PC expressions does not involve labeling words and expressions as 
‘euphemistic’ or ‘PC’ unless they are explicitly marked or ‘pre-empted’ by such disclaimers 
as euphemistically speaking and to be politically correct. 
On the one hand, speakers’ utterances can and do give rise to a certain 
hedged/attenuated/indirect or not-saying-it-all effect without being recognized and labeled as 
‘euphemistic’ or ‘PC’ by the hearers, while on the other, speakers themselves can explicitly 
signal that they have deliberately resorted to euphemisms/PC expressions as specific type of 
linguistic devices with the intention of producing these cognitive effects. 
Language users all make particular linguistic moves in conversations and, when called 
upon to do so, may be able to rationalize why they made that particular move. Such 
rationalizations are metalinguistic comments in which the speaker states what it is he/she did 
with language, or at least intended to do. From the RT standpoint, such devices, along with 
“smileys” and other emoticons in written conversations, show the direction in which 
relevance is to be sought. The metalinguistic comments trigger a process of inferencing to 
calculate and specify the speaker’s communicative intention(s) with regard to some attitudinal 
meaning. Whenever speakers feel that hearers do not have enough accessible conceptual 
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information for the derivation of the intended contextual effects, they may provide additional 
contextual assumptions to facilitate the process of interpretation. In other words, implicated or 
contextual premises may be made explicit (cf. Blakemore 1997: 15). The purpose of such 
reformulations is to modify the audience’s cognitive environments by guaranteeing access to 
certain assumptions, making them mutually manifest. Therefore, they contribute to extending 
the cognitive context in order to ensure that addressees understand the intended relevance of 
the original formulation.  
The intended optimal relevance depends on the contextual assumptions that are made 
accessible to the interpreter and the decision to reformulate is based on the assumption that 
the original formulation did not achieve optimal relevance. This means that there are 
expectations about how the assumptions made manifest may be processed in a relevance-
rendering manner. Thus the aim of reformulations is to provide further assumptions in order 
to maximize expectations of relevance. In deciding on the degree of accessibility of certain 
assumptions, speakers metarepresentationally attribute thoughts to the hearers. The decision 
inevitably depends on speakers’ own abilities and preferences and on speaker’s 
metarepresentation of hearers’ abilities and preferences and on speakers’ metarepresentation 
of hearers’ abilities and processing resources.  
The euphemistic function of words and expressions is often marked by pauses, various 
hesitation markers (you know, uh, like) and other metapragmatic hedging devices, which 
accompany indirectness in discourse (cf. Katsev 1988: 46-47; Senichkina 2006: 39). These 
hedging units indicate that the hearer is reluctant to use a direct nomination in referring to a 
given topic and is searching for a euphemistic substitute. Such metapragmatic means serve the 
purpose of preparing the hearer for something he or she might find axiologically disfavorable.  
Similarly to irony, all euphemisms, precisely because they are not literal, are code 
terms or phrases depending on tacit or mutual understandings. Unlike irony, which can’t be 
introduced with ‘to speak ironically’ without ruining the ironic effect, some euphemisms can 
be introduced with ‘to speak euphemistically’. In irony there is a claim that you are displaying 
your attitude as opposed to describing it. Unlike cases of cooperative transparent euphemisms, 
introducing an argumentative euphemism with euphemistically speaking to make the 
euphemistic intention explicit will destroy the speech act since euphemisms do not constitute 
a behavior but a special pragmatic effect of ‘behavior evaluation’, a description of an attitude 
(similarly, saying *To speak angrily “John left” would be totally odd and would ruin the 
effect of anger itself). 
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Metalinguistic comments are thus only applicable to transparent conventionalized 
euphemisms and cannot be used with the argumentative ones (cf. *There was, euphemistically 
speaking, collateral damage) as they would immediately reveal the true argumentative nature 
of the euphemism. Once the argumentative euphemism is recognized for what it is, the 
underlying dysphemism will be meta-represented and the manipulative intention will become 
explicit resulting in the subsequent collapse of the manipulative attempt, as discussed in 
Maillat and Oswald (2009): “<…> manipulation is a kind of speech act which is not meant to 
be recognized at all, not even indirectly”. 
The use of militarese jargon, for instance, outside of the context relative to which it is 
conventionalized, e.g. the White House press conference instead of the Pentagon meeting of 
chiefs of staff, will inevitably trigger a request for more explanations about the intended 
meaning. This will expose the manipulative nature of such discursive strategies, concealed in 
most cases behind the alleged intention of sparing the hearer communicative discomfort. In 
cases where speaker’s manipulative intention is recognized for what it is, hearers can 
demonstrate that they are not endorsing the use of a euphemism by resorting to metalinguistic 
negation and/or by placing scare quotes around the exposed euphemism or using ‘so-called’ 
and ‘alleged’ to express skeptical/ironic attitude: they are not 'displaced people', they are 
'refugees', it’s not “collateral damage”, it’s ‘killing of civilians’. 
In irony, on the contrary, the speaker is making mutually manifest the echoic intention 
while in euphemism the hearer infers it without being intended by the speaker and this 
launches the ironic effect. The echoed proposition needs to be recognized for the utterance to 
receive euphemistic interpretation. Thus in using the euphemistic collateral damage ironically 
(pronouncing mockingly with an ironic tone of voice or saying ‘there was, euphemistically 
speaking, collateral damage’), the speaker is expressing a dissociative attitude to an attributed 
‘echoed’ thought, which helps with recognition of irony but spoils the euphemistic effect. 
The echoic use of such ironic attitude markers as ‘so-called’ or ‘alleged’ implies that 
the speakers dissociate themselves from the euphemistic nomination as they believe that it is 
not the ‘right’ linguistic unit to use to refer to some aspect of reality while realizing that such 
a use is called for by the current discursive situation. For example, someone who says ‘so-
called political correctness’ expresses a mocking attitude to this kind of ideology which is 
viewed by some as a sort of censorship, an attack on freedom of speech. 
In addition to reformulation markers, which are usually used to explicate 
euphemistic/PC intentions, their meanings can also be explicated by metalinguistic comments 
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which follow them. Metalinguistic comments which come after the euphemistic/PC 
expressions are referred to as ‘reformulation markers’ (RMs) (e.g. that is or in other words), 
which present their host member in a new perspective from which it is to be interpreted by 
assigning a new interpretation on the grounds that relevant inferences have not been achieved. 
Thus in other words communicates that the proposition expressed by the utterance linked to 
it, is an alternative means of communicating the content of the preceding discourse segment. 
That is, it provides other words for something. For example, the proposition Peter is fired is 
an alternative means for the euphemistic The boss no longer requires Peter’s services. 
According to Blakemore (1996), items such as that is (to say) and in other words are 
conceptual and non-truth conditional, that is, they encode concepts which are constituent not 
of the proposition expressed, but of higher level explicatures. Blakemore (1996: 333–334) 
maintains that Wilson and Sperber’s argument for the conceptual status of adverbs like 
regrettably is also relevant for reformulation markers. Thus in “Regrettably, I couldn’t help 
you” (Wilson and Sperber, 1993: 17), the adverb does not contribute to the truth conditions of 
the utterance (i.e., ‘‘Mary couldn’t help Peter’’), but it does contribute to its higher level 
explicature: Mary regrets that she couldn’t help Peter. 
Let’s consider the following examples from (Blakemore 1996:335): 
(31) 
Regrettably, they said that my paper was too long 
Higher level explicature: It is regrettable that my paper was too long 
and 
(32) 
A: We will have to let her go 
B: In other words, she’s fired 
Higher level explicature She’s fired is an interpretation of the thought encoded by A’s 
utterance (Blakemore 1996: 338). Blakemore (1996: 333) explains that that, in contrast with a 
speaker who uses so or after all, a speaker who uses that is or in other words can be charged 
with untruthfulness. She uses the following example as evidence (ibid. 1996: 334): 
(33) 
She said she no longer requires your services 
In other words, she said I’m fired 
That’s not true. She didn’t say that 
She said she no longer requires your services; therefore, you are fired 
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#That’s not true. That’s not a conclusion (Blakemore 1996:334) 
J. Wilson (1995) shows that such implicated meanings can be used to direct a hearer’s 
interpretation, while avoiding responsibility for any inferences which the hearer makes. The 
author calls this a form of “thought manipulation” – a conjuring trick where we employ those 
forms, which we predict will lead to the interpretation most conducive to our aims at a point 
in time.  
Following Ifantidou’s (1993) analysis of parentheticals, Blakemore states that that is 
and in other words can be analyzed as contributing to propositions which have their own 
relevance, although they do not contain the main point of the utterance as a whole. Thus in 
discourse sequence uses, the discourse marker consists of a parenthetical that expresses a 
proposition such as That is another way of putting it; These are other words for something 
(Blakemore 1996: 337), which in turn leads the hearer to recover a higher level explicature 
expressing a reformulation: The speaker believes that P is a faithful representation of a 
thought Q where Q is the thought communicated by the reformulated utterance Blakemore 
(1996: 340). This analysis is based on the idea that reformulations are representations of 
utterances which they resemble. As she points out, “where the resemblance involves the 
sharing of logical and contextual implications, the utterance can be said to be relevant as a 
representation of a thought, or as Sperber and Wilson would say, as an INTERPRETATION 
of a thought” (Blakemore 1996: 338). Further, a speaker who produces an utterance which is 
a representation of another utterance cannot be creating expectations of truthfulness, but of 
faithfulness (Blakemore 1996: 338). 
Metalinguistic comments assist, to varying degrees, in the inferential process by 
making explicit reference assignment, disambiguation, further enrichment and elliptic 
material in connection with the recovery of the propositional form. They do this also by 
supplying further explicatures, which in their turn bring about the intended contextual effects, 
and by explicating implicated premises and conclusions. We may conclude that, in general, 
they help in all sorts of inferential processes that are involved in the interpretation of an 
utterance. In cases of restatement of explicatures and explication of implicatures, 
metalinguistic comments contribute to the recovery of higher level explicatures. They do so 
irrespective of their position in the utterance. 
The possibility of being charged with falsehood while attempting to explicate 
euphemistic expression with reformulation markers explains the principle motivation for 
euphemistic language use, i.e. plausible deniability or being in a position of declaring “I said 
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no such thing”. The implicated inferences enable speakers to deny having a certain level of 
commitment to the content communicated in uttering something. Thus if one doesn’t intend to 
convey a political attitude by some choice of words, anyone who discerns one could be said to 
be making an illegitimate inference. This is, according to Cameron (1995), one of the most 
controversial issues concerning the functioning of ‘euphemisms with attitude’ or politically 
correct words and expression in discourse.  
Cameron (1995) rightfully predicts that hearers may end up inferring something, 
which is at odds with the coiner’s intentions (though repeated exposure to a term will refine 
initial hypotheses about its meaning), but the point is that they will make something of it 
rather than nothing. Furthermore, it is impossible to prevent speakers from engaging in 
metalinguistic speculation on the reasons why one term was chosen over other possibilities; 
that is, evaluating as well as simply interpreting phrases like ‘collateral damage’. One 
possible inference here is recognition of ‘moral disengagement’ of the allies who, in 
describing a certain state of affairs as ‘collateral damage’, are trying to minimize what is 
happening and their own responsibility for it. And the moment such an inference is actually 
made, any attempt at concealment and disinformation has failed and, considering that hearers’ 
realization that they have been lied to, actually aggravates the negative effect the expression 
produces in the cognitive environment of the hearer. 
The next section looks into the possibility of drawing a distinction between 
euphemisms and the language associated with political correctness. 
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5.4 Distinguishing euphemisms from PC  
This section presents a discussion of the methodological issue of the possibility of 
distinguishing euphemisms from PC-inspired lexical substitutes. 
From the analysis presented so far, it follows that the principal function of 
euphemisms can be regarded as attempting to frame some denotation, which can be perceived 
as negative, positively through linguistic means. Unlike cases of euphemistic language use, 
PC-inspired substitutes are resorted to not when some denotation is negative and is in need of 
amelioration, but when the wording used to refer to it needs rephrasing.  
The function of euphemisms in discourse is not limited to a cooperative hedging or 
‘veiling’ of axiologically disfavorable aspects of reality and they can also be used with a 
purpose of attempting to conceal the truth behind one’s words by framing or ‘sugar-coating’ 
the underlying axiologically disfavorable reality: “to blur reality, not so much to avoid 
offense, but to deceive” (Allan and Burridge 2006: 85).  
Unlike euphemisms, PC vocabulary is used not to refer to bad or forbidden things but 
rather to express a positive attitude to certain population groups reference to which is 
considered a sensitive issue in a certain society at a certain period of time, by carefully chosen 
and often preferred by the stigmatized population groups themselves55 vocabulary units. This 
is done with the purpose of avoiding lexemes considered discriminatory by those population 
groups e.g. senior citizens for old people, developmentally or educationally-challenged or 
special instead of retarded, differently-abled or people with disabilities instead of disabled; 
physically challenged for invalid.  
Hughes (2010: 18) argues that euphemisms clearly bear close relations with the 
language of PC, since all the classic formulations of political correctness show avoidance of 
direct reference to some embarrassing topic or condition. Halmari (2011) considers 
euphemism to be the main tool of political correctness and other researchers agree that the 
PC-inspired language is basically euphemistic” (Chamizo Domínguez and Nerlich 2002). 
Burridge (2006: 455) notes, however, that although modern dictionaries of euphemism (such 
as Ayto, 1993) include politically correct expressions among their entries, many accounts of 
                                                 
55 There are, however, instances with the population groups themselves actually prefer non-PC 
vocabulary. Thus, deaf is preferable to hearing-impaired for those who identify with Deaf Pride. Blind appears 
to be the term of choice of the National Federation of the Blind, which rejects “people who are blind” etc. (see 
http://www.blind.net/bpg00005.htm).  
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non-discriminatory language in handbooks such as Banks and Mulder (1996) expressly deny 
the language they are recommending is euphemistic. Allan and Burridge (2006: 98) echo this 
line of thinking when they write: 
“For many people, euphemism is a pejorative label attaching to any deodorizing 
language; the sort of doublespeak that turns dying into terminal living, killing into the 
unlawful deprivation of life and potholes into pavement deficiencies. They believe 
such euphemism to be value-laden, deliberately obfuscatory jargon intended to 
befuddle the hearer. Understandably, if euphemism is seen in this light, those 
promoting PC-inspire relabelling disown it”.  
Euphemisms and PC share a significant common feature: they are used as attenuating 
devices in discourse. The effect of a “cushioned blow” produced by euphemisms and PC 
expressions is akin to the function of the hedged “I don’t think you’re right”, which sounds 
more acceptable than “I think you’re wrong”. This function of ‘cushioning the blow’ can be 
achieved by various lexical, syntactic and even graphic and phonetic means where the 
denotation is not actually ‘improved’ but is rather masked by resorting to abbreviations or 
graphic elliptical means, e.g. H.E. double hockey sticks for hell, s…t, f?1k, fcuk, … and bleep 
or such phonetic distortive substitutes as freaking and blinking instead of fucking.  
According to Israel (2006), hedging/attenuation in general is a way of framing an 
expressed proposition, t, against the background of a saliently unexpressed proposition, u, 
where it is understood that u unilaterally entails t. The author observes that attenuation differs 
from mere uninformativeness in that u is not just unsaid, but salient in the context as 
something which could easily have been said.  
As hedging/attenuating strategies, euphemisms have traditionally been used in place of 
direct designations considered to be tabooed or prohibited by social norms. Many of such 
taboo-related euphemisms do not have a neutral counterpart (orthophemism) e.g. there is no 
neutral substitute for English N1 (the act of urination) and N2 (the act of defecation). Medical 
terms urinate and defecate can hardly be considered orthophemistic as they still bear negative 
connotations associated with the intrinsic awkwardness associated with mentioning these 
topics in most contexts and, therefore, are not commonly resorted to in discourse. It appears 
that such euphemistic substitutes are quickly contaminated in discourse by their stigmatized 
denotations and are subject to the process of euphemism treadmill, which is discussed in 
chapter 9. 
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On the other hand there are linguistic unis which are used instead of some other 
nomination due to the existence of a verbal interdiction on its use: their denotation is neutral 
or positive but the word or expression is considered to be axiologically disfavorable by some 
population groups and inappropriate by proponents and adherents of political correctness. The 
focus of the cushioning attitude here is the dictum or the verbal form of the utterance itself, 
not some stigmatized topic. This can be observed when students from foreign countries are 
referred to as international students instead of foreign students to make them feel more 
welcome and at home; corporate apparel is used instead of company uniform to make it 
sound more ‘classy’ and not focus on the uniformity of people wearing it.   
These lexical substitutes do not arise in response to taboo and do not cover up any real 
taboo topic in the traditional superstitious word magic sense, i.e. fear of falling into disfavor 
with supernatural powers or contracting diseases if one utters the forbidden words or 
expressions. In other words, while it is generally inappropriate to talk about sex under most 
circumstances and one has to find ways of distancing the audience from the denotation to 
make as if one is not actually mentioning the forbidden topic, there is nothing impolite or 
shameful in mentioning someone’s race, profession, age etc. However the way these topics 
are referred to, i.e. their linguistic ‘packaging’ can vary considerably.   
 Whenever we say that something is a euphemism, a question naturally arises: ‘what is 
it a euphemism for?’ Is the term bailout used to refer to a federal loan to the ‘big three’ US 
automobile manufacturers a euphemism for financial assistance to prevent bankruptcy? In 
many cases it is rather problematic to find a neutral orthophemistic term that would merely 
describe reality without positive or negative connotations, which corresponds to some 
purported euphemism. It is not entirely clear, for example, whether ‘die’ is a neutral 
alternative for ‘pass away’ any more than ‘deaf’ is for ‘hearing impaired’. The word ‘die’ can 
certainly be considered as more direct and hence an orthophemism, and in some contexts 
might well be the mundane and ‘neutral’ expression. But in most contexts its mention would 
conjure up associations too vivid to be considered neutral.  
Cameron (1995) argues that euphemism has been a key notion in the debate on 
politically correct language. She claims, however, that PC language cannot be equated with 
euphemism, because the existence of euphemism and dysphemism always implies the 
presence of what she calls ‘neutral’ (orthophemistic) terms that lie somewhere in the middle. 
Indeed, in case of PC language it is very often impossible to find a neutral, value-free term 
Chapter 5. X-phemisms/PC and intentionality 
166 
 
that corresponds to some purported ‘euphemism’ as most PC expressions were invented with 
the purpose of replacing the existing discriminatory ones (e.g. racial slurs). 
Hughes (1993) suggests that whereas physically challenged is a ludicrous attempt to 
gloss over the true condition of the person in the wheelchair; cripple would be a perfectly 
truthful and value-free description. However to researchers like Cameron cripple in present-
day English appears to be more on the derogatory side of the continuum: “Applying it to 
someone with a physical disability – as opposed to, say, a playground companion whose 
clumsiness you wished to deride – was taken to be offensive, or at least tasteless, long before 
most English speakers had ever heard of ‘political correctness’” (Cameron 1995: 143).  
Cameron (1995) argues that someone who claims African-American is a euphemism 
because it covers up the fact that African-Americans are dark-skinned is implicitly asserting 
that a description of people by skin color is a value-neutral description, the natural and 
obvious way to classify them. She concludes that in most cases, the old and new terms differ 
in way that are more complicated than just ‘positive’ versus ‘negative’ or more versus less 
polite: “Homosexual is neither more nor less taboo than gay, and most people outside the 
group regard them both as negative terms, but homosexual is a clinical description invented 
by sexologists, whereas gay is by origin an in-group label signifying a social or political 
identity.” (Cameron 1995: 146)  
PC calls for a more precise and accurate use of language. The argument goes as 
follows: since women can also chair meetings, chairperson is not euphemistic, it is simply 
accurate (Allan and Burridge 2006: 96). The same way news conference is more accurate than 
press conference since it includes TV media and not only newspapers and magazines – the 
press. Expressions like firefighter and Ms mean something, which is not offensive and 
inclusive: firefighter means person (male or female) who fights fires, Ms means both married 
and unmarried woman. Firefighter doesn’t mean neither fireman nor firewoman, but both. PC 
terms deliberately highlight certain aspects of a group’s identity. When members of the black 
community campaigned for African-American it was to emphasize, not genetics or color, but 
the historical roots of a group that forms part of the US, thus bringing the name in line with 
those of other ethnic minorities such as Japanese Americans and Italian Americans. Thus 
political correctness can be viewed as being more accurate and as a way of calling various 
groups by the names they prefer.  
By resorting to euphemisms speakers suggest that whatever they are referring to (a 
denotation) is in need of amelioration or attenuation.  On the one hand, it is possible that a 
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denotation that is in need of amelioration or softening will be ascribed a status of 
axiologically sensitive, on the other hand a lexeme that refers to a positive denotation can be 
ascribed the disfavorable status. It follows that such expressions as collateral damage can 
hardly be considered PC, as the primary motivation behind coining them was to blur reality 
by defocusing negative referents innocent civilians, accidentally killed as a result of military 
actions (cf. also correctional facilities for prison and clients of correctional facilities for 
prisoners).  
Paradoxically, the fact that a denotation is in need of euphemization ascribes the 
denotation the status of potentially axiologically sensitive. Thus from the point of view of 
semiotics, it is important to establish whether the lexeme itself is disfavorable or what it refers 
to in the world is. The introduction of new PC substitutes for concepts which did not 
previously require to be hedged: policeman – police officer, chairman – chairperson (to 
include women), drugstore – pharmacy, foreign student – international student are cases in 
point. In cases like these the denotation itself is not axiologically disfavorable, but the lexeme 
used to refer to it is considered dispreferred and needs to be substituted.  
If one views PC as a form of euphemistic communication, it loses all its ‘correctness’ 
since being euphemistic to or about somebody also implies inferiority of the hearer and 
presupposes speaker’s patronizing position of power. People’s choices of words announce 
their stance towards traditionally stigmatized population groups. Resorting to PC-inspired 
language, can therefore amount to having the attitude of the following type: ‘I have the power 
to name you with a name that can offend you, but I will not do that due to face-saving 
considerations’. Being vested with the power to name and trying not to offend presupposes 
the ability to offend. Therefore, it appears impossible to avoid offending someone by 
paternalistically choosing how to ‘name the other’.  
Similarly to euphemisms, PC expressions can push the real subject to the background 
and highlight instead a specific detail or a particular view of the whole topic, thus evoking the 
feeling of ‘not saying it all’, which lies somewhere between lack of seriousness and irony. 
Therefore, in many cases politically correct expressions turn out to have a contrary effect to 
the one initially intended as discussed in sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
The problem with specifying all possible ways of producing euphemisms an PC-
related terms stems from the fact that dysphemisms in the form of discrimination can occur at 
the level of presupposition, humor or irony and therefore can be difficult to substitute as 
illustrated by the following anecdote from Cameron (1998) in which she relates how a 
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friend’s father, when he sits down to eat his dinner, always asks his wife: “Is there any 
ketchup, Vera?’ and this indirect question is interpreted by all as a request by the man for his 
wife, Vera, to fetch the ketchup for him rather than as a request for information about the 
availability of ketchup. Mills (2004: 128) calls it ‘indirect sexism’ as gender is not oriented to 
explicitly in the interaction; however, the presupposition underlying the utterance are 
gendered and based on sexist beliefs, therefore can be considered dysphemistic.  
A euphemistic/PC intention can be attributed to a speaker even when none was 
intended especially when the hearer has grounds to be epistemically vigilant (Sperber et al. 
2010) and suspect the speaker of not being benevolent (e.g. previous record of being 
uncooperatively vague or otherwise manipulative), as illustrated by the following example 
from the TV show “Veep” (Season 2 Episode 1) in which in order to disambiguate the 
meaning of boat, the hearer is requesting that speaker’s intention be made explicit: 
(34) 
 Mike: I’m in a financial hole, ok? I bought something I shouldn’t have and I can’ get 
rid of it.  
Sue: What did you buy?   
Mike: A boat! 
Sue: Is that a euphemism? 
Mike: No it’s a boat. It’s a leaky fucking boat and noone’s betting on it (on Ebay – 
A.S.). 
Despite numerous attempts of defining the category of euphemisms in terms of their 
semantic properties in extant research literature (such as ‘semantic vagueness’, ‘stigmatized 
nature of the denotation’, ‘potential to generate positive connotations’, ‘preservation of 
truthfulness of the utterance’, ‘superficial nature of amelioration of the denotation’ among 
others (see Potapova 2008 for an overview), researchers are yet to find a single set of 
semantic properties common to all and defining euphemisms as such. Therefore, euphemisms 
as a category need to be analyzed in terms of their pragmatic functions and not exclusively in 
terms of the type of linguistically encoded information. Such an analysis would include 
considering the role of inferential processes in the interpretation of euphemistic utterances. 
Therefore, these linguistic units can only be fully understood within a framework of a 
cognitive pragmatic theory of communication. 
Of central importance to the analysis of functional feasibility of PC is the question of 
whether PC language is effective only when it is novel (cf. Giora 2003), that is when it is 
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inferred as ‘marked’ in discourse and arises in interaction only when the “politically correct” 
intention is attributed to the speaker by the addressee or anticipated as the default and, 
therefore, expected linguistic behavior. 
Euphemisms and PC expressions appear to be different teleologically since the aim of 
PC is to bring people’s unconscious biases to consciousness and hence it is only efficient 
when it is novel, while euphemisms are used to camouflage taboos or axiologically 
disfavorable topics and their euphemistic or manipulative potential increases, by leading to 
their processing being shallow in discourse, as they become more conventionalized. In most 
cases euphemisms relate to covering already existing taboos and sensitive topics while PC 
practices came as a response to the need for changing the way some population groups are 
referred to, which came to be perceived by many negatively as a form of censorship and 
thought control associated with the liberal political agenda. This resulted in the term PC 
falling into disfavor and led to the situation in which PC groups attempt to distance 
themselves from being PC.  
What is interesting to investigate is the interpretive procedure a euphemism displays 
and the similarities or differences among different procedures. Providing descriptions of 
particular euphemisms, establishing taxonomies and their limits, or creating paradigms or 
relationships among the literal and metaphorical values of a given euphemisms, is not, from 
the cognitive-pragmatic standpoint, worth pursuing. 
The next section considers whether euphemisms and PC can be subsumed under the 
broader category of linguistic politeness as well as touches upon the issue of whether some 
acts are inherently face-threatening/impolite despite the type of linguistic packaging chosen to 
communicate them and regardless of speaker’s intention underlying their use. 
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Chapter 6. X-phemisms/PC and (im)politeness 
Linguists have traditionally characterized euphemisms as intentionally used 
substitutional face-saving strategies speakers resort to for politeness purposes, i.e. motivated 
by the desire of sparing addressees from communicative discomfort by representationally 
displacing topics that evoke negative emotional response (see Allan and Burridge 1991; 
Liszka, 1990). This chapter critically reviews various theoretical approaches to (im)politeness 
and analyzes whether euphemisms/PC can be subsumed under the broader category of 
linguistic politeness.  
6.1 The Speech-Act theoretic view of (im)politeness 
Politeness has traditionally been defined in terms of good manners, etiquette or more 
generally social norms, which prescribe how people should behave in certain situations. Being 
polite amounts to knowing what is appropriate or inappropriate in a given communicative 
situation. This everyday notion of politeness, however, according to Terkourafi (2001), turns 
out to be ambiguous and imprecise, and cannot serve as the basis for a theoretical definition 
with reference to which politeness phenomena may be identified and described (Terkourafi 
2001: 5). 
Allan and Burridge (2006) inextricably tie euphemistic language use to politeness and 
see politeness and the notion of ‘face’ as central to their discussion of x-phemisms. They 
argue that politeness and orthophemism or euphemism go together as do their negative 
counterparts impoliteness and dysphemism: 
“(In)offensiveness is definable in terms of face which, Anglo-centrically, we described 
as ‘public self-image’. All these categories of language and behaviour are wedded to 
context, time, and place… In fact the tabooed, the offensive, the dysphemistic, and the 
impolite only seem more powerful forces because each of them identifies the marked 
behaviour. By default we are polite, euphemistic, orthophemistic and inoffensive; and 
we censor our language use to eschew tabooed topics” (Allan and Burridge 2006: 47). 
As we can see, on Allan and Burridge’s (2006) view, if one’s behavior is congruous with the 
norms or ‘unmarked’, it is evaluated as polite and if those norms are not followed, it is 
considered impolite or rude.  
According to Mills (2003: 151) politeness, and particularly notions of etiquette or 
“proper behavioral conduct” (Eelen 2001: 1), have played an important role in distinguishing 
between and keeping separate the working and middle class. Mills notes that etiquette books 
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are far less common at present; however, even outdated notions of U and non-U behavior still 
prevail. For example, when Prince William fiancée’s mother Carole, used the inappropriate 
pleased to meet you and “unaristocratic” words like toilet instead of lavatory and pardon 
instead of I beg your pardon in front of The Queen56, this behavior was deemed “non-U”, 
highly impolite and lowbrow by the royal watchers. Other words allegedly proscribed by 
royal etiquette include the perfectly appropriate in other contexts mirror, settee, serviette and 
notepaper, which should be looking glass, sofa, napkin, and writing paper57. 
Numerous volumes have been written on the phenomenon of linguistic politeness. 
However, according to Fraser “while the existence of politeness or the lack thereof is not in 
question, a common understanding of the concept and how to account for it is certainly 
problematic” (Fraser 1990: 219). The lack of consensus over how to understand and define 
the notion of politeness has permeated politeness research to date. According to Escandell-
Vidal (1998: 49) classical approaches to politeness see it as derivable in the form of 
conversational implicature and the length of the inferential path as representative of the 
degree of politeness. There are currently debates in research literature regarding whether 
politeness should be studied as a lay or ‘folk’ notion called 1st order politeness or politeness1 
(Eelen 2001, Watts 2003, Locher 2006, Locher and Watts 2005) or as a theoretical construct 
specifically devised for pragmatic research called 2nd order politeness or politeness2 (Watts 
2003).  
Among the first researchers who paid attention to the theoretical status of politeness 
was Goffman (1955, 1967), who introduced the idea that face-work, or maintaining one’s 
positive public self-image, mediates social interactions. Under his theory, people strive to 
maintain their own face, as well as protect the face and feelings of others, in an interaction. 
Using Goffman’s concept of facework and combining it with Grice’s (1975) maxim-based 
theory of conversational implicature,  Brown and Levinson (1987) designed a framework for 
explaining motivation of polite forms in language use, one of the major tenets of which is that 
linguistic politeness, as a reason for deviating from norms of rational58 efficiency expected 
from communicators in a conversation, is communicated in the form of a conversational 
                                                 
56 Attested: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/world/europe/17royal.html 
57 Attested: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/the-art-of-etiquette-a-bluffers-guide-to-
being-posh-445059.html 
58 Brown and Levinson define rationality as a “mode of reasoning from ends to the means that will 
achieve those ends” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 61). 
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implicature and the absence of communicated politeness may, ceteris paribus, be taken as 
absence of the polite attitude (Brown and Levinson 1987: 5). 
Brown and Levinson (1987) developed Goffman’s conception of face to include 
negative face, i.e. the wish to act freely and remain free from imposition, and positive face, or 
the desire to maintain a positive self-image. Brown and Levinson (1987) regard certain speech 
acts as intrinsically capable of threatening hearer’s negative face (e.g. orders, requests) as well 
as speaker’s/hearer’s positive face  (confession, disapproval, criticism). The face-threatening 
capacity or ‘weightiness’ (W) of a speech act depends in Brown and Levinson’s theory on 
such variables as social distance (D), relative power (P) between the speaker and the 
addressee, and the absolute ranking of imposition of the act (R). They illustrate this with the 
following formula: W(eightiness)x = D(istance) between (Speaker, Hearer) + P(power) 
between (Hearer, Speaker) + R(anking of imposition)x.  
Faced with a potentially face-threatening communicative situation, the speaker, in 
Brown and Levinson’s (1987) theory, has several possible options in her disposal ranging 
from doing the face-threatening act (FTA) without any redress to minimizing the potential 
face-threat by resorting to some mitigating linguistic strategy and avoiding doing the act 
altogether:  
  Do the FTA 
  Do the FTA on record 
   Do the FTA on record bluntly, without redressive action 
   Do the FTA on record with redressive action 
    Do the FTA on record with positive politeness 
    Do the FTA on record with negative politeness 
  Do the FTA off record 
Don’t do the FTA 
Indirectness in general and euphemisms in particular fall on the ‘off-record’ side of the 
spectrum of the possible strategies. They are resorted to with the purpose of mitigating face 
threat (either of the speaker, the hearer of some third party) and avoidance of mentioning 
some taboo topic. Under Brown and Levinson’s (1987) politeness theory, speakers are 
considered polite if they mitigate FTAs and enhance or maintain an addressee’s face during a 
face-threatening utterance and euphemisms/PC qualify as exactly this kind of language use. 
Brown and Levinson’s classification of FTA-mitigation strategies is based on the 
speech-act-theoretic (SAT) model of communication put forward by Austin (1962) and 
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further developed by Searle (1965). From the SAT standpoint, politeness as mitigation of 
FTAs is seen as one of the main motivations for the use of indirect speech acts (Searle 1975, 
Brown and Levinson 1987, Terkourafi 2001). 
SAT-based theory of politeness, which pairs certain speech acts with what the speaker 
is doing (their illocutionary force) in uttering them, will not hold in light of the discussion of 
cases in which the linguistic form of words uttered is at variance with the illocutionary point 
of the utterance (euphemistic dysphemisms and dysphemistic euphemisms discussed in the 
previous chapter). Therefore a conclusion can be made to the effect that linguistic forms 
cannot be viewed as directly linked to communicating (im)politeness out of context of use.  
Contrary to the SAT view, in Relevance Theory, there is no claim about a constant 
correlation between sentence types and illocutionary act types. Linguistic forms do not 
directly encode illocutionary forces, but merely serve as a guide for interpretation, i.e. as a 
constraint on relevance: they “make manifest the direction in which relevance is to be sought” 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 254). On the relevance-theoretic view, sentence types encode 
information that restricts the range of possible interpretations but the particular force of a 
particular utterance always depends both on the linguistic form and the context. Thus the 
intended interpretation of the expression “Can I help you?” may vary on a scale from very 
polite to utterly rude depending on the tone of voice with which it is pronounced. This is can 
be illustrated by the following example from the TV series “Lie to me” (Season 3 Episode 13) 
where a stranger is eating a sandwich and reading a book in Loker’s office: 
(35) 
Loker: Can I help you? 
Stranger: Depends… you got any mustard? 
… 
Stranger: Why do people do that? 
Loker: Do what? 
Stranger: Say “Can I help you” when you really mean “Who the hell are you?” 
Despite questioning that the assignment of every utterance to a particular speech-act 
type is part of what is communicated and plays a necessary role in comprehension, Sperber 
and Wilson (1995: 244) allow that some speech acts do, however, need to be communicated 
and identified as such in order to be performed. Euphemistic/PC acts are instances of such 
acts, as in order to produce the ‘cushioned blow’ effect, euphemisms must be communicated 
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ostensively and recognized as substitutes for some other, saliently unexpressed dispreferred 
content. 
Politeness/impoliteness/rudeness are second-order notions ranging over behaviors. 
Like other second-order notions (e.g. modifiers such as ‘fast’), they must be fleshed out in the 
shape of a particular behavior (‘fast turtle’) to come into being. An utterance such as “I 
am(being) polite/rude” is unlikely to constitute/threaten face even if the hearer recognizes the 
speaker’s intention, because such an utterance fails to provide behavioral evidence that the 
hearer can evaluate as polite (or rude). It, therefore, appears essential that the hearer ascribe 
the speaker a euphemistic/PC attitude: “the speaker is being euphemistic in saying that P” in 
order for the euphemistic/PC act to be successfully performed. As an ‘off-record’ politeness 
strategy, euphemistic use can be viewed as indirect speech acts59 where speakers leave it to 
the hearer to work out the intended meaning. We can assume that the possible perlocutionary 
effect that an utterance may produce is not under the speaker’s control although she can 
anticipate it. Such is the case when unintentional offence is given by the mere mention of 
terms utterance of which is regarded derogatory irrespective of intention underlying their use 
(e.g. racist slurs). 
The central issue concerning indirect speech acts (ISA) has always been the question 
of how the hearer arrives at the interpretation intended by the speaker. Traditionally, scholars 
have held that in order to interpret an ISA, the hearer has to do a certain amount of 
inferencing, i.e. that the propositional content and the illocutionary force of the indirect 
speech act are arrived at via a stepwise application of inferencing rules of some sorts. 
Leech (1983:102) provides the following explanation: “In an absolute sense, [1] Just 
be quiet is less polite than [2] Would you please be quiet for a moment? But there are 
occasions where [1] could be too polite, and other occasions where [2] would not be polite 
enough. There are even some cases where [2] would strike one as less polite than [1]; where, 
for example, [1] was interpreted as a form of banter, and where [2] was used ironically”.  
More recently, it has been suggested that the ISA activates one part of a cognitive 
model that then metonymically evokes the whole model or some other part of it (Thornburg 
and Panther 1997; Panther and Thornburg 1998; Gibbs 1994: 351 ff.) Thus a hedged or 
                                                 
59 A different view is held by Burkhardt (2010), who observe that although euphemisms are violations 
of the Gricean maxims of Quality on the one hand and of the maxims of Quantity and Manner on the other, they 
may not be considered as indirect speech acts, for their purpose is to block rather than to provoke 
reinterpretations in their recipients (Burkhardt 2010: 369-370). 
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mitigated conventionalized indirect speech act such as “I would like you to close that 
window” metonymically evokes the (face-threatening) request itself  “Close that window!” as  
a conversational implicature that comes about through the pragmatic enrichment of the 
propositional blueprint expressed by an indirect statement like “There is a draft in here”, 
where the speaker can always deny having asked the hearer to close the window and the 
implicature (close the window) could be cancelled in another context as seen in the following 
exchanges: 
 (36) 
a) There is a draft in here 
Implicature: Close the window 
b) The heat is unbearable. There is a draft in here. 
Implicature: Let’s go into this room. 
"Could you please close the window" has become a conventionalized way of referring 
to another speech act similarly to the way drink in I need a drink has become a 
conventionalized way to refer to 'I need an alcohol beverage' without actually saying 'alcohol' 
via a process of pragmatic narrowing. This meaning has become conventionalized relative to 
the specific context of use. Thus uttered by an adult at a bar, drink would normally not be 
understood as expressing the speaker's desire for a glass of milk. Nevertheless the alcohol 
beverage reading is cancellable as in I need a drink but no alcohol, please. 
Relevance Theory accounts for such kind of language use in terms of the 
descriptive/interpretive use distinction, by claiming that the relationship between what people 
say (public representations) and their thoughts (mental representations) is that of interpretive 
resemblance (Sperber and Wilson 1995). 
The idea is that an attribute of a speech act can stand for the speech act itself in the 
same way that an attribute of a person can stand for the person. The source of a metonymy 
serves as a “reference-point” (cf. Langacker 1993) whose sole purpose is to provide access to 
and activate a target meaning. For example, the concept SPECIAL in special education is 
part of a knowledge structure which it evokes and the metonymic reading involves a shift 
from this concept to the most readily available salient element in the frame along with the 
whole array of conceptual (meta)representations present in this frame. Through the 
metonymic shift, the neologistic reference point special is backgrounded while other 
previously used concepts are evoked, since any derogatory or unfavorable denotation or 
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connotation within language expressions happens to be very salient and will dominate the 
interpretation of their immediate context (for discussion see Allan and Burridge 1991). 
Metonymies can be used for economy of expression as they provide quickly 
understood stereotype-based references or cognitive shortcuts. Lakoff (1987) argues that 
people tend to think of categories/frames, such as, for instance MOTHER in terms of the 
salient stereotypes, in this case ‘housewife mother’ Lakoff (1987: 79-90). Metonymies evoke 
such stereotypical meanings due to the fact that people’s knowledge in long-term memory can 
be metonymically referred to by the mere mention of one salient subpart of these events. 
Historical examples of the use of stereotypes for economy of expression, as cognitive 
shortcuts to activate entire frames they are part of, include ‘frogs’ for Frenchmen, ‘iron 
maidens’ for professional women and recently ‘crackers’ for lower income rural whites. 
Similarly to racist slurs, PC speech can also be used to proclaim racial inferiority and deny the 
personhood of target-group members by presenting all members of the target group as alike 
and therefore inferior (see the discussion in Lakoff 2000: 101). This happens due to most PC 
expressions being partonymic metonymies. They represent (quite similarly to their biased 
counterparts) the whole person through a certain quality (origin, race, sexuality, health 
condition etc.), highlighting a certain feature of the source domain, which is subsequently 
attributed to the target (cf. She is an African-American and She is just a pretty face).  
Thus if we compare the presently politically incorrect old people with the hedged 
senior citizens, we can see that both expressions focus on and highlight one exclusive single 
salient feature of the referents – age and identify them according to this property (cf. calling 
Steve Wonder a blind black man as opposed to referring to him as an outstanding musician 
and composer). In using PC expressions, speakers assume the ingroup/outgroup discourse 
stance or perspective and by using these metonymies they highlight and focus on single 
salient features thereby preventing the perception of individuals of phenomena as a whole.  
The meaning of such metonymic euphemistic expressions as go to bed used to stand 
for have a sexual intercourse, is underspecified, similar to the example where the speaker 
offers his/her date to come up for coffee, since they omit reasons for going (cf. also go to the 
bathroom (to urinate), go to the hospital (for a medical procedure), yet they succeed in 
referring appropriately by invoking a frame or script so the missing information if filled in 
inferentially. The ‘stand for’ relationship is a basis of every metonymic construction and 
euphemisms work along exactly the same line – they substitute or ‘stand for’ something else 
by providing a mental referential shortcut to another concept.  
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In a series of articles Pinker et al. (2008), Lee and Pinker (2010) question the 
traditional viewpoint that politeness is the primary motivation for indirectness. Adopting 
Brown and Levinson’s distinction between on-record and off-record indirect speech acts, they 
present experimental results showing that while the choice between speaking bluntly and on-
record (positive and negative) indirect speech acts are indeed sensitive to considerations of 
face-threat, off-record indirect speech acts do not seem to be similarly affected (Lee and 
Pinker, 2010:789). The authors then go on to construct an alternative explanation, according 
to which the point of off-record indirect speech is to negotiate situations where the speaker’s 
willingness to cooperate is uncertain, by introducing the option of plausible (or at least 
possible) deniability.  
Similarly to neo-Griceans (see section 1.3), Récanati (2010) considers that processing 
of indirect speech acts happens via Generalized Conversational Implicatures, which he calls 
default implicatures (DIs). He points out that: 
“<…>(G)eneralized conversational implicatures are not merely generalized, they are 
also conventionalized: they are associated with certain linguistic items serving as 
triggers for the automatic process of implicature generation. That generalized 
implicatures tend to become conventionalized in this way seems natural. The 
conventions associating linguistic forms with DI arguably belong to the category of 
'conventions of use', as opposed to straightforward 'meaning conventions' (Searle 
1975, Morgan 1978). They are similar to the conventions in virtue of which an 
instance of the construction 'Can you VP?' is readily interpreted as a request, even 
though literally it is a question. The derivation of the indirect speech act of request 
from the direct speech act of question is based upon rationality considerations of the 
Gricean sort, but the inference is short-circuited as a result of generalization and 
conventionalization (Bach and Harnish 1979)” Récanati (2010: 257-258). 
To date there is no general agreement regarding whether politeness is inferred in 
discourse or constitutes anticipated behavior. The next section contrasts approaches, which 
view it as an intentional strategic way to convey a polite attitude in the form of a 
particularized implicature with the one where it is perceived as the normal (unmarked) way 
people talk – where politeness passes unnoticed in the form of a generalized conversational 
implicatures (Escandell-Vidal 1996, 1998; Jary 1998; Terkourafi 2001, 2003; Haugh 2003).  
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6.2 Politeness: inferred vs anticipated 
Grice’s CP and the maxims were formulated under the assumption that the common 
purpose of the talk exchange is maximally efficient exchange of information and do not 
include concerns of politeness. Although not developed in his proposal, Grice (1975) himself 
suggested that politeness could be behind such violations: “There are, of course, all sort of 
other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character) such as ‘Be polite’ that are also 
normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate 
nonconventional (i.e., conversational) implicatures.” (Grice 1975, 1989) 
In an attempt to elaborate Grice’s CP so as to account for politeness, Lakoff (1973) 
proposed a set of pragmatic rules that were said to be most often in competition with or 
subsumed under Grice’s maxim of clarity: 
1. Be clear. 
2. Be polite (Lakoff 1973: 296) 
In this model, politeness is viewed as avoidance of offense, which should most often 
supersede clarity since, according to the author, in most informal conversations, actual 
communication of important ideas is secondary to merely reaffirming and strengthening 
relationships (Lakoff 1973: 298). She further formulated three rules of politeness as follows: 
1. Don’t impose. 
2. Give options. 
3. Make (the addressee) feel good – be friendly. (Lakoff 1973: 298) 
Leech’s (1983) notion of politeness as a conversational principle parallels Grice’s CP, 
which he supplemented by the six maxims of Politeness Principle (i.e., the tact, generosity, 
approbation, modesty, agreement, and sympathy maxims). Unlike Lakoff, who regarded 
politeness as superseding clarity, Leech considered that Politeness Principle interacts with CP 
at the same level, where the latter explains illocutionary indirectness motivated by the former.  
As a representative the ‘politeness as an implicature’ view, Kallia (2004) proposes that 
politeness arises in the same way as (particularized) conversational implicature from the 
interaction of a ‘maxim of politeness’ with the other conversational maxims and Grice’s 
Cooperative Principle. The maxim of politeness is formulated as follows:  
“Be appropriately polite in form (choice of how) and content (choice of what). 
Submaxim 1: Do not be more polite than expected. 
Submaxim 2: Do not be less polite than expected.” (Kallia 2004: 161). 
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Pfister (2010: 1275-1276) argues that the maxim of politeness is not general enough to 
be called a “conversational maxim” as conversational maxims apply independently of any 
conventions or social norms, i.e. rules prescribing a certain behavior, in a context. As one of 
such norms, politeness arises when an action is in congruence with a norm, while its opposite, 
impoliteness, arises when the behavior is to the contrary (see Fraser, 1990:219).  
Haugh (2003) argues that if we expect a certain behavior to occur that does indeed 
occur, and this behavior gives rise to politeness, then politeness is anticipated. On the other 
hand, if we are not expecting a certain behavior to occur which nevertheless does occur, and 
this behavior gives rise to politeness, then this politeness must be inferred. This view is shared 
by Terkourafi (2001), who regards politeness as ‘anticipated’ when a particular linguistic 
form or pragmatic strategy is conventionally used in a particular situation and as ‘inferred by 
means of an implicature’ when the expression used by the speaker is not conventionalized for 
some use (Terkourafi 2001: 175). 
Similarly to Terkourafi, Spencer-Oatey’s (2005, 2008) rapport-management approach 
also emphasizes that politeness can only be judged relative to a particular context and a 
particular addressee’s expectations and concomitant interpretations. Spencer-Oatey (2011) 
argues that prescriptive or proscriptive overtones can become associated with expected 
behaviour, and that as a result, people start perceiving rights and obligations (which she labels 
‘sociality’) in relation to them and may feel annoyed if the expected behaviour is not 
forthcoming.  
For Terkourafi (2005) politeness is an unmarked behavior because in her theoretical 
framework all acts are considered as face-supporting or face-constituting, and therefore face is 
there by default. This means that ‘face-threat redress’ does not need to be normally 
communicated via a particularized implicature (PCI) contrary to the view assumed by Brown 
and Levinson, but is often conveyed via a generalized conversational implicatures (GCI). The 
word ‘normally’ is key here, because GCIs occur only when an utterance matches the context 
in which it is regularly used according to the interactants’ expectations. The view is supported 
by Escandell-Vidal (1996, 1998).  
In Terkourafi’s model polite behavior is intended as cooperative communicative 
behavior, i.e., as an integral element in Grice’s Cooperative Principle, rather than a deviation 
from it. The view of politeness as a deviation from norms of rationality has been criticized as 
counterintuitive by researchers who view politeness as the normal and expected (and therefore 
non-memorable) type of behavior, which often passes unnoticed and the breach of such norm 
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as salient in interaction (see Escandell-Vidal 1996, 1998; Fraser 1990, 2005; Jary 1998, 
Terkourafi 2001). Similarly to grammar rules, these authors consider politeness as a 
requirement of language, which we only notice when some form of (verbal) behavior does not 
comply with it. As Kasper (1990) notes, people normally “comment on absence of politeness 
where it is expected, and its presence where it is not expected”, which means that “politeness 
is more often anticipated than communicated” (Jary 1998: 1).  
Since polite intentions are taken for granted and expected to be present in every 
conversation, they need not be made ostensive. Jary (1998) points out that sometimes a hearer 
can find that some aspects of the speaker’s verbal behavior “are not relevant enough to be 
worth the hearer’s attention” and therefore not processed in discourse. Unlike politeness, 
which normally passes unnoticed, perceived impoliteness constitutes marked behavior, which 
is commented on in a conversation.  
Thus the politeness effects resulting from uttering Could you please tell me what time 
it is? are sometimes not relevant enough to be noticed by hearers, as politeness has become a 
default and anticipated type of linguistic behavior, or as Žegarac puts it: 
“When I say to you: Do you mind if I open the window? I am certainly using a polite 
form. But am I communicating some polite assumptions? Hardly, provided you 
assume that I am generally a polite person. True, my utterance does provide evidence 
of my being polite, but you would not be justified in assuming that I intended it to be 
relevant in this way. An utterance can hardly be expected to be relevant to the hearer 
merely by virtue of confirming belief assumptions which are already held at maximal 
strength.” (Žegarac 1998: 353)  
Watts (1989, 2003) calls such anticipated politeness ‘politic behavior’ and defines it 
as: “socioculturally determined behaviour directed towards the goal of establishing and/or 
maintaining in a state of equilibrium the personal relationships between the individuals of a 
social group. It is behaviour, linguistic and nonlinguistic, which the participants construct as 
being appropriate to the ongoing social interaction.” (Watts 1989: 135)    
Watts (2003) argues that linguistic behavior which is perceived to be beyond what is 
expectable, i.e. salient behavior should be called polite or impolite depending on whether the 
behavior itself tends towards the negative or positive end of the spectrum of politeness (Watts 
2003: 19).   
There is a general agreement in research literature that sentences are not ipso facto 
polite and that linguistic structures do not in themselves denote politeness, but rather that they 
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“lend themselves to individual interpretation as ‘polite’ in instances of ongoing verbal 
interaction” (Watts 2003:168).  
Among the earliest adherents of the view that politeness is not inherent in linguistic 
expressions are Fraser and Nolan, who argue: “[…] no sentence is inherently polite or 
impolite. We often take certain expressions to be impolite, but it is not the expressions 
themselves but the conditions under which they are used that determines the judgment of 
politeness” (Fraser and Nolan 1981: 96). A similar position is taken by Brown (1995) who 
writes that politeness “inheres not in forms, but in the attribution of polite intentions, and 
linguistic forms are only part of the evidence interlocutors use to assess utterances and infer 
polite intentions” (Brown 1995: 169). Holmes (1995) argues that not only is there an infinite 
variety of ways of expressing linguistic politeness, it is also the case that the same linguistic 
devices can express different meaning in different contexts: “There is nothing intrinsically 
polite about any linguistic form” (Holmes 1995: 10).  
The erroneous view that there are intrinsically (im)polite forms stems from the code 
model of communication according to which speakers encode their messages into signals and 
the task of the hearer is seen as decoding them. In arguing that expressions “lend themselves 
to individual interpretation” Watts (2003:168) notes that the encoded semantic meaning does 
play some part in determining the interpretation of politeness in that it constrains 
interpretation by encoding procedural meaning (Blakemore 1987). Jary (1995) relevance-
theoretic account suggests that linguistic forms used to perform illocutionary acts only 
achieve relevance themselves if they differ from what was expected. 
In this respect, Culpeper (2011) argues that evaluations of uses of impoliteness 
formulae such as swearwords tend to be relatively stable because they are constrained by the 
conventionalized associations that interlocutors share. According to him, this is evident from: 
“the commonplace fact that people have opinions about how different expressions 
relate to different degrees of politeness or impoliteness out of context, and often 
opinions which are similar to others sharing their communities. They must have some 
kind of semantic knowledge; or to put it another way, the pragmatics of these 
expressions must be semantically encoded in some way” (Culpeper 2011:124).  
Drawing on Terkourafi’s (2008) research, Culpeper makes the point that this semantic 
knowledge is ‘schematic knowledge’ in that it relates to conventionalized (rather than 
conventional) meanings, that is to say, such meanings are arrived at through a process in 
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which “particular expressions are associated in one’s mind with particular contexts” Culpeper 
(2011: 129).  
Applying the ideas from the above discussion to the analysis of euphemisms/PC, we 
can assume that, generally speaking, resorting to euphemisms/PC could be viewed as 
anticipated linguistic behavior when the behavior, which gives rise to euphemistic/PC 
interpretations is expected, while it could potentially be regarded as inferred when the 
behavior giving rise to euphemistic/PC interpretations does not meet hearers’ expectation 
regarding what is relevant provided the context.  
Drawing analogy with politeness works for many instances of euphemistic 
communication as the choice between alternative expressions will always depend on context. 
However, unlike (im)polite forms, some expressions appear to be somehow intrinsically x-
phemistic. For example, terms for die such as pass away and sleep are euphemistic and 
marked as such in dictionaries, whereas croak and peg out and kick the bucket are not.  
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6.3 X-phemisms/PC and (im)politeness 
Allan and Burridge (1991:14-20, 27 f.) attribute euphemisms to face-saving and 
dysphemisms to deliberate face-threatening. Indeed, dysphemisms may be face-threatening to 
the hearer or to some third party, and euphemisms may be face-saving. However, face-
threatening accounts for negative politeness in general, even without touching any taboo 
concept, and likewise face-saving accounts for positive politeness in general, even without 
touching any taboo concept. So, polite/impolite lexical expressions are not necessarily 
euphemisms/dysphemisms. 
Unlike euphemisms, politeness enjoys a pre-theoretical status, i.e. people have an 
intuitive understanding of the notion of politeness as it is familiar to any competent speaker of 
a language since childhood. It is probably safe to assume that, unlike politeness assessments, 
during online processing of utterances containing euphemistic expressions, people outside of 
the area of linguistic inquiry may not be necessarily familiar with the technical notion of 
‘euphemism’. As a result,  non-linguists or language users not familiar with the concept 
EUPHEMISM will not be in a position to infer information about the euphemistic status of an 
utterance as words and expressions do not carry a 'This is a euphemism' label in discourse. A 
specific euphemistic perlocutionary effect will, nevertheless, be generated leading to the 
hearer holding assumptions about speaker’s evasiveness, his intention to avoid a stronger, 
riskier or more direct (saliently unexpressed) word/expression. The avoided lexical form has 
to be mentally represented in order for some lexical material to produce the euphemistic 
effect. Hearers will inevitably metarepresent the saliently unexpressed dispreferred content 
guided by the presumption of optimal relevance carried by all ostensive stimuli and utterances 
in particular.  
By resorting to euphemisms or PC expressions, a speaker who utters the weaker 
version counts on the hearer to recognize that the stronger proposition was intended to be 
communicated (see Horn 1989: Chapter 5; Horn 2000). This intentional use of a weak 
proposition to communicate a related, stronger proposition depends on a hearer's ability to 
enrich the content of an indeterminate meaning. It thus both frees the speaker from full 
responsibility for what she communicates, and frees the hearer from undue strain on his 
credulity. 
There are commonsense notions of what politeness and impoliteness are, which are 
distinct from sociolinguistic metadiscourse about what constitutes linguistic politeness. Watts 
et al. (1992) maintain that researchers into linguistic politeness frequently confuse ‘folk’, or 
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‘lay’, interpretations with the technical interpretation, and throughout his book on politeness 
Watts (2003) calls  ‘folk’ interpretations of (im)politeness ‘first-order (im)politeness’ and 
(im)politeness as a concept in a sociolinguistic theory of (im)politeness ‘second-order 
(im)politeness’.  Since there are no such ‘folk’ notions of euphemisms non-linguists are likely 
to talk about indirectness, avoidance or evasiveness rather than euphemistic language use.  
Regarding the correlation between PC and politeness, Klotz (1999) observes that there 
is a clear link between politeness and political correctness because both govern communal life 
in every society and because we are hardly aware of them with their ideological, historical 
and cultural implications in our everyday life. Polite linguistic behavior indeed shares certain 
similarities with PC. Similarly to PC, politeness is not a kind of quality humans are born with. 
It is culture-specific and needs to be taught.  However, unlike PC, politeness has a very long 
history and culture-specific linguistic forms associated with this type of behavior have 
become conventions of language – an evolutionary stage, which PC is yet to achieve. In my 
opinion, unlike fully conventionalized, already salient and unmarked politeness, at the current 
stage of its evolution, PC is still inferred (rather than anticipated) and therefore the 
perlocutionary effect consisting in the hearer holding a belief to the effect that the speaker is 
being PC in saying that P, will always be inferred, since interlocutors are still aware of the 
novelty of this kind of discourse. 
Unlike euphemisms, PC expressions are not necessarily used to avoid mentioning a 
taboo and they are not always equated with politeness. Political correctness must be explained 
independently of politeness, as polite communicative behavior is not a necessary feature of 
political correctness: utterances may be interpreted as politically correct or incorrect 
irrespective of being polite or impolite.  
There is indeed a clear link between politeness and euphemistic language. However, 
just because an expression is considered more polite than some other expression does not 
automatically make it a euphemism. I see the main difference between euphemisms and 
politeness in the fact that people indeed expect other people to be polite in conversation. This 
expected behavior is perceived as normal or “unmarked” and therefore it passes unnoticed, 
while impoliteness is marked in relation to what is expected as appropriate (linguistic) 
behavior provided the context. Novel euphemisms/PC, on the other hand, constitute marked 
behavior. Politeness consists in displaying awareness of another’s feelings, whereas 
euphemism consists in the avoidance of a word or idea whose direct expression is taboo. 
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There is some overlap between the two (it can be polite to be euphemistic, and both functions 
are served by indirectness) but they are not identical.  
For the methodological purpose of distinguishing euphemisms from other strategies of 
(im)politeness and indirectness, a question can be posed whether anything that was said 
instead of something else, which could have been said but was not, can be considered a 
euphemism and following this logic, can excuse me be considered a euphemism for get out of 
my way and more importantly do hearers infer the get out of my way every time they hear 
excuse me?  Following the same line of thought one may also wonder whether uttering the 
phatic token Hello! to greet someone is a euphemism for failing to produce a greeting, and 
whether uttering See you later! can be considered a euphemism for not saying good-bye 
where it is expected? Whenever a speaker thinks he or she is being euphemistic/PC, does the 
hearer think so too? In other words, if euphemisms are “telling it like it isn’t” (Time 1978), 
do hearers always attempt to discover the underlying “what is?” 
Not saying hello to one’s acquaintance wherever a greeting is expected is certainly 
impolite and face-threatening. However, saying hello cannot be considered a substitute for 
failing to produce a greeting since euphemisms require a kind of expression-to-expression 
conventional mapping, which hello does not have. Hello does not mean any allegedly 
dysphemistic counterpart the way pass away means die in most contexts or coffee is 
metonymically broadened to mean ‘sex’ in example (9).   
The paradox arising from the expression-to-expression mapping associated with 
dialectical nature of euphemistic language is that the underlying taboos are meant to be 
discovered if the euphemistic utterance is to be understood and recognized for what it is, 
while at the same time these taboos are meant to be concealed by the same very expression. It 
is as if the denotation were viewed from two opposing points of view: “Un certain mot ou 
nom ne doit pas passer par la bouche. Il est simplement retrancheґ du registre de la langue, 
effaceґ de l’usage, il ne doit pas exister. Cependant, c’est la` une condition paradoxale du 
tabou, ce nom doit en meˆme temps continuer d’exister en tant qu’interdit.” [A given word or 
name must not be spoken. It is just removed from the register of the language, expunged from 
use. Nevertheless, that is the paradoxical condition of taboo, that name will at the same time 
continue to exist even though it is forbidden.] (Benveniste 1974)  
From the above discussion, it follows that research into the domain of euphemisms/PC 
has a direct bearing on issues currently debated within the discipline of pragmatics, namely 
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the one concerning views regarding the stages along which comprehension of what people 
intend to communicate when they speak figuratively takes place (see section 1.4). 
According to Myers-Scotton and Bolonyai (2001), a dynamic and flexible account of 
polite behavior needs to consider that “even though most choices reflect some societal pattern, 
speakers make linguistic choices as individuals. That is, choices ultimately lie with the 
individual and are rationally based” Myers-Scotton and Bolonyai (2001). According to the 
authors, what ultimately sets linguistic choices in motion is speaker intentions and 
calculations to optimize rewards. On their view, not the speech community nor even the social 
network, but rather individuals, necessarily “own” the linguistic choice of one way of 
speaking over another. 
As rational beings, speakers make their linguistic choices as a result of cost-benefit 
assessments of the potential outcome of their communication as compatible, in relevance-
theoretic terms, with their abilities and preferences. That is, rationality means cognitively 
based calculations: “When faced with several courses of action, people usually do what they 
believe is likely to have the best overall outcome. This deceptively simple sentence 
summarizes the theory of rational choice” (Elster 1989:22). In case of euphemisms and PC 
expressions, the benefits are social consequences gained from using these particular units in 
place of possible alternatives, rather than a pure exchange of propositional information.  
Chilton (2004) views euphemism as part of the recurrent instances of what Habermas 
called ‘strategic’ use of language when interests distort communication. Chilton (2004: 46) 
names three such strategic functions: coercion, legitimization/delegitimization, 
representation/misrepresentation and claims that euphemism in discourse is the opposite of 
metaphor as far as ideology is concerned. Where metaphor replaces words and is coercive and 
legitimizing, euphemism is suppressive and dissimulating. He suggests that the linguistic 
strategies that effect euphemism include not only the sort of lexical replacement but also 
omission, passivization and nominalization. Chilton (2004) argues that euphemism has the 
cognitive effect of conceptually ‘blurring’ or ‘defocusing’ unwanted referents.  
In addition to ‘defocusing’, euphemisms are certainly used with the purpose of 
‘focusing’ hearers’ attention on positive aspects of what is said. Such focusing/defocusing 
function is achieved metonymically and according to Pauwels (1999: 272) metonymy often 
seems to function as a kind of ‘avoidance strategy’, for reasons of euphemism. As I show in 
section 3.3, metonymy also functions as a ‘focusing strategy,’ which, in cases where such 
focusing is irrelevant, can give rise to dysphemistic interpretations. 
Chapter 6. X-phemisms/PC and (im)politeness 
187 
 
In political discourse x-phemisms are used for purposes of legitimizing some point of 
view/ideology or amelioration of meaning, while dysphemisms are used for delegitimizing 
purposes and pejoration of meaning (cf. calling someone a ‘terrorist’ vs. calling someone a 
‘freedom fighter’) through connoting the respective associations.  
The next chapter provides an overview of contributions made by research within the 
multidisciplinary discipline of Critical Discourse Analysis, whose stated goal is uncovering of 
implicit ideologies in texts, to analyzing the ideology-framing potential of PC and 
euphemisms. It also examines pragmatic mechanisms underlying verbal manipulation.
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After reviewing contributions from the field of Critical Discourse Analysis on the 
topic of PC, the chapter discusses that x-phemisms/PC can fulfil the function of framing the 
discourse through perspectivization or metonymic highlighting of some details while 
backgrounding others, hyperbolizing in case of euphemisms the positive aspects while 
diminishing the relevance of negative ones. By representing their referents as better (or worse 
in case of dysphemisms) than what the direct designations portray them like, these lexical 
units are used to trigger a positive (or negative) emotional response or ‘perlocutionary effect’ 
in the hearers and, therefore, can arguably be effectively used for manipulative purposes.  
7.1 PC and Critical Discourse Analysis 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a multidisciplinary theoretical framework 
created with the purpose of analyzing ideological prejudices and the exercise of power in 
texts. The principal aim of CDA is viewed as uncovering the opacities in discourse, which 
contribute to the exercise, maintenance or reproduction of unequal relations of power 
(Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). The main concern of CDA’s agenda is to “educate people 
more broadly in the abuse of power by linguistic means, to reveal how language is used for 
deception and distortion and the fostering of prejudice” (Widdowson 2004: ix).  
Researchers working within the CDA tradition try to uncover ideology, defined by van 
Dijk as “the basis of the social representation shared by members of a group” (van Dijk 1998: 
8), in so far as it is expressed and influenced by language and discourse and aim to 
“investigate critically social inequality, as it is expressed, signaled, constituted, legitimized 
and so on by language use” (Wodak 2001:2).  
While not being associated with any specific school of linguistic or discourse analysis, 
the umbrella term CDA unites methodologically and theoretically heterogeneous approaches, 
which share a common goal of answering such questions as whether social and political 
change can be implemented through changes in language, what is the relationship between 
them and how such change can actually be implemented.  
PC is viewed and analyzed in this discipline from the point of view of theories of 
social constructionism – “theories of social life as socially (discursively) constructed as an 
effect of discourses” (Fairclough 2003: 22). Processes of cultural and discursive intervention, 
such as PC, are regarded as attempts to change discourses on the assumption that changing 
discourses will, or may, lead to changes in other elements of social practices through 
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processes of dialectical internalization (Fairclough 2003). Fairclough cautions against the 
possibly ‘the other way round’ effect of dialectical internalization, noting that discourses do 
not come out of nowhere. At the same time Fairclough (2003: 23) recognizes that discourse 
may construct and reconstruct social practices, social structures and social life, but there is no 
guarantee of such constructive effects as there can be a fair share of resistance to change 
among the target social groups. 
Fairclough (2003) suggests that if people can be persuaded to talk of partner rather 
than the person I’m living with or lover (or even mistress), or if people being sacked is partly 
displaced in public discourse by organizations downsizing, there will (or may) be 
consequential changes in how non-marital relationships and economic restructuring are 
perceived, and how people act and react towards them (Fairclough 2003: 22).  
The phenomenon of PC is analyzed at length from the perspective of Critical 
Discourse Analysis in the special issue of Discourse and Society (2003 vol.14) dedicated in 
its entirety to political correctness. All the researchers in the special volume converge that 
there is no homogeneous social movement of PC advocates out there and that ‘political 
correctness’ and being ‘politically correct’ are almost always identifications imposed upon 
people by their political opponents (Fairclough 2003).  
Thus in his article Toolan (2003: 71) points out that the phrases politically correct and 
political correctness have become contaminated and stigmatized by their constant application, 
by conservatives, to reformist practices entailing, according to the conservative, a simulated 
concern or respect. One consequence of this stigma is that progressivist proponents of 
political correctness will be found acting or speaking in its spirit but never in its name. No 
progressivist, for entirely understandable strategic reasons, will say explicitly that they 
advocate a particular policy or naming ‘on political correctness grounds’. They must say they 
do so on anything but such grounds: self-determination, impartiality, inclusiveness, 
appropriateness, politeness, awareness of a word’s history or an audience’s sensitivities, and 
so on and so forth. The phrases politically correct and political correctness have simply 
acquired too entrenched a negative semantic for them to be used, in normal circumstances, 
without implied criticism of the activity so described (either criticism of others, or ironizing 
criticism of self). 
Toolan distinguishes between two kinds of PC with no ‘in-between’ cases: tyrannical 
and trivial: “When in North American academia it is alleged that a particular teacher has been 
hired on the grounds of their gender or race over many more able candidates, this is implicitly 
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being characterized as tyrannical political correctness. When someone who has learned not to 
say the girls in the office is also advised not to say the women in the office but the office staff, 
they may respond, expressly or impliedly, that this is trivial political correctness” (Toolan 
2003: 71). 
The article by Suhr and Johnson notes that the use of ‘PC-related’ terms (i.e. ‘political 
correctness’, ‘politically correct’, ‘PC’, etc.) in three British broadsheets, more or less mirrors 
the rise and decline reported by Lakoff for the US. By contrast, the analysis by Johnson and 
Suhr of the German newspaper Die Welt and Toolan’s study of the French paper Le Monde 
show how the appearance of loaned and/or integrated variants of ‘political correctness’ did 
not really begin to gather momentum until the mid- to late 1990s. Seen in conjunction with 
Lakoff’s (2000) US survey, what these three articles clearly demonstrate is that in a 
quantitative sense ‘political correctness’ has not run its course to the same extent everywhere. 
CDA researchers note that there have been a number of assessments of the political 
and philosophical implications of ‘PC’ from what might be broadly characterized as a 
sociolinguistic point of view. Nonetheless, they believe that much remains to be said about 
the topic from a specifically discourse-analytical perspective. In this regard, the articles in the 
special volume of Discourse and Society “look at ‘PC’ discourse (with a lower case ‘d’) in 
that they specifically examine stretches of language containing ‘PC’-related terms such as 
‘political correctness’, ‘politically correct’, ‘PC’, etc.  
However, despite this ambition all the articles look at ‘PC’ Discourse (with a capital 
‘D’) insofar as they explore the broader discursive processes and social practices in which the 
phenomenon is embedded. Suhr and Johnson (2003) point out that:  
“ <…> unsurprisingly, it has not always been easy – or, of course, desirable – to 
separate these two concepts of discourse in relation to ‘political correctness’ but it is 
worth noting here some potential ambiguities that we were forced to confront. 
Occasionally, for example, we struggled to separate the concept of ‘PC’ discourse in 
the sense of: (i) stretches of discourse data containing ‘PC’-related terms, and (ii) 
discourse which had been labelled ‘politically correct’ (and which may or may not 
contain ‘PC’-related terms). To complicate matters further, the latter process of 
labelling discourse(s) as ‘politically correct’ is itself an example of ‘PC’ Discourse, 
thereby exemplifying the kind of broader discursive processes and social practices 
which were simultaneously the object of study.” Suhr and Johnson (2003: 6-7) 
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Statements like the above-mentioned show that “discourse approaches are more like 
tools for the analyst rather than explanation of natural language understanding procedures” 
(Saussure 2007: 183, my emphasis, A.S.). In their ‘a posteriori’ analysis CDA researchers 
treat PC as a natural category, which enables them to conduct qualitative and quantitative 
analysis of its production and use.  
Unlike the post hoc analysis of what PC is, offered by discourse-analytic approaches, a 
look at the dynamic process of interpretation of PC utterances can lead us to a significantly 
different understanding of this phenomenon as a continuum of cases, which includes novel, 
one-off uses, conventionalized PC metonymies understood via generalized pragmatic 
routines, and fully semanticized metonymies that have entered the lexicon.  
In order to talk about anything, one has to ‘package’ the information she intends to 
convey by her utterances accordingly in order to prepare the appropriate utterances. The 
following section shows that implicit information regarding the value judgments associated 
with the use of certain linguistic units (e.g. as being ‘PC’ or ‘non-PC’) in particular contexts 
can be regarded as represented by cognitive frames, which can be described as the ways in 
which individuals understand and interpret portions of reality.  
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7.2 Framing the point of view in discourse 
The notion of ‘frame’ was introduced by Goffman (1974) to mean a contextualizing 
perspective, an angle or point of view. Frames can be constituted of a variety of things, 
including cultural (meta)-representations, background assumptions or even “features of the 
talk itself that invoke particular background assumptions relevant to the subsequent 
interaction” (Duranti and Goodwin 1992). In Cognitive Semantics ‘frames’ are viewed as 
conceptual/perceptual gestalts which explicate the processes of perspectivization and 
“windowing of attention” in terms of “figure/ground” effects. (cf. Fillmore 1977; Dirven et al. 
1982; Talmy 1996; Ungerer and Schmid 1996:205–249). 
Such organized sets of knowledge are seen as having interconnected slots, which are 
“filled” with ‘default’ assignments capturing the typical features of the world. The default 
values can be displaced with new information that fits better the situation at hand. The slots of 
frames can be viewed within the RT framework as procedural instructions or requirements 
placing constraints on what variables can possibly fill them. The slots are filled with default-
values and correspond to expectations of relevance, which hearers bring to the interpretation 
process, guiding them in making sense of ostensive stimuli. The ‘defaults’ with which the 
slots of a frame are associated, create expectations regarding how relevant certain types of 
discourse are for the hearers and consequently lead to various depths of processing of 
discourses.  
According to Gibbs (1999) cognitive frames or knowledge organized and stored in 
long-term memory can be metonymically referred to by the mere mention of one salient 
subpart of such frames: “We see that mention of the subpart metonymically stands for the 
whole event. In some versions of script theory, the most salient part of the script (i.e., its 
metonymic representation) is explicitly encoded as a ‘script-header’ in memory such that 
activation of the header accesses all the information encoded in the entire script” (Gibbs 1999: 
69). For instance, go to bed becomes a metonymic way of mentioning part of the scenario 
instead of another part of scenario, a euphemism for have sex just as a perfectly 
orthophemistic wash up receives a euphemistic interpretation in the following example from 
“The Big Bang Theory” (Season 5 Episode 12): 
(37) 
Penny: So are we ready to order? 
Amy: Gimme a minute, I’m gonna go wash up! 
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Sheldon: Well, that’s odd, we both washed up when we came in…it’s probably a 
euphemism for urination. 
As seen from this example, lexical units possess the ability to activate cognitive and 
evaluative frames (alternatively referred to as scripts, scenarios, plans, etc. see Schank and 
Abelson 1977) in the mind of the addressee. As a result, addressees are led to regard reality in 
different ways depending on the lexical choices made to describe, or define, that portion of 
reality. In producing utterances, speakers choose their words in accordance with assumptions 
they hold in their cognitive systems regarding a certain model of the world (cf. Fillmore 1976: 
26) and individuals generally understand each other because they are able to reconstruct the 
scenarios their interlocutors have in mind metarepresentationally by relying on the frame-
activating power of words. 
The use of lexical units for strategic framing can be regarded in terms of selection and 
salience: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described” (Entman 1993: 52; italics in the original). Framing practices are aimed at changing 
relative degrees of salience among different aspects of an issue or different considerations. In 
addition to this, framing involves reconfiguring the semantic associations among the relevant 
concepts stored in one’s memory (Higgins 1996). For instance, the aim of using such clichés 
as national security in official political discourse is to produce an effect upon the hearer, 
which consists in a positive perception of governmental activities and forming a positive 
attitude to, for instance, some piece of proposed legislation: e.g. to extend the term of the 
Patriot Act – a law that limits civil liberties in the US because of the issues of national 
security. 
Lakoff (2004) argues that new concepts and ideas can only be properly understood 
when there is some point of reference against which to draw relevant inferences and that 
framing is about using language that fits a particular worldview. He explains that, since 
people think in frames against which new information is processed, "confronting someone 
with facts” may have little or no effect on the addressees, unless they have a frame that makes 
sense of the facts. 
As previously discussed, RT postulates that human cognitive systems are hard-wired 
to process new information for relevance as a result of an evolutionary adaption. From the 
relevance-theoretic standpoint, the process of utterance interpretation involves the selection of 
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a particular subset of mental representations or assumptions, which can be (confirmed) 
strengthened, cancelled or combined with contextual information to yield contextual 
implications (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 117).  Since new information is processed against the 
background of the one already available in our minds, a subset of our stored assumptions and 
concepts is likely to be active at any given point, with different subsets being activated at 
different points (see Vega Moreno 2007: 41). These assumptions are not totally independent 
of each other: information is usually stored as an organized set of related assumptions 
(Sperber and Wilson 1995: 87-88), which can be accessed to act as a context for 
interpretation.  
Yus (2013) refers to the subsets of stored information against which interpretation of 
utterances takes place as ‘make-sense frames’. RT views human memory as organized in such 
a way that an activation of a certain concept in one’s cognitive environment immediately 
spreads over and activates related concepts, which themselves activate related concepts to 
different degrees. The pieces of co-accessed information that are likely to be simultaneously 
relevant tend to be co-activated in domain-specific chunks of stored organized experientially-
based expectation-structuring knowledge or ‘make-sense frames’ (see Yus 2013). 
Tendahl (2009) points out that the dynamic cognitive view of online construction of 
context in which utterances are processes adopted by RT suggests that when it is not 
immediately clear what the context for an utterance is, the addressee does not automatically 
incorporate a default context, but he will first of all search for a context that is available and 
that would make the utterance optimally relevant. It is not just the context which influences 
the understanding of utterances, but expectations of relevance together with utterances may 
also determine the context brought to bear on the interpretation process. The interpretation 
process is thus seen in RT as guided by a mutual adjustment of expectations of relevance, the 
context and the utterance (see Tendahl 2009: 161). 
From the relevance-theoretic standpoint, Escandell-Vidal (1996: 641) argues that the 
fact that a particular frame is activated does not mean that this frame is the context: the frame 
only makes a pre-selection of a structured set of assumptions from which the specific context 
can be chosen; so the relevance-theoretic view that the context is the particular subset of 
representations used in the interpretation of a particular utterance can be maintained. 
As cognitive constructs, frames explain how knowledge is represented in general and 
the role background knowledge plays in structuring the lexicon. Concepts, which conform to 
these schemas are easily internalized and remembered (Sperber 1996: 69) and therefore are 
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also easily evoked, which lowers the amount of effort needed for their processing. Minsky 
(1977) explains the way frames operate in the following way:  
“When one encounters a new situation [. . .], one selects from memory a structure 
called a frame. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by 
changing details as necessary. A frame is a datastructure for representing a stereotyped 
situation like being in a certain kind of living room or going to a child’s birthday 
party. Attached to each frame are several kinds of information. [. . .] Some is about 
what one can expect to happen next”. (Minsky 1977: 355) 
The information stored in a particular frame interacts with information stored in 
adjacent frames. The current level of activation influences the salience and hence accessibility 
of a frame in one’s cognitive environment. Particular ‘triggers’ in an utterance open up 
particular frames and the more a frame is used, the higher its level of activation and the spread 
of activation causes the so-called priming effects: the exposure to a stimulus influences a 
response to a later stimulus. In other words, calling into action of specific frames or scripts 
works metonymically so that reference to one or more of the features of a script will ready it 
and call it to mindfulness.  
Examples of framing practices, whose aim is to refocus attention on different aspects 
of reality by means of resorting to euphemisms include renaming torture to advanced 
interrogation, domestic spying (eavesdropping) which connotes breaking the law and taking 
away civil liberties to anti-terrorist surveillance program, connoting protecting the American 
people from terrorism as part of fighting the war on terror (cf. also limited contingent of 
Soviet troops in Afghanistan, brotherly help to the people of Afghanistan, peacemaking 
operation, antiterrorist operation in Chechnya). The scope of such words as limited, 
brotherly, peacemaking, antiterrorist applies to the entire expression and reframes the 
phenomena referred to by making them sound more positive to promote a certain agenda. 
Such euphemisms are used in an attempt to improve reality by manipulatively presenting it in 
a positive light through such structuring of symbolic representation that would set in motion a 
distinct train of thoughts in individuals’ reasoning (Price et al. 1997) and their ways of 
regarding an issue. 
The following examples also illustrate such attempts: 
(38) 
American spies were exchanged for Russian intelligence officers (Russian Channel 1) 
(39) 
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“US Marines cannot engage Taliban militants who shoot at them” (Fox News on 
‘rules of engagement’ 17.02.10). 
Lexical choices have significant framing effects as they encourage certain 
interpretations while discouraging others by selective influence over the individual's 
perception of the meanings attributed to words or phrases as, for instance, in the following 
statement:  
(40) 
Governor of Indiana Mitch Daniels: “We do not accept that ours will ever be a nation 
of havs and have-nots. We must always be a nation of havs and soon-to-havs” 
(quoted on “The Daily Show” 23.02.2012)  
Here, soon-to-havs is positivizing poverty as having the potential of becoming rich. 
Similarly, referring to rich people as job creators can be used to argumentatively highlight 
exclusively the positive attributes of the rich. 
Whenever an object or event is described in positive terms, e.g. protectorate for 
colony, legacy drivers or devices for old drivers/computers, it is likely to be evaluated more 
positively compared to the same object described in equivalent negative terms. Thus 
advocates for the right to abortion refer to themselves as pro-choice, which automatically 
makes their opponents anti-choice and hence opposed to freedom and un-American. At the 
same time anti-abortion activists refer to themselves as pro-life which makes their opponents 
anti-life/pro-death. The phrase pro-life (anti-abortion) emphasizes that fetuses and embryos 
are human beings, unborn children and therefore have a right to live, while pro-choice (pro-
abortion) stresses the importance for women to have control over their fertility and the choice 
whether to continue a pregnancy.  
Croft and Cruse (2004) argue that framing effect leads to a cognitive bias resulting in 
presenting the same option in different formats. They discuss the use of FETUS vs. UNBORN 
BABY by opposing sides of the debate on abortion, where: 
“FETUS profiles the entity in question against a more general MAMMAL frame: any 
mammal’s unborn progeny may be called a fetus. This frame makes abortion appear 
less morally repugnant <…> The complex phrase UBORN BABY exploits two 
frames: BABY profiles the same entity against the more specific HUMAN frame: we 
prototypically use baby only for human offspring. Both BABY and UNBORN profile 
the entity against its projected later lifestage, namely after birth. These frames make 
abortion appear more repugnant <…> and all agree that once a fetus is born, it is a 
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human being. The difference in framing the entity denoted by fetus or unborn baby 
therefore orientates (or biases, to frame it differently!) the hearer towards the political 
stance on abortion adopted by the speaker” (Croft and Cruse 2004: 19; italics in the 
original). 
Examples of framing in PC-inspired discourse include the use of senior citizen instead 
of old man, as it focuses on experience, need for respectful attitude towards seniority, while 
also suggesting involvement in the affairs of society and all its processes including the right to 
vote granted to all citizens. The PC expression senior citizen is not as clear about the 
capability of the person in question to lead an independent life as old person, which strongly 
connotes dependence on others and general helplessness. 
In a similar way, illegal immigrant focuses on the illegal status of the person while 
guest worker focuses on the fact that the person works in the country and puts them in the 
same line with people specifically invited because of their high qualifications. Each of these 
expressions implies the validity of their particular ideological stance while discrediting the 
validity of the opposing one.  
I fully agree with Cameron who notes in her book “Verbal Hygiene” (1995) that the 
politics of discourse are about getting others to believe that the point of view embodied in this 
or that verbal representation is not really a point of view but just the plain truth of the matter, 
whereas alternative representations are biased. She argues that those who talk about ‘collateral 
damage’ and ‘the elimination of undesirable elements’ are engaged in this kind of politics. 
But so too are those who tell us that what should have been said in both cases is ‘murder’ and 
that referring to ‘murder’ as ‘collateral damage’ is a perversion of the English language. As 
instances of echoic interpretive use, euphemisms and dysphemisms do not describe some state 
of affairs, but rather provide evidence of how speakers uttering them intend the audience to 
perceive this state of affairs and thereby express their own attitude to it. 
One of the founders of CDA, Teun van Dijk (2005: 736), lists euphemism as one of 
the principal categories of ideological discourse analysis and describes it as a semantic move 
of mitigation or hedging, which is part of the broader framework of the strategy of positive 
self-presentation, and the avoidance of negative impression formation. The capability of 
presenting/framing discourse participants as well as discourse subject as more or less positive 
ascribes these lexical units the function of ‘axiologemes’ or key words capable of framing 
discourse by establishing context against which subsequent utterances are to be processed. 
Such axiologemes declare speakers’ ideological stance and position them within the US vs. 
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THEM dichotomy, which is realized in discourse as a strategy of group identification through 
positive self-representation and negative other-representation. The positive US vs. negative 
THEM strategy is “very typical in the biased account of the facts in favor of the speaker’s or 
writer’s own interests, while blaming negative situations and events on opponents or on the 
Others (immigrants, terrorists, youths, etc.)” (van Dijk 2006: 373). 
Generally speaking, x-phemisms always express subjectivity in language.  The US vs. 
THEM opposition is viewed in CDA as the most fundamental social category hardwired in 
the brain’s organizing system (Tavris and Aronson 2007: 58) and the difference between 
euphemistic and dysphemistic communication can be viewed in terms of contrasting the 
framing of discourse euphemistically to represent the speaker’s point of view (US) vs. 
framing it dysphemistically to represent some opposing viewpoint (THEM).   
The existence of frames as organized sets of stored experientially-based knowledge is 
regarded in sociolinguistic research as the psychologically real implementations of the 
“habitus” (Terkourafi 2005: 253), which is the sociological notion put forward by Bourdieu 
(1990). Habitus is the internalization of the external through recurrent exposure to the same or 
similar situations. It refers to the system of internal dispositions that enables, and at the same 
time regulates and limits, the individual’s thoughts, perceptions, expressions and actions. As 
Bourdieu explains: “[T]he habitus is an infinite capacity for generating products – thoughts, 
perceptions, expressions, and actions – whose limits are set by the historically and socially 
situated conditions of its production” (Bourdieu 1990: 55). The past experience is actively 
present in the form of schemes of perception, thought and action, that “tend to guarantee the 
‘correctness’ of practices and their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules 
and explicit norms” (Bourdieu 1990: 54). 
The “internalization through recurrent exposure” associated with the notion of habitus 
can lead to a situation in which euphemisms cause what Butler (1997) calls “unintended 
proliferation” of what they censor as, according to the Graded Salience Hypothesis, concepts-
representations become salient and foremost on people’s minds due to conventionality, 
frequency, familiarity, or prototypicality: “while less salient meanings are slow, salient 
meanings are accessed rapidly and always first, regardless of contextual bias or speaker's 
intent. Indeed, this sort of 'reflex' is pervasive, irrespective of the fact that it may, at times, be 
'stupid' (Fodor 1983), ignoring or resisting sensible behavior” (Giora 2003). 
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Frames can be stored in the form of cultural metarepresentations60 shared amongst 
members of a social group (Sperber 1996) as “organized set of racialized ideas, stereotypes, 
emotions, and inclinations to discriminate” (Feagin 2006: 27) As organized sets of related 
information, frames can be metonymically evoked with the purpose of constraining the 
context in which utterances are meant to be interpreted by the speaker, since subtle changes in 
the wording of the description of a situation or an issue might affect how audience interprets 
the situation at hand. Scheufele (2000: 309) argues that such strategic framing can influence 
how audiences think about issues, not by making aspects of the issue more salient, but by 
invoking interpretive schemata that influence the interpretation of incoming information. 
Hence it can be regarded as an attempt to manipulate the audience by constraining the context 
of interpretation and effectively blocking access to any alternative contextual assumptions 
(see Maillat and Oswald 2011). 
In order to be euphemistic it can be enough to use an NP utterance and let the hearer 
complete the missing propositional information by inferring it. Uttering ‘Iraq’ to mean ‘the 
US-led occupation of Iraq’ can be a successful communicative act if the hearer manages to 
derive the intended meaning of the utterance in his/her search for its relevance (cf. Carston’s 
2002a claim that concepts are pointers to mental spaces). Having failed to find relevance the 
hearer can always ask what the relevance is explicitly by saying ‘what do you mean by X?’ or 
‘what does that have to do with X?’ 
The main purpose of euphemisms/PC is to prevent certain implicatures from going 
through while encouraging others. Thus lover can be regarded as euphemism compared to a 
stronger expression regular sexual partner, as its use is aimed at stopping the most relevant 
inference associated with the “being lovers” frame, namely having sexual intercourse, from 
going through by refocusing attention on the “having feelings of love for each other” aspect 
of that frame. 
As such discourse structures per se cannot be viewed as manipulative or non-
manipulative, however, as has been correctly noted by CDA researchers (cf. van Dijk 2006: 
373), some of the structures may be more efficient than others in the process of influencing 
the minds of recipients in the speaker’s or writer’s own interests.  
                                                 
60 A metarepresentation (representation of another representation) involves a higher-order 
representation, usually an utterance or thought, with a lower-order representation, either in the form of a public 
representation (e.g. utterances), a mental representation (e.g. thoughts), or an abstract representation (e.g. 
sentences, propositions), embedded in it (see Wilson 2000: 411). 
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In their pragmatic analysis of cognitive manipulation, Maillat and Oswald (2011) 
discuss context selection in frames from the relevance-theoretic point of view. The authors 
point out that assumptions ‘mobilized’, in their words, to act as a context for utterance 
interpretation can include mental representations about all sorts of things, such as: social 
relationships, events, concepts, linguistic items, mental states, general knowledge, perceptual 
evidence, etc. They argue, from the relevance-theoretic standpoint, that what determines the 
order of inclusion of these sets of assumptions into the context of interpretation is their 
relevance towards the utterance at stake, i.e., the amount of cognitive effort their derivation 
requires and the effects they are expected to yield with respect to the efficiency of the 
comprehension procedure. Therefore, the order of inclusion of assumptions corresponds to the 
order of their accessibility (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 142): the more salient and hence 
accessible an assumption is, the more likely it is to be included within the context of 
interpretation. The next section addresses the manipulative potential of resorting to 
euphemistic/PC language.  
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7.3 The manipulative dimension of euphemisms/PC 
This section argues that euphemisms/PC can be manipulatively used to conceal the 
true state of affairs by triggering neutral or positive connotations in the audience, which can 
subsequently lead to an approval or acceptance of, for instance, certain governmental policies 
or ideological issues, which were previously considered unacceptable or deplorable. 
Considering the information overflow in today’s world, modern-day discourse recipients do 
not always have the time necessary to process information critically and identify manipulative 
euphemisms for what they are. This can sometimes put hearers in a situation where they are 
forced to ‘shallow-process’ certain contextual assumptions. 
7.3.1 Manipulation and the depth of processing  
The human cognitive system is rather selective, at least when it comes to perceiving, 
processing, memorizing and recalling information (Vega Moreno 2007: 7) and sometimes the 
conscious mindful processing of certain highly conventionalized expressions and their 
semantic components in discourse may not be necessary to derive the interpretation the 
speaker intended to convey by using those words on particular occasions.  
Craik and Lockhart (1972) were among the first researchers to pay attention to the fact 
that a stimulus can be processed to different levels or depths in drawing the distinction 
between ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ processing. ‘Depth of processing’ is taken here to refer to the 
amount of information that is considered in processing a stimulus (for discussion see Vega 
Moreno 2007: 6). Whereas in shallow processing people process structural or phonological 
information, deep processing involves the processing of semantic information about word 
meaning or the encyclopedic information made accessible by the use of a word. Allott and 
Rubio Fernández (2002), for instance, show that the interpretation of certain lexical items can 
lead to “cognitive shortcuts” whereby the addressee only activates the most salient conceptual 
assumptions related to a lexical entry. Such shallow processing can be responsible for the 
construction of occasion-specific ad hoc concepts that correspond to a contextually targeted 
interpretation. 
Conventionalized cooperative euphemisms like pass away for die tend to blend and 
not stand out as ‘marked’ in discourse. Despite acquiring camouflage-like properties and 
being processed in a shallow way, they can nevertheless contribute to framing a discourse to 
speaker’s advantage through connotations and specific associations they trigger in hearers, i.e. 
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by “inviting” the hearers to conceptualize of death in the reframed terms of a ‘journey to the 
unknown’ rather than the ‘end of everything’, associated with the direct nomination. 
Interpretation of novel (perlocuitonarily uncooperative) euphemisms achieves 
relevance in virtue of their ‘marked’ status in discourse as their processing requires additional 
cognitive effort/inferential work. Such euphemisms can be used as manipulative ‘spin’ to 
strategically disguise something negative as something positive and twist the vision of the 
world in the mind of the addressee (Rigotti  2005: 68), while pursuing some self-interest 
agenda. Thus in examples like the oxymoronic friendly fire or smart bomb the positive 
connotations of the first lexeme neutralize the negative connotations of the second while the 
use of collateral damage can lead to faulty reasoning: a sort of “red herring” fallacy in which 
an irrelevant topic is presented in order to divert attention from the original issue, i.e. one can 
declare that there was merely some ‘collateral damage’ rather than ‘people were murdered’, 
thereby deviating attention from lost individual human lives by altering the importance of 
mentioning it directly, allegedly with the purpose of sparing the hearer communicative 
discomfort. 
 Cognitive processing of various euphemistic abbreviations, contractions, 
circumlocutions and elliptical constructions requires a high degree of commitment on the part 
of the hearer, as he/she must invest considerable cognitive resources or ‘processing effort’ 
into their interpretation. Thus uttering activity incompatible with the diplomatic status is 
vague and euphemistic (it actually means spying in most cases), however the associations it 
gives rise to cannot be evaluated as either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ with certainty. In cases 
where the link between the euphemism and the denotation is too vague to be recognized, one 
can possibly talk about the loss of a euphemistic hedging function since in cases like these a 
euphemism turns into a lie or disinformation.  
Resorting to euphemisms/PC can be generally regarded as motivated by the need/wish 
to encourage certain interpretations while discouraging others, by intentionally presenting 
certain assumptions about a state of affairs as more relevant than others, or presenting as 
relevant assumptions previously held as irrelevant by the audience. In relevance-theoretic 
terms, such a linguistic tactic can be formulated as ‘making strongly mutually manifest 
assumptions which are different from the ones hearers currently hold at maximum strength in 
their cognitive environment’. 
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The new relevance of assumptions can be presented overtly as well as covertly61.  
Such communication fits very well with the definition of manipulative discourse given by 
Saussure (2005: 95): “…to manipulate is, firstly, to communicate the relevance of things that 
are not relevant, and/or retain actually relevant information”.  This sort of manipulation is 
achieved by constraining the contexts of interpretation (see Oswald and Maillat 2011).  
Strategically used euphemisms and linguistic62 political correctness may be regarded 
as a type of local linguistic manipulative strategy (Saussure 2005: 94) used with the purpose 
of achieving certain goals. The paradox with the manipulative use of euphemisms/PC stems 
from the fact that the tabooed denotations, which the use of a euphemisms is aiming to veil or 
conceal or dispreferred lexical units, which the use of PC expressions is aiming to replace, 
must be mentally (meta)represented in order for a linguistic unit to be ascribed euphemistic 
status via a higher-level explicature to the effect that the speaker is being euphemistic/PC in 
saying that P. This makes manipulative strategies employing euphemisms illocutionary 
suicidal (term introduced by Vendler 1976) as in order to ‘go through’ manipulation must 
remain covert or latent (for discussion see Maillat and Oswald 2009, Rigotti 2005).  
Thus when speakers attempt to resort to euphemistic/PC language for manipulative 
purposes, one of the necessary conditions for the manipulative intention to be fulfilled is the 
absence of salient dispreferred direct nominations in the vernacular, which could disclose the 
true state of affairs. The availability of such dispreferred alternatives could potentially activate 
‘epistemic vigilance’ – a mental module, responsible for checking credibility of information 
as well as trustworthiness and competence of speakers conveying it  (see Mascaro and 
Sperber 2009, Padilla Cruz 2012, 2013, Sperber et al. 2010), which euphemisms are supposed 
to keep dormant. 
 
                                                 
61 The more covert an act of persuading is, the more manipulative it will become (see Taillard 2000). 
62 Nominating Michael Steele who is an African-American as the head of the traditionally 
predominantly white Republican party is seen as a tribute to political correctness in the US and constitutes an 
example of extra-linguistic political correctness. Another example is making Santa Claus more PC by picturing 
him as a non-smoker and his coat as made of artificial fur in the current US media. 
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7.3.2 Manipulation and theory of mind 
Cases of shallow-processing apart, the verbal manipulation of public opinion is not 
easily achieved in discourse due to the fact that human beings are endowed with 
metarepresentational capabilities (the so-called ‘theory of mind’), which enable the ones 
manipulated to ‘read the mind’ or recognize the intentions of manipulators. The theory of 
mind hypothesis is advocated by Sperber (1994; 2000), who argues for the existence of a 
genetically evolved innate ‘metarepresentational module’, which is a key feature of human 
intelligence, linked to communication. Metarepresentational63 module is, according to this 
hypothesis, a second-order module with the ability to form concepts of concepts and mental 
representations of mental representations, one’s own and those of others.  
As discussed in section 1.1, since Grice, the process of utterance comprehension has 
been viewed in pragmatics as involving recognition of intentions underlying the production of 
utterances. Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995) recognizes different layers of 
metarepresentation involved in comprehension as part of recognition of speaker’s intention in 
producing an utterance, depending on hearer’s expectations of relevance: Naïve Optimism, 
Cautious Optimism and Sophisticated Understanding.  
In the Naïve Optimism stage, hearers do not need to think about speaker’s thoughts 
since they expect actual relevance and accept the result if it is relevant enough. The only 
metarepresentation involved here is the attribution of the relevant-enough interpretation as the 
speaker’s meaning. The naively optimistic interpreters will be the ones most easily 
manipulated whenever a manipulative discourse string, camouflaged as benevolent or 
empathic, aims at evoking emotions that “give rise to the assumption, on the addressee’s side, 
that the speaker is sincere and that he shares the worries of the addressee” (Saussure 2005: 
105), as the naively optimistic hearers tend to assume that the speaker is both competent and 
benevolent (Wilson 2000): 
The metarepresentational abilities of healthy, adult interlocutors are those of a 
Cautious Optimism. According to this interpretation strategy, hearers are aware that what they 
see as most relevant in an utterance might not be what the speaker wanted to communicate. 
                                                 
63 Sperber (2000b) distinguishes between different types of metarepresentation: mental representations 
of mental representations (e.g., the thought ‘John believes that it will rain’), mental representations of public 
representations (e.g., the thought ‘John said that it will rain’), public representations of mental representations 
(e.g., the utterance ‘John believes that it will rain’), and public representations of public representations (e.g., the 
utterance ‘John said that it will rain’) (Sperber 2000b: 3). 
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Consequently, an extra level of metarepresentation is added, because the addressee now 
questions whether his interpretation is not just the most relevant interpretation to himself, but 
also the interpretation that the speaker would assume to be most relevant to his addressee. If 
the addressee comes to the conclusion that it is not the interpretation that the speaker would 
assume to be most relevant, he will have to look for another interpretation that satisfies this 
requirement. Unlike a naïve optimist, a Cautiously Optimistic hearer assumes that the speaker 
is benevolent, but not necessarily competent. 
For example, when the speaker makes a slip of the tongue and utters penguins instead 
of pigeons hearers will nevertheless be able to invert the signals and infer the ‘true meaning’ 
behind speaker’s words, as seen in the following example from Wilson (2000): 
(41) I’ve been feeding the penguins in Trafalgar Square. 
 I’ve been feeding the pigeons in Trafalgar Square  
Here hearers will be able and willing to repair the speaker’s utterance using available 
background knowledge and interpret it in a way in which the speaker had possibly intended 
her utterance. 
Speakers can resort to some ‘wrong’ marked lexical forms, perceived by the audience 
not as proper names of the concepts they nominate, either because they simply have the 
wrong concept-form mapping in their lexicon, as a slip of the tongue or with a specific 
purpose in mind Carston (1999: 382). Interpretation of euphemisms and politically correct 
expressions can thus be regarded as bearing close resemblance to the way slips of the tongue 
like the following  
(42) A. Where is the chicken? 
 B. You mean where is the kitchen? 
are processed online, as hearers constantly form hypothesis about what the speaker 
could have meant by using some unusual, ‘wrong’ or otherwise marked in relation to the 
context of utterance (not meeting their contextual expectations of relevance/appropriateness) 
form rather than merely ‘decoding’ the linguistically coded message, while assuming the 
speaker to be rational and his/her utterances carrying the presumption of optimal relevance. 
The underdeterminacy thesis can thus provide an insight into the mechanism underlying the 
marked-in-relation-to-some-context euphemistic/PC language use: already at the level of the 
cautious optimism hearers manage to infer the correct interpretation by forming hypotheses 
regarding what the speaker could have meant by resorting to some marked in relation to the 
context of utterance linguistic form in search for the intended relevance of the utterance.  
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Trying to make sense of novel euphemistic language use is very likely to trigger 
epistemic vigilance already at the level of cautious optimism leading to the inevitable 
replacement of the new linguistic form by the more familiar one similarly to the way slips of 
the tongue or foreign accents are corrected.  
Unlike the previous two interpretive strategies, the strategy of Sophisticated 
Understanding, is normally employed by adult hearers, and allows them to cope with the fact 
that speakers are not always benevolent: they may intend an interpretation to seem relevant 
enough without in fact being so (see Wilson 2000). By employing this interpretative strategy, 
hearers can cope with deceptive cases in which nothing more than the appearance of 
relevance is attempted or achieved. Sophisticated understanding involves hearers accepting an 
interpretation if speakers might have thought hearers would think it as relevant enough. 
Hearers then assume that speakers may be neither competent nor benevolent and only intend 
to seem relevant (i.e. purported relevance). This more sophisticated metarepresentational 
strategy allows hearers “to doubt and disbelieve, which involves representing a representation 
as being improbable or false” (Sperber 1996: 71). 
When information regarding the speaker’s commitment becomes involuntarily 
relevant to the processing of a discourse string, it can be interpreted as ‘accidentally relevant’ 
(cf. Noh 2000: 66) by hearers. An utterance is accidentally relevant when the hearer finds an 
interpretation that is optimally relevant to him in a way the speaker manifestly did not foresee 
(Noh 2000: 66). According to Noh (2000), the reference to ‘the speaker’s abilities and 
preferences’ in the definition of the presumption of optimal relevance takes into account the 
fact that the speaker may be unable or unwilling to produce the most relevance possible 
utterance, even when she knows what that would be. The cases of accidental relevance take 
into account the fact that the speaker may not know what would be optimally relevance to the 
hearer. 
Noh (2000) points out that the criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance 
assumes that the speaker is benevolent enough not to deceive the hearer into thinking 
something is relevant when it is not: “it does not cover the case where the speaker says 
something she knows to be irrelevant, thinking that it will seem optimally relevant to the 
hearer and therefore deceive him” (Noh 2000: 66-67). Noh (2000) argues that the strategy of 
Sophisticated Understanding takes this case into account by showing how the hearer may still 
understand an utterance even though he realizes that it was only intended to seem optimally 
relevant to him. 
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An addressee who has got reasons to believe that the speaker is not necessarily a 
benevolent communicator will not uncritically accept the first relevant interpretation that 
comes to his mind. Sperber (1994: 194–8) describes the procedure in the following way: 
“<...> the hearer should follow that path of least effort, but he should stop, not at the 
first relevant enough interpretation that comes to mind, nor at the first interpretation 
that the speaker might have thought would be relevant enough to him, but at the first 
interpretation that the speaker might have thought would seem relevant enough to 
him” (Sperber 1994: 196–7; italics in original). 
Chilton (2005: 27) argues that the existence of the metarepresentational mental 
module suggests that humans naturally and automatically tend to look for interpretations of 
discourse acts in terms of what speakers are intending to convey and to do. This mind-reading 
ability is linked to the notion of ‘Machiavellian intelligence’ (Byrne and Whiten 1988) or 
‘tactical deception’ caused by individual wants:  
“Its workings follow from the ability to read the intentions of others, and to recognize 
the ability of others to read one’s own intentions, leading to the ability to mask one’s 
intention <…> the ability to verbally mislead, deceive and to lie is clearly closely 
related” (Chilton 2005: 27).  
Chilton makes a very important observation shedding light on the possible 
mechanisms underlying verbal manipulation: “<…> if an individual A has an innate ability to 
read the minds of B and use deception for his or her own ends, then conversely, B must have 
the same ability and could in principle use it to read the intention to deceive” (Chilton 2005: 
27). Chilton concludes that if individual humans are innately Machiavellian, they are also 
innately able to counter one another’s machinations. If language is crucial to this ability and 
associated activity, then they should have an innate ability not just to use language in 
Machiavellian ways but to detect and counter one another’s Machiavellian use of language 
(Chilton 2005: 31). It would make no sense to assume that some people have a Machiavellian 
module and some don’t. But if everyone has it, it is also necessary to assume that all 
individuals have the ability to counter it in others (Chilton 2005: 42).  
In their discussion of manipulative discourse, Maillat and Oswald (2009) point out that 
communication, including manipulative communication, cannot take place unless the message 
conveyed is understood by the addressee. It follows that, in order for a word or expression to 
be interpreted in its euphemistic function, it is necessary to identify what this linguistic unit is 
attempting to hedge or conceal. From the point of view of its production, euphemistic 
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language, which has not yet become conventionalized, requires 2nd order metarepresentation 
or “theory of mind” in the form “speaker believes that hearer will find such and such 
expression axiologically disfavorable, therefore a substitute is required”. 
Speakers can resort to euphemistic language for manipulative purposes, which, 
similarly to cases of cooperative euphemistic communication, functions as a strategy of 
mitigation ‘cushioning the blow’ that the more direct and therefore face-threatening 
designations may deal. However manipulative use of euphemisms aims to do so for a 
different reason than its cooperative counterpart. Manipulative discourse can be used for 
purposes of (self)-justification where speakers attempt to preserve their own or some third 
party’s positive self-image or ‘face’ by manipulatively resorting to such euphemisms as: 
downsizing instead of firing, executive action for targeted assassination; pacification for 
punitive operation. It is the so-called ‘diplomatic’64 discourse used for construing reality as 
more positive while intentionally distortively describing and/concealing or ‘camouflaging’ the 
true state of affairs behind some inherently negative, illegal, immoral, deplorable, 
inappropriate or otherwise unacceptable phenomenon, behavior or event.  
The strategic use of euphemistic substitutions is aimed at impeding the critical and 
objective evaluation of the situation at hand, which is supposed to happen not only due to 
their positive connotations, but also by means of creating a sort of inferential buffer between 
the interpreter’s mind and their stigmatized referents – increasing the inferential path with the 
purpose of morally distancing/disengaging the hearer from the referent(s). This sort of 
distortive hedging pushes the true meaning one or several inferential steps further thereby 
attempting to undermine the so-called ‘epistemic vigilance’ (Mascaro and Sperber 2009, 
Padilla Cruz 2012, 2013, Sperber et al. 2010) of their audience by presenting themselves as if 
being outside of the paradigm of concepts covered by the particular topic. As a result, 
whenever hearers fail to recognize the euphemistic nature of such expressions as, for instance, 
collateral damage, the manipulative effect of such a covert type of communication will be at 
its maximum. 
In this respect Padilla Cruz (2012) notes that if an interpretation passes through the 
filters of epistemic vigilance and is found to be believable, reasonable and fault-free, the 
                                                 
64 It is interesting to note in that the word ‘diplomatic’ itself acquires euphemistic overtones when it is 
used instead of ‘understatement’ or even ‘lying’ and the metalinguistic disclaimer ‘diplomatically speaking’ can 
be interpreted as a marker of an upcoming euphemism.  
 
Chapter 7. X-phemisms/PC and ideology 
209 
 
hearer may take it to be what the speaker intended to communicate in uttering the particular 
discourse string (or in relevance-theoretic terms, speaker’s ‘informative intention’, the search 
for which is triggered by speaker’s communicative intention) but, more importantly, he may 
add up the information that it makes manifest to his personal universe of beliefs (see Padilla 
Cruz 2012). 
It is worth pointing out that ‘Machiavellian’ speakers engaged in ‘tactical deception’ 
can never fully predict and neither can they be held fully accountable for the inferences 
hearers derive during the interpretation process. Contrary to the picture painted by the code 
model of communication, there is no “duplication of thoughts” in communication as any 
utterance is only an interpretation of the thought speakers intend to convey, or in relevance-
theoretic terms utterances bear ‘interpretative resemblance’ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, 
Carston 2002a) to thoughts they communicate. In inferential communication there is no one-
to-one mapping from the concept encoded in a word to the communicated concepts. 
According to RT, the aim of communication in to increase the mutuality of cognitive 
environments and thereby the similarity of thoughts, rather than to guarantee a generally 
unreachable and psychologically unrealistic strict duplication of thoughts.  
The fact that meanings encoded by concepts are always adjusted online by contextual 
assumptions means that there exist many more concepts in our minds than there are words in 
a language to encode them (see Sperber and Wilson 1998) and most concepts are not 
lexicalized. The contribution that a particular word makes to the overall intention of the 
speaker usually is not just a decoded concept. Instead, relevance-guided inferences on the 
basis of the linguistic trigger in a particular context may lead the hearer to the speaker’s 
intention. Thus according to Sperber and Wilson (1998), words generally point to various 
concepts, all of which could theoretically be the word’s meaning in the utterance, but only 
one of which is the word’s meaning in a particular explicature. 
The following chapter analyzes how online processing of utterance containing 
euphemistic/PC expressions can be treated within the frameworks of various pragmatic 
theories.
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This chapter applies the frameworks of three pragmatic theories to providing an 
account of the mechanisms responsible for semantically underdetermined utterances yielding 
interpretations labeled as euphemistic and politically correct. The inferential procedures are 
analyzed from three theoretical perspectives: 1) Gricean, on which euphemisms can be 
viewed as a CP-flouting weak form of lying, communicated as particularized conversational 
implicatures;  2) post-Gricean, represented by relevance-theoretic pragmatics, which views 
inferential pragmatic processes as not only responsible for the derivation of what is 
implicated, but also for determining what is said and 3) neo-Gricean, represented by 
Levinson’s theory of Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs). 
 8.1 The Gricean perspective 
In their theory of x-phemisms, Allan and Burridge (1991) adopt the Gricean 
presumption that interactants are rational and cooperative. Consequently speakers are 
regarded as not choosing the forms and style of the utterances randomly, but as normally 
having some reasons for selecting the particular ones used. In this framework, it is the task of 
the hearer to (not necessarily consciously) seek that reason when interpreting speaker’s 
utterance (Allan and Burridge 1991: 5).  
In Grice’s framework, when a speaker appears to have failed to observe the 
Cooperative Principle, the hearer will search for the motivation and implicated meanings or 
‘implicatures’. From the Gricean perspective figurative lanauge can be viewed as deliberate 
floutings of various Maxims of the CP since by resorting to it speakers don’t tell what is 
literally true but implicate some related proposition, leaving it up to the hearer to infer the 
literal expression, which would make the utterance comply with the Supermaxim of Quality 
(try to make your contribution one that is true). 
On the Gricean view, metaphorical euphemisms like pass away will be understood as 
generating particularized conversational implicatures arising from a flouting of the first 
Maxim of Quality: ‘Do not say what you believe to be false’ (Grice 1975/1989: 28). In this 
framework, a speaker uttering a euphemism makes a statement that represents a category 
mistake and the addressee will search for an interpretation that would explain why the speaker 
has obviously not adhered to the Maxim of Quality.  
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Euphemisms, however, do not violate Grice’s maxim of truth the way metaphors do. 
Nobody can claim that such references as friendly fire or collateral damage are not truthful 
descriptions of some events. However some of them cannot be considered to be a form of 
cooperative communication since they don’t tell the whole truth.  
In discussing violations of Gricean Maxim of Quantity, Allan and Burridge write: “It 
would normally be dysphemistic to say things like My neighbor, who is a woman, is pregnant, 
because it contains an unnecessary relative clause; we know that if the neighbor is pregnant, it 
MUST be a woman” (Allan and Burridge 1991: 5). It is very likely, however, that uttering My 
neighbor, who is a woman, is pregnant will be interpreted as an ironic statement rather than a 
dysphemistic one as it conveys the background assumption that the neighbor is not (does not 
look like) a woman. 
Davis (2007) argues that speakers frequently withhold information that would be 
offensive or disappointing to the hearer, violating the Maxim of Quantity. They exaggerate in 
order to please or flatter and utter “benign lies” in order to spare the hearer's feelings, 
violating the Maxim of Quality. Brown and Levinson (1978) and Leech (1983) observed that 
Gricean maxims can clash with the Principle of Politeness. People pick “safe topics” (e.g., the 
weather) to stress agreement and communicate an interest in maintaining good relations but 
violating the Maxim of Relation. Euphemisms avoid mentioning the unmentionable, but in the 
process violate Manner and Quantity (see Davis 2007: 93-94). 
If euphemisms/PC are considered to be a weak form of lying (see Burkhardt 2010), 
then they should be regarded as more cognitively costly than ‘telling it like it is’. Michaelian 
(2013), for instance, argues that formulating a lie may be more cognitively demanding and 
liars generally devote more resources to monitoring and controlling their own behaviour, 
since they are less likely to take their credibility for granted. The author notes that liars 
generally devote more resources to monitoring receivers, for the same reason; liars may have 
to remind themselves to roleplay; liars have to actively suppress the truth (which tends to be 
activated automatically); liars have to deliberately activate the lie (the lie tends not to be 
activated automatically) (see Michaelian 2013). 
Fallis (2009) defines lying as saying something one believes to be false while 
believing that one is in a context where Grice’s (1975) Maxim of Quality, “Do not say what 
you believe to be false”, is in effect. Unlike lying, deceiving can be regarded as making a set 
of assumptions you believe to be false mutually manifest, hoping that the hearer will accept 
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them as true or possibly true. Considering this, euphemisms can be viewed as “bald faced 
lies”, i.e. lying without the intent to deceive. 
Carson (2006) and Sorensen (2007) present cases of such “bald-faced lies”, which 
show that intending to deceive is not in general necessary for lying. A bald-faced lie is one 
that is obviously a lie to those hearing it (The phrase comes from 17th-century British usage 
referring to those without facial hair as being seen as acting in an unconcealed or open way). 
For example: a man on the witness stand in a courtroom has witnessed a murder. Because 
there is CCTV footage that clearly shows the man witnessing the murder, and this footage has 
been presented to the jury, everyone knows that everyone knows that the man saw the crime 
take place. But, for fear of reprisals, when asked whether he saw the murder, the witness says, 
I did not see the murder. 
From the Gricean point of view euphemisms can be viewed as violations of various 
Maxims of the CP and hearers will be seen as inferring the more direct, saliently unexpressed 
dispreferred word or expression as part of derivation of particularized conversational 
implicatures. Such meanings will, on the Gricean processing model, be part of implicitly 
communicated content. Hearers may attempt to ‘correct’ the violations of the maxims of the 
CP associated with euphemistic language use by resorting to (public or private) metalinguistic 
negation/denial in constructing the conversational implicatures which speakers expect them to 
derive by violating the various maxims. 
From the pragmatic point of view, words and expressions acquire meanings in certain 
contexts as part of hearers’ recognition of the intentionality underlying what the speakers say 
in the actual context of utterance. The next section shows that as instances of intentional 
ostensive communicative behavior, euphemistic/PC can be naturally explained within the 
post-Gricean cognitive-pragmatic model of ostensive inferential communication known as 
Relevance Theory. 
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8.2 The RT perspective  
This section argues that from the RT-standpoint, comprehension of x-phemisms both 
of the conventional cooperative and the argumentative uncooperative kind, as well as PC-
related lexical units, can be analyzed as part of the overall inferential process of constructing 
relevance-driven hypotheses about speaker-intended meanings on the basis of the manifest 
linguistic evidence and contextual assumptions to yield fully propositional speaker-intended 
meanings. 
8.2.1 Euphemisms as optimally relevant inferences 
Traditionally viewed as tropes or rhetorical figures used to disguise ‘unpleasant’ 
concepts with nominations which are not the ‘proper names’ of those concepts, euphemistic 
strategies are, according to Allan and Burridge (1991), present in all known world languages 
and thus constitute a linguistic universal. Brown and Levinson (1987: 216) also report 
evidence which indicates that euphemisms are a “universal feature of language usage”. 
Similarly, Malmkjær (2002: 241) observes that the avoidance of particular words for social 
reasons seems to occur in all languages and euphemisms arise in their place and Chamizo 
Domínguez (2009: 433) suggests that euphemisms have been used by speakers of all world 
languages since the ancient times. 
Such claims made in research literature point in the direction of the need for resorting 
to indirectness in general and to euphemistic strategies in particular being part of the 
hardwired natural abilities of human beings. If people in all known world cultures resort to 
euphemisms, such strategies must be innately rooted in cognition. They transcend language 
and have to do with natural more fundamental meaning-processing abilities, which the 
discipline of cognitive-pragmatics was designed to explain.  
As discussed in section 1.4, in Relevance Theory speakers are not constrained to say 
what is strictly speaking true and that’s why in many communicative situations euphemisms 
may very well turn out to be the best ways to achieve optimal relevance. The array of weak 
implicatures they generate can be assumed to best resemble the speaker’s thoughts about the 
particular subject and her commitment to what is said. A euphemism, in this respect, is a kind 
of economical concatenation of reference and attitude about naming. For instance, 
residentially flexible is used instead of I express a positive attitude to the people who do not 
have a roof over their head by not calling them homeless. 
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I would like to formulate this claim in the following way: from the relevance-theoretic 
standpoint, using a euphemism/PC expression leads to weak implicatures about what is said 
and enables the speaker to express her attitude to what is said in a more economical than 
providing the full exposition explicitly. 
Understanding this range of weak implicatures may require additional cognitive effort 
on the part of the listener, but this is offset, according to the principle of relevance, by extra 
effects not achievable by orthophemisms (direct designations). Thus in RT, speaking 
euphemistically is just another way of satisfying the presumption of optimal relevance. 
Achieving optimal relevance involves producing the most relevant utterance compatible with 
the speaker’s abilities and preferences (such as the use of euphemisms/PC instead of some 
dispreferred expressions). The communicative principle of relevance implies that the most 
appropriate means of communicating a proposition is not necessarily one which fully encodes 
all of its constituents.  
From the RT perspective, the general motivation for euphemism is the presumed fact 
that often a euphemistic utterance is more relevant than some dispreferred saliently 
unexpressed more direct alternative. This means that often the cognitive effects that the 
speaker intends his addressee to gain could not be achieved in any other way with less 
processing effort for the hearer. The additional processing effort incurred by the generation of 
a large array of weak implicatures is offset by the cognitive effects derived during the online 
processing of a euphemistic utterance. Unlike Grice’s processing picture, on which inferring 
the more direct, saliently unexpressed dispreferred word or expression will be seen as 
implicatures of utterances containing novel euphemistic/PC locutions, Relevance Theory 
treats such meanings as achieving relevance at the level of explicatures (a combination of 
linguistic decoding and pragmatic inference), i.e. such meanings are pragmatic but belong to 
the propositional form of the utterance.  
According to the traditional RT view, the gap between the utterance and the thought of 
the speaker is obvious to the hearer. Therefore, for example, conventional metaphors like pass 
away (die) are represented by at least one strong implicature (die) without which the utterance 
would not be accepted as being relevant, and an array of weak implicatures the derivation of 
which lies in the responsibility of the hearer. More figurative metaphors may communicate 
several weak implicatures or, as they are referred to in RT, ‘poetic effects’ (see Pilkington 
2000). This original RT view was later amended by works in the field of Relevance Theory 
lexical pragmatics (see chapter 9), which now regards conceptual narrowing and broadening 
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responsible for the derivation of figurative meanings as part of explicature rather than viewing 
them as communicated via implicatures. 
Once conventionalized, this type of language is used to optimize relevance, i.e. to 
achieve the adequate balance between processing effort and cognitive effects. The coded 
message here does no more than provide the right direction in which to channel the inferential 
process. The linguistically encoded element of an utterance is not geared toward achieving the 
highest degree of explicitness, but rather towards keeping processing effort down (no more 
than is necessary for the recovery of the intended cognitive effects), so information that is 
clearly already highly activated in the addressee’s mind is often not given linguistic 
expression.  
From the relevance-theoretic standpoint euphemisms are not uniform in their cognitive 
inferability but represent a continuum of cases from fully inferable lexicalized euphemisms 
(e.g. pass away), which have passed the test of time, became conventionalized in languages 
and are marked as such in dictionaries, through partially inferable semi-lexicalized (e.g. 
collateral damage) to possibly initially non-inferable novel euphemisms, as sometimes the 
discovery of the true referent behind a euphemistic expression requires an elaborate 
explanation as in the internally displaced people meaning refugees who have been driven out 
of their homes but cannot leave their home-countries65. 
Despite the differences in degrees along the continuum of cognitive inferability, in RT, 
comprehension of both familiar (conventionalized) and unfamiliar euphemisms is carried out 
along the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure according to which the hearer treats 
the encoded meaning as input to a pragmatic inferential process whose output is a hypothesis 
about the speaker-intended meaning. Speakers, resort to euphemisms for consideration of 
economy of expression, i.e. when such substitutes for direct nominations are the most 
economical and hence relevant ones compatible with the communicator’s abilities and 
preferences.  
From the code-model point of view, where a hearer is taken to entertain a thought 
identical to the speaker’s, euphemization would be pointless. Within the inferential model of 
communication, which RT advocates, the speaker produces an ostensive stimulus that 
provides the audience with evidence which resembles, and is capable of revealing, the content 
of that thought. Humans are cognitive misers and on the production side, the discourse string 
like “The bombing of this military installation was accompanied by extensive collateral 
                                                 
65 Attested example: the National Public Radio broadcast 10.12.2005 
Chapter 8. The online processing of utterances containing euphemisms/PC 
216 
 
damage” is the optimally relevant way of avoiding a longer uneconomical periphrastic 
description “I am being euphemistic in saying that the bombing of this military installation 
killed many civilians”, as it is an economical way to communicate the propositional attitude 
description “The speaker is being euphemistic in saying that P” which is a higher-level 
explicature derived using the background knowledge in assigning reference to collateral 
damage guided by the principle of relevance. 
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8.2.2 Processing effort as a criterion for markedness  
The speaker may purposefully use a new marked linguistic form in place of a 
discarded dispreferred one with a certain type of intention. As discussed in the chapter on x-
phemisms and (im)politeness, comprehension of unmarked language (e.g. anticipated 
politeness) is intuitive and unconscious (even though when asked, the judging subject can 
become aware of the conclusion of the inference), while in comprehending marked language 
hearers adopt a reflective stance towards the ongoing discourse (e.g. marked use of language, 
which signifies marked situations is inferred).  
Packaging utterances into a (marked) euphemistic/PC form in order to convey a 
certain thought (e.g. some information along with an attitude to what is said) can serve the 
overall goal of ‘economy of expression’, representing an effort-saving convenience for the 
speakers who rely on the hearers’ pragmatic inferential abilities to arrive at the intended 
interpretation. In the example (9), for instance, the expression come up for coffee could be 
seen as a convenient shorthand for the fuller encoding come up for coffee and a sexual 
intercourse. Here what is actually said is a euphemistic understatement. The speaker’s 
commitment-attitude to the implicated proposition is very weak as he can plausibly deny66 
having implicated the ‘sexual intercourse’ part, since the words have not actually been 
uttered.  
According to Levinson (2000: 135), in Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) Relevance theory, 
marked expressions require more processing effort and thus contribute to the estimation of 
relevance. The relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure imposes constraints on utterance 
processing, which guide the hearers to analyze contextual assumptions and interpretive 
hypothesis in order of their accessibility or ‘salience’. As previously mentioned, an important 
contribution of RT was the observation that assumptions can be communicated weakly and 
strongly. The strength or the degree of salience of assumptions in certain contexts is regarded 
as “a result of its processing history” and consequently “a more accessible assumption is one 
that is easier to recall” (Sperber and Wilson 1995:77), i.e. its retrieval requires less cognitive 
processing effort.  
Admittedly, this suggests two ways in which some encyclopedic information can be 
more manifest to an individual at some moment. Thus Assimakopoulos (2014) points out that, 
                                                 
66 In Gricean pragmatics, implicature cancellations are connected with the capacity to deny having 
implicated that Q by asserting P, but not the capacity to assert Q as a possible repair to having asserted P. 
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on the one hand, if an assumption has been recently used in an inference then it should be 
more manifest to the hearer than competing assumptions. On the other hand, the more 
frequently an assumption has entered the inference, the more accessible the frame in which it 
is included should be for future context selections with respect to the interpretation of an 
utterance that includes the relevant concept. This reflects the tendency we have to forget 
encyclopedic information that we rarely use in our cognitive processing (see Assimakopoulos 
2014 for discussion). 
In line with the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure (Wilson (2000), in order 
to recognize the intention which underlies the production of an utterance, addressees will 
follow the path of least cognitive effort in calculating cognitive effects, consider 
interpretations in order of accessibility and stop when their expectation of relevance is 
satisfied. The existence of the order of accessibility or relative salience of assumptions 
associated with the use of a particular word or expression means that the prototypical or 
default meanings of an expression or rather the ‘core’ encyclopedic features associated with 
the communicated concepts (see Rubio Fernández 2008) will be accessed first due to their 
salience on hearers’ minds. 
The graded nature of salience of features associated with concepts is affected, 
according to Giora (2003) by such factors as their conventionality, frequency, familiarity, or 
prototypicality. The view put forward in her Graded Salience Hypothesis differs from the one 
adopted in RT in that it assumes that more salient meanings are accessed faster than and reach 
sufficient levels of activation before less salient ones, regardless of contextual information or 
authorial intent. Coded meanings of low salience, however, may not reach sufficient levels of 
activation to be visible in a context biased toward the more salient meaning of the word 
(Giora 2003: 11). 
In order to achieve relevance, a certain contextual effect has to be achieved at a 
minimal processing effort. Schuster (2003) points out that if a certain utterance has a high 
degree of prototypicality in its context a contextual effect is given at a minimal assistance of 
processing effort:  
“In the case of adjacency pairs prototypicality can be pointed out excellently in terms 
of preferred and dispreferred seconds. The first part of an adjacency pair can be 
accounted for as creating a micro-context against the features of which certain seconds 
are more or less prototypical in terms of classic markedness criteria as for instance 
frequency distribution and also more socio-culturally determined notions such as 
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expectations of the participants in regard to appropriateness and politeness. Negative 
expressions are thus avoided frequently and are replaced by disparaging antonyms or 
euphemism” (Schuster 2003: 148). 
The existence of such adjacency pairs (the preferred and dispreferred seconds) means 
that markedness is a relational concept: the marked linguistic form necessarily presupposes 
the existence of its unmarked counterpart – the norm or “ground” in relation to which it is 
marked as “figure” in cognitive environments or contexts of hearers. Levinson (2000) notes 
that on the formal side, marked forms, in comparison to corresponding unmarked forms, can 
be more morphologically complex and less lexicalized, more prolix or periphrastic, less 
frequent or usual, and less neutral in register. On the meaning side, such forms suggest some 
additional meaning or connotation absent from the corresponding unmarked forms (Levinson 
2000: 137).  
According to Traugott and Dasher (2002: 18-19), what will turn out to be a marked 
expression will be very specific to a language or a community, but the effect of markedness, 
however it is expressed, will be consistent across these languages and communities. 
In a functional-grammar framework the dichotomy marked vs. unmarked is explicated 
as follows: the marked format tends to be structurally more complex or larger, less frequent 
and thus cognitively more salient and cognitively more complex in terms of mental effort, 
attention demands, or processing time (Givon 1993: 179; Levinson 1983: 307).  
A similar idea is expressed by a very general notion of markedness proposed by 
Levinson (1983): less effort is unmarked. The Gricean reasoning is that the speaker seems to 
have gone out of his way to avoid using the unmarked expression and so must be trying to 
avoid whatever the unmarked expression would suggest by making the hearer invest 
additional cognitive effort into processing the marked utterance. In RT additional processing 
effort incurred by the use of the marked expression generates a wider range of weaker 
implicatures (vis-à-vis their unmarked counterparts) as well as higher-level explicatures, i.e. 
embedding or metarepresenting the utterance under the propositional attitude/illocutionary 
force indicators. 
Considering this, it is rather tempting to assume that the longer and the more indirect a 
euphemism is the more it is trying to conceal the underlying reality by diverting 
attention/increasing the effort necessary to process it. Dirven and de Mendoza Ibanez (2010: 
16), for instance, argue that a more complex linguistic form usually carries a greater amount 
of meaning, and form is motivated by functional factors such as politeness, demands of 
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informativeness, and rhetoric, among others. The authors illustrate this by comparing the 
wording of the sign No smoking in a public place with that of Customers are kindly requested 
to refrain from smoking, if they can in the dining room of a chic restaurant. 
Sometimes euphemisms are indeed longer than the dispreferred expression because, 
for example, in English the dispreferred Anglo-Saxon words tend to be shorter than the 
‘learned’ substitutes of Latin origin,  and partly because “it almost always takes more words 
to evade an idea than to state it directly and honestly” (Rawson 1981: 10).  However, it 
appears that the relations of iconicity here are rather objectionable since according to Blum-
Kulka’s principle of pragmatic clarity: “Lengthening the inferential path beyond ‘reasonable 
limits’ set by norms which are subject to situational and cultural constraints, constitutes an 
imposition in itself, which subtracts from the politeness of an utterance” (Blum-Kulka 1987: 
141). In Blum-Kulka’s opinion, balance between two aspects of minimization (of the 
imposition, and of the length of the inferential path) is achieved by means of conventional 
indirectness, which is placed at the high end of the politeness scale. 
The artificially introduced PC alterations of the naturally-evolved grammatical norms 
to the so-called ‘people first’ linguistic forms, discussed in section 3.3 (e.g. people of color), 
can hardly be considered optimally relevant as they require extra cognitive processing effort 
without yielding any additional positive cognitive effects.  Thus the well-formed normal 
people is more relevant than the ill-formed people of norm on the processing-effort side, as 
people of norm yields no extra cognitive effects.  
In order to render this utterance relevant, hearers are forced to access those contextual 
assumptions, which would render it relevant, for example that the speaker is not being serious 
(literal), etc. In other words, the greater effort involved in processing an ostensive linguistic 
stimulus must be offset or ‘rewarded’ by compensatory effects and so some (weak and 
indeterminate) implicatures can arise (Carston 1995: 237). In such cases, hearers start to 
generate numerous weak implicatures assuming that the speaker intended to communicate an 
array of non-propositional effects.  
Unusual phrasings lead to extra inferences based on the assumption that the speaker 
would not have used the unusual marked linguistic form if he did not want those inferences to 
be drawn. According to RT (Sperber and Wilson 1955) the extra processing effort required 
for reanalysis often gives rise to additional inferences in the form of (mildly humorous) 
effects.  
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Thus processing female sibling, involves more effort than processing sister. Female 
sibling is longer and sibling is a less frequently used word than sister, and so less accessible. 
According to the definition of optimal relevance the hearer should be put to no extra effort in 
deriving the intended effects of an utterance. It follows from this that a speaker using female 
sibling intended the hearer to derive effects that he would not derive from sister.  
From the RT standpoint, upon encountering a marked expression, the hearer knows 
that it is relevant enough to be worth processing and that it is the most relevant one 
compatible with the communicator’s abilities and preferences and attempts to recognize the 
speaker’s intention behind this particular linguistic choice – performs mutual adjustment of 
context, explicit content and implicatures. In their search for relevance, hearers inevitably 
metarepresent the ‘default’ (conventional, unmarked or salient in Giora’s sense) linguistic 
choice underlying the use of the marked one and the speaker’s attitude to it (e.g. endorsing, 
questioning, dissociative etc.). 
In his work on poetic effects of weak implicatures Pilkington (2000: 111) argues that 
conventional metaphors require less time and processing effort since during their processing a 
metarepresented set of assumptions is accessed en bloc. I suggest that the same applies to 
conventional euphemisms as instances of figurative language. They may be processed faster 
because the time-consuming activity of retrieving contextual assumptions and generating 
many implicatures is not necessary. The implications of conventional euphemisms are 
assumed to be all ready-made by activating the corresponding ‘make-sense frame’. 
RT views the relationship between an utterance and a thought of the speaker as one of 
interpretive resemblance67 between the propositional forms of the utterance and the thought. 
The hearer does not expect the speaker’s utterance to be literal, but rather optimally relevant. 
This means that the general motivation for euphemisms is that utterances containing them will 
be more relevant relative to the context of use than their dysphemistic/orthophemistic 
counterparts and the cognitive effects the speaker intends the hearer to get could not be 
achieved otherwise with less processing effort for the hearer. 
The next section shows that the processing of euphemisms involves the attribution of 
an utterance or thought and part of their relevance is achieved by means of the expression of 
                                                 
67 As discussed in section 1.2.4, the idea of resemblance means that the relevance of the lower-order 
representation lies in its resemblance to another representation, rather than its being true of the state of affairs 
which it represents. 
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an implicit68  attitude, as inferential processes enriching a linguistically encoded logical form 
or ‘propositional blueprint’ can also enrich the social or attitudinal message encoded by 
ostensive stimuli.  
                                                 
68 Unlike explicit (overt) stance markers (obviously, unfortunately, I think/believe/doubt/hope/hate/love 
etc.), euphemisms express stance implicitly. This implicit information can be made explicit by embedding it 
under propositional attitude or speech act description or, in RT terms, constructing a “higher-level explicature”. 
Chapter 8. The online processing of utterances containing euphemisms/PC 
223 
 
8.2.3 Euphemisms/PC as echoic interpretive use  
In this section I argue that from the RT standpoint, the cognitive processing of 
euphemistic/PC neologisms involves metarepresentation of the saliently unexpressed in the 
context of utterance dispreferred content. I regard euphemisms and PC expressions as 
interpretive ‘echoic’ devices used to convey an attitude to the proposition expressed by 
utterances containing them rather than descriptive statements about some state of affairs in the 
world.  
From the cognitive-pragmatic standpoint, euphemistic/PC language use is motivated 
by and results from human mind-reading capacity to attribute intentions and infer speaker 
meanings on the basis of not fully determined linguistic evidence. The processing of such 
language relies heavily on metarepresentations. In fact, labeling an utterance as ‘euphemistic’ 
is only possible after a decent amount of metarepresentational inferencing (considering the 
expression used against the possible salient alternatives) has been performed, since in 
understanding euphemisms, hearers need to think about the thoughts the speaker is thinking of 
in producing the utterance. 
By means of resorting to euphemisms/PC language, speakers encourage their 
interlocutors to access assumptions that could be part of their informative intention. 
Assumptions made mutually manifest by this language use may include: “the word is used in 
place of some other dispreferred one, which is avoided because of its taboo status or because 
of its negative political or ideological connotations”. 
Using the RT distinction between descriptive and interpretive uses of language (see 
section 1.2), I propose that: 
Euphemisms and PC expressions as instances of interpretive use where salient 
dispreferred words and expressions are metarepresented/inferentially corrected during the 
process of enriching the sentence meaning to utterance meaning by metalinguistic means in 
cognitive systems of hearers.  
Unlike such instances of interpretive use as reported speech, which are interpretive 
resemblances of attributed thoughts, I suggest that a euphemistic/PC utterance is an 
interpretation of a thought which is a representation of a thought which the speaker believes 
to be dispreferred, i.e. undesirable given more desirable alternatives, to someone (not 
necessarily herself) in certain contexts. 
In their discussion of x-phemistic communication, Allan and Burridge (2006: 49) note 
that: “[I]t is quite possible to deny the applicability of one term while asserting what amounts 
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to a preference for the appropriate connotations of its cross-varietal synonym, as in He’s not a 
lodger, he’s a paying guest or They’re not boobs, they’re bosoms, or … He’s not a liar, he’s 
just careless with the truth”.  
There is a term for this phenomenon, coined by Horn and widely used in semantics 
and pragmatics literature: metalinguistic negation (also referred to as negation polémique by 
Ducrot 1984, 1989). According to Horn (1989: 363): "[metalinguistic negation is] a device for 
objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatever, including the conventional or 
conversational implicata it potentially induces, its morphology, its style or register, or its 
phonetic realization." From the RT standpoint, Carston (1996) observes that the crucial 
property of metalinguistic negations is that ''the representation (or a part of it) falling in the 
scope of the negation operator is implicitly echoic"(Carston 1996: 320-321). 
In the following constructed example, the speaker is resorting to metalinguistic 
negation to express the attitude to the form of an attributed utterance, which he considers 
contextually inappropriate: 
(43) 
It isn’t ‘raining’, we are experiencing “unfavorable weather conditions”.  
The opposite can also take place as in: 
A: France is suffering from unfavorable weather conditions. 
B: You mean it’s been RAINING there for days? 
According to Noh (2000: 93), even higher-level explicatures involving speech-act and 
propositional-attitude descriptions can be echoed: 
(44) 
A: Pass me the salt. 
B: (critically) Pass you the salt! 
B echoes A’s utterance to express disapproval of the lack of politeness, suggesting that 
“Could you pass me the salt?” would be the preferred one to use in this context. 
In the following dialogue from the show “Veep” (Season 1 Episode 2) one of the 
participants Dan is objecting to Amy’s lexical choice without resorting to explicit 
metalinguistic negation: 
(45) 
Amy: That’s lying! 
Dan: Uh, creative semantics. 
Amy: Well, that’s creatively semantic way of saying we’re lying. 
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Dan: Still creative. 
The following exchange from the animated series “South Park” Season 16 Episode 6 
illustrates how metalinguistic negation can be used to disagree with someone’s lexical choices 
as being representative of some state of affairs in the world: 
(46) 
Kyle: We could go to the city pool, they have a water-slide. 
Eric: No, no, no, I’m not getting in the pool with Kenny. He has herpes. 
Kenny: What? 
Eric: Look at his lip! You got herpes, dude! 
Kenny: It’s not ‘herpes’, it’s a cold sore. 
Erik: No, ‘cold sore’ is what girls call it, Kenny. It’s actually herpes. 
Kenny: It’s just a fever blister. 
Erik: Did you hear that, guys? Kenny says it’s just a fever blister. You sound like a 
chick Kenny. That’s herpes, dude, you got that shit till you die. 
In this example Eric is metalinguistically objecting to the use of the euphemistic forms 
cold sore and fever blister since what these lexemes connote is, in his opinion, not a truthful 
representation of the actual state of affairs. 
In the following examples metalinguistic negation also targets connotations and 
objects to the focus assumed by euphemistic utterances: 
(47) 
Sheldon: You know, when my grandfather died, and Meemaw was alone, my mom 
arranged for her to visit a center three times a week where she could socialize with 
other lonely people. It’s very nice. They discuss current events, play bridge, get a hot 
meal. 
Leonard: That sounds lovely. 
Sheldon: It is if you like bridge. Do you like bridge, Leonard? 
Leonard: Sheldon, I’m just not dating someone right now. I don’t need to go to a 
senior center. 
Sheldon: Meemaw resisted at first, but now she loves it. 
Leonard: Fine. If I don’t meet someone soon, you can put me in a home. 
Sheldon: It’s not a home. It’s a senior center.  We’d never put Meemaw in a home! 
(The Big Bang Theory Season 4 Episode 5) 
(48) 
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Leonard: I don’t know, it’s still a little weird since, you know… 
Howard: She dumped you? 
Leonard: She didn’t “dump” me, we were just in different places in the relationship. 
Sheldon: I fail to see how a relationship can have the qualities of a geographic 
location.  
(“The Big Bang Theory”: Season 3 Episode 23) 
(49) 
Watson: You stole a 50-million dollar painting! 
Holmes: I didn’t “steal” it, I’m just delaying its return. 
(“Elementary” Season 1 Episode 10) 
Having been recognized as interpretively used overtly echoic and the speaker’s 
attitude towards their propositional content as dissociative, politically correct utterances can 
obtain ironic interpretation as witnessed in such cases as: 
(50 ) 
My guest Amy Farrell wants to end the persecution of fat people. I’m sorry… ‘extra 
Americans’ (from “The Colbert Report” 04.05.2011).  
Sometimes the discrepancy between the lexical units used and the contextually 
expected language can trigger ironically euphemistic interpretations as illustrated by a 
situation in which a woman assaulted shoppers by spraying them with pepper spray to get a 
bargain at Walmart while shopping on Friday after Thanksgiving. The officials referred to this 
by rebranding assault into competitive shopping with the ensuing comment by Jon Stewart: 
“What a weird Sex and the City way of rebranding assault: I’m not a murderer, I’m a ghost 
creator” (“The Daily Show” 28.11.2011). In cases like He’s not “dead”, he is metabolically 
challenged the ironic ‘special effect’ is inevitably generated but only as a result or re-
processing (one of the feature of echoic utterances pointed out by Carston 1996), i.e. 
increased processing effort.  
What all these possible types of echoic use have in common and what they share with 
a wider class, including cases of mention, quotation and free indirect speech, is that a 
representation is being used not to represent an object or state of affairs in the world but to 
represent a representation. In such cases the relationship between representation and that 
which is being represented is not the truth-based descriptive sort but is one of resemblance 
(see Sperber and Wilson 1995). 
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Such mock-PC expressions as motivationally challenged (lazy), ethnically 
homogenous area (ghetto, barrio), geological correction (earthquake), uniquely coordinated 
(clumsy), residentially flexible (homeless), uniquely fortuned individual on an alternative 
career path (loser), are necessarily metarepresented and processed as interpretive, echoic uses 
by the addressees. The echoic nature of utterances containing such expressions makes them 
akin to ironic use, which is accompanied by the implicit expression of a dissociative attitude.  
Within Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), verbal irony is explained as a 
case of echoic interpretive (attributive) metarepresentational use of utterances with which the 
speaker expresses an attitude of dissociation or disapproval of a proposition. Similarly to 
irony, euphemistic/PC expressions can be analyzed as echoic interpretive (attributive) 
metarepresentations, but the attitude expressed by the speaker in one of endorsement or 
acceptance of a proposition. Both types of utterances shares some features but differ as 
regards the expression of attitude.  
Novel euphemistic/PC expressions are thus not cases of descriptive use, but of echoic 
interpretive use of language. The target is inevitably pragmatically inferred and this inference 
is governed by considerations of optimal relevance. Recognizing the allusion costs a hearer a 
certain amount of extra processing effort, which is offset by extra cognitive effects. The 
cognitive effects would be considerably reduced if hearers failed to recognize the target of the 
novel metonymic reference.  
To illustrate this point, let’s consider the use of pavement deficiencies in contexts 
where potholes are expected as the salient default (example quoted in Burridge 1997). Pothole 
is more salient than the creative echoic pavement deficiency. Salience means that the 
expression is more accessible and hence less processing effort is required in interpreting 
pothole than pavement deficiency. In order to be understood, the new expression needs to be 
metarepresented as the salient pothole, which will be inferred along with the higher-level 
explicature “the speaker is being PC in saying that P”.  
The use of novel pavement deficiency in place of pothole puts the hearers to additional 
processing effort, which will be offset by extra (qualitatively different) cognitive effects based 
on the use of the “wrong” name.  Comprehension of pavement deficiency involves two stages 
– metarepresenting the content of the utterance containing the word and its form, during 
which ad hoc concepts are constructed during explicature derivation – an inference guided by 
considerations of optimal relevance via the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure and 
the salient target pothole is evoked (inferred). Pavement deficiency mentally undergoes a sort 
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of metalinguistic correction. The source of the novel euphemism is inferred and the degree of 
interpretive resemblance between the two representations is determined pragmatically. As a 
result of extra processing effort in search for relevance, a higher-level explicature is 
constructed: The speaker is being politically correct in saying that P.   
Understanding an interpretively-used utterance involves recognition on the part of the 
hearer of the fact that in producing this utterance the speaker is thinking not directly about a 
state of affairs, but about another utterance or thought. In order to do so hearers must 
(publicly or privately) ‘metarepresent’ those other utterances or thoughts. In doing so hearers 
inevitably evoke salient dispreferred alternatives, which the euphemisms/PC expressions were 
coined to replace, thereby dealing ‘collateral damage’ of reinforcing their salience in the 
vernacular by, for example, necessitating the retention of the pothole form in processing the 
novel pavement deficiency. It is interesting to note here that the personification and 
subsequent desire not to offend potholes demonstrates that humans possess an innate 
disposition to attribute intentions, beliefs and other psychological states not only to other 
people and animals, but also to inanimate objects. 
The additional metarepresentational level incurs extra processing effort, which, as 
discussed in section 8.2.2) is viewed as the principal criterion according to which linguistic 
units are regarded as marked or unmarked by hearers engaging in their cognitive processing. 
In some cases speakers resort to euphemisms hoping that by increasing the level of effort 
necessary for processing a linguistic string they will succeed in hampering conceptual access 
to the disfavorable referents by introducing a new name for the referent.  
For instance processing the marked enhanced interrogation techniques used in the 
context where torture is unmarked and expected as ‘default’ will result in the hearer 
metarepresenting the echoed salient torture in order to understand what enhanced 
interrogation techniques stands for along with the recovery of such higher-level explicatures, 
e.g.: the speaker is being euphemistic (politically correct) in saying that P.  The inferred 
speaker’s attitude to the alluded dispreferred word torture will be that of moral 
disengagement while at the same time expressing the attitude of endorsement towards the 
proposition expressed by the utterance containing the euphemistic form. The utterance is 
tacitly expressing the idea that the speaker regards torture as a type of ‘necessary evil’ as 
evidenced by the euphemistic reference he resorts to with the purpose of highlighting the 
positive connotations of enhanced (better, sophisticated) and techniques (professional, 
skilled) or focusing on the end result acquisition of evidence as seen from the example below, 
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thereby obscuring negative connotations associated with the straightforward nomination 
torture.   
Recognized for what they are, such instances of uncooperative argumentative 
euphemisms will be subject to ironic mockery: 
(51) 
President: I’ve authorized a private interrogation team to acquire the evidence. 
White House Chief of Staff: Acquire the evidence? (ironically) 
President: Once we have it, she will be irrelevant. 
White House Chief of Staff: Keeping the truth from Jack Bauer is one thing, but 
authorizing the illegal detention and torture of a prisoner … how far are you willing 
to go to protect this lie? 
President: As far as necessary to preserve this treaty. It’s vital for the security of this 
nation and what I’m doing is for the greater good.  
(“24” Season 8 Episode 19) 
In this example, the President is not denying that by acquire the evidence she (the US 
President is female in this episode of the show) means torture and expresses her benevolent 
attitude to it by attempting to reframe the underlying state of affairs through an even broader 
euphemism (going) as far as necessary for the greater good. 
Similarly to euphemisms/PC, the main point in cases of verbal irony is to express the 
speaker’s dissociative attitude to a tacitly attributed utterance or thought (or, more generally, a 
representation with a conceptual content, for instance a moral or cultural norm), based on 
some perceived discrepancy between the way it represents the world and the way things 
actually are (see Sperber and Wilson 1998; Wilson and Sperber 1992). 
In classifying an utterance as ‘politically correct’ or ‘politically incorrect’ hearers use 
the assumptions conveyed by the utterance to construct higher-level explicatures, under which 
they may also embed other levels of metarepresentations (i.e. recognition of the lower-order 
communicative intention). This can be illustrated by an example involving the echoic use of 
the generic anaphoric he/she pronoun form:  
(52) 
After the voter makes his or, from what I understand, in some states, her onscreen 
selection… (“The Daily Show” 03.11.2004) 
This ironic example is overtly impolite and parasitic on the PC version of the utterance 
his or her, to which a news anchor is supposed to adhere in covering presidential elections in 
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order to follow the new communication standard: “After the voter makes his or her onscreen 
selection”. The speaker directs the audience to the optimally relevant interpretation, by 
assuming a dissociative attitude towards the echoic interpretive his/her and by producing an 
Optimally Innovative utterance. The utterance is metarepresented as several higher-level 
explicatures: 
the speaker is being ironic in saying that P 
the speaker is being politically correct in saying that P 
the speaker is pretending to be politically correct in saying that P 
the speaker is informing us that he assumes he to be the standard pronoun form to be 
used in such contexts in saying that P 
It evokes the previously used biased his, which is, presumably, still perceived as an 
unmarked default linguistic form by some hearers. At the same time it communicates a 
number of such weakly communicated implicatures as: 
In some states, decisions male voters make are significantly influenced by the opinion 
of their spouses;  
In some states male voters make onscreen decisions for themselves and their wives; 
In some states female voters don’t exercise their right to vote; 
The speaker does not like the new onscreen voting system, etc. 
As we can see, there are many reasons why a speaker aiming at optimal relevance 
might decide to resort to echoic use. It may provide access to a wide range of contextual 
implications; it may enable the speaker to express a variety of attitudes, ranging from 
complete approval to complete rejection, towards the descriptive content of the utterance.  
Euphemistic/PC utterances echo the undesirability of alternative or dispreferred 
expressions, which could have been used in place of the euphemistic/PC utterance and during 
their online processing in discourse, euphemisms inevitably evoke mental representations of 
the expressions which they were coined to replace. The echoic pointing to the undesirability 
of alternative dispreferred expressions reinforces the salience of the dysphemisms and leads to 
the constant turnover of euphemisms mitigating strongly tabooed as well as merely sensitive 
topics resulting in their  ‘over-lexicalization’, which according to Halliday’s observation, is 
indicative of problematic areas in a society. 
The echoic nature of some nominations can be witnessed in their pragmatic behavior, 
notably in terms of collocability and appropriateness across contexts. Notably, they prevent 
the intersubstitutability of the ‘cross-varietal’ synonyms or words sharing the same denotation 
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but differing in connotations (Frege’s ‘tone’, Kaplan’s ‘expressive content’) in certain 
contexts. Thus one can say flowers died while flowers passed away is not as appropriate and 
is likely to receive an echoic ironic interpretation. Similarly a driver can yell angrily at a 
careless pedestrian Are you blind? but not Are you visually impaired? because of the clash of 
attitudes: an angry driver cannot simultaneously combine his anger with a benevolent attitude 
towards the addressee. Similarly, while visually impaired can be used synonymously with 
blind as its politically correct substitute, it cannot be used in such idiosyncratic collocations as 
‘Love is blind – Love is visually impaired’ without generating humorous effects, because one 
is not supposed to express this kind of PC attitude to an abstract concept of LOVE but only to 
another human being. Thus a statement like Love is visually impaired can only be interpreted 
as echoing the PC attitude and expressing a mocking attitude to it. 
Whenever processing of euphemisms and PC expressions involves (public or private) 
metalinguistic negation or correction, the attitude expressed by these echoic uses will be one 
of rejection. The implicit nature of this negation can be made explicit as in “It’s not 
appropriate to mislead the audience by saying ‘collateral damage’ where one should say 
‘death of civilians during military operations’”. 
Once the veiling intention behind a euphemism is recognized, it can turn into its 
opposite, where the true meaning shines through, as in the following examples from the show 
“24”: 
(53) 
Caller: I think he has become involved with radical groups. 
O’brien: You mean terrorists? 
Caller: Yeah… 
(“24” Season 4 episode 18) 
(54) 
JB: Mike, if we wanna procure any information from the suspect, we’re gonna have to 
do it behind closed doors. 
President: Are you talking about ‘torturing’ this man? 
JB: I’m talking about doing what is necessary to stop this warhead from being used 
against us. 
(“24” Season 4 episode 18) 
(55) 
Also consider the following example from the movie “Shrink” (2009): 
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- Is this an intervention? 
- It’s an ‘opportunity’. 
- You say that one more time and I’m gonna throw a fucking crab cake in your face. 
Uttering radical groups, do it behind closed doors and opportunity in the above 
examples is supposed to have positive connotations unlike such lexemes as terrorists, torture 
and highlight the more positive aspect of an intervention (an event when family and friends 
gather to help an individual suffering from, or rather ‘living with’, to be PC, an alcohol or 
drug addiction). However, those utterances produce the opposite effect as the hearers 
immediately manage to see through the euphemisms and the realization that one is being 
verbally manipulated can potentially make hearers angry. 
As a result of such metalinguistic processing, the intended euphemisms are 
transformed into their opposite – dysphemisms as hearers consider their use to be contextually 
inappropriate.  It is worth mentioning here that the use of ‘inadvertent massacre’, for instance, 
instead of ‘inadvertent killing’ in revealing the “true” meaning of collateral damage would be 
a connotative fallacy  as massacre, along with slaughter, is situated on the far negative end of 
the axiological spectrum of killing: from euphemistic damage – through orthophemistic 
killing – to dysphemistic massacre.  
In processing marked euphemistic locutions hearers inevitably resort to metalinguistic 
commenting on the new lexical unit by comparing/contrasting it with familiar ones through 
metalinguistic negation. One can speak of metalinguistic correction instead of metalinguistic 
negation in cases like the following example from the TV series ‘24’ (Season 6 Episode 1):  
(56) 
Tom: Our country is under siege and you are the National Security Advisor, Karen. 
Frankly, I’m surprised by your resistance. 
Karen: These places that you keep building, they are nothing more than concentration 
camps.  
Tom: Detention facilities. And the criteria for who should be detained are very 
reasonable. 
Here it is the linguistic form or packaging itself that is objected to and not the 
propositional content of the utterance. Ironic effect cannot be said to have been generated in 
this particular example by the use of detention facilities as apparently the use of this 
euphemism in place of an apparent dysphemism concentration camps does not produce such 
an effect. 
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Thus we can conclude that the processing of contextually inappropriate x-phemisms in 
discourse involves either public or private (mental) metalinguistic correction/negation as in 
“this is not the best DARN game in the world, this is the best DAMN game in the world” 
(from Fox news “Super Bowl” special report). Unlike descriptive negation, metalinguistic 
negation is truth-functional – the negated material is metarepresentationally (interpretively or 
metalinguistically) used and contributes to the truth-conditional content of the utterance via 
the proposition expressed (see Noh 2000: 212)  
Uncooperative euphemisms are corrected by (public or private) metalinguistic 
negation and/or denial where a higher level explicature is derived to the extent that the 
speaker is being euphemistic in saying that P. 
They are not displaced people, they are refugees. 
Utterances with metalinguistic negation are sometimes created with the intention to 
entertain and mock the otherwise serious choice of words in PC language and its attempts at 
focusing on positive aspects of something through framing: I didn’t trip, it was a random 
gravity check; They are not black people on welfare, they are inner-city government subsidy 
recipients (The Daily Show 13.12.2011). 
In some situations, the use of less familiar euphemisms can succeed in hampering 
conceptual access to the disfavorable referents. However, the marked status of such 
euphemisms makes them ‘stand out’ in discourse by requiring additional cognitive effort to 
process them. Such mindful (as opposed to ‘shallow’) processing mode inevitably leads to the 
(public or private) metarepresentation of the saliently unexpressed dispreferred alternatives in 
search for an optimally relevant interpretation and this reinforces their salience in discourse.  
I now turn to the discussion of how conventionalization of meaning takes place by 
combining insight from relevance-theoretic and neo-Gricean GCI-theoretic pragmatics. 
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8.3 The conventionalization cline 
In this section I examine the possibility of combining relevance-theoretic and GCI-
theoretic inferential mechanics in an account of conventionalization of meaning. In analyzing 
the phenomenon Bach (1998) refers to as ‘standardization’ (also referred to as 
‘conventionalization’ and ‘routinization’), Capone (2011) has recently proposed that once 
inferences become standardized, they are no longer processed through the Principle of 
Relevance, but become heuristic-based inferential shortcuts. Driven by the Principle of 
Relevance, inferences associated with certain inputs may become ‘cognitive defaults’.  
The idea of conventionalization or (routinization) of inferences at the lexical 
pragmatic level is not foreign to RT, since Wilson and Carston (2007) argue that: 
“<…>(S)ome of these pragmatically constructed senses may catch on in the communicative 
interactions of a few people or a group, and so become regularly and frequently used. In such 
cases, the pragmatic process of concept construction becomes progressively more routinized, 
and may ultimately spread through a speech community and stabilize an extra lexical sense”. 
(Wilson and Carston, 2007:15). Capone (2011) quotes Mey (2004) in pointing out that this 
happens similarly to the way “<…> certain apt metaphors (e.g. ‘sharp’ for ‘intelligent’), due 
to their ‘success’, obtain near-lexical status” (Mey 2004: 113).  
Euphemisms/PC expressions can be viewed in both frameworks as ways to optimize 
relevance (in RT) or processing (in GCI-theory) as they make it possible to infer some 
unencoded aspects of the speaker’s meaning from metalinguistic properties of the utterance 
such as the choice of a given word from among a set of closely related alternatives (but see 
Noveck and Sperber 2007). 
Whenever it is possible for speakers to construct a novel sentence or a novel phrase to 
convey a particular meaning, they often choose to rely on formulaic language which they have 
used and processed repeatedly. Thus although, as Vega Moreno (2007: 218) notes, the 
English language allows speakers to form grammatical sentences such as ‘have a wonderful 
anniversary of your birth’ or ‘have a nice remembrance of the day your mother delivered 
you’, it is rather unlikely that native speakers would choose to congratulate a friend on his 
birthday by uttering these expressions. Instead they would prefer to use the very familiar 
string ‘happy birthday’. Repeatedly heard and repeatedly used constructions such as these are 
often preferred, among other reasons, primarily because they are easier for the speakers to 
produce and for the hearers to understand – for reasons of economy of effort. Vega Moreno 
(2007) explains: “On the language side, we often communicate by using fixed expressions 
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and formulae which save the hearer unnecessary processing effort in deriving the intended 
meaning. On the psychological side, there is a range of experimental evidence which suggests 
that our minds have the ability to allocate attention to potentially relevant stimuli and to the 
potentially most relevance-enhancing ways of processing these stimuli” (Vega Moreno 2007: 
227). 
From the point of view of their production, euphemisms can be viewed as an attempt 
at metarepresentationally framing the content of what is said against the background of 
something which could have been said (i.e. is among the options potentially expectable in the 
context, or a ‘saliently unexpressed proposition’ cf. Israel 2006), but wasn't and the process of 
their understanding inevitably involves enriching the content of the sub-propositional 
meaning they express. 
For example, when someone uses expressions like blank, you know or resorts to a 
“communicative pause” instead of uttering an actual word, he/she is claiming, or assuming, 
that hearers are capable of reconstructing inferentially the meaning of what was not actually 
uttered:  “You are a piece of you know what”; “I need to use the, you know…”, or even 
“Where’s the euphemism around this house?” 
The very unwillingness of uttering something indicates a sensitive area and prompts 
the hearer to employ all available encyclopedic information in their cognitive environments to 
fill in the blanks in search for relevance. What is needed is a heuristic that prompts hearers not 
only to look for what could have been said instead of all the euphemistic lexemes used, but 
also to fill-up relevantly the various you knows, hesitation pauses and blanks. This heuristic 
could explain how indirectness becomes conventionalized in use over time and how 
euphemisms become contaminated with negative connotations (see chapter 9). 
There exist words and expressions whose meaning may be interpreted as euphemistic 
due to contextual factors. These are nonce inferences which are not euphemistic regardless of 
context.  Some euphemistic strategies are nonce cases of framing or, to use a current 
buzzword, ‘spinning’ reality by linguistic means (where it is very difficult for the hearer to 
realize that a linguistic string is a substitute for something dispreferable) in a way that best 
serves the speaker’s purposes.  
An option to consider is that euphemisms are processed by exploiting a heuristic, that 
is, a kind of non-strictly logical but stable type of information processing, a shortcut we are 
‘hard-wired’ with. Heuristics are numerous and enable us to increase significantly the 
efficiency of information processing. One such heuristics, known under the names of framing 
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effect in Tversky and Kahneman (1986) foundational works and quantity heuristics (Q-
heuristics) in other frameworks (cf. Levinson 2000) is a serious candidate for forming the 
grounds on which euphemisms are informationally processed.  
Heuristics have a counterpart: whereas they lead to faster processing and to numerous 
gains in everyday life, they also lead to systematic errors in certain conditions. A type of 
systematic error caused by a heuristic is a cognitive bias. Q-heuristic marks the tendency to 
believe that what isn’t said is not the case and is precisely defined by Levinson (2000) as 
follows: “For the relevant salient alternates, what isn’t said, is not the case”. It appears as a 
modified version of Grice’s first Maxim of Quantity: “Make your contribution as informative 
as is required”. 
Q-heuristics, envisaged as a ‘framing effect’, consists in drawing different conclusions 
from the same information, depending on how that information is presented. This heuristic 
has been found capable of influencing decision behavior (Tversky and Kahneman 1986). The 
idea here being that the initial context will shape the following perceptions, experiences and 
behavior and any derogatory or unfavorable denotation or connotation within language 
expressions will dominate the interpretation in their immediate context. 
Within this framework, the M-Principle is responsible for generation of euphemistic 
meanings: 
Speaker’s maxim: indicate an abnormal, nonstereotypical situation by using marked 
expressions that contrast with those you would use to describe the corresponding normal, 
stereotypical situation. 
Recipient’s corollary: What is said in an abnormal way indicates an abnormal 
situation, or marked messages indicate marked situations, specifically: 
Where S has said “p” containing marked expression M, and there is an unmarked 
alternated expression U with the same denotation D which the speaker might have employed 
in the same sentence-frame instead, then where U would have I-implicated the stereotypical 
or more specific subset d of D, the marked expression M will implicate the complement of the 
denotation d (Levinson 2000: 136-137).  
According to Levinson (2000: 15) conversational implicatures are motivated, not 
arbitrary – so the task of replacing arbitrary signs with motivated ones can also be 
accomplished by conventionalization of implicatures – by employing the mechanism of 
invited inferences (Traugott and Dasher 2002).  
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Meanings tend to become increasingly based in the speaker’s subjective belief 
state/attitude towards the proposition (Traugott 1989: 35). At the same time speakers weigh 
up optimal understanding for the hearer against minimal effort on his/her own part. 
Levinson’s heuristic-based GCI-theoretic framework can be used to account for the 
way meaning become conventionalized along the following cline of 
conventionalization/subjectification (Traugott 1999; Levinson 2000; Traugott and Dasher 
(2002). From: utterance-token meanings (PCIs) which are knowledge- and situation-specific 
invited inferences that arise “on the fly” and have not been crystallized into commonly used 
implicatures through utterance-type meanings (Levinson’s GCIs) which are cancellable 
preferred meanings and conventions of use in language communities or “generalized invited 
inferences” to (indefeasible) coded meanings (semantics), which is a convention of a 
language at a given time.  
Terkourafi (2001) explains that this cline implies a gradual detachment of meaning 
from context: “inferences arising from speakers’ intentions become defeasible inferences 
associated with properties of linguistic expressions which in turn become part of those 
expressions’ coded meaning (hence indefeasible)” Terkourafi (2001: 152).  
Terkourafi (2001) cites empirical evidence providing grounds for the hypothesis that, 
as part of becoming gradually detached from context on the way from PCIs to GCIs, 
inferences go through a stage at which (minimal) contextual input is still required and the 
corresponding inferences become presumed in virtue of general heuristics, rather than derived 
in virtue of the speaker’s intentions. Her proposal differs from Traugott’s (1999) in suggesting 
an additional layer of utterance-type meanings, which are presumed in minimal context and 
not in all contexts, ceteris paribus, as follows from the traditional Gricean and neo-Gricean 
view of GCIs. 
The contextual variables constituting the ‘minimal context’ in relation to which an 
expression is considered euphemistic/PC, can be taken to include information along the lines 
suggested by Allan and Burridge’s MCPC criterion (discussed in section 5.2) as well as other 
variables suggested by Terkourafi (2001: 153) in relations to politeness assessments, 
including information about the interlocutors’ sex, age, the setting of the exchange, the timing 
of a particular utterance, explicit cultural assessments of specific behaviors, idiosyncratic 
factors, and further intonational and kinesic clues. Such contextual variables can include, 
according to Bach (1999b: 72), anything that the hearer is to take into account to determine 
the speaker’s communicative intention. 
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Considering the above discussion, I propose that the unmarked status of a lexical unit, 
which has become conventionalized relative to the context of utterance in which it is assesses 
as euphemistic/PC, can be seen as licensing its processing via automatic I-GCIs, while the 
processing of lexical units marked as not conventionalized in their euphemistic use involves 
relevance-driven derivation of (speaker-intended) explicatures, which can subsequently 
become routinized as M-implicating the saliently unexpressed dispreferred alternatives. 
In Terkourafi’s (2001) proposal, once conventionalization relative to a context has 
taken place, markedness turns out to be a function not so much of the formal properties of a 
certain form of words alone, as of such properties in conjunction with the (minimal) context 
in which the words are used. The resulting inferences are considered generalized because they 
are independent from nonce context, however, they are dependent on a minimal context, and 
are therefore universal only inasmuch as the mechanism for their derivation is also universal 
(Terkourafi 2001: 154). Terkourafi (2001) points out that the view of GCIs as context-
dependent is in accord with Barsalou’s (1987) argument for the context-dependent nature of 
‘stereotypicality’, which, as discussed in section 1.3, is the notion, fundamental to Levinson’s 
views of the heuristics/principles and how they are applied. 
According to Horn’s (1984) division of pragmatics labor if two expressions share the 
same denotation, the marked one will pick up the interpretation complementary to the 
unmarked expression’s. The use of a marked (relatively complex and/or prolix) expression 
when a corresponding unmarked (simpler, less “effortful”) alternate expression is available 
tends to be interpreted as conveying a marked message (one which the unmarked alternative 
would not or could not have conveyed) (see Horn 1984:22). 
 According to Levinson (2000), the Gricean reasoning would have it that the speaker 
seems to have gone out of his way to avoid using the unmarked expressions and so must be 
trying to avoid whatever the unmarked expression would suggest. Two coextensive 
expressions differing in formal markedness tend to become associated with complementary 
subsets of the original extension (e.g. kill and cause to die) (see Levinson 2000: 137). 
Depending on the degree of conventionalization of euphemisms and PC expressions 
relative to some context of use69, they can be processed via I- and M-GCIs. If uttering a 
                                                 
69 For Terkourafi (2001: 154-155), the expression most frequently associated with a particular 
communicative function relative to a context becomes the unmarked means of fulfilling this function in this 
context. The expression is at this stage the unmarked alternative relative to other expressions potentially used in 
that context. 
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euphemistic locution is perceived to be unmarked relative to a certain context, that is such an 
utterance conforms to the hearer’s expectations about the way language is normally used, it 
will be presumed to be euphemistic/PC by way of an I-GCI. The expression to go to the 
bathroom can probably serve as an example of a fully conventionalized euphemism, no longer 
associated with its spatial meaning “to transport oneself to the bathroom”, but which evokes 
the target dysphemistic sense automatically in such examples as “The dog went to the 
bathroom on the living room rug”. 
If uttering a particular linguistic form does not conform to the hearer’s expectations 
and stands out as ‘marked’ in discourse, an M-GCI pertaining to the complement of the 
euphemistic I-implicature will be generated in the form of the automatic metalinguistic 
replacement/correction of the euphemistic/PC form by the saliently unexpressed dispreferred 
one. This is the type of euphemism Abrantes (2005) refers to as not being part of the lexical 
inventory, but rather the source of instant shelters, created to soften or veil a sudden event, 
according to the particular intention of the speaker. 
In line with Giora’s view that PC language is effective only when it is novel, we can 
assume that when PC expressions lose out on markedness, they gradually stop being PC. 
Their being PC depends on their being marked. In other words, an expression cannot remain 
PC if it catches on and the underlying dispreferred alternative becomes its M-GCI. It wears 
out, though semantically nothing has changed. 
Novel PC language gives rise to a PCI of political correctness and the speaker’s PC 
intention is meta-represented as part of the derivation of the higher-level explicature. In 
processing lexical units, which have not yet become conventionalized, hearers are invited to 
look for the intended referent, which is not readily available, but must be inferred online. As a 
result, the salient dispreferred alternative, instead of which the PC expression was used will 
also be inferred. There is also a possibility that when faced with an entirely novel and creative 
lexical unit, the hearer will fail to reach the intended referent, e.g. he/she may end up inferring 
that rather than homeless, 'residentially flexible' refers to rich people who want to avoid 
paying too much tax and keep travelling for that reason. Thus in order to effectively fulfill its 
stated objectives, PC-related language needs to always be perceived as marked.  
When hearers come across a marked PC expression, they may interpret it by 
expanding it to its compositional content as part of relevance-driven explicature derivation, 
e.g. inferentially fixing the reference of collateral damage to unintended killing of civilians. 
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With frequent use, this way of achieving relevance can become routinized and the 
dispreferred content will come to be derived by way of an M-GCI in an automatic manner. 
Guided by the principle of relevance (trying to ascertain why a speaker resorted to this 
particular linguistic form), hearers may continue deriving other relevant (weak) PCIs on 
whether the speaker is being indirect/evasive/deceptive, etc. in saying that P.  Following the 
relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, they may then ratify the PCI to the effect that 
the speaker is expressing a certain attitude, or not ratify it, and decide that although the 
speaker was using an allegedly euphemistic/PC form, his attitude to what is said was 
ironic/mocking etc.  
In case of novel/creative non-conventionalized expression, a strong PCI (or higher-
level explicature) to the effect that ‘the speaker is being euphemistic/PC in saying that P’ may 
be derived in the process of relevance-driven hypothesis evaluation regarding why the speaker 
has resorted to this particular linguistic form, i.e. ascertaining the speaker-intended meaning 
online while considering contextual variables discussed above. Additional weaker higher-
level explicatures/PCIs-conjectures of speaker’s (im)politeness/truthfulness/commitment to 
what is said, etc. may be derived by following the relevance-theoretic comprehension 
procedure (trying to figure out what the expression means). 
Conventionalization is taken here to be an individual-specific and culture-specific 
cline: from fully novel, requiring most processing effort, through marginal cases, to fully 
conventionalized requiring least processing effort ceteris paribus. 
The likelihood that the hearer will automatically compositionally replace the figurative 
expression, e.g. pass away with its literal meaning died in trying to fix propositional content 
of the utterance containing this expression is proportional to the degree to which the 
expression is conventionalized for the hearer. It follows that, ironically, since the salient 
dispreferred alternatives are inevitably meta-represented in processing the novel 
euphemistic/PC expressions, they actually become literal conventional meanings of these 
figurative expressions as they become conventionalized. In order to be ascribed the status of a 
‘euphemism’ (by way of a PCI or a higher-level explicature), the propositional content 
(explicature) of pass away - ‘die’ has to be mentally represented as the dispreferred 
alternative, which the euphemisms substitutes.  
Thus the proposition expressed by uttering the novel “There was collateral damage” 
can only be understood by compositionally replacing it with its literal paraphrase “Civilians 
were unintentionally killed during the military operation”. Also “What does ‘collateral 
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damage’ mean?” can be explicated by “It means that civilians were unintentionally killed 
during the military operation” the propositional content of which cannot be further reduced to 
another “that”-clause, except, in this particular case, by saying that ‘military operation’ means 
(euphemistically stands for) that “a country is waging a war’: e.g. War in Iraq – Operation 
Iraqi Freedom.  
Thus from the points of view of Levinson’s GCI theory, marked euphemistic/PC 
words and expressions, which have not yet been conventionalized, will always implicate a 
euphemistic/PC M-GCI, e.g. the GCI He is homeless will always be M-implicated by He is 
residentially flexible regardless of context or intention underlying its use. In relevance-
theoretic terms, such inferences can be regarded as contributing to what is explicitly 
communicated by speakers in uttering sentences containing these words and expressions as a 
sort of reference assignment required for residentially flexible (as in: what does residentially 
flexible stand for/refer to?) and thus homeless happens to be part of what is said (explicated) 
by “residentially flexible”. 
This explains why and how, diachronically, euphemisms can become ‘contaminated’ 
with negative connotations associated with taboo topics, which leads to their constant 
turnover in the vernacular or “euphemism treadmill”, as well as why political correctness is 
effective only when it is novel and hence capable of bringing people’s unconscious biases to 
consciousness. The biases are, arguably, brought to consciousness by metarepresenting the 
salient dispreferred alternatives as part of comprehension process.  
The process of euphemism treadmill, discussed at length in chapter 9, can thus be 
regarded in Levinson’s (2000) framework as relying on GCIs. For example, drink is narrowed 
or, in Levinson’s own terms, “specialized” to alcoholic drink by way of I-GCI towards the 
stereotypical extension “egged on” by euphemism Levinson (2000: 138-139). He notes, 
following Horn, that unlike the “intoxicating” I-implicatures of drink, which are now long 
conventionalized and recognized in dictionaries as a separate sense, an autohyponym, the 
sexist I- implicatures of secretary or nurse are matters of social rather than linguistic 
conventions.  
Levinson argues that by changing social conventions one can change linguistic ones:   
“<…> in British English vicar and vicaress meant, respectively, male priest in the 
Church of England and his spouse, until the recent innovation of female priests. To 
avoid the connotations, chocolate-drink manufacturers extol the virtues of their 
beverage (historically, beverage was at least as contaminated!) … (I)t is fairly clear 
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that the process of narrowing by I-implicature (as with missile to rocket) not only 
allows a new life for worn-out (marked) words but, by M-implicature (to the 
complement of the I-implicature associated with the unmarked term), trims their 
meaning too. “The dress is pale red” suggests (by M-contrast with pink) that the 
dress is not prototypical pink but somewhere between pink and red.” (Levinson 
2000: 138-139). 
The relevance-theoretic explanation of euphemism treadmill is provided in terms of 
the construction of the on-line contextual modulation of meanings due to pragmatic processes 
operating at the level of individual words, to the discussion of which I turn in the next 
chapter.
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Chapter 9. A lexical-pragmatic account of euphemism treadmill 
The main focus of this chapter is the application of the relevance-theoretic account of 
lexical pragmatics (Carston 1997, 2002a; Sperber and Wilson and 2006; Wilson and Carston 
2007) to analyzing how euphemistic/PC interpretations arise as a result of relevance-driven 
on-line construction of occasion-specific senses due to pragmatic processes operating at the 
level of individual words and expressions, within the overall process of forming hypotheses 
about the explicit content of utterances. I argue that the construction of ad hoc concepts 
involved in the processing of novel euphemistic/PC expressions is responsible for these 
locutions achieving new relevance in discourse. 
9.1 Lexical pragmatics and semantic change 
The section considers research in the area of relevance-theoretic lexical pragmatics, 
which suggests that conceptual encodings are not actually full-fledged concepts, but rather 
concept schemas, or pointers to a conceptual space, on the basis of which, on every occasion 
of their use, an actual concept (a constituent of the language of thought, see section 2.2.3) is 
pragmatically inferred (see Carston 2002b).  
Recent research in the emerging field of lexical pragmatics (e.g. Blutner 1998, 2002; 
Carston 2002a, 2010b; Wilson 2003; Wilson and Carston 2007) has made it possible to 
analyze processes responsible for the resolution of semantic underdeterminacy by an 
interaction between decoding and inference not only at the level of what is explicitly 
communicated globally by whole sentences, but also at the local level of individual lexemes 
and phrases. 
The use of a word on a particular occasion may express some conceptual meaning, 
which differs from the one encoded by the contextually-independent semantic meaning of that 
word. Whenever a word is used to express a concept different from its linguistically encoded 
meaning, the new meaning is constructed by drawing on encyclopedic information, and is 
required to make the utterance relevant in the expected way. This happens because, as Sperber 
and Wilson (1998) have argued, the mapping between the lexicon and the concepts repository 
is not one-to-one but one-to-many, a lexical item being therefore underspecified with regard 
to the actual conceptual meaning. The linguistically encoded sense of a word does not serve 
as its default interpretation because language users have more mentally represented concepts 
than there are linguistically encoded concepts.  
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Ariel (2002) illustrates this point by considering that, for instance, cut in cut a cake, is 
different from, and irreducible to, a general meaning of cut, which would also account for cut 
in cut parsley, etc. Cut, then, is associated with slightly different meanings, all of them 
equally literal, depending on the object being cut. Similarly to cut, red will be interpreted 
differently depending on what it modifies, e.g. red skin, red hair, red potato. These context-
dependent meanings are all listed in our mental lexicon, which is an indication of the number 
of concepts we can represent in our minds and communicate exceeding the number of words 
available in any given language to encode those concepts. Ariel (2002) points out that the 
availability of multiple slightly different literal meanings associated with one concept renders 
the notion of ‘literal meaning’ itself obsolete. The author attributes the nuances of meaning 
partly due to the different “mental images” produced by cut and red in all of those 
collocations. 
As already discussed in section 1.2, in RT, the presence of a word in an utterance 
serves as a starting point for a relevance-guided inferential process resulting in the 
construction of contextually appropriate sense. Words carry only meaning potential and the 
meaning is constructed online by building contexts in which they would be relevant. The 
overall interpretation process is guided by a mutual adjustment of expectations of relevance, 
the context and the (explicit and implicit) content of the utterance. 
Recent work in the area of relevance-theoretic lexical pragmatics (RTLP) advocates 
the view according to which lexical interpretation typically involves the construction of an 
occasion-specific sense or ad hoc concept, which is adjusted based on the interaction among 
encoded concepts, contextual information and expectations of relevance (Wilson and Carston 
2007). Following seminal work on ad hoc concepts by Barsalou70 (1983, 1987), RTLP offers a 
unified account on which lexical narrowing and broadening are the outcomes of a single 
inferential interpretive process which fine-tunes the interpretation of almost every word. 
According to Carston (2002a: 322), in constructing an occasion-specific ad hoc concept, 
speakers can use a lexically encoded concept to communicate a distinct non-lexicalized 
(atomic) concept, which resembles the encoded one in that it shares elements of its logical and 
                                                 
70 According to Barsalou’s theory of ad hoc concept formation, on which the current RT model is 
explicitly based, frames do not deliver ready-made and stable concepts: “instead of viewing concepts as invariant 
structures that are retrieved intact from long-term memory when needed, it may make more sense to view 
concepts as temporary constructs in working memory that are tailored to current situations" (Barsalou 1987:120).  
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encyclopedic entries, and that hearers can pragmatically infer the intended concept on the 
basis of the encoded one. 
The way the encoded lexical concepts underdetermine speaker-intended concepts can 
be illustrated with the following example, in which Stephen Colbert (“The Colbert Report” 
07.11.2011) discusses how Texas state representative Larry Taylor used the word Jew in a 
derogatory manner as an ethnic slur while addressing insurance companies who didn’t pay the 
claims of disaster victims in a timely manner at a hearing by saying: “Your job is to pay the 
client. Don’t nitpick. Don’t try to Jew them down... That’s probably a bad term”. Due to 
online pragmatic processes of occasion-specific (ad hoc) concept construction operating at the 
level of individual words, the meaning of Jew can be modulated (narrowed) in context to 
become an ethnic slur JEW*, which implies and endorses the stereotypical notion that Jewish 
people are greedy.  
Regarding the decompositionality of ad hoc concepts into constituent elements, which 
seems to be stemming from the paraphrases often provided in the RT literature (e.g. DRINK* 
is narrowed to mean ALCOHOL DRINK), Carston (2010b) points out that it might look as if 
they are being construed as decompositional; for example, DANCE* has been glossed as 
‘dance in an intense, focused, lively way’. However, Carston (2010) explains that the idea 
behind this is that ad hoc concepts are, generally, ineffable, in the sense that, as well as not 
being lexicalized, there isn’t a linguistic phrase that fully encodes them either, and the 
paraphrases are intended as just a rough indication to aid readers in understanding what we 
have in mind in particular cases (see Carston 2010b). 
Applied to cases of euphemistic/PC language use, the ineffability of ad hoc concepts 
means that speakers infer, for instance, COME UP FOR COFFEE from examples (9) and (11) 
as some sort of non-typical broader kind of COME UP FOR COFFEE* by activating relevant 
encyclopedic assumptions, which are part of stored make-sense frames (scripts) of having 
coffee/dating. The sexual intercourse meaning is certainly defeasible and will not go through 
when processed against a different cognitive script/scenario, e.g. uttered to invite a colleague 
to come up to one’s office for a cup of coffee. 
Processing of novel figurative language in general, appears to involve the inevitable 
metarepresentation of the direct ‘literal’ alternative. In order to make the meaning of a novel 
figurative discourse string relevant, hearers need to have manifest assumptions associated 
with the encyclopedic entries of the concept being processed. For instance, hearers processing 
example (57) will need to understand that the complex concept DEF LEPPARD 1987 
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metonymically refers to the album of the British rock band called “Hysteria” and is broadened 
here to include something that happened at the Parliament today: 
(57) 
 The discussion of the controversial law caused a real “DEF LEPPARD 1987” at the 
Parliament today. 
Only the hearers who have the necessary background assumptions manifest in their cognitive 
systems, will be able to make the necessary reference assignment to the speaker-intended 
concept HYSTERIA and derive it as part of the explicature of the utterance. Along with this, 
the hearers will derive an array of weak implicatures about hearer’s reason for substituting the 
direct nomination with the indirect one.  
As instances of figurative indirect language, euphemisms/PC are used to refer not to 
referents themselves, but to other, saliently dispreferred in the context of utterance, names of 
those referents. Their processing thus involves reference assignment whose targets are other 
concepts the speaker intended by the particular use of a word, instead of direct references to 
something in the world. In other words, semantically, euphemisms have no meaning apart 
from ‘meaning’ the dispreferred counterparts, which they were coined to replace. The 
speaker-intended concepts they refer to contribute to explicatures of utterances containing 
them. 
Concepts are regarded by RTLP as contextually constructed ‘ad hoc’ from a reservoir 
of encyclopedic information, the salience, and hence the level of accessibility of which, varies 
from individual to individual, and from situation to situation. The following example from 
“The Big Bang Theory” (Season 03 Episode 23) illustrates how a concept can be broadened 
to include assumptions in no way associated with its lexicalized sense: 
(58) 
Raj: I’m watching someone’s TV. “The Good Wife” is on. I tell you, this is my new 
“Gray’s Anatomy”. 
Here the speaker means that “The Good Wife” is his new favorite show and that it 
replaced his previously favorite TV show “Gray’s Anatomy”. Thus THE GOOD WIFE shares 
the same encyclopedic property of being the speaker’s favorite TV show with GRAY’S 
ANATOMY*. Examples like this along with smart is the new SEXY* and Iraq is the new 
VIETNAM* (for the US) are instances of category extension or ‘broadening’. On this view, 
the metaphorical use of chameleon would be considered as involving an expansion from the 
category CHAMELEON to the category CHAMELEON*, which is lexically adjusted to 
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include both actual chameleons and people who share with chameleons the encyclopedic 
property of having the capacity to change their appearance in order to blend in with their 
surroundings (see Wilson and Carston 2007 for a discussion). 
Cases of ad hoc narrowing of the meaning encoded by lexicalized concepts include 
such general-for-specific metonymies as PILL*, which can be used in a narrow sense to mean 
birth-control pill similarly to the way DINK* is commonly used in a restricted sense of 
alcohol drink. In uttering I need to go to the bathroom speakers are typically understood to 
have resorted to a euphemisms by referring to the specific concept toilet by narrowing the 
general meaning of BATHROOM to BATHROOM* (or broadening the BATHROOM to 
include the toilet in cases where the two facilities are located in separate rooms of the house). 
Similarly, a speaker who utters I wanted to be a Letterman but I was a Leno, invites 
the hearer to select the subset of relevant salient assumptions about David Letterman from 
encyclopedic entries (confident, funny and admired) and Jay Leno (no so much admired after 
his return as The Tonight Show host replacing Conan O’Brien), which would produce 
positive cognitive effects in the search for relevance. The phrases N-word as well as the F-
word, the c-word etc. can also be treated as cases of narrowing as they pick only one of all 
possible words in the English language that begins with the respective letters.  
The lexical-pragmatic process of ad hoc concept construction is triggered and 
regulated by the principle of relevance, according to which hearers expect that the intended 
interpretation of an utterance will yield positive cognitive effects without extra processing 
effort. The broadening/narrowing takes place due to contextually constrained expectations of 
relevance. RT argues that it is the ad hoc concept constructed online and not the concept 
encoded by the word, which the hearer takes as a constituent of the explicature. It is therefore 
this ad hoc concept that contributes to the truth-conditional content of the utterance and which 
warrants the derivation of the intended implications (see Vega Moreno 2007). 
The adjustment process may be a spontaneous, one-off affair, involving the 
construction of an ‘ad hoc’ concept which is used once and then forgotten; or it may be 
regularly and frequently followed, by a few people or a group, until, over time, the resulting 
‘ad hoc’ concept may stabilize in a community and give rise to an extra lexicalized sense as 
witnessed by the use of coffee to mean ‘sex’ in the examples (9) and (11) above. Wilson and 
Sperber (2002: 247) note that stabilizing a word in the public language to encode such a 
concept involves coordinating cognitive dispositions in a community over time. The 
underlying lexical pragmatic processes endow underspecified words and expressions with 
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meaning in a particular utterance which gives rise not only to the construction of implicatures, 
but it can also be pragmatically enriched in order to get a full-fledged propositional form (or 
explicature in relevance-theoretic terms) 
In her research Vega Moreno (2007) shows that the more a word is broadened or 
narrowed in a particular way, the less effort it will cost to follow the same route in the future, 
and hence the more likely it is to be followed by hearers using the relevance-theoretic 
comprehension heuristic, according to which hearers (a) follow a path of least effort in 
constructing an interpretation of the utterance (and in particular in resolving ambiguities and 
referential indeterminacies, enriching or adjusting the encoded meaning, supplying contextual 
assumptions, deriving implicatures, etc.); (b) stop when their expectations of relevance are 
satisfied (or abandoned). William of Occam71 in the 14th century already thought that the 
lexical fixation of concepts is due to repetition of successful experiences of denomination. 
This observation, along with the fact that the intended concept is taken be part of the 
propositional content, has some important consequences for our analysis of euphemisms/PC. 
Following Vega Moreno’s (2007) proposal, repeated processing of the same lexical unit will 
result in considering roughly the same contextual assumptions, then following roughly the 
same inferential steps to enrich the explicit content with the ad hoc concept and deriving 
roughly the same sort of implications. These assumptions and computations may become 
increasingly salient to the hearer, directing his attention to a familiar inferential route, thereby 
minimizing the processing effort invested in interpreting the utterance. This may lead to the 
development of a kind of pragmatic routine, by following the same inferential routes that have 
been successful on previous occasions.  
When a euphemistic/PC expression become lexicalized, the ad hoc concept originally 
used to convey the speaker’s meaning may be added as an extra-meaning to that word’s 
lexical meaning. Repeated exposure to one particular broadening/narrowing of an encoded 
concept may result in the broader/narrower concept itself being stored in memory as a stable 
concept which the hearer may use thereafter as a shortcut to the construction of other one-off 
ad hoc concepts when interpreting further utterances. As we can see, stabilization of a lexical 
change originates from the semantic change related to construction of ad hoc concepts. 
                                                 
71 Modified Occam’s Razor is Grice’s principle that ‘senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity’ 
(Grice 1967/1989). 
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From the relevance-theoretic lexical pragmatic standpoint, the goal of some PC 
practices can be viewed as attempting to change the way such concepts as, for instance, 
DOCTOR, SURGEON, LAWYER, POET etc. are processed online by extending 
(broadening) their meaning, which has stereotypically defaulted to “white male”, by inviting 
inferences, which include non-white females (for instance, ASIAN FEMALE DOCTOR) by 
way of constructing a broader in denotation ad hoc concept DOCTOR*, the (prescribed) 
repeated use of which will enable its gradual lexicalization in discourse. 
Processing John is an African-American as a novel coinage will involve bringing 
together the encyclopedic entries for AFRICAN and AMERICAN and constructing a 
complex ad hoc concept AFRICAN-AMERICAN*. This will be a non-lexical ad hoc concept 
merely resembling the concept linguistically encoded in the propositional form of the 
utterance. The entry AFRICAN will constrain the information selected from the entry 
AMERICAN by influencing the accessibility ranking of the information in the AMERICAN 
entry. Hearers will activate their encyclopedic knowledge about Africa and culturally attribute 
the quintessential feature of this concept to the constructed ad hoc concept – the continent, 
where predominantly black people live, who at some point of history were brought to the 
continent of North America as slaves.  
This kind of “forced referencing” or “invited inferencing” arising on the fly in 
language use, which Traugott defines as a “cognitive <…> process by which pragmatic 
meanings come to be conventionalized and reanalyzed as semantic polysemies (Traugott 
2002: 1), may, in turn, metarepresentationally activate the frame containing terms initially 
used for slaves in the past, which will be attributed as a cultural property of the neologism. 
The presumption of relevance does not show hearers how to make such connections, 
however, it stimulates hearers to seek and construct them. 
The attributive ad hoc concepts generated by hearers in interpreting novel expressions, 
will later develop into a salient conceptual entry in their cognitive systems. In order to 
become such, the ad hoc concept relies on the activation of the salient conventionalized 
previously used terms, which are “copied” onto a new ad hoc concept and this generates extra 
rhetorical effects, not achieved by the use of the older term they were coined to replace. 
Following a path of least effort, hearers will start copying into the new concept logical and 
encyclopedic properties of the encoded concept until their expectations of relevance are 
satisfied, at which point they will stop.  Considering this, it is probably safe to assume that at 
the stage of a neologism, constructing the ad hoc concept AFRICAN-AMERICAN*, will 
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involve all the negative connotations, associated with the previously used biased expressions, 
which will be literally “dragged” onto the new PC term, thereby making it truth-conditionally 
equivalent with the dispreferred one.  
If we assume that the overall ‘idiomatic’ meaning of a particular PC or euphemistic 
expression is derived via decomposing its constituent parts, this can tell us much about the 
way their processing takes place. Interpreting a novel PC or a euphemistic expression such as 
collateral damage would involve metarepresenting and combining the meanings of civilian 
and deaths to derive the figurative interpretation. In this case collateral would be assigned the 
meaning of civilian and stored as such in cognitive systems of addressees and damage would 
be assigned the (new) meaning of death and stored as such as well. We can make a prediction 
that the reverse appears to be plausible, that is the word civilian would acquire a new meaning 
collateral and then be possibly applied as such in other collocations sometimes with the 
purpose of creating an ironic/humorous effect and the semantics of damage, which normally 
does not appear to include death, will be broadened so as to include this kind of ultimate 
damage as well. The entire expression collateral damage will thus be stored as a new 
semantic representation civilian death.  
If the extra cognitive effort resulting from the need for reinterpretation, invested in 
processing novel utterances is rewarded by a wide variety of cognitive effects (thereby 
rendering the novel utterance relevant), this may promote the stabilization of a new item in 
the hearer’s semantic memory.  According to Pilkington (2000), such effects are generated 
when certain contextual assumptions, made more salient through processing other utterances, 
guide the interpretation of figurative utterances: “The wider context causes certain 
assumptions within the encyclopedic entries that are explored to become more highly 
activated and, hence, makes them easier to process and use in the construction of further 
assumptions” (Pilkington 2000: 190). 
Papafragou (1996) notes that after being extensively used, an expression that has 
originated as a product of metonymic naming may begin to lose its former descriptive 
content. Consequently, it can gradually accept as its new descriptive content the 
referential content it has when used interpretively:  
“What the speakers initially did not endorse as a truthful description of a referent 
becomes the proper descriptive meaning of the expression and is registered in the 
lexicon. The empirical consequence of this is an increase in the accessibility of the 
referent, since the latter does not have to be computed any more but merely retrieved 
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from memory: the motivation of the whole phenomenon lies in referential cost-
efficiency. The derivational link can still be intuitively felt but it is as weak as that of 
dead metaphors: in both cases, immediate and standard effects are yielded by 
minimized processing effort” Papafragou (1996). 
It is possible to assume that upon hearing a novel expression, hearers immediately 
realize that the linguistically encoded meaning and the meaning communicated by the 
speaker’s use of this particular string of words differ and there are reasons why the speaker 
has not resorted to a familiar conventionalized term. Hearers will treat the whole string as a 
semantic unit (single concept) to which they are to assign some content (a token).  
Only after hearers start accessing this token automatically as a result of frequent use 
on numerous occasions, does the new euphemistic/PC neologism become a cognitively stable, 
salient and well-understood concept. With enough exposure, the partially understood concept 
may develop into a well-understood concept-type (as opposed to a temporary token), which 
may be stored in the hearer’s mental lexicon. Thus the meaning of the euphemistic/PC 
neologism is only recognized and understood because the salient target concept is listed and 
activated in the hearer’s mental lexicon. In other words, as the word becomes more and more 
entrenched through repeated usage, hearers will get more and more used to selecting 
particular encyclopedic assumptions in order to form ad-hoc concepts. 
According to the study by McGlone et al. (2006), the possible outcome of this process 
is twofold: either the newly entrenched word becomes ‘contaminated’ with all the taboo 
associations of the previously used dispreferred lexical units or it can acquire camouflage-like 
properties, making it hard to recognize the new lexical unit for what it really is, i.e. in its 
euphemistic functions.  
Many researchers argue that the taboo-induced need for language change leads to a 
continuous turnover in vocabulary and as a result of this, linguistic innovations which are the 
products of this language change can be thought of as having 'careers' in the vernacular (cf. 
Bowdle and Gentner 2005). By way of an example we can take the phrase juvenile 
delinquents which from 1950s had been used to refer to adolescent criminals and recently was 
replaced by the allegedly improved value-free label conduct-disordered youth. I now turn to 
the analysis of the inferential mechanics underlying such ‘careers’ of euphemisms.  
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9.2 Euphemism treadmill as semantic change  
In this section I analyze claims made in research literature to the effect that once 
euphemisms cease to be ambiguous, the euphemistic sense becomes their salient meaning and 
eventually they may become taboo terms themselves and as such, will be discarded by 
language users as dispreferred (e.g. Rawson 1995, Pinker 1997; Chamizo Domínguez 2009, 
Wałaszewska 2010). Such lexicalization of taboo connotations, allegedly, makes speakers 
continuously make up novel euphemisms in order to replace the terms, which have turned into 
taboos diachronically. Allan and Burridge (2006: 243) refer to this process as the Allan-
Burridge Law of Semantic Change72, according to which: “Economics has Gresham’s Law: 
‘Bad money drives out good’. Sociology has Knight’s Law: ‘Bad talk drives out good’. 
Linguistics has the Allan-Burridge Law of Semantic Change: “Bad connotations drive out 
good”.  
The Allan-Burridge Law of Semantic Change appears to be a restatement of 
observations previously made by researchers, since, as Hughes (2010: 18) observes, the 
founding figure of semantics Michel Bréal noted back in 1900 in his seminal work that words 
often “come to possess a disagreeable sense as a result of euphemism” Bréal (1900: 100). 
Jespersen similarly observed in 1905 the “usual destiny of euphemisms; in order to avoid the 
real name of what is thought indecent or improper, people use some innocent word”, which 
eventually ends up becoming “habitual in this sense it becomes just as objectionable as the 
word it has ousted and now is rejected in its turn” (Jespersen 1962: 230). This is, of course, an 
ironic outcome, since the intention of euphemism is precisely to avoid the “disagreeable 
sense”. The point is that euphemisms seldom remain euphemisms over time, but can become 
contaminated by association with what they seek to disguise.  
Among more recent mentions of this process are Rawson (1981: 4), who notes that 
“bad meanings or associations of words tend to drive competing ‘good’ meanings out of 
circulation” and Pinker (1994a, 1997), who refers to this process as ‘euphemism treadmill’ 
that ultimately wears out the term when it becomes ubiquitous in text and discourse (cf. also 
Allan and Burridge 1991, 2006). The “euphemism treadmill” refers to the process in which 
euphemistic neologisms acquire all the negative associations of the words they were coined to 
                                                 
72 Allan and Burridge (2006) name relative salience of taboo terms as the reason why languages 
abandon homonyms of taboo terms: “One possible explanation for the salience is that obscene vocabulary is 
stored and/or accessed differently in the brain from other vocabulary” (Allan & Burridge 2006: 37-41).  
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replace and this causes introduction of a serious of allegedly more preferable replacement 
units, e.g. crippled > handicapped  >  invalid >  disabled >  differently-abled >  physically 
challenged >  people with disabilities and people who use a wheelchair; idiotic > retarded > 
challenged > differently abled; old people > elderly people > senior citizens; poor countries 
> undeveloped > underdeveloped > the Third World > less developed > lesser developed > 
developing; garbage collector > sanitation engineer; janitor > environmental hygienist; 
insane asylum > mental hospital etc.  
Pinker (2002) observes that people invent new words for emotionally charged 
referents, but soon the euphemism becomes tainted by association, and a new word must be 
found, which soon acquires its own connotations, and so on. Pinker makes a very important 
observation that the euphemism treadmill demonstrates that it is concepts, not words, that are 
primary in people's minds: “Give a concept a new name, and the name becomes colored by 
the concept; the concept does not become freshened by the name, at least not for long. Names 
for minorities will continue to change as long as people have negative attitudes toward them. 
We will know that we have achieved mutual respect when the names stay put” (Pinker 2002: 
190-191). 
A similar sentiment is shared by Bolinger (1980) who argues that a euphemism is: 
“most apt to be noticed if it is new <…> The cultivation of euphemism to paper over 
unpleasant reality leads – when the reality is truly unpleasant – to long histories of synonyms 
each of which started off as a euphemism and then, by intimate association with the unloved 
thing that it named, ended up as a dysphemism <…> The downgrading is so regular that it 
invites a domino theory of euphemism: the fall of each term leads to the fall of the next, and 
in some areas of meaning we find an endless series of terms each of which had its day of 
innocence and then fell from grace <…> The effect on the language is not only to multiply 
synonyms for the disagreeable, but to spoil a lot of otherwise good words. Like bad coin, bad 
meanings drive out good. Not bad intrinsically, since meanings are neither bad nor good, but 
bad in the sense that what is referred to is felt to be bad; linguists call this process 
PEJORATION” Bolinger (1980: 73-74). 
The main function of euphemisms is generally agreed to be the formal softening of an 
axiologically disfavorable nomination and due to the formal nature of such a substitution it 
cannot fulfill its fig-leaf function for a long time. Novel euphemisms achieve relevance in 
discourse, in virtue of hearers’ being able to metarepresent the salient dispreferred alternative. 
This way of achieving relevance may potentially disappear over time and the expression can 
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take its full place in the considered language and then cease to be euphemistic: because of the 
increasing use, this expression may become simply the usual one, replacing the old one, 
which is then perceived as dysphemistic.  
The effect of this law is that many euphemisms become ‘contaminated’ over time, as 
the connotations reattach themselves and require a new euphemism to be found. Allan and 
Burridge (2006) illustrate the law by considering how the word insanity derived from Latin 
in-sanus ‘not-healthy’ and originally had a much broader domain, encompassing all bodily 
organs and their functions; but once pressed into euphemistic service, it quickly narrowed to 
mentally unsound.  
A similar observation is made by Allan and Burridge (2006) with reference to PC-
inspired language: “PC language tramps the same treadmill…African-American now replaces 
black which earlier replaced Negro73  and coloured. And so it goes on; if society's prejudices 
continue to bubble away, the negative connotations soon reattach themselves” (Allan and 
Burridge 2006: 89).  The most recent substitution of African- Americans for people of color as 
a preferred term by which to refer to this population group is highly questionable and is often 
ridiculed by members of this population group themselves. 
Generally speaking, the treadmill phenomenon does not apply exclusively to 
euphemisms, but appears to be a tendency of pragmatic adjustment of meaning expressivity in 
general. According to Meillet’s (1921 [1912]: 140) observation, for instance: “Languages 
<...> undergo a sort of spiral development: they add extra words to obtain an intensified 
expression; those words weaken, wear out and are reduced to the level of simple grammatical 
tools; new or different words are added for expressive purposes; the weakening process 
begins anew; and so on without end.” 
Euphemism treadmill represents the subjectification of meaning – a diachronic cline of 
semantic change74: propositional > interpersonal (expressive) or from less to more personal 
                                                 
73 The word ‘Negro’ is still used in the name of the educational organization “United Negro College 
Fund” http://www.uncf.org and in such word combinations as ‘Negro literature’ 
http://www.britannica.com/blackhistory/article-9399871 
74 I’m using Traugott’s interpretation of the notion of subjectification (see Traugott (1982), Traugott and 
Dasher (2002: 19–20), Traugott (2003a: 125), which is based on Halliday’s (see Halliday (1985: 36–37; Halliday 
and Hasan 1976: 26–27) classification of the functions of language: the logical/experiential, textual, and 
interpersonal (Traugott 1982: 247–248).The notion of subjectifiaction is found in research literature since early 
structuralist linguistics, see Bréal (1897). For a different interpretation of the notion see Langacker (1990, 1998, 
1999), Nuyts (2001), Verhagen (2005). 
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meanings that express speaker-attitude  (Traugott 1982: 253), where “more personal” is 
defined as “more anchored in the context of the speech act, particularly the speaker’s 
orientation to situation, text, and interpersonal relations” (Traugott 1982: 253).  
The discussion of mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of euphemism treadmill 
can be traced to Larin’s 1977 paper, where the author in analyzing how taboo topics change 
diachronically and how different they are in various social groups argues that for euphemisms 
to enjoy a lasting career, it is important that they have a well-known dysphemistic counterpart 
in that vernacular. His argument is that the loss of a rude or unacceptable equivalent drives 
the euphemism itself into the category of direct nominations and in that case a new substitute 
is required (Larin 1977: 110). Larin also noted that the more often a euphemism is used the 
quicker it loses its ameliorating capacity and the sooner it will require another euphemistic 
substitute for itself. This is tantamount to saying that abbreviations, new borrowings from 
other languages and words of foreign origin in general are the best possible candidates for 
having the most euphemistic potential.  
Neologisms coined through abbreviations and acronyms, however, are not immune to 
the contamination either. For example, «бомж» (bomzh), which started in Russian as a 
euphemistic abbreviation «без особого места жительства» (bez osobogo mesta zhitel’stva 
― without a specific place of residence) used to refer to a homeless person, with time turned 
into a derogatory term used to refer to this category of people. The term subsequently lost its 
euphemistic status and currently functions in Russian as a dysphemistic insulting term whose 
initial abbreviation meaning is not transparent to most speakers anymore.  
In this regard McGlone et al. (1994) point out that one’s beliefs and attitudes about 
words and phrases often depend more on their synchronic usage than the circumstances under 
which they were coined considering that the typical speaker is not a lexicographer and most 
speakers who refer to a ‘pay-your-own’ way lunch as Dutch treat without harboring any 
prejudice against the people of Holland are simply unaware that this idiom originated as an 
ethnic slur (see Siefring 2004). 
It is also possible to imagine the situations where words are ascribed euphemistic 
functions even when no such intention was demonstrated on the part of the speaker, simply 
because of their ‘foreignness’ and the capacity to trigger in hearer’s cognitive environment 
associations which are more positive than those triggered by the more familiar direct 
designation. 
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If euphemistic senses of a lexical unit tend to wear off due to frequency of its use, the 
question naturally arises: does such a euphemism simply “blend in” as unmarked in discourse 
or do negative connotations associated with the taboo it is trying to hide, reattach themselves 
in time and the continued marked status of such nomination in discourse makes it stand out 
and constantly draw attention to itself, thereby gradually transforming it into a taboo term and 
requiring that further substitutions be coined? 
According to the associative contamination hypothesis (see McGlone et al. 2006), a 
euphemism can stop fulfilling its euphemistic function once its meaning has become 
semanticized. Sometimes it is replaced by a new euphemism with the same denotational 
meaning which in its turn can acquire and become ‘contaminated’ with the negative 
connotations of the direct nomination of its tabooed or stigmatized referent, which it was 
coined to replace. According to this view, the more conventionalized a euphemism is the less 
likely it is to implement its euphemistic (or ‘face-saving’) function successfully. Many words 
suffer pejoration which often results from society’s perception of a word’s tainted denotation 
contaminating the word itself. The perceived contamination may have to do with, for instance, 
the unprestigious nature of some professions: оператор машинного доения (operator 
mashinnogo doyeniya – automatic milking operator) instead of доярка (doyarka – 
milkwoman), технический работник (technicheskiy rabotnik – technical worker) instead of 
уборщица (uborshchitsa – cleaning woman).  
McGlone et al. (2006) note that all accounts of associative contamination in 
euphemism imply that the ‘face value’ of a euphemism depreciates as it becomes 
conventional in discourse, and thus communicators’ perceptions of a euphemism’s politeness 
and its familiarity in the vernacular are negatively correlated. Familiarity is, on this view, the 
principal source of contamination that precipitates a euphemism’s fall into disfavor. 
Unfamiliar euphemisms should appear less contaminated than their familiar counterparts and 
thereby enjoy an advantage in politeness.  
In order for the euphemism to achieve its euphemistic purposes in discourse it must 
pass unnoticed similarly to the way true politeness passes unnoticed while impoliteness and 
over-politeness are noticed as deviations from the norm of (cooperative) communication. In 
this respect McGlone et al. (2006) note that even though conventionality may confer 
pragmatic stealth and mindlessness-inducing qualities to a euphemism, factors such as 
speaker status and prior message context also affect its discourse salience. 
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Apart from achieving unmarked status by aiming at maximum semantic generality, 
there is evidence indicating that the presence of cliché euphemistic expressions in discourse 
can trigger a rigid, “mindless” mode of information processing that favors stimulus 
generalization over discrimination and heuristic reasoning over deliberation (Burgoon and 
Langer 1995). The aim of resorting to such expressions can be regarded as attempting to keep 
hearer’s epistemic vigilance (Mascaro and Sperber 2009, Padilla Cruz 2012, 2013) dormant.  
According to McGlone et al. (2006) cliché euphemisms are processed in an 
inattentive, mindless fashion, which enables them to operate ‘under the radar’ in a way that 
less familiar euphemisms cannot. Their unmarked status in discourse makes them easy to both 
understand and overlook, and thereby limits the attributional penalty hearers might impose on 
a speaker who chooses to raise the topic.  
According to McGlone et al., (2006) the ‘associative contamination’ hypothesis is 
directly contradicted by the ‘camouflage hypothesis’, according to which conventionality only 
improves euphemistic potential of euphemisms and PC expressions. Indeed, if salience of 
euphemisms decreases as they become more and more conventionalized, the effort required 
for their processing will decrease substantially, enabling the addressees to process them in a 
mindless fashion. As a result, conventionalized unmarked euphemisms are more likely to be 
‘shallow-processed’ in discourse (cf. Allott 2006: 147ff).  
Similar to the way politeness conceived of as ‘politic behavior’ (Watts 2003) must 
have an unmarked status in discourse in order to fulfill its function (see section 6.2), McGlone 
et al. (2006) suggest that if a euphemism is to succeed in reducing the communicative 
discomfort associated with a distasteful topic, it is imperative that it not call undue attention to 
itself. The authors compare the success of euphemisms as a discourse strategy with the way 
camouflage succeeds in its military mission by rendering its subject as inconspicuous as 
possible in the surrounding context. The mindless shallow processing of a conventional 
euphemism can counteract the contamination it may have acquired from chronic association 
with its conceptual referent. 
According to Vega Moreno (2007) relevance-driven comprehension of utterances 
generally involves the selective and relatively shallow processing of available information, so 
that only those activated assumptions which are likely to contribute to the relevance of the 
utterance would be processed. Since hearers often arrive at a satisfactory interpretation after 
processing the words in a relatively shallow manner they may not need to consider further 
information made accessible by these words, their homonyms or the words that they are 
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composed of. The extra effort invested in exploring the internal composition of expressions 
like African-American is, on other possible occasions, like debates over the issues of political 
correctness, rewarded with extra effects, not generally derived in normal conversations (cf. 
distinction between controlled and automatic processing discussed in Vega Moreno 2007). 
Controlled processing is characterized as a slow, conscious and voluntary process which 
requires high levels of attention and a considerable amount of time and effort, while 
automatic processing is fast, involuntary, unconscious, effortless and requires little or no 
attention.  
The conventionalization of euphemisms may render them unmarked in discourse and 
they will no longer be felt to be euphemistic. However, as long as the corresponding reality 
remains status quo and the tabooed/stigmatized referent is in need of euphemization, other 
euphemisms will continuously be found or created by the speaker to replace the expression 
which is no longer felt to be euphemistic. This explains why political correctness can never be 
successful over a longer period of time (as long as the old prejudices and superstitions 
endure).  
Allan and Burridge consider the term “x-phemistic recycling” to be a more accurate  
reference to the “constant turnover of vocabulary for words denoting taboo concepts” (Allan 
and Burridge 2006: 243), as dysphemisms and orthophemisms are involved in the 
euphemization process as well which, for them, resembles more a cycle than a (tread)mill. I 
believe that regardless of whether PC can be equated with euphemisms or represents 
something quite similar, however differing in important aspects of its meaning and underlying 
motivation, the same ‘cycle’ that applies to euphemisms will also apply to PC expressions. In 
the hope that attitudes towards stigmatized population groups will change if language is 
reformed, new PC nominations continually replace the allegedly biased politically incorrect 
terms. Yet, the assumption that the new coinages will simply replace the old ones is too 
strong, because the new PC vocabulary is subject to the diachronic process of associative 
contamination leading to their subsequent recycling. 
A telling example of this process is the number of renamings of the currently named 
American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, discussed as a case in 
point by Halmari (2011). Its former name (before 2006) was The American Association on 
Mental Retardation. This was its fourth name during its 130-year history. Between 1933 and 
1987, the organization was called the American Association on Mental Deficiency. When it 
was founded in 1876, it was named the American Association of Medical Officers of 
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Institutions for Idiotic and Feebleminded Persons. In this instance, the premodified, concrete 
noun phrase (idiotic and feebleminded persons) came to be seen as offensive, and it was first 
replaced by an abstract nominalization mental deficiency. The word deficiency, having 
acquired too many negative connotations, was replaced by retardation, which again soon 
underwent the same process: a former euphemism had become a dysphemism. The most 
recently adopted name, including yet another abstract lexical euphemism, intellectual and 
developmental disabilities, is unlikely to last either. 
The word retarded coined as a euphemism for previously used terms like slow, simple 
and feeble-minded, allegedly due to it being of foreign origin and, therefore, not so easily 
decodable and free from negative connotations, very quickly became derogatory and started to 
be used as an insult synonymous with stupid/dumb, as in “This movie was retarded”, “Are 
you a retard?”. Interestingly, parallel to the various PC-inspired substitutes, e.g. intellectually-
challenged/impaired, special, differently-abled etc., it has prompted the appearance of the 
euphemistic replacement ‘the R-word’, e.g. “He called me the R-word” (see http://www.r-
word.org/). Scientific terms, coined as orthophemistic nominations of stigmatized referents, 
e.g. assessing the severity of intellectual disability: idiot (IQ of 0–20), imbecile (IQ of 21-50), 
moron (IQ of 51–70), as well as coitus (sexual intercourse), are also readily available for 
malign appropriation, as seen from the example (3), in which Penny declares “You’re just 
coitusing with me, aren’t you”. 
From the relevance-theoretical standpoint, attempts of employing euphemisms/PC 
with the purpose of framing some state of affairs in the world as positive, do not and cannot 
achieve this goal as efficiently as those who resort to them hope to, since hearers are able to 
efficiently infer the saliently unexpressed dispreferred content and see the referents of 
euphemistic/PC expression in their “true light”, by following interpretive strategies based on 
the principle of optimal relevance. In other words, if cognitively-challenged (or any other 
suggested PC substitute) is imposed as a replacement of retarded in an attempt to oust the 
latter out of use as politically-incorrect, there is no guarantee whatsoever that the new term 
will not be picked up as an insult and used in a sentence like “Are you, cognitively-
challenged?” or “The movie was cognitively-challenged”.  
Research by Wałaszewska (2010) shows that one of such lexical-pragmatic processes, 
namely conceptual narrowing, can be responsible for giving rise to euphemistic 
interpretations in discourse. The author aims to explain the regularity and unidirectionality of 
the processes uncovering what euphemisms were supposed to veil and resulting in the 
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euphemism treadmill, in terms of lexicalization of such narrowed ad hoc concepts involving 
transfer of some connotations (namely, negative taboo associations) from the encyclopedic 
entry of the lexicalized concept to its logical entry, where logical properties amounting to a 
proper definition of a concept are stored. Since the negative taboo associations are more 
salient than other associations transferred to the logical entry, the meaning of a word 
employed as a euphemism narrows to the taboo sense alone and thus the contaminated word 
becomes regarded as a taboo term.  
Wałaszewska (2010) illustrates this process by discussing that the ‘general for 
specific’ metonymy-based euphemism undertaker, which originally had an axiologically-
neutral meaning of “someone who undertakes odd jobs” and later started to be used in the 
narrower hyponymous euphemistic sense of “someone who undertakes to organize funerals”, 
the taboo associations, which need to be worked out by the hearer in contexts where the word 
is resorted to for euphemistic purposes, became stronger, more accessible and finally became 
lexicalized.  
The same process is noted by Allan and Burridge (2006) without recourse to 
relevance-theoretic explanatory tools:  
“English undertaker once referred to someone who undertakes to do things, i.e. an 
‘odd-job man’; it was used as a euphemism for the person taking care of funerals, a 
funeral undertaker. Like most ambiguous taboo terms, the meaning narrowed to the 
taboo sense alone, and is now replaced by the euphemism funeral director…The once 
euphemistic [going to the] toilet is fading from euphemism to orthophemism and is 
being superseded by the euphemisms bathroom or restroom in American and loo in 
spoken British and Australian… There is a wealth of evidence that where a language 
expression is ambiguous between a taboo sense and a non-taboo sense its meaning will 
narrow to the taboo sense alone. This perhaps explains why dysphemistic language is 
often referred to as strong language" (Allan and Burridge 2006: 37-41) 
The processing picture suggested in the thesis considers that on the one hand, as 
hearers people are hardwired, as a result of evolutionary adaptation, to process ostensive 
communicative behavior for relevance. On the other hand, communicators have certain 
expectations about the way language is normally used as witnessed by the use of euphemisms 
and PC expressions, which speakers resort to due to their presumed position on the positive 
end of the axiological x-phemistic axis, while avoiding other linguistic codes due to their 
presumed disfavorable meanings, which are expected to attract biased negative attention.  
Chapter 9. A lexical-pragmatic account of euphemism treadmill 
261 
 
While acknowledging the relevance-seeking nature of the particularized 
conversational implicatures (PCIs), derived by constructing hypotheses about the speaker-
intended meanings on the basis of manifest linguistic evidence and contextual assumptions, I 
suggest that the production and processing of euphemisms/PC expressions can take place in a 
heuristic-like manner along the lines of  fast and frugal principles suggested by Levinson for 
the derivation of automatic default meanings presumed in the absence of contextual 
information to the contrary. Combining the relevance-theoretic and the GCI-theoretic 
principles makes it possible to account for routinization of pragmatic inferences. 
Let’s consider predictions such a hybrid model would make in terms of cognitive 
inferential procedures involved in the local lexical-pragmatic processing of the expression 
‘terminological inexactitude’: 
If the utterance conforms to the hearer’s expectations about the way language is 
normally used, it will be presumed to be euphemistic by way of an I-GCI. The unmarked 
status will aid in “camouflaging” the disfavorable referents by obscuring negative 
connotations associated with the direct dispreferred nomination lie. Failure to metarepresent 
‘lie’ due to contextually lowered expectations of relevance can enable 
manipulation/disinformation to go through. If the utterance does not conform to hearer’s 
expectations about the way language is normally used, faced with a new signal, guided by the 
principle of relevance, the hearers will use their background encyclopedic assumptions in 
interpreting it and broaden INEXACTITUDE as part of explicature derivation to include that, 
which it is trying to conceal, namely, lie as a reference assignment necessary for 
compositionally fixing the truth-conditional content of ‘terminological inexactitude’. The ad 
hoc concept INEXACTITUDE* will be understood as some general (only partially-inferable) 
and abstract kind of ‘inexactitude’ and will not be equated with prototypical ‘lying’. The 
hearer may object to such an alleged mistaken concept-to-word mapping by publicly or 
privately metalinguistically correcting the perceived discrepancy between the two concepts 
INEXACTITUDE and LIE and declare: That’s not ‘inexactitude’, that’s lying!  
This metalinguistic mode of processing explains why and how, diachronically, 
euphemisms/PC expressions can become ‘contaminated’ with negative connotations 
associated with taboo topics, which can lead to their recycling in the vernacular or 
“euphemism treadmill”, as well as why political correctness is effective only when it is novel 
and hence capable of bringing people’s unconscious biases to consciousness.  
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This way of achieving relevance can become routinized relative to some context of use 
and the marked status of the utterance will, in Levinson’s terms, M-implicate a non-
prototypical form of lie (since the word lie itself has not actually been uttered) in an automatic 
manner in the absence of contextual information to the contrary. This GCI is cancellable, as 
the speaker can always (plausibly) deny having intended lie to be communicated. 
The defeasible nature of such inferences can be illustrated by the following example in 
which Winston Churchill uses the phrase ‘terminological inexactitude’ during the 1906 
election campaign in its literal sense of ‘inexact terminology’ rather than euphemistically 
meaning ‘lie’: 
The conditions of the transvaal ordinance ... cannot in the opinion of His Majesty's 
Government be classified as slavery; at least, that word in its full sense could not be applied 
without a risk of terminological inexactitude. 
With frequent use, the conventionalized pragmatic meanings can be reanalyzed as 
semantic meanings as “in the course of time inferences do become references” in language 
use (Bolinger 1971: 522).   
In addition to the GCIs, which are inferential routines with which a particular 
linguistic form can become associated due to being frequently used in a particular way, 
higher-level explicatures can be derived to the effect that the speaker is being 
euphemistic/indirect/misleading/deceptive in saying that P 
An array of relevance-seeking non-automatic strong and weak particularized 
conversational implicatures can also be derived depending on the context of utterance and the 
speaker’s intention underlying its use. The hearer may draw inferences that the speaker is 
endorsing the proposition expressed by the euphemistic form, expressing the attitude of moral 
disengagement towards the proposition expressed by the dispreferred form, regards lying as 
‘necessary evil’ and tries to cushion the blow.  
The following section considers the possible sources of the alleged associative 
contamination of euphemisms/PC. 
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9.3 The sources of associative contamination 
This section looks into the possibility of linking research findings in the area of 
negativity bias with the phenomenon of associative contamination of euphemisms to explain 
the mechanism underlying this process from the cognitive-pragmatic standpoint.  
Wałaszewska (2010) emphasizes that the repeated use of euphemistic expressions is 
not the only explanation of the fact that taboo associations typically grow so powerful as to 
cross the boundary between the encyclopedic and logical entries. In discussing the importance 
of relative salience of taboo concepts for this transfer of assumptions she quotes research by 
Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957) who discovered a general tendency for any derogatory 
or unfavorable connotation within a language expression to dominate the interpretation of its 
immediate context due to the much higher emotional effect their use produces, or as Allan and 
Burridge (2006: 244) put it, taboo sense are so salient that they will dominate or even 
suppress other sense of a language expression employed as a euphemism.  
Regarding the possible source of taboo contamination of euphemisms we can list 
evidence collected by Baumeister et al. (2001) from multiple areas including reactions to 
events, close relationships, social interactions in general, emotions, learning, neurological 
processes, child development, social support, information processing, memory, etc., according 
to which “bad is stronger than good”. The authors reason that the pattern is so pervasive that it 
cannot be maladaptive at the evolutionary level. They argue that bad is stronger than good 
because bad signals the need for change which generally enhances evolutional fitness. This 
idea of the negativity bias as an adaptively meaningful mechanism has been expressed by 
Pratto and John (1991) (among others). They argue that it is of evolutionary advantage that 
our attention is selective and is directed toward negative information. They consider this 
attention bias towards the bad an “automatic vigilance strategy”, i.e. a type of cognitive 
vigilance that directs us to pick up with more attention certain types of information which are 
essentially negative in the sense that they bear undesirable consequences; thus this particular 
cognitive vigilance driven towards handling negative information constitutes a kind of 
negativity heuristic or bias. 
A number of studies have noted various manifestations of the cognitive vigilance 
induced by the negativity bias. Zhuo (2007), for instance, shows that the lexical semantics of 
emotive intensifiers in German, English and Chinese can be best explained in a cognitive-
affective model of negativity bias. The author quotes empirical evidence confirming that the 
negativity bias is an automatic tendency to pay significantly more attention to unpleasant than 
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pleasant information. Negative events have, so to speak, a greater impact on people’s 
behavior than positive events.  The author concludes that threat-relevant negative emotions, 
including fear, anger and disgust, exercise greater power on our cognition and linguistic 
behavior: “Given the role played by emotions in selective attention, the negativity bias 
logically boils down to the asymmetrical entrenchment of emotions: threat-relevant negative 
emotions are more entrenched than positive emotions” (Zhuo 2007: 421). 
The negativity bias is about the special attention paid by humans to negativity on the 
occurrence of specific negative informational events. This goes, however, well with another 
feature of cognition which is about humans mostly focusing on ‘good things’ at a more 
general level (i.e. in the absence of negative specific informational events). This cognitive 
bias oriented towards the positive is manifest, again, in the use of language itself. Boucher 
and Osgood (1969) claim that there is a universal human tendency to use evaluatively positive 
words more frequently, diversely and facilely than evaluatively negative words or, as they put 
it more simply, that “humans tend to ‘look on (and talk about) the bright side of life.’” This 
hypothesis, which they named Polyanna hypothesis  after the 1913 novel Pollyanna by E.H. 
Porter describing a girl who always tries to find something to be glad about in every situation, 
has been echoed by subsequent research concerned with more specific asymmetries in the use 
of positive and negative words (Cooper and Ross 1975; Kelly 2000).  
Interestingly, the Polyanna effect does in fact provide an explanation for the general 
principles behind the pragmatics of euphemistic and politically correct communication. 
Crucially, the central mechanism underlying these verbal strategies is the avoidance of some 
dispreferred alternatives. That is, these positive strategies are based on the presupposition of 
the negativity of certain codes that are considered derogatory, offensive etc., and which as 
such are expected to attract biased negative attention. 
Speakers give preference to positive topics and to linguistic units with more positive 
connotations. In the sense that universally verbal choice is shaped by an awareness of 
wordrisks, to adopt Crystal’s (2006) concept, and a desire for auspiciousness, harmony and 
other things along similar lines, the Pollyanna effect, very much like the euphemism 
treadmill, is ultimately motivated by fear and avoidance of the negative, which amounts to 
saying that it is ultimately motivated pragmatically by the need to control the cognitive 
vigilance intervening in the processing of negative topics and words, that is the negativity 
bias. 
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Zhuo (2007) argues that while the Pollyanna effect does mean that humans tend to talk 
about the bright side of life, this is not the same as looking to the bright side of life. Positive 
words help us construct the bright side of life and protect us from the uncomfortable truth and 
we use positive words rather than negative words to stay out of trouble. On this risk 
avoidance view, our aversion to negative words in language use is best understood as being 
motivated by our instinctive vigilance towards potential threats. Therefore, Zhuo (2007) 
suggests that the positivity bias must be thought of as derivational from the negativity bias 
and inexplicable without reference to it. 
Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957) identify a general tendency for any derogatory 
or unfavorable connotation within a language expression to dominate the interpretation of its 
immediate context. Taboo senses are so salient in discourse that they will dominate or even 
suppress other senses of a language expression employed as a euphemism (Allan and 
Burridge 2006: 244). Wałaszewska (2010: 71) relates this phenomenon to the fact that the 
emotional impact of words fleshing out taboo concepts is much higher than that of words 
realizing non-taboo concepts: “The special nature of the taboo contamination process results 
from the nature of the taboo concept, whose associations pervade the meaning of the general, 
underspecified expression selected as a euphemism for that concept”.  Wałaszewska (2010: 
72) concludes that this way the axiologically-neutral, underspecified expression is narrowed 
to the taboo sense, whose psychological salience drives out positive implications beyond the 
boundaries of the logical or even encyclopedic entry.  
Conceptual narrowing, regarded by Wałaszewska’s (2010) as responsible for the 
construction of euphemistic meanings and euphemism treadmill, is not the only lexical-
pragmatic process, viewed in RT as responsible for the construction of ad hoc concepts. As 
the examples below show, euphemistic/PC interpretations can also arise as a result of 
conceptual broadening, i.e. by sense developments resulting in polysemy: 
(59) 
Renee: Why are you so uptight? 
Bree: Well, compared to you, a woman who paid for our drinks by showing off the 
Bronte sisters. 
Renee: The Bronte sisters? Geez, even your boob jokes are repressed.  
(“Desperate Housewives” Season 8 Episode 11) 
(60) 
Kate: How are you feeling? 
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Charlie: Sad. 
Kate: Do you want me to take you to Carlsbad Caverns (A National Park in New 
Mexico, USA – A.S.)? 
Charlie: Is that a euphemism for something else? 
Kate: Yes. 
Charlie: Then yes.  
(“Anger Management” Season 1 Episode 3) 
Wałaszewska’s (2010) seminal analysis of ‘general for specific’-based euphemisms 
from the point of view of relevance-theoretic lexical pragmatics covers cases where 
SOMETHING ELSE is narrowed to SOMETHING ELSE* meaning ‘sexual intercourse’, 
although it is highly doubtful that this particular substitution will ever become so lexicalized 
as to be subject to taboo contamination and euphemism treadmill. 
Wałaszewska’s analysis, however, does not cover the lexical pragmatic process of 
conceptual broadening and, therefore, could not be extended to, for instance, the case where 
THE BRONTE SISTERS in the example (59) and CARLSBAD CAVERNS in the example 
(60) are broadened to THE BRONTE SISTERS* and CARLSBAD CAVERNS* and acquire 
the emergent properties of ‘female reproductive organs’. 
It is tempting to make an assumption here that these particular euphemistic 
metaphorical interpretations come to life as a result of a very strong non-propositional 
imagistic component75 of its meaning, while its euphemistic nature allows for plausible 
deniability, i.e. the speaker can always deny having suggested sexual intercourse in the 
example (60). Kate uses “Carlsbad Caverns” to test whether Charlie is expecting this kind of 
innuendo from her. When Charlie readily interprets that expression as an illicit invitation to a 
sexual intercourse, he is still not sure whether his interpretation is correct, which prompts him 
to resort to a euphemism of his own something else in order to reserve some plausible 
deniability for himself. 
Comparing the cases of narrowing and broadening, a conclusion can be made to the 
effect that since broadening actually increases the number of weak explicatures derivable 
from the utterance containing a novel euphemistic locution, only the relevant assumptions 
from encyclopedic entries of ad hoc concepts formed as a result of narrowing the original 
                                                 
75 As previously discussed, Recanati (2004) suggests that the so-called primary pragmatic processes 
responsible for the derivation of explicit content of utterances or ‘what is said’ are of associative-imagistic nature 
rather than inferential. See also Carston (2010) and Wilson (2010).  
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lexicalized concept to its tabooed sense will carry over to their logical entries, thereby 
inviting the subsequent treadmill. 
As a consequence, the x-phemistic explicatures of ad hoc concepts formed as a result 
of broadening the original lexicalized concept will not become conventionalized and 
euphemisms formed this way are not subject to treadmill. Thus the repeated use of the Bronte 
sisters for breasts, or Carlsbad Caverns for female genitals, is not likely to result in the 
conventionalization of the polysemous euphemistic meaning. 
The assumption that only certain cases of euphemistic/PC use, namely interpretations 
derived as a result of narrowing the lexically encoded concept to the speaker-intended ad hoc 
concept, are subject to treadmill converges with the fact that many synonyms manage to 
coexist synchronically. It is striking, in particular, to notice, that many of the “chains of 
euphemisms” mentioned by Wałaszewska (2010: 66), e.g. the replacement of dysphemistic 
mad by crazy, insane, lunatic, mentally deranged and mental, simply do not reflect the true 
state of affairs in the English language. All the words from this chain, for example, 
successfully coexist synchronically in discourse and can be found in texts of many different 
stylistic registers. For example, “umad bro?” is a very popular current expression used in 
social media/online gaming communities to express strong feeling of dislike towards some 
piece of online communication. Additionally, there exist words and expressions, which 
endure for extended periods of time in their PC function as seen in the example of black used 
interchangeably with African-American in the media.  Encyclopedic entries of concepts 
contain subjective assumptions such as those connected with personal feeling evoked by the 
concepts. That’s why African-American is used interchangeably with black by some speakers, 
contrary to the associative contamination view of euphemism treadmill. Some speakers do not 
have any negative connotations attached to the lexeme black. 
It is interesting to note in this respect that the fact that the term ‘political correctness’ 
perseveres despite such associative contamination, points against the treadmill being an 
exceptionless rule applicable in all cases where negative connotations attach themselves to 
lexical units, thereby causing the need for subsequent onomasiological lexical change. 
The vast number of terms for toilet: lavatory, w.c., toilet, restroom, loo, little 
boys/girls room, cloakroom and euphemistic phrases for using it such as: powder one’s nose, 
pay a visit, freshen up and many more all seem to co-exist synchronically in the English 
language. It is also interesting to note in this respect that direct nominations of stigmatized 
referents endure unchanged in the vernacular far longer than their euphemistic counterparts 
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and are not subject to the process of treadmill the way euphemisms are. Chances for 
dysphemisms to be subject to some sort of treadmill are infinitesimal as, according to the 
OED, one of the strongest invectives in the English language, ‘cunt’, has endured in the 
language since 1230. 
Unlike PC proper, mock-PC expressions are not likely to be subject to the ‘treadmill’ 
either, as they don’t not mean (or invite inferences of) any dispreferred non-PC counterpart 
that required substitution and, therefore, will have nothing to be “associatively contaminated” 
with during the course of their career in a vernacular. Thus it is probably safe to assume that 
the suggested introduction of localized capacity deficiencies instead of traffic bottlenecks, will 
be interpreted as mock-PC and will not require that further substitutions be subsequently 
coined.  
The fact that many cooperative euphemisms endure in languages for a long time 
testifies in favor of camouflage hypothesis (see McGlone et al. 2006) and against the 
associative contamination one. Unlike the conventionalized cooperative euphemisms, the 
argumentative uncooperative euphemisms make use of any word or phrase and combines it in 
a particular way to convey the intended effect. I suggest that the euphemistic potential of 
expressions like, for example, friendly fire (accidental killing of one’s own troops) or surgical 
strikes (precise bomb attacks) hardly resides in the particular lexemes, but rather results from 
the paradoxical combination of a negative noun with a positive adjective: fire is a terrible 
thing, but qualifying it as ‘friendly’ makes it somewhat less dangerous or harmful, and 
describing bomb attacks as ‘surgical’ suggests that they are the necessary ‘bad thing’ to 
prevent a bigger evil. In expressions like these, less immediate and more reflective knowledge 
is required, if one wishes to understand their true implications. 
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Modern pragmatic theories agree on (actually built around) the fact that languages do 
not fully encode thoughts. They disagree however on the particulars of the processes 
responsible for bridging the gap between the meaning encoded in sentences by semantics and 
the meaning communicated by speakers uttering these sentences on particular occasions. They 
also disagree on what should count as explicitly and implicitly communicated meaning. 
In his seminal work on inferential communication, Grice viewed pragmatic 
contribution to the determination of what is said as only responsible for reference assignment, 
resolution of ambiguities and indexicals, leaving pragmatics mostly in charge of derivation of 
conversational implicatures. Grice’s views received subsequent revisions in both neo- and 
post-Gricean theories. Thus RT has reduced all the maxims of the CP to one overarching 
principle of relevance, questioned the cooperative nature of communication and the fact that 
speakers aim at maximum explicitness/literalness and showed that there is much more 
pragmatic intrusion into what is said than Grice had originally envisaged. Unlike RT, neo-
Griceans kept Grice’s distinction of conversational implicatures as generalized (going through 
unless there are contextual assumptions serving as evidence to the contrary) and particularized 
(going through only in specific contexts). 
The two views differ in that neo-Griceans suggest that there are default meanings 
associated with the use of certain linguistic forms, while RT acknowledges the existence of 
default contexts of interpretation whereby certain contextual assumptions become associated 
with the use of some locutions. The degree to which euphemistic/PC meanings of lexical units 
become conventionalized relative to the context of use is therefore an important factor in their 
production and interpretation. I have suggested that consistency of the proposition expressed 
by the utterance with background assumptions about reality and about the desirable states of 
affairs are also crucial factors determining whether the utterance will receive a 
euphemistic/politically correct interpretation.  
The theoretical significance of the approach presented here stems from the fact that it 
represents an attempt of combining theoretical insights from competing pragmatic theories to 
account for the phenomena of euphemization and political correctness. While RT is best 
equipped to explain the derivation of conscious explicatures and PCIs, which have to do with 
the recognition of speaker’s intention, Levinson’s GCI theory provides heuristics responsible 
for the derivation of the routinized automatic default inferences.  
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I have attempted to present further theoretical evidence against the charges of RT as 
being unable to account for such traditionally social aspects of communication as 
(im)politeness, face and x-phemisms/PC. In RT there is a claim that utterances are used not 
only to convey thoughts but to reveal speakers’ attitudes to, or relation to, the thoughts 
expressed; in other words, they express propositional attitudes, perform speech acts, or carry 
illocutionary force (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 10). From the sociolinguistic point of view, 
euphemisms certainly have to do with establishing and maintaining interpersonal 
relationships, what in the realm of sociolinguistics is referred to as ‘face-work’, and their use 
reflects the social aspect of communication. Their use, however, is cognitive-based since the 
recognition of a lexical unit as a euphemism presupposes knowledge of what it is used 
instead of or, in other words, knowledge of what could have been said otherwise but was not 
due to considerations of face. In communicative situations this easily accessible knowledge is 
used for cognitive online processing of discourse. Thus it can be considered that the 
sociolinguistic concept of face is in itself a cognitively-based notion. 
In the study euphemisms/PC expressions were regarded as representing a special kind 
of cross-varietal synonymy whereby the lexical units, dispreferred due to linguistic and socio-
cultural considerations, are replaced by the more preferred ones having identical descriptive 
denotational meaning, but differing in the expressive connotational one. It was suggested that, 
based on the preference for one expression over another, x-phemistic synonyms can generally 
be conceived of as located along an x-phemistic continuum (dysphemisms, orthophemisms 
and euphemisms) where the replacement of one term by the other does not change the truth-
value of the sentence containing it. These expressions differ in connotations due to differences 
in the way their production is framed. The use of collateral damage for civilian deaths, for 
instance, abstracts/backgrounds the loss of individual human lives. While black focuses on the 
skin color, African-American emphasizes the historical origin of this racial group as well as 
present citizenship. The ‘intensional’ meaning (as opposed to extensional) meaning of blacks 
is different from African-Americans as citizens of the USA of African descent.  
Contrary to Cameron’s (1995) opinion regarding the “insulation” and “disassociation” 
of hearers by resorting to euphemisms, from the point of view of their cognitive online 
processing, euphemistic use is not likely to have the intended “verbal hygiene” effect. Indeed, 
certain linguistic signs or “ostensive stimuli” produced by speakers can lead to making 
adverse inference about the type of the speaker and thus speakers have an incentive to alter 
what they say to avoid that inference to preserve their public self-image or “face”. When 
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speakers produce ostensive stimuli to convey their meaning (to avoid the adverse inferences), 
hearers are nevertheless able to invert the signals and infer the “true meaning” lurking behind 
one’s words.  
The study has determined that from the point of view of their production, lexical units 
– ostensive stimuli meant by speakers uttering them to receive euphemistic/PC interpretations, 
represent an attempt to frame the content of what is said in such a way so as to produce a 
specific perlocutionary effect of a ‘cushioned blow’, which can result in hearers drawing 
inferences to the effect that the speaker is being euphemistic/PC in saying that P, as well as 
potentially also leading to the hearer holding assumptions about speaker’s intentional 
evasiveness, manipulation and generally evoking the feeling of ‘not saying it all’. 
At the same time, from the point of view of their cognitive online interpretation, the 
propositional content framed in such a manner will inevitably be processed against the 
background of the cross-varietal dispreferred member of the x-phemistic adjacency set of 
synonyms, which could have been resorted to, but was not. Thus euphemistic/PC language 
use is fundamentally grounded in the metarepresentational ability that allows us to infer 
speaker meanings from encoded linguistic meanings. The mechanisms underlying the 
(distinct) linguistic phenomena of euphemization and political correctness can be explained 
by on-line contextual modulation of meanings due to pragmatic processes operating at the 
level of individual words. 
Linguistic meaning encoded in utterances containing locutions, which trigger 
euphemistic/PC interpretations in their audience, just like any other utterance, underdetermine 
speaker-intended meanings since languages do not fully encode thoughts. These 
interpretations constitute a specific euphemistic effect to the effect that the speaker is being 
indirect and is avoiding some stronger saliently dispreferred expression in saying that P. 
As an account of ostensive communication, Relevance Theory sheds light on the way 
the ‘saliently unexpressed proposition’ is metarepresented in the processing of utterances 
receiving euphemistic/PC interpretations due to the naturally-evolved relevance-seeking 
nature of human cognition and the presumption of optimal relevance carried by all utterances. 
The paradox of the situation is that people are constantly encouraged to reinforce the salience 
of dysphemistic/politically incorrect words and expressions on their minds, by the very 
establishment that insists that such verbal hygiene practices be undertaken. 
The choice not to resort to the salient dispreferred alternative explained by the 
‘abilities and preferences’ clause of the presumption of optimal relevance is very important 
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for the discussion of euphemisms/PC as it explains that speakers do not always produce 
utterances which would be the most relevant ones at that time to their addressees. Thus  
speakers can, on the one hand, be motivated by such considerations as politeness, negative 
and positive face-concerns and resort to conventionalized cooperative transparent lexical 
units, whose euphemistic meanings are listed as such in dictionaries and the desire to adhere 
to verbal practices collectively known as ‘political correctness’. On the other hand, the 
decision not to resort to the salient dispreferred alternative from the x-phemistic set of cross-
varietal synonyms, can be the result of the speaker harboring a hidden agenda to resort to 
novel uncooperative euphemisms, jargon and doublespeak for argumentative and 
manipulative purposes, i.e. concealing or distorting some state of affairs on account of their 
not being advantageous for the speaker.  
The relevance of euphemisms along with many of the ‘off-record’ communicative 
strategies, which are not meant literally, such as irony, sarcasm and hyperbole, lies in the fact 
that the speaker encourages the hearer to entertain a thought or proposition using 
encyclopedic information about their senses and contexts of occurrence. With respect to 
euphemistic/PC language, it appears that the dispreferred expressions, which the new 
language was coined to replace will inevitably be made mutually manifest along with other 
assumptions communicated by speakers during the recognition of the informative intention by 
hearers. These contextual assumptions can become conventionalized relative to some context 
of use.  
The capacity of a neologism to be ascribed a euphemistic/PC status is contingent on 
the discovery of the underlying veiled or concealed taboos and politically incorrect/biased 
expressions during the process of interpretation since the labeling of certain expressions as 
‘euphemistic’ or ‘PC’ carries the presupposition of the existence of dysphemistic and 
politically incorrect ones. The hearer must inevitably incorporate these presuppositions (e.g. 
mentally represent the politically incorrect expressions underlying the use of the novel terms) 
in order to arrive at the intended interpretations. In this, the use of euphemisms/PC 
expressions is not unlike ordering somebody not to think of big white elephants – while it is 
possible to incorporate selected elements by deliberately thinking of them, one cannot exclude 
the salient ‘features of the norm’ just as one cannot order someone not to think about 
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elephants76 (Kahneman and Miller 1986: 141) since “when we negate a frame, we evoke the 
frame” (Lakoff 2004). 
By resorting to a euphemism speakers show their attitude to the discourse subject and 
engage into a sort of mind-reading game as they try to predict or ‘metarepresent’ the sort of 
reaction mentioning a taboo subject or using a dysphemism will arouse in the hearer and thus 
attempts to avoid the negative emotional response by preemptively metarepresenting it. 
According to R. Giora (personal communication), there is experimental evidence that, 
ironically, for novel language to succeed, in the sense that people will start using it and 
adhering to it, the novel language must exploit evocation of the (salient) dispreferred 
representations it was coined to replace. This point is expressed in her Optimal Innovation 
hypothesis. 
The conclusion drawn here converges with the idea put forward by Carston regarding 
the lingering of the literal. Carston (2010) proposes processing of figurative expressions on 
two levels, whereby the literal meaning is held mentally on a metarepresentational level 
during the course of comprehension, with the function of informing the outcome of figurative 
interpretation. Similarly, in processing euphemisms the dispreferred expression must be held 
mentally (serves as a reference point) in order for an utterance to be able to receive a 
euphemistic interpretation. Carston refers to this as “the lingering of the literal” (Carston 
2010), a case of continuous activation of the literal meaning during processing, past the point 
of its contribution to the propositional meaning outcome as shown in a psycholinguistic study 
by Rubio Fernández (2008). Here the encoded meaning of a metaphorical expression is 
‘mentally held’ in front of the ‘inner eye’ and can thus accompany the proposition expressed 
without interfering at the explicit level.  
The very act of resorting to euphemisms/PC is evidence of the speaker’s desire to alter 
the hearer’s cognitive environment in such a way as to make strongly manifest to the hearer a 
new set of assumptions about, for example an event, a state of affairs, etc., which would 
normally be considered dispreferred, offensive, axiologically negative etc., framed as more 
positive than it really is, so that the hearers accept the new representation as true or possibly 
                                                 
76 Such an effect is explained by the theory of ironic processes of mental control (Wegner 1994, 2002): 
“The mind appears to search, unconsciously and automatically, for whatever thought, action, or emotion the 
person is trying to control. A part of the mind, in other words, is looking surreptitiously for the white bear even 
as we are trying not to think about it.” (Wegner 2002: 141) The theory suggests that this ironic monitoring 
process can actually create the mental contents for which it is searching. This is why the unwanted thought 
comes back to mind. 
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true. The speaker aims at getting the hearers to conceptualize of something in euphemistic 
terms, as more positive than it really is, thereby attempting to institute the desired resulting 
change of perspective on something, which the hearer can accept as true or probably true. 
Having reviewed the role of intentionality in the production of euphemisms, the study 
established that despite the view that utterances are interpreted as euphemistic/PC due to 
considerations to linguistic content, context and speaker intentionality, which stems from the 
RT model of processing, certain conventionalized lexical units are likely be interpreted as x-
phemistic in most contexts regardless of the speaker’s intention underlying their use, as the 
neo-Gricean view suggests. As a result, the x-phemistic values of some lexical units are 
established only in a special context, while the value of other units is always established 
unless a special context is present (cf. the appropriated use of slurs discussed in section 5.2.1). 
Clearly, if the latter weren’t the case, lexicographers who compile dictionaries of euphemisms 
and dysphemisms would have nothing to base their collections on, as there would be no 
possible way to ascribe a euphemistic/dysphemistic status to a word or an expression outside 
of the actual context of use.  
Assuming a pragmatic stance to the investigation made it possible to show how 
speakers invite hearers to draw inferences based on the linguistic evidence provided along 
with contextually available premises and existing background knowledge. It also provided an 
insight into what forms those inferences may take and what types of output they yield. In 
other words, the main focus of the analysis undertaken in this study has been the meaning-
making process itself.  
Embedding euphemisms within the scope of logical operator (negation, modals, 
counterfactuals) and propositional attitude operators shows that euphemistic meanings are 
part of what is said rather than what is implicated since conversational implicatures are not 
embeddable under logical and other operators (cf. Récanati 1989; 2003). 
(61) 
Peter believes there was collateral damage. 
Peter believes that civilians were killed during military operations. 
The content (truth values) of euphemistic assertions is not different in kind from their 
literal paraphrases. It is the manner in which they are presented that is different. 
Responses to euphemistic utterances containing metalinguistic negation indicated that 
expressive meanings are part of what is said. Metaphorical meaning of metaphor-based 
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euphemisms is also part of what is said, explicitly communicated content and can be denied 
directly: 
(62) 
Cf. also: He didn’t pass away, he died. 
Did he pass away? No he didn’t die. 
Was there collateral damage? No, civilians were not killed. 
In the example (62), it is the form that is denied by metalinguistic negation, not the 
content. At the same time, when speakers deny “There was no collateral damage” (or affirm 
“True, there was collateral damage”) they deny that civilians were killed, thus the expressive 
content can be regarded as part of what is said (truth conditional content) of utterances rather 
than what is implicated. The speaker cannot retort “That’s not what I said”. 
Attempting to gloss over some dispreferred expression with a new coinage does not 
guarantee that the new lexeme will become the newly established convention of language and 
use. In some cases new units very soon become contaminated with the taboo topic they refer 
to and thereby the process of euphemism treadmill will be launched. I have shown that from 
the relevance-theoretic standpoint, the likelihood of this process taking place is increased in 
cases of narrowing the lexicalized meaning of a concept to its taboo meaning while 
suggesting that the treadmill is less likely to happen in cases of conceptual broadening 
involving ad hoc concept construction. 
Euphemisms and PC expressions can be regarded as motivated by the economy of 
expression. However, at the same time they can be viewed as hampering conceptual access to 
the referent with the purpose of, for example moral distancing or disengagement where the 
hearer, guided by the principle of relevance, has to explore the activated frame in order to 
derive an array of weak implicatures in order to infer the saliently unexpressed dispreferred 
content. The use of some euphemisms can also “interfere with the order of accessibility of 
contextual assumptions to ensure that the hearer’s interpretation of a manipulative utterance 
only accesses a sub‐optimal set of contextual assumption, crucially preventing her from 
accessing a dissonant, although optimal, set” (see Maillat and Oswald 2009). 
The speaker may exploit the cognitive principle of relevance to manipulative predict 
what the hearer will make of his/her utterances. The speaker can metarepresent a non-
verbalized thought or proposition that she expects and intends the hearer to entertain in a 
certain communicative situation. By recognizing mental states of others, speakers may be able 
to predict, for instance, which stimulus is likely to attract attention of the hearer at a given 
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time, which background assumptions will be likely considered in processing the ostensive 
stimulus and which inferences will be derived. 
Manipulation can go through due to hearer’s inability to choose the dominating 
interpretation to focus on (civilians killed) and instead he deals with multiple weaker 
implicatures (some unspecified kind of DAMAGE* (physical, moral?) happened which was 
necessary and inevitable). Ad hoc concept DAMAGE* here is broadened to include killing 
(Merriam Webster’s definition of damage is loss or harm resulting from injury to person, 
property, or reputation) just as in the case of oxymoronic friendly fire (accidental shooting of 
own troops), two opposite interpretations of friendly and fire are blended into broader 
friendly* fire* - a misused concept - an empty metaphor or simulacrum with multiple possible 
interpretations which has no referent.  In friendly fire, FRIENDLY* is broadened to include 
DEADLY and therefore this constitutes a case of concept misuse or ‘glittering generalization’ 
– using words with positive connotations to denote axiologically disfavorable phenomena.  
Experimental work of Rubio Fernández (2007, 2008) points to the conclusion that no 
matter how powerful the context may be, there are some context-independent aspects of 
conceptual meaning that remain activated during interpretation. From the GCI-theoretic 
standpoint, dysphemisms are such aspects of meaning and will be inferred regardless of 
speakers’ intention by way of M-GCIs. 
From the relevance-theoretic standpoint, there is nothing special about the way 
euphemisms/PC are processed online. Just as it happens during online processing of any 
utterance, following the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, hearers will test the 
presumption of optimal relevance communicated by an utterance containing a euphemistic or 
politically correct word or expression, considering whether its most accessible interpretation 
achieves a level or relevance that satisfies his own expectations of relevance, i.e. enables him 
to obtain the maximum amount of contextual effects that offset the cognitive effort he has to 
invest.  In order to do so, the addressee will follow the path of least effort and expand her 
cognitive context against which the input is interpreted in various directions by including 
cultural metarepresentations manifest to him/her into the interpretation process – checking 
whether the proposition expressed by the utterance is consistent with her cultural/moral 
assumptions about reality and the desirable states of affairs. 
Thus proponents of collateral damage or friendly fire can be justified in their 
expectations that in processing these linguistic strings hearers will follow a path of least effort 
and infer sufficient meanings and implications that make a speaker’s utterance optimally 
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relevant for them. Following the path of least effort in deriving implications hearers will 
activate only some highly accessible assumptions from the encyclopedic entries of encoded 
concepts. The more familiar one is with an expression, as a result of it being conventionalized 
in a vernacular or due to it being salient on that particular individual’s mind, and the greater 
the contextual cues, the less processing effort will be needed to understand it. 
Thus the relevance of utteances containing euphemistic/PC words and expressions lies 
in communicating the attributed dispreferred content, as part of explicature derivation along 
with evoking a broad array of weak implicatures. The content of these implicatures can 
include reasons for choosing the particular linguistic form to communicate the meaning, i.e. 
referring to X by resorting to some alternative lexical form would be: biased, impolite, 
dysphemistic, politically incorrect or otherwise inappropriate. Along with this, hearers may 
derive higher-level explicatures to the effect that ‘the speaker is being 
indirect/euphemistic/polite/politically correct etc. in saying that P. 
Combining the relevance-theoretic and GCI-theoretic approaches, I suggest the 
following cognitively-based theoretical formulation of the euphemistic effect:   
We have a euphemistic effect whenever it is strongly mutually manifest to 
interlocutors that the main relevance of the utterance containing a linguistic form (trigger) is 
achieved by pragmatically adjusting the meaning encoded by the concept associated with this 
particular linguistic form to include the saliently unexpressed in the context of utterance 
dispreferred conceptual content P as part of explicature derivation. The locution is perceived 
to be euphemistic by way of an automatically derived I-GCI when it is unmarked in the 
context of utterance, which can result in its being processed in a shallow manner. An M-GCI 
to the complement of the I-GCI will be derived when the locution is perceived as marked in 
the context of utterance. The euphemistic locution-trigger interpretively echoes P as “non-
typical P” through an array of weak PCIs (thereby allowing for plausible deniability), while at 
the same time expressing the attitude of endorsement towards the proposition expressed by 
the utterance containing the euphemistic form. The derivation of P in the process of enriching 
the semantically underspecified content of utterances containing the locution-trigger subjects 
it to associative contamination resulting in subsequent euphemism treadmill. 
Given the right context, even such unlikely candidate as debate preparation can be 
interpreted as non-typical DEBATE PREPARATION*, contextually broadened to include 
sexual intercourse, as seen from the following example from “Totally Biased with W. Kamau 
Bell” (Season 1 Episode 8): 
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(63) 
Woman: I think the first lady did a great job of doing debate prep for the President. 
W. Kamau Bell: So I am right that the “debate prep” is a euphemism for a…? 
Woman: No-no-no-no-no-no-no…. 
Euphemisms/PC have to do with ‘how’ not ‘what’. They don’t constitute behavior, 
they are evaluations of behavior. Unlike metaphors, in euphemisms the speaker’s primary 
communicative purpose is to express her attitude. The focus is shifted from representing 
reality per se to the way reality is framed and the particular state of affairs is represented.  
From the above discussion it follows that conventionality can improve euphemism’s 
concealing capacity since the more conventionalized a euphemism is the less effort is required 
to process it. Conventionality leads to shallow processing of euphemisms in discourse. Less 
familiar euphemisms require more attention and processing effort and such mindful 
processing inevitably triggers the underlying dysphemisms.  
The use of novel euphemistic and politically correct language, paradoxically, 
reinforces the salience of dysphemisms or politically incorrect/biased language in the 
vernacular as the search for relevance inevitably evokes the dispreferred assumptions, which 
are part of the same frame as the preferred ones, as constituents of cognitive contexts 
constructed during the online processing of the novel ostensive stimuli.  
This doesn’t happen in cases of shallow processing of conventionalized euphemisms 
and pc-expressions due to contextually lowered expectations of relevance. In such cases the 
content of the representation formed by a hearer may lack some of the implications of the 
logical entries of the lexicalized concepts in the utterance (cf. Allott in Saussure 2005: 147ff).  
That is hearers may fail to identify the axiologically disfavorable denotation behind the 
euphemism, i.e. the corresponding implicature will not be derived. Thus conventionality may 
confer camouflage-like properties to euphemisms as the more conventionalized a euphemism 
is relative to some context, the less effort is required to process it. Less familiar euphemisms 
or conventionalized for some use but used outside of the context relative to which they are 
conventionalized can also succeed in hampering conceptual access to the disfavorable 
referents. However these euphemisms require more attention/processing effort and their 
mindful processing inevitably leads to the (public or private) metarepresentation of the 
underlying dysphemisms in search for an optimally relevant interpretation and this reinforces 
their salience in discourse.  
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For example, as ‘collateral damage’ becomes more conventionalized, its efficiency at 
camouflaging ‘death of civilians’ increases. In other words, the more marked a euphemism is 
in discourse the lower is its euphemistic potential (it is interpreted by way of Levinson’s M-
implicature). On the contrary the more the PC expression stands out, the better it performs its 
function of bringing people’s unconscious biases to consciousness.  
The goal of bringing people’s unconscious biases to consciousness cannot be limited 
to challenging salient biased expressions as it is achieved by replacing them and can only 
have a higher-order objective - disposing of these terms thereby stopping their effect on 
thought. The change in underlying social context and stance is a condition for salient 
meanings not to continue to be evoked.  
Euphemisms/PC become relevant to hearers when they are incompatible with hearer’s 
existing assumptions regarding some state of affairs. More generally, only when assumptions 
made manifest by the euphemistic utterance are incompatible with the mutually manifest 
assumptions, are euphemisms/P relevant. In other words, there is always a point of view in 
language, but we are apt to notice it only when it is not one we share (Cameron 1995: 73-74). 
I would like to conclude my discussion by succinctly summarizing the above analysis 
with a quote from a recent TED talk by an etymologist M. Forsyth (2012):  
“Reality changes words far more than words can ever change reality”.  
The account presented in the thesis can be extended by considering the sources of 
information that feeds the two types of pragmatic inference and the interation between them. 
In addition to strategies of indirectness reflecting the lexical choices individual speakers 
make, further research could consider cases of passivization, omission, nominalization as well 
as discursive indirectness, which may not necessarily make use of euphemistic/PC locutions.  
The thesis focused on euphemisms and PC-related language in the English-speaking 
discourse as instances of intralingual interpretive use. It would also be interesting to provide a 
relevance-theoretic account of the “interlingual interpretive use”, that is of translation of x-
phemisms (taboos, euphemisms, PC words and expressions as well as slurs) into different 
languages. 
Investigations of the nature of metaphoric and metonymic mappings responsible for 
the derivation of euphemistic and PC meanings, could benefit from combining relevance-
theoretic and cognitive linguistic approaches to account for the so-called emergent properties, 
following the recent trend pointed out by researchers working within the frameworks of the 
two theories (for example, Tendahl, Gibbs and Wilson). 
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